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This is a study of New Zealand’s retention and entrenchment of a 
neoliberal policy regime, focusing on the role played by international finance. 
The study examines the influence that international private financial markets 
and institutions exerted over the macroeconomic policy formulation of New 
Zealand governments during the period from 1994 to 2011. It is argued that the 
emergence of international private financial markets and New Zealand’s 
subsequent integration into these markets was instrumental in successive 
governments retaining and entrenching all of the core features of a neoliberal 
macroeconomic policy nexus. This includes, most prominently: a monetary 
policy regime focused on maintaining low, stable inflation; an independently 
floating foreign exchange regime; and a conservative fiscal policy oriented 
towards surplus-generation and public debt reduction. 
The study utilises a sophisticated neopluralist theoretical framework that 
also draws on neo-Marxist analyses developed in the field of international 
political economy. Within this theoretical framework, neopluralism identifies 
the key sources of business power within contemporary liberal democracies. 
Respectively, neo-Marxist international political economy identifies the major 
sources of the power of private financial capital within an increasingly inter-
connected global economic system. This theoretical approach provides a 
coherent and empirically-grounded explanation of the crucial role played by 
international private financial markets in successive New Zealand governments’ 
retention and entrenchment of all of the key features of the neoliberal 




A critical realist methodology is used to apply the theoretical framework 
deployed in this thesis. This entails the use of primarily, but not exclusively, 
qualitative data - such as historical company reports, official government policy 
statements, official statistics, and interviews with key actors involved in the 
process - to develop a robust analysis of the influence that international private 
financial markets exercised over macroeconomic policy formulation in New 
Zealand during the period from 1994 to 2011. This analysis highlights the causal 
significance of the political activities of individual human agents, while also 
identifying the broader underlying causal mechanisms that were at play. 
The central finding of this study is that the comprehensive programme of 
financial market liberalisation and financial sector deregulation implemented 
by the Fourth Labour Government between 1984 and 1990 effectively served to 
integrate New Zealand into the Dollar-Wall Street Regime. Comprising the 
current system governing contemporary international financial relations, the 
Dollar-Wall Street Regime accords a central role in public macroeconomic 
management to international private financial markets. The major political 
effects of New Zealand’s integration into the Dollar-Wall Street Regime during 
the period from 1994 to 2011 derived from a transformation of the underlying 
structural relationship between the state and internationally-mobile financial 
capital. This resulted in a curtailment of the operational autonomy of the state, 
the ability of citizen voters to exert democratic political influence, and, 
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In 2007, a mounting wave of defaults on loans in the US ‘subprime’ 
mortgage market triggered a Global Financial Crisis (GFC). After initially 
appearing largely unaffected by rapidly rising foreclosures in the US housing 
market, Wall Street was suddenly overwhelmed by bad debts. Indeed, by the 
end of the following year all of the major Wall Street investment banks - Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan, and Goldman Sachs - had 
either collapsed, undergone a forced merger, or had their regulatory status 
fundamentally revised. 1  The tumult on Wall Street rapidly proliferated 
throughout the global financial system. International credit markets, including 
the key inter-bank lending market, effectively became frozen, thereby 
engendering a global ‘credit crunch.’ Subsequently, the deep malaise affecting 
the global financial system spread to the rest of the global economy. The 
resulting economic downturn was by far the worst experienced since the Great 
Depression. 
The events surrounding the GFC and the ensuing global economic 
recession demonstrated the significant impact that developments in the 
international financial arena are capable of having on states and their 
formulation of public policy. In the immediate aftermath of the US ‘subprime’ 
crisis, for example, many states undertook substantive policy measures in order 
to prop up significantly weakened domestic financial systems. In the case of the 
                                                          
1
 D. Harvey 2010, The Enigma of Capital (London: Profile Books), 2. 
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UK and the US, this involved the provision of massive publicly funded bailouts 
of privately owned banks. For other states, such as New Zealand, it involved 
the implementation of new regulatory measures (such as increased minimum 
capital reserve requirements for banks) and the introduction of wholesale and 
retail deposit guarantee schemes. In addition, while many of the advanced 
capitalist economies sought to stave off recession via the introduction of large 
fiscal stimulus packages in 2009, New Zealand’s newly-elected Fifth National 
Government (FNG) found its own fiscal policy options considerably stymied. 
Due to the threat of a national credit rating downgrade, the FNG could 
introduce only modest expansionary fiscal measures in Budget 2009.2 
It is thus important that scholarly accounts of New Zealand’s political 
economy consider the influence that international private financial interests are 
capable of wielding over government policy formulation. Indeed, failure to do 
so ultimately renders such accounts incomplete. This reality is clearly 
acknowledged within the extant literature. From 1984 onwards, New Zealand 
underwent a major shift from social democratic Keynesianism to a radical 
brand of market-oriented neoliberalism. Since then, the hard core of this policy 
framework has been retained and entrenched by successive New Zealand 
governments. Existing explanatory accounts highlight a number of important 
underlying causes of New Zealand’s historic shift to, and subsequent retention 
and entrenchment of neoliberalism. Included amongst the identified causes is 
the key role played by international private financial capital. 
 
Existing Explanatory Accounts 
Prominent amongst existing explanatory accounts of the shift to a 
neoliberal policy framework in New Zealand are those based on either Marxist 
                                                          
2
 Despite its apparent fiscal moderation, the Fifth National Government’s operating deficit was 
nevertheless substantial. The Financial Statements of the Government of New Zealand reveal that the 
combination of significantly reduced revenues and increasing expenses resulted in a NZ$10.5 billion 
operating deficit for the year. See Treasury 2009, Budget 2009 (Wellington: Treasury), 6. 
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or neopluralist analyses. Possibly the most sophisticated Marxist account to 
date is that of Roper. 3  Roper’s explanation centres on four distinctive, but 
interrelated, components. First, the collapse of the ‘long boom’ and the 
subsequent onset of prolonged economic stagnation greatly increased the 
economic pressures on the state and, consequently, significantly increased the 
pressure on New Zealand governments to formulate public policy in the 
interests of business.4 Second, a shift in the balance of societal power in favour 
of business in the late 1970s and early 1980s occurred in part because 
“employers became increasingly industrially militant” and also more politically 
active. 5  Roper argues that this activism has since been primarily directed 
“towards lobbying successive governments” to maintain and extend “the 
neoliberal policy agenda.” 6  Third, the historical shift in the international 
economic orthodoxy from Keynesianism to neoliberalism in the mid-1970s 
influenced the shift in the societal balance of power between the working class 
and business in favour of the latter. It also “subsequently...provided the broad 
intellectual and ideological paradigm for policy making” in New Zealand.7 
Finally, the institutional structure of the state or, more specifically, “the 
strategic location of Treasury and the Reserve Bank”, the ‘unicameral’ 
parliamentary system, and the “institutional dominance” of cabinet, are seen to 
be important in explaining why neoliberalism was implemented so rapidly and 
comprehensively in New Zealand, and why the hard core of the neoliberal 
programme has subsequently been retained and entrenched.8 
                                                          
3
 B. Roper 2005b, Prosperity For All? Economic, Social, and Political Change in New Zealand Since 1935 
(Melbourne: Thompson, Dunmore Press). 
4











Roper subsequently elaborated on his explanatory account in work 
published separately. 9  A “central concern” of this additional work was to 
highlight that external “global forces” were also of considerable explanatory 
importance in relation to New Zealand’s historic shift in policy-making from 
Keynesianism to neoliberalism.10 External forces associated with international 
private financial capital figured prominently amongst those discussed. Indeed, 
according to Roper, one of the most important dimensions of contemporary 
‘globalisation’ is that which encompasses “the New Zealand financial system 
and its relationship to shifting patterns of global finance, foreign investment, 
and the size of public and private offshore debt.”11 However, for Roper, while 
“at a high level of generality it [was] possible to identify broad dimensions of 
the process of globalisation and its impact on New Zealand”, extensive 
additional research focusing on the impact of each of the various dimensions of 
the globalisation process on the historic shift in New Zealand politics from 
Keynesianism to neoliberalism was ultimately required.12 
Foremost amongst neopluralist explanatory accounts is that of Mulgan. 
To a significant extent, Mulgan’s account largely accords with that of Roper. 
The influence of Treasury, the role of business political activism, and the state of 
the economy are highlighted as important, as well as the underlying structure 
of government in New Zealand and the central position of cabinet within it.13 
Where Mulgan’s account differs significantly, however, is in its explicit 
acknowledgment of the role played by international private financial markets 
(IPFMs) in the entrenchment of neoliberalism. The structural constraint 
presented by a “fear of adverse market reaction” is cited, for example, as a key 
reason why substantive social democratic policies such as greatly increased 
                                                          
9
 Roper 2005a, “Globalisation and the Shift in Policy-Making from Keynesianism to Neoliberalism: The 
Decline of National and State Autonomy?”, in R. Patman and C. Rudd (eds.), Sovereignty Under Siege?: 
Globalisation and New Zealand (Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate). 
10
 Ibid, 20. 
11
 Ibid, 29. 
12
 Ibid, 30. 
13
 R. Mulgan 2004, Politics in New Zealand (Auckland: Auckland University Press), 142, 309-318. 
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“public expenditure on health and education” or significant wealth 
redistribution measures are “kept off the [political] agenda.”14 Mulgan observes 
that underpinning “the increasing political power of financial interests is the 
greater mobility of capital” that has resulted from “the process of financial 
deregulation...undertaken in the mid-1980s.” 15  Financial assets can now be 
moved rapidly in and out of the country and “such movement critically affects 
the value of the New Zealand dollar and also interest rates, both of which are 
key components of any government’s economic strategy.”16 As a result, Mulgan 
points out that IPFMs now represent a “central participant in government 
decision making in New Zealand.”17 
Alongside these distinctively Marxist and neopluralist explanations 
stand a number of other important accounts lacking any overt theoretical 
orientation. Most prominent amongst these are the accounts provided by Jesson 
(1999) and Kelsey (1999, 2015).18 Jesson openly states that he believes that it has 
been the spread of what he terms a “finance culture” within both the state and 
society that has primarily underpinned the shift to and subsequent 
entrenchment of neoliberalism in New Zealand.19 Jesson contends that as a 
result of the spread of this finance culture, any government that “seriously” 
attempts to revise the neoliberal policy framework will face immense 
opposition from the business elite and government bureaucracy.20 
Jesson locates the source of this new finance culture within the collapse 
of the post-war ‘Bretton Woods’ international monetary system (BWS) and the 
                                                          
14
 Ibid 314, 317. 
15
 Ibid, 317. 
16




 B. Jesson 1999, Only Their Purpose is Mad: The Money Men Takeover New Zealand (Palmerston North: 
Dunmore Press); J. Kelsey 1999, Reclaiming the Future (Auckland: Auckland University Press); 2015, The 
FIRE Economy (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books). It is important to note that, while not overtly 
stated, these analyses are nevertheless based on various theoretical assumptions. Jesson, for example, 
explicitly states (1999, 153) that he is a socialist, and thus his account can be characterised as broadly 
(but not strictly) Marxist in nature. 
19
 Jesson 1999, 39-40. 
20
 Ibid, 7-8, 16, 210-212. 
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massive increase in speculative financial activity this engendered.21 The collapse 
of the BWS is seen to have ultimately “magnified the power of...finance” within 
the New Zealand economy, which, in-turn, tipped the balance of societal power 
“decisively in favour of finance” and led to the “phenomenal” rise of a finance-
oriented business and bureaucratic elite in New Zealand.22 Jesson argues that 
this finance-elite “now dominates political discourse” within New Zealand’s 
political economy and thus presents a serious obstacle to any meaningful 
retrenchment of the neoliberal reforms.23 
In terms of their treatment of the role of international finance in 
cementing New Zealand’s shift to neoliberalism, Kelsey’s respective 
explanatory accounts are possibly the most sophisticated. In her 1999 work 
Reclaiming the Future, for example, she notes, that “perhaps the most powerful 
barrier to deviating from the free market path...is fear of how ‘the markets’ 
would respond.” 24  Kelsey locates the genesis of this important barrier to 
substantive retrenchment of neoliberalism in the breakdown of the BWS in the 
early 1970s.25 The shift to floating foreign exchange (FX) regimes, increased 
financial market deregulation, and financial ‘innovation’ resulting from the 
collapse of the BWS are seen to have led to the creation of “a 
predatory,...speculation-driven global financial system” that now poses “a 
major threat to [New Zealand’s] economic stability.”26 Kelsey argues that as a 
consequence of this major shift in the global economic environment, “the 
prospect of a downgrade in New Zealand’s credit rating” has emerged as a key 
“justification for keeping the neoliberal programme on track.”27 
Respectively, in her 2015 work, The FIRE Economy, Kelsey outlines how 
this significant barrier to the substantive retrenchment of neoliberalism has 
                                                          
21
 Ibid 46-59. 
22
 Ibid, 39, 46, 48. 
23
 Ibid, 58. 
24
 Kelsey 1999, 77. 
25
 Ibid, 145. 
26
 Ibid, 147, 153. 
27
 Ibid 77, 80-83. 
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been locked into place via a host of international free trade and investment 
agreements. New Zealand is bound by “the WTO’s Financial Services 
Agreement” (also known as the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS)), as well as “a raft of [other] commercial treaties”, states Kelsey.28 
Driven by powerful private US financial interests, these various “agreements 
apply to the broad spectrum of financial services – from banks, insurers and 
derivatives traders to credit-rating agencies and financial media – as well as 
cross-border flows of capital.” 29  Kelsey argues that a key function of these 
international financial services agreements has been to effectively constrict the 
“policy space” available for domestic financial regulation and control. 30 
Fundamentally, New Zealand governments are now, to a significant extent, 
legally precluded from implementing substantive revisions of the country’s 
highly liberalised regulatory regime. 31  As Kelsey observes, crucially, this 
includes regulation of the capital account; the ability of New Zealand 
governments “to control the volume or makeup of capital flows in and or out of 
[the] country” has been severely curtailed.32 As a result, the significant IPFM-
derived constraints faced by the state in New Zealand have been effectively 
embedded. 33  International financial capital is guaranteed a high degree of 
operational flexibility and kinetic freedom within the New Zealand economy, 
                                                          
28
 Kelsey 2015, 207, 209. 
29
 Ibid, 208. Kelsey cites US firms AIG, American Express, Citicorp, and Merrill Lynch as being especially 
influential in the establishment of so-called ‘trade in services’ agreements. This perspective is 
corroborated by former senior WTO official David Hartridge who publicly stated that “without the 
enormous pressure generated by the American financial services sector, particularly companies like 
American Express and Citicorp, there would have been no services agreement.” See D. Hartridge 1997, 
“What the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Can Do”, speech to the Clifford Chance 
Conference on “Opening Markets for Banking Worldwide: The WTO General Agreement on Trade in 
Services”, London, January 1997. 
30
 Kelsey 2015, 212. 
31
 As Kelsey explains, “the [WTO] financial services agreement” does contain “a prudential exception” 
which ostensibly enables signatory governments to implement limited regulatory measures if 
threatened by financial instability. However, the wording of the agreement is so vague that it is actually 
unclear “what it allows governments to do” in practical terms. See ibid 2015, 209-210. 
32
 Ibid, 222. 
33
 Ibid, 206. 
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thereby ensuring the ongoing reproduction of external financial disciplines on 
the broad spectrum of state policy formulation. 
 
The Approach of this Study 
This thesis extends these existing accounts by providing an original 
explanatory account focusing on the important (but sometimes 
underappreciated) role played by IPFMs in the retention and entrenchment of 
the neoliberal policy regime. Building on an earlier study published in 2010, 
this thesis investigates the major political implications of financial market 
liberalisation in New Zealand.34 It does this by undertaking a detailed historical 
exploration of the significant influence that IPFMs have exerted over the public 
policy formulation of successive governments. The focus of the investigation is 
limited in two important ways. First, while its overall scope is much broader, 
the main chronological focus of the investigation is on the period from 1994 to 
2011. That is, it is primarily concerned with the period after the major neoliberal 
reforms had been implemented (and the chief political architects had left 
government) up until and including the immediate aftermath of the GFC. 
Second, the principal focus of the investigation is on core macroeconomic policy; 
monetary, foreign exchange, and fiscal policy. This is because of its central 
importance in determining the overall shape of broader government policy 
agendas. Fundamentally, the way in which it is formulated has considerable 
bearing on virtually all other aspects of public policy. 
The investigation draws extensively on the rich body of literature 
published in the field of critical international political economy that examines 
the closely intertwined relationship between the global economic dominance of 
private international finance and the ongoing prevalence of neoliberalism. In 
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particular, it integrates the analysis developed by Peter Gowan in his seminal 
(1999) work, The Global Gamble. 35  Centrally, Gowan’s analysis contends that 
since the breakdown of the BWS in the early 1970s, international financial 
relations have operated under what he refers to as the ‘Dollar-Wall Street 
Regime’ (DWSR). Under the DWSR, extensive power in international monetary 
affairs is accorded to the US state. In addition, Wall Street-centred IPFMs play a 
core role in the public macroeconomic management of most governments 
around the world. 
This thesis develops a sophisticated neopluralist theoretical framework. 
This approach maintains that, due to the nature of the capitalist system of 
economic organisation, business interests possess a disproportionate capacity to 
exert influence over the modern liberal democratic state. It upholds that, in 
comparison to other societal interests, business generally has access to superior 
economic resources, enabling more effective engagement in the liberal 
democratic political process. More importantly, however, neopluralism also 
maintains that business possesses significant structural power, while also 
acknowledging that it is ultimately historically contingent and contested by 
other groups in society. 
A neopluralist theoretical framework offers a strong conceptual 
foundation on which to base the following empirical study of the relationship 
between internationally-mobile financial capital and the state in contemporary 
New Zealand. In particular, it provides a coherent, empirically-grounded way 
to explain the crucial role played by IPFMs in successive New Zealand 
governments’ retention and entrenchment of all of the key features of the 
neoliberal macroeconomic policy nexus. It also provides a rigorous analytical 
foundation on which to base a critical evaluation of the extant political 
arrangements that allow internationally-mobile financial capital to exert 
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significant influence over public macroeconomic policy formulation in New 
Zealand. 
This thesis adopts a critical realist methodology. Critical realism 
constitutes a distinct alternative to the naturalist and hermeneutical traditions 
that have traditionally dominated social scientific investigation. It refutes the 
methodological individualism associated with naturalist methods, which 
effectively reduces social scientific enquiry to an examination of the activity of 
individual human agents isolated from their discrete historical contexts. 
Simultaneously, it rejects the methodological holism that is characteristic of the 
hermeneutical tradition, which over-emphasises the causal significance of 
broad structural factors in determining historical outcomes, and also critically 
understates the importance of individual agents. Instead, the critical realist 
methodology employed in this thesis upholds the fundamental importance of 
considering both individual agency and the influence of broader social 
structures when explaining social and historical phenomena. 
Centrally, this thesis argues that the comprehensive programme of 
financial market liberalisation implemented by the Fourth Labour Government 
effectively served to integrate New Zealand into the DWSR. 36  Continued 
integration into the DWSR subsequently placed considerable constraints on the 
macroeconomic policy formulation of successive New Zealand governments 
throughout the period from 1984 to 2011. In particular, all of these governments, 
regardless of party composition or ideological orientation, faced significant 
implied pressure from IPFMs to closely adhere to all of the key features of the 
neoliberal macroeconomic policy regime. This included, most notably: a 
‘monetarist’ approach to monetary policy primarily aimed at maintaining low, 
stable levels of inflation; a freely-floating FX regime; and a conservative 
“surplus-driven, low debt” approach to fiscal policy.37 From this, the thesis 
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contends that the major political implication of financial market liberalisation in 
New Zealand has been a transformation of the underlying structural 
relationship between the state and internationally-mobile financial capital. It is 
argued that this development has refined the structural constraints on the state, 
resulting in a curtailment of both the operational autonomy of the state, and 
also of the ability of citizen voters to exert democratic political influence. 
 
Organisation of the Thesis 
The study is organised into seven chapters. Chapter One begins by 
delineating the key features of the critical realist methodology being used to 
apply the neopluralist theoretical framework developed in this thesis to the 
critical analysis of New Zealand’s retention of all of the key features of the 
neoliberal macroeconomic policy nexus. The chapter then outlines the 
underpinning neopluralist theoretical framework necessary in order to guide 
the following empirical and historical study. This entails an examination and 
critical assessment of the major theoretical perspectives that seek to explain 
business-state power relations in contemporary liberal democratic states. 
Through this process, I establish that a neopluralist theoretical perspective is the 
most useful to adopt for the empirical study that follows. The focus of Chapter 
Two is on the regime governing contemporary international monetary relations, 
Gowan’s DWSR. The chapter examines the underlying nature of globalisation, 
the structure and function of the DWSR, and how the DWSR became 
established. This latter issue specifically involves a detailed discussion of the 
global rise and spread of neoliberalism. Chapter Three describes how New 
Zealand became integrated into the DWSR through the neoliberal policy 
reforms implemented by the Fourth Labour Government during the period 
from 1984 to 1990. Subsequently, it outlines the major existing explanations of 
New Zealand’s historic shift to neoliberalism and suggests that additional 
causal factors should also be considered. Appendix A contains an expanded 
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account of New Zealand’s historic shift to neoliberalism, building on the 
existing explanations outlined in Chapter Three. 
Following Chapter Three, the focus of the thesis shifts. The principal 
subject of attention becomes the political effects of New Zealand’s integration 
into the DWSR. Chapter Four analyses these in relation to the Fourth National 
Government (in power from 1990 to 1999). The key features of the Fourth 
National Government’s fiscal austerity strategy are discussed in detail and then 
the key explanatory factors are considered. The DWSR is highlighted as an 
important factor driving both its initial implementation and its subsequent 
retention. Chapter Five outlines the so-called ‘Third Way’ approach to public 
policy making pursued by the Fifth Labour Government (FLG) during the 
period from 1999 to 2008. This involves a detailed examination of the core 
features of the FLG’s macroeconomic policy nexus – monetary policy, fiscal 
policy, and FX policy. In Chapter Six, the key constraints on the macroeconomic 
policy formulation of the FLG are examined. Particular attention is paid to the 
impact that integration into the DWSR had on the New Zealand state’s 
operational autonomy during the period from 1999 to 2008. This comprehensive 
account is subsequently used to discern the value that Gowan’s DWSR analysis 
provides for a neopluralist model of the New Zealand state. Chapter Seven 
corroborates the overall importance and explanatory power of this DWSR-
based analysis for our understanding of the operation of the New Zealand state 
during the neoliberal-era. It does this by examining the influential role played 
by IPFMs in determining the overall shape and scope of the FNG’s 









Towards a Critical Analysis of Business-State Relations 
 
Introduction 
Ongoing research into the nature of business-state power relations in 
modern liberal democratic societies highlights the need for theoretical models 
to account for the significant and inequitable political power that private 
financial capital derives from its dominant position in both the domestic and 
global economic systems. This is an important issue to study as it raises serious 
questions about how effective contemporary liberal democratic systems are at 
expressing the actual political will of an electorate due to the potential for 
interest groups based on financial capital interests to exert disproportionate 
influence over state policy formulation. This chapter will seek to examine and 
critically assess the key theoretical perspectives seeking to explain the power 
dynamics operating in modern liberal democratic political systems. These 
theoretical perspectives comprise classical pluralism and the main paradigms 
critical of classical pluralism; Marxism, the Neo-Weberian state-centred 
perspective, and neopluralism. Although each of these perspectives afford 
valuable insights into the power dynamics operating within the bounds of the 
modern liberal democratic state, neopluralism is the most useful to adopt for 
this study. 
The overall theoretical approach developed in this study combines 
neopluralism with some of the central theoretical insights of neo-Marxist critical 
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international political economy.1 Centrally, it draws on the work of Gowan, 
especially his influential Dollar-Wall Street Regime (DWSR) analysis developed 
in The Global Gamble. 2  It also draws extensively on the work of authors 
influenced by Gowan. This includes, most prominently, the analyses developed 
by Panitch and Gindin. 3  Within this theoretical framework, neopluralism 
identifies the key sources of business power within contemporary liberal 
democracies. Respectively, neo-Marxist international political economy 
identifies the major sources of the power of private financial capital within an 
increasingly inter-connected global economic system. Fundamentally, utilising 
a sophisticated neopluralist theoretical framework in conjunction with the 
central insights of critical international political economy enables us to explain 
why private financial capital holds such a powerful position (both domestically 
and globally) within the hegemonic neoliberal capitalist system. It also provides 
a rigorous conceptual framework on which to base a critical evaluation of the 
current political arrangements that allow financial capital to exert frequently 
dominant influence over government and public policy formulation. 
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1.1) Critical Realist Methodology 
In broad terms, Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism consists of two core 
elements. The first of these, termed ‘transcendental realism’, comprises 
Bhaskar’s philosophy of the natural sciences.4 As such, in isolation, it is not of 
central relevance to the methodology being developed for use in this thesis. 
However, as Toby Boraman observes, “’transcendental realism...provides the 
foundation for his philosophy for the social ‘sciences’.”5 Therefore, while it will 
not be accorded extensive treatment at this juncture, a brief sketch of the core 
features of Bhaskar’s transcendental realism will nevertheless be undertaken 
here. Principally, this will allow for a fuller understanding of the philosophical 
underpinnings of the social scientific methodology being deployed in the body 
of this thesis. 
As Andrew Collier observes, “no philosophy exists in a vacuum; there 
are always particular opposing philosophies which coexist in any historical 
period, and every philosophy engages, implicitly or explicitly, in controversy 
with its opponents.”6 Transcendental realism is no exception to this. It stands as 
a distinctly ‘middling’ philosophical course running between the comparatively 
polar competing theories of the natural sciences of ‘classical empiricism’ and 
‘idealism’.7  
Classical empiricism can be most effectively conceived of as entailing “a 
‘clean slate’ approach” to ontological thought.8 It upholds “a conception of 
people as passive sensors of given facts and recorders of their given constant 
conjunctions”, and a parallel contention that “knowledge can always be 
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5
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University Press), 1-23. 
8
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analysed in a purely individualistic way.”9 Respectively, and in stark contrast to 
classical empiricist perspectives, an idealist approach to the philosophy of 
science is based around an ontology contending that “the objects of scientific 
knowledge” are, ultimately, “a construction of the human mind.”10 In other 
words, they “are artificial constructs and though they may be independent of 
particular men, they are not independent of men or human activity in 
general.”11 
At heart, transcendental realism accepts the key classical empiricist 
contention that the world exists independently of human perception. 12 
However, simultaneously, transcendental realism categorically denies the 
classical empiricist contention that individuals have the ability to view the 
world objectively as entirely detached and impartial observers; it 
fundamentally objects to the notion that “the edifice of knowledge” can in any 
way have wholly “indubitable foundations” entirely “abstracted from any 
historical and social context.”13 The key problem, as Bhaskar points out, is that 
classical empiricism “never enquires for a moment into its [pre-existing] 
conditions... (In this it is irredeemably pre-critical)” and thus “amounts to a 
systematic repression of the fact that we learn from others how we learn from 
nature.”14 Classical empiricism quite simply fails to “recognise that what we 
experience is determined not just by what is there, but by what we have already 
learned.”15 
In contrast to classical empiricism, Bhaskar’s transcendental realism 
notices the necessarily subjective perceptions of human observers. It upholds 
that knowledge is fundamentally “a transient historical phenomenon” resulting 
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from a taught interpretation and thus also constitutes a more general social 
ideology.16 However, this is not to say that transcendental realism accepts the 
idealist assertion that subjective perception is the sole determinant of 
truth/knowledge. 17  Bhaskar argues that such a perspective would involve 
upholding what he terms the ‘epistemic fallacy’.18  
The epistemic fallacy is, in essence, the mistaken analysis of statements 
about being “in terms of statements about knowledge.” 19  This fallacy is 
symptomatic of a tacit conflation of the ‘intransitive’ and ‘transitive’ domains. 
The ‘intransitive domain’ consists of a space where, Bhaskar claims, “things in 
general exist and act independently of their descriptions.”20 Correspondingly, 
as Boraman outlines, “the ‘transitive domain’ refers to theories, models, 
paradigms and facts that seek to describe, measure and explain the material 
things and structures of the ‘intransitive domain’.” 21 In-effect, the failure to 
establish a clear division between these two realms leads to an explicit or 
implicit denial that “knowledge follows existence, in logic and time” and, as 
Bhaskar argues, “any philosophical position” that fails to recognise this has in-
fact “got things upside down.”22  
In opposition to idealism and its epistemic fallacy, for transcendental 
realism “it is not a necessary condition for the existence of the world that 
science occurs. But it is a necessary condition for the occurrence of science that 
the world exists and is of a certain type.”23 Thus, it can be seen, Bhaskar’s 
transcendental realism forms a sort of ‘hybrid’ school of thought containing key 
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elements derived from both classical empiricism and idealism.24 As Bhaskar 
summarises: 
 
It regards the objects of knowledge as the structures and 
mechanisms that generate phenomena; and the knowledge as 
produced in the social activity of science. These objects are neither 
phenomena (empiricism) nor human constructs imposed upon 
phenomena (idealism), but real structures which endure and 
operate independently of our knowledge, our experience and the 
conditions which allow us access to them.25 
 
As noted above, this transcendental realist philosophy of the natural sciences 
forms the basis of his respective philosophy for the social sciences.26  Indeed, as 
Andrew Collier observes, Bhaskar’s philosophy of the social sciences ultimately 
“refers to [Bhaskar’s] development of the possible implications of 
transcendental realism for the human sciences.”27 This philosophy, forming the 
second (and, for the purposes of this thesis, more important) core element of 
Bhaskar’s critical realism, is entitled ‘critical naturalism’. 
The history of the philosophy of the social sciences has been dominated 
by two main, polarised epistemological and ontological positions.28 At one end 
of the spectrum, a dominant ‘naturalist’ (or ‘realist positivist’) tradition has 
argued for a virtual “unity of method between the natural and social 
sciences.”29 According to this school of thought both the natural and human 
sciences are considered to concord with a positivist model of science, which 
sees science as “value-free, atomistic, [and] discovering causal laws of a 
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“constant conjunction” model (whenever A happens, B happens).”30 As a result, 
those subscribing to such a perspective argue that social science should 
primarily function to isolate objective causal laws capable of being expressed in 
the form of “universal statements” of a constant conjunction type.31 
In diametric opposition to this ‘naturalist’ tradition is an anti-naturalist 
‘hermeneutical’ tradition.32 The hermeneutical tradition centrally upholds “an 
absolute contrast between the science of the physical non-human world of 
nature and the science of the [social] world of mind, of culture, and of 
history.”33 As Bhaskar observes, followers of a hermeneutic philosophy of the 
social sciences usually accept the positivist explanation of the natural sciences 
or “at least its implicit ontology”. 34  However, the hermeneutic tradition 
contends that the nature of the subject matter (that is, social realities) precludes 
the discovery of causal explanations in the social sciences. Consequently, 
subscribers to a hermeneutic school of thought uphold that the results of social 
science are instead, by necessity, “non causal and often tied to the views of the 
people being studied.”35 
Bhaskar’s critical naturalism stands as a distinct alternative to both of 
these dominant traditions within the philosophy of the social sciences. At its 
heart stands a rejection of what is perceived to be the problematic shared 
ontology of the positivist and hermeneutic schools of thought; the assumption 
of a ‘constant conjunction’ model of the natural sciences.36 As Collier outlines, 
Bhaskar’s critical naturalism argues “that natural laws should be expressed not 
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as constant conjunctions...but as tendencies,” and that “this applies even to the 
most rigorous and basic laws of nature.” 37 It follows from this that critical 
naturalists maintain that social science should not look for strict regularities but 
instead look for tendencies and that “these tendencies (contra the hermeneutic 
philosophers) are causal.”38 
It is fundamentally on this basis that critical naturalists agree with the 
basic underlying view of a naturalist philosophy of the social sciences, “insofar 
as it argues for the possibility of an explanatory social science (that is, a social 
science whose basic goals are similar to the natural sciences).” 39  It is also 
fundamentally on this basis that critical naturalists categorically reject the 
hermeneutic claim of “a radical division between the methodology of the social 
and the natural sciences.”40 Critical naturalism, however, stands as a ‘tempered’ 
or ‘qualified’ version of naturalism.41 More specifically, it upholds a number of 
important “limits on the possibility of naturalism” that derive from inherent 
characteristics of the social world that are perceived to restrict the efficacy of the 
methods of the natural sciences when applied to the study of society.42 The 
various sets of limits on naturalism delineated by Bhaskar are characterised as 
‘epistemological’, ‘relational’, and ‘ontological’ respectively.43 
The principle epistemological limit on naturalism derives from the fact 
that “the objects of social scientific enquiry...only ever manifest themselves in 
open systems.”44 The central implication of this inherent impossibility of closed 
systems for social scientific methodology is that the social sciences are 
prevented, in principle, from being able to “shut off the effects of processes 
which are not being tested in order to isolate and test a single mechanism” and, 
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as a result, they are “denied... decisive test situations for their theories.” 45 
According to Bhaskar, this ultimately requires “that the criteria for 
the...development...of theories in social science cannot be the discovery” of 
causal laws of a constant conjunction-type. Instead, the criteria can only be the 
discovery of tendencies that must by necessity be purely “explanatory and non-
predictive.”46 
The principle relational limit on naturalism is that the social sciences are 
in essence internal to their subject matter. “They are themselves an aspect of, 
and causal agent in, what they seek to explain.”47 This subject-object relational 
condition contrasts directly with the natural sciences where, as Bhaskar 
observes, “in general...the objects of knowledge exist and act independently of 
the process of the production of the knowledge of which they are the objects.”48 
The methodological significance of this is that the process of knowledge 
production in the social sciences is characterised by an in-built “hermeneutic 
dimension” that Bhaskar terms “causal interdependency.”49 This refers to the fact 
that the objects of social scientific enquiry “may be causally affected by social 
science and in some cases not exist independently of it”, and, conversely, the 
social sciences themselves may be conditioned by developments in wider 
society.50 It is to be observed, however, that for Bhaskar (in contradistinction to 
hermeneutic schools of thought) such causal interdependency does not enervate 
the underlying transcendental realist assertion of the object’s existential 
intransivity.51 The existential intransivity of an object is maintained as an a priori 
“condition of any investigation” applying uniformly to both the social and 
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natural sciences, but the “categorical properties” of the objects under study are 
seen to qualitatively differ between the social and natural sciences. That the 
social sciences “are themselves an aspect of, and causal agent in”, the objects 
they seek to explain is one such key qualitative difference.52 
The principle ontological limits on naturalism derive from “the activity-, 
concept-, and space-time-dependence of social structures.”53 To quote Bhaskar 
at length, critical naturalists contend that: 
1. Social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist 
independently of the activities they govern. 
2. Social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist 
independently of the agents’ conceptions of what they are 
doing in their activity. 
3. Social structures, unlike natural structures, may be only 
relatively enduring (so that the tendencies they ground 
may not be universal in the sense of space-time invariant).54 
As a result of these apparent specificities of social structures, critical naturalists 
suggest that the study of social structures is unlikely to result in the uncovering 
of universal laws of causality, but rather only to succeed in exposing temporary 
causal tendencies.55 
The key social scientific theory that operationalises the methodological 
insights provided by a critical naturalist philosophy of the social sciences is 
Bhaskar’s Transformative Model of Social Activity (TMSA).56 In The Possibility of 
Naturalism, Bhaskar argues that philosophical conceptions of society have 
tended to be divided along lines of being either broadly individualist or 
collectivist.57 As Bhaskar details, “methodological individualism is the doctrine 
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that facts about societies, and social phenomena generally, are to be explained 
solely in terms of facts about individuals.”58 Bhaskar identifies the work of 
Popper, Watkins, and Weber most closely with this tradition.59 Respectively, a 
collectivist conception of society (which Bhaskar associates most closely with 
the work of sociologist Emile Durkheim) upholds that fundamentally “the ideas 
and practices of individuals are determined by society.”60 Stylised conceptions 
of these two polar views of society are presented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 below. 
Through his TMSA, Bhaskar seeks to synthesise these broader conceptions of 
society.61 
 
Figure 1.1) ‘Voluntarism’ 
 
Source: Bhaskar 1998, 40. 
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Figure 1.2) ‘Reification’ 
 
Source: Bhaskar 1998, 40. 
Centrally, the critical realist TMSA acknowledges a limited degree of 
validity for each of the individualist and collectivist conceptions of society. Each 
conception is observed, for example, to derive “plausibility from the fact that it 
seems to touch on an important truth.” 62  However, both conceptions are 
simultaneously observed to be fundamentally problematic. Methodological 
individualism, for instance, is seen to entail an excessive measure of 
voluntarism and social atomism that quite obviously understates the 
methodological importance of the material social conditions that routinely 
impede the free, independent action of individuals. Correspondingly, the 
methodological holism of the collectivist conception of society is seen to involve 
overt ‘reification’ or a simplistic socio-structural determinism that neglects the 
reality of human agency.63 
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Bhaskar’s synthesised TMSA seeks to avoid both the excessive 
voluntarism and the excessive reification of its predecessors. Following Marx, it 
does this by developing a unique relational conception of society.64 A relational 
conception of society constitutes an understanding of the social world as 
“essentially consisting in or depending upon [enduring and persistent] 
relations.”65 As Collier explains, according to the TMSA’s relational conception of 
society, “there have to be two distinct kinds of being: social institutions that 
pre-exist the agent and are independent of him or her, and an intentional agent 
whose action presupposes and makes use of those institutions but is not 
explained by them.” 66  However, under the TMSA, individual agents and 
societies are simultaneously observed to be related in several key ways. First, 
society is considered to be “entirely the effect of human actions.”67 It effectively 
constitutes “an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions which 
individuals reproduce or transform, but which would not exist unless they did 
so.”68 Second, “every human action presupposes society with its relations and 
institutions as a condition of its possibility”; and third, “human intentional 
activity, in addition to producing (when successful) what is intended, 
reproduces [and/or transforms] society (usually unintentionally).” 69 It (social 
reproduction and/transformation) is fundamentally “an achievement, a skilled 
accomplishment of active subjects, not a mechanical consequent of antecedent 
conditions.”70 A stylised representation of the TMSA as a conception of society 
is presented in Figure 1.3 below. 
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Figure 1.3) The Transformational Model of Social Activity 
 
Source: Bhaskar 1998, 46. 
In this way, the TMSA effectively resolves “the division between society 
and the individual, and between structure and agency.” 71  It allows the 
possibility of avoiding both the simple reduction of individual agents to social 
effects characteristic of methodological holism, and the simple reduction of 
society to the activity of individual human agents that is characteristic of 
methodological individualism. 72  Moreover, as a direct consequence of its 
stressing of what Bhaskar terms “material continuity”, the TMSA is also capable 
of upholding a strong notion of social transformation.73 Not only do the actions 
of individual human agents serve to reproduce social structures and relations, 
the TMSA, in essence, also entails that the actions of these same discrete agents 
are ultimately capable of the fundamental transformation of the existing social 
structures and relations that underpin contemporary society. 74  As Bhaskar 
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observes, neither of the previously discussed methodological stereotypes, nor 
Berger and Pullberg’s ‘dialectical’ conception of society, are genuinely capable 
of recognising and conceptualising this possibility.75 
As the adopted methodological approach, Bhaskar’s critical realism and 
the TMSA make a number of important contributions to this thesis. The first of 
these is an emphasis on the development of specifically historical explanations. 
Centrally, and in contrast to the competing holistic and individualist 
methodologies outlined previously, Bhaskar’s TMSA allows the possibility of 
examining both individual agents and social structures as causes when 
developing possible social scientific explanations. This aspect of Bhaskar’s 
‘explanatory schemata’ is primarily a reflection of the TMSA’s cognisance of the 
ultimate complexity of social reality. “At any given moment, there is always a 
structured complex of intra- and interrelated entities: actors, actions, rules, 
resources, practices and social systems” operating in the social world and “any 
outcome is typically codetermined by the numerous parts of a complex.”76 
However, in addition to recognising their overarching complexity, the 
TMSA also recognises the previously discussed chief ‘epistemological limit’ 
placed on the naturalist conception of social science; that social systems are 
inherently open. As Patomaki observes, “firstly, the relationship between the 
causal complexes and those of its external conditions is typically not constant; 
and, secondly, change and qualitative variation in the objects possessing causal 
powers – including social actors – are ubiquitous.” 77  As a consequence, in 
addition to emphasising the importance of considering both human agency and 
social structures when developing social scientific explanations, the adoption of 
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the TMSA also emphasises the importance of analyising causes in their 
historical context. This means, for example, that in order to produce an 
adequate account explaining the ‘re-emergence’ of global financial markets 
following the collapse of Bretton Woods in this thesis, I will be required to take 
into account several overlapping factors. I will have to consider not only the 
important role played by the particular imperial aspirations of the US state and 
capital (and to a lesser extent the supporting aspirations of the UK state and 
capital), but also how the historic re-emergence of global financial markets 
related to the onset of a major crisis of global capitalism and the coincidental 
rise and rapid geographic spread of global neoliberalism.78 
The second important methodological contribution made by Bhaskar’s 
critical realism and the TMSA is an emphasis on the inherent ‘non-neutrality’ of 
explanations in social scientific enquiry. This emphasis on non-neutrality stems 
from the fact that, as previously shown, “social structure and human agency are 
existentially interdependent.”79 Social structure is considered to be “both [an] 
ever-present condition and continually reproduced outcome” of praxis (human 
activity), while human activity is upheld as being “both... (normally conscious) 
production, and (normally unconscious) reproduction of...society.” 80  Such a 
view implicitly entails that social scientific endeavour is, by nature, normally 
conscious work undertaken by a human agent all the time mediated by 
underlying material social conditions. In other words, “social science always 
only happens in a context which is at once always understood, 
preconceptualised, and codetermined” by a complexity of both praxian and 
structural factors.81 It is fundamentally for this reason that the social scientific 
enquiries contained within this thesis are 
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Necessarily non-neutral; that they are intrinsically critical (both of 
beliefs and their objects) and self-critical; that accounts of social 
reality are not only value-impregnated but value-impregnating, 
not only practically-imbued but practically imbuing; and that in 
particular they both causally motivate and logically entail 
evaluative and practical judgments ceteris parabis.82 
 
As Patomaki observes, ultimately, “the [methodological] point” of this notion of 
inherent ‘non-neutrality’ in social scientific explanations is to require the 
construction of “explanatory models more systematically and reflectively.”83 In 
practical terms, this means that the neopluralist theoretical framework 
developed in this thesis will act to mould the nature of the particular historical 
facts presented and discussed throughout this thesis. However, these same 
historical facts will, in-turn, also potentially feedback into the deployed 
theoretical framework in order to inform it, or even promote its alteration.84 So, 
for example, while neopluralism will guide this study in its endeavour to 
uncover the policy constraints imposed on the Fifth Labour and Fifth National 
Governments by highly mobile international financial capital, the same 
empirical evidence assembled to expose these major international financial 
constraints will simultaneously serve to expose previously unperceived gaps in 
the guiding neopluralist framework. 
However, Patomaki also observes that as part of the process of 
constructing systematic and reflective explanations, “different possible...causal 
hypotheses” must be articulated, and that the related process of eliminating 
weaker hypotheses requires significant empirical work.85 This view is founded 
on the basic critical realist ‘RRRE’ “scheme of explanation in open systems” set 
out by Bhaskar in The Possibility of Naturalism.86 The key features of this are 
outlined in Table 1.1 below. 
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Table 1.1) Bhaskar’s Four-Phase ‘RRRE’ Schema for Practical 
Explanation in Open Systems 
 
Resolution The resolution of a complex event into its 
components (causal analysis). 
Redescription The redescription of component causes in 
terms of idealisations, abstractions, and 
appropriate categories of social ontology. 
Retrodiction The retrodiction to possible (antecedent) 
causes of components via independently 
validated normic statements. 
Elimination The systematic interpretive empirical 
assessment of these hypotheses, together 
with the elimination of the weaker 
hypotheses. 
Sources: Bhaskar 1998, 129; Patomaki 2003, 208. 
As Patomaki notes, ultimately, both quantitative and qualitative 
empirical data can be employed for the purposes of the final elimination phase 
of explanation in open systems. “Quantitative data”, for example, “may be 
indispensable...in deriving research problems and estimating how common 
structures and tendencies are.”87 Ontologically, however, “given the contextual 
nature of efficient causes (= reasons for actions) – and the ubiquity of qualitative 
change and variation”, Patomaki argues that qualitative evidence must be 
primary.88 Fundamentally, it is “qualitative languages and methods [that] are 
needed to identify relevant structures and causal powers, and to show how and 
why objects possess these causal powers.” 89  Consequently, in addition to 
constructing explanations more systematically and reflectively, the TMSA’s 
contribution of a notion of non-neutrality also entails that qualitative data will 
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serve as the dominant factor in determining the strength of prospective causal 
hypotheses in this thesis. So, for example, when developing my own account of 
the historical shift to neoliberalism in New Zealand alongside those that already 
exist, I will mainly rely on qualitative primary materials such as historical 
company reports, official government policy statements, and interviews with 
key actors involved in the process as my key sources of empirical data. 
A further important methodological contribution made by Bhaskar’s 
TMSA is the lending of an ‘emancipatory impulse’ to the explanation 
developed in this thesis. As Bhaskar outlines in his work Reclaiming Reality, 
‘emancipation’ is to be conceived here as: 
Paradigmatically, a process of structural transformation – as a 
transformation in structures rather than a marginal adjustment of 
states of affairs and as a transformation to other (needed, wanted 
and empowering) structures rather than to a realm which 
magically escapes determination. Associated with this is a notion 
of freedom as consisting not merely in decreased restrictions, nor 
merely in these plus enhanced capacities under existing 
structures, but in emancipation from those unnecessary, 
undesired and oppressive (including exploitive) structures of 
power, domination and distorted need recognition, opportunity 
and communication.90 
 
Underpinning the ‘emancipatory impulse’ lent to this thesis is Bhaskar’s 
contention that social science, in addition to possessing an obvious explanatory 
function, also has “a necessarily evaluative function, entailing critical value 
judgments.”91 This contention is based on the fact that critical evaluation is a 
vital precondition of producing sufficiently robust explanations of social 
institutions. As Sayer observes, “social science must be critical of its object. In 
order to be able to explain and understand social phenomena we have to 
evaluate them critically.”92 As Patomaki details, when a proposed “explanatory 
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model can be extended to also explain [the competing account] T and its 
reproduction, both conditions for social criticism are fulfilled: the critical 
condition (‘T is an inferior account’) and the explanatory condition (‘T can be 
explained).”93 Bhaskar argues that when both these explanatory and critical 
functions of social science have been fulfilled, and that it has been 
acknowledged that (due to the previously discussed inherent non-neutrality of 
social scientific explanations) “truth is a normative notion” in the social 
sciences, the possibility that explanatory social theory can be “intrinsically 
emancipatory” is implied.94 
Moreover, Bhaskar also argues that beyond the mere possibility of an 
‘emancipatory impulse’, in some particular circumstances, critical social 
scientific explanation necessarily implies emancipation.95 In order to illustrate 
Bhaskar’s point, Collier, a prominent proponent of critical realism, provides 
several examples of ‘false belief.’ These include the classic neoliberal notion that 
‘fecklessness’ causes unemployment and, drawing on Marx’s account of the 
wage form, the ideology that under the capitalist wage system, wages constitute 
payment for labour. 96  In the latter case, Collier argues that the apparent 
prevalence of this belief within contemporary advanced capitalist societies can 
be explained by the fact that “not only does the institution of wage-labour cause 
false beliefs about itself, it also protects itself from the wrath of the workers by 
this illusion. To expose this, Collier continues, “is to criticise the wage system”, 
and, ultimately, also to instigate opposition to it.97 The essential contention is, 
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then, that once individuals are made aware of underlying structures of 
oppression, they will naturally pursue their transformation.98 
Fundamentally, by lending it an ‘emancipatory impulse’, the adoption of 
the critical realist TMSA “enables the making of inferences from explanation to 
criticism and transformations explicit” in this thesis. 99  As Collier outlines, 
Bhaskar’s TMSA allows this thesis to generate a concrete emancipatory project 
“by showing there to be (a) a need, (b) some obstacle preventing its satisfaction, 
and (c) some means of removing this obstacle.”100 In specific terms, this means 
that this thesis seeks to develop an explanatory critique of New Zealand’s 
contemporary liberal democratic political system. It contends that, perhaps 
contrary to popular perception, substantive democracy is significantly 
(although not entirely) curtailed under current political economic conditions, 
and that integration into the US-dominated global financial nexus known as the 
Dollar-Wall Street Regime (DWSR) is a major factor contributing to this. 
Ultimately, it proposes that a fundamental alteration of the current 
arrangements governing international monetary relations that establishes a 
rigorous, collaborative Keynesian-style system of capital and exchange controls 
in support of financing real economic activity is the key means of removing this 
obstacle to substantive liberal democracy. 
The final important contribution made by critical realism to this thesis is 
that it enables one to navigate the major intellectual rift between objectivism 
and subjectivism in social scientific methodology. 101  On the basis of their 
transcendental realist philosophy of the natural sciences, for critical realists 
there can exist no objective universal truth beyond temporal bounds that can 
                                                          
98
 Boraman, 103. 
99
 Patomaki 2003, 215. 
100
 Collier 1994, 183. 
101
  As Boraman observes (105), “numerous attempts” have been made to surmount this “polarity” 
between objectivism and subjectivism. See, in particular, P. Abrams 1980, “History, Sociology, Historical 
Sociology”, Past & Present, 87, 3-16; R. Bernstein 1983, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, 
Hermeneutics and Praxis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
Critical Realism and Neopluralism 34 
 
assert the superiority of one explanation over a contender.102 Critical realism 
instead “entails the acceptance of...the principle of epistemic relativity, which 
states that all beliefs are socially produced, so that all knowledge is transient, 
and neither truth-values nor criteria of rationality exist outside historic time.”103 
As Bhaskar outlines, this subsequently entails the rejection of the epistemic 
absolutism of objectivist methodologies. However, this does not mean that 
critical realists support the adoption of an undifferentiated intellectual 
eclecticism either; critical realism also simultaneously rejects the subjectivist 
doctrine of judgmental relativism, which maintains that all beliefs are equally 
valid, in the sense that there can be no rational grounds for preferring one to 
another.”104 
Critical realists aver that, in terms of determining the salience of one 
explanation over another, theories can in-fact be “hierarchically ranked.”105 As 
Outhwaite argues, for example, “we can say a theory is better than another if it 
explains (under its descriptions) most of what the second theory explains 
(under its descriptions) plus some further things which are not explained by the 
second theory.”106 Consequently, when explaining the retention and extension 
of the neoliberal policy framework by the Fourth National Government during 
the period from 1990 to 1999 (Chapter Four), a review of the most potent 
explanatory accounts developed to date will first be undertaken. Only after this 
has been completed will an alternative explanation (acknowledging and 
integrating the most important aspects of the previous explanations) be posited. 
Similarly, when seeking to determine the extent to which the DWSR 
constrained the macroeconomic policy formulation of the Fifth Labour 
Government (FLG) during the period from 1999 to 2008 (Chapter Six), a section 
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outlining the prevailing political context and its resulting constraints on the 
FLG will precede my own detailed explanation accounting for the role of the 
DWSR. 
Thus, a critical realist methodology will be employed to apply the 
theoretical framework developed in this thesis. But which theoretical approach 
should be adopted to guide the following empirical and historical study? 
Determining this is the primary focus of the remainder of this chapter. Several 
main competing theoretical perspectives seek to explain the power dynamics 
operating in modern liberal democratic political systems. Classical pluralist 
approaches are probably the most commonly adopted in studies of New 
Zealand’s contemporary political economy. 107  Therefore, classical pluralism 
makes an appropriate point of departure for our discussion. 
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1.2) Classical Pluralism 
Classical pluralism is a theoretical model of the state that conceptualises 
representative democracy as comprising “an ‘ideal type’ of democracy in which 
political equality is maximised.”108 It fundamentally upholds that citizens in 
contemporary liberal democracies are able to effectively exert influence over 
government or, in other words, that functional polyarchy prevails.109 Classical 
pluralist analyses of power relations within nation states emerged and 
coalesced into a relatively coherent school of thought during the 1950s and 
1960s. The work of authors such as Dahl and Truman was particularly 
prominent and influential.110 The classical pluralist model of the state is now 
widely considered to constitute a relatively naïve conception of power relations 
within advanced capitalist societies. “Even the most sophisticated models of 
pluralism” are seen to be lacking sufficiently robust explanatory power in 
relation to public policy outcomes.111 Despite this, however, classical pluralism 
remains steadfast in its position as the dominant perspective pertaining to 
analyses of government decision-making in contemporary New Zealand.112 As 
Roper observes, “much writing on interest group influence on public policy in 
New Zealand continues to be doggedly committed to a broadly classical 
pluralist…orientation.”113 Consequently, the key features of classical pluralism 
will be outlined here. This will enable a critical assessment of whether or not it 
comprises a robust theoretical model capable of effectively guiding an analysis 
of the influence that international financial markets exert over government 
macroeconomic policy formulation in New Zealand. 
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According to the relatively unsophisticated version of classical pluralism 
that, historically, has tended to dominate studies of New Zealand politics, the 
state in capitalist society essentially “acts as a neutral arbiter of societal 
conflict.” 114  As Dunleavy and O’Leary elaborate, the state is regarded as a 
largely “passive vehicle through which inputs are processed. The state 
resembles a weathervane. It simply mirrors or responds to the balance of 
pressure group forces in civil society.” 115  It is important that the classical 
pluralist conception of state neutrality is properly understood. While they are 
often inaccurately characterised as upholding such a relatively crude 
conception of state neutrality, pluralists do not generally consider the state to 
constitute an essentially timeless, “mainly inert [recipient] of pressure from 
interest groups.”116 Instead, the classical pluralist neutral state is responsive - 
both in terms of policy output and structure - to the pressures exerted on it.117 
Thus, as Smith observes, “the [‘neutral’] state for pluralists is in a Poulantzian 
sense the condensation of groups’ forces. It does not hold the ring but reflects 
the pressures on it.”118 
The essence of the classical pluralist theoretical model is consequently 
relatively straight forward. Centrally, the political process in contemporary 
liberal democracies is considered to involve the demos freely interacting with the 
state to express a variety of demands. 119  The state, erstwhile conceived as 
essentially comprising a collection of neutral institutions which are highly 
responsive to the myriad political pressures exerted on them, responds to this 
plurality of democratic influences via the formulation of public policy.120 As 
Dunleavy and O’Leary observe, pluralists do not maintain that citizens have the 
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capacity to “directly control policy-making in polyarchies.”121 Such capacity is 
deemed to be effectively precluded by the size of modern nation-states. 122 
Instead, pluralists articulate four major channels of influence through which the 
citizen body exercises power over the state policy-making apparatus.123 
The primary channel through which citizens are deemed to exercise 
power in liberal democracies is the parliamentary system whereby the citizen 
body exercises ultimate discretionary power in the political sphere by 
periodically determining the formation of party-based governments.124 Largely 
“undeferential citizens” are seen to independently appraise the existing 
government’s performance and weigh it against alternative “personalities, 
parties, and policy packages.”125 Free elections are subsequently held at regular 
intervals through which the citizens select a preferred political leadership that 
is “temporarily entrusted with state power.” 126  Between elections, pluralists 
maintain that a high level of party competition in parliament, combined with a 
strong inherent motivation to retain power, effectively constrains the governing 
party’s scope for autonomous action. 127  As a result, governments in 
contemporary liberal democracies closely adhere to a programme of public 
policy that genuinely reflects the expressed preferences of the electorate.128 
The interest group system is also considered to be especially important. 
Indeed, as Smith observes, “most pluralists would ascribe a central role to 
pressure groups in the political process.”129 Pluralists conceive of the interest 
group system as consisting of a multitude of competing “semi-public or private 
groups” freely organised within civil society. 130  The size, number, and 
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sophistication of these groups are historically dynamic. Some of these groups 
are effectively permanent and extremely well resourced (such as business 
associations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), while others are 
comparatively “ephemeral”, forming and dissolving in response to specific 
policy issues (anti-Iraq War protest groups, for example). 131  However, as 
Mulgan observes, they all share a uniformity of purpose. “Their function is to 
articulate the interests which their members share on particular areas or 
questions of government policy, and to attempt to influence government in 
their direction.”132 Ultimately, citizens in contemporary liberal democracies are 
seen as exerting significant continuous influence over government via the 
interest group system.133 Thus, for pluralists, public policy is not only explained 
by the outcome of episodic elections and party competition in parliament, but 
also by the [government’s] steady appeasement of small groups.134 
It is crucial to observe that, for pluralists, the interest group system 
fundamentally operates as a “level playing field.” 135  As encapsulated by 
Dunleavy and O’Leary, “the system is permeable, capable of being penetrated 
by any group which can build up its size, mobilise its members, and motivate 
them to express strong feelings.” 136  Pluralists acknowledge that groups 
representing business interests generally occupy a “favoured position” in the 
interest group system.137 Superior resources deriving from their constituents 
position within the economy logically translates into more effective engagement 
with the state policy-making apparatus.138 Thus, despite the contrary claims of 
many of their critics, sophisticated pluralists do acknowledge an explicit link 
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between economic and political power.139 However, pluralists maintain that, in 
contemporary liberal democracies, the relative power of business is effectively 
curtailed by strong “countervailing” influences. 140  For pluralists, powerful 
interest groups are usually (eventually) matched by rival groups representing 
competing interests. Where no such ‘counter-groups’ emerge, powerful 
countervailing influences are still considered to exist in the form of “potential 
groups.”141 As Smith elaborates, according to pluralists, “people have multiple 
membership of unorganised groups.”142 Fundamentally, these “are groups with 
shared interests but which do not actually become organised.”143 Due to their 
previously mentioned assumed inherent desire to achieve re-election, political 
leaders take account of the interests of both these organised and potential 
counter-groups largely to the same extent that they take account of the interests 
of powerful organised groups.144 Thus, for pluralists, powerful countervailing 
influences essentially function as a pro-democratic counterweight that offsets 
the significant practical advantages accruing to business interests, thereby 
ensuring overall balance in the interest group system. 
The third major channel through which citizens exercise power in 
contemporary liberal democracies is comprised of the institutions of local 
government. Indeed, for pluralists, “legally autonomous sub-national 
governments are indispensable to polyarchy.”145 In broad terms, the means by 
which the institutions of local government allow citizens to influence 
government action are usually largely identical to those of the parliamentary 
channel. The key difference is ultimately one of geography. As Mulgan 
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elaborates, whereas the parliamentary system enables citizens to exercise 
democratic power at a national level, 
the various institutions of local government – general-purpose 
bodies, such as city, borough and country councils, and special 
purpose bodies, such as catchment boards, harbor boards and 
electric power boards – allow members of each local community 
to share in controlling their own activities.146 
 
According to pluralists, the final major channel through which citizens 
exert influence over government is the modern mass media. The institutions of 
the private news media constitute “the chief watchdogs guarding the ‘public 
interest’ against governments.” 147  For pluralists, professional 
“journalists…pursue the ‘truth’ in a relatively disinterested manner.” 148 
Through this process, the media uncovers, and subsequently relays to the demos, 
“accurate and full information about politics.” 149  Thereby, a fully informed 
citizen body is invested with the capacity to effectively scrutinise the conduct of 
their elected leaders. 150  This provides for extensive public oversight of the 
government’s policy agenda. Thus, the modern mass media operates “as a 
critical check upon the power of the…government of the day.”151 It ensures a 
high level of electoral accountability, essentially precluding the possibility of a 
government pursuing a policy agenda radically at odds with the preferences of 
the citizen body. 
As can probably already be surmised, the major channels of influence 
delineated by pluralists are seen to be “closely [inter-]connected with one 
another.”152 As Mulgan explains at length: 
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The parliamentary and the interest group systems have the same 
focal point, the cabinet, those members of the ruling 
parliamentary party who are ministers in charge of government 
departments and who together form the most authoritative body 
in central government. Lower down there is also considerable 
interpenetration: interest groups try to influence the views of 
political parties and MPs as well as those of government 
departments, and MPs present the parties’ views to sectional 
interests. Similarly, the institutions of local government interact 
with the parliamentary system, through contact with political 
parties and local MPs. Local bodies are also active within the 
interest group system, and have their own national associations 
competing for government attention alongside other interest 
groups.153 
 
Therefore, for pluralists, the four major channels through which citizens 
exercise power in a classical pluralist model of the state are not sharply 
delineated. Instead, they operate in a complex, interdependent manner. Each 
core set of institutions complements the operation of another, thereby “ensuring 
that the different demands of different sections of the people are translated into 
political action.”154 
 Thus, the classical pluralist model of the state can be characterised as a 
theoretical framework that maintains that citizens in contemporary liberal 
democracies exercise effective power over a ‘neutral’ state “which simply 
reflects the balance of forces…in society.”155 The citizen body exercises this 
power through four distinct (but nevertheless inter-related) channels of 
influence - the parliamentary system; the interest group system; the institutions 
of local government; and the media – without one group or set of interests in 
society consistently dominating the process. Classical pluralism does cite a link 
between economic and political power and, thus, is somewhat more 
sophisticated than is commonly acknowledged by its critics. However, as will 
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be shown in the following sections of this chapter, significant weaknesses with 
the model persist. Fundamentally, classical pluralism fails to properly account 
for the observable dynamics of political and economic power in contemporary 
liberal democracies. Most notably, this includes the significant capacity of the 
state itself to function as an autonomous actor and the disproportionate 
influence that business is consistently able to exert over government policy-
making.  
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1.3)  The Critics of Classical Pluralism 
This section exposits the central conceptual themes of the Marxist and 
Neo-Weberian paradigms and the critique they make of classical pluralism. At 
the same time, however, the discussion also involves an evaluation of the 
usefulness of these approaches for the analysis of the dynamics of power within 
the liberal democratic system. It is important to note from the outset the 
inherent diametrical opposition to which these perspectives are oriented. 
Callinicos, referring to Weber as the “Bourgeois Marx”, observes of the 
situation that “their political stances represent a dramatic opposition, Weber’s 
championship of the bourgeoisie…starkly confronting Marx’s socialist 
internationalism.” 156  Despite the intrinsic theoretical tension between these 
perspectives, however, both present robust opposition to the classical pluralist 
paradigm. As will be demonstrated, both Marxist and Neo-Weberian scholars 
present analyses that effectively counter the core principles of the classical 
pluralist model; that political power is fully and equally vested in the 
democratic polity.  
 
Marxism 
Marxist theories of the state are clearly differentiated from other 
theoretical perspectives.157 This is most notable because, as Callinicos states, the 
fundamental characteristic of Marxism is an “insistence on accounting for social 
inequalities and political struggles in terms of the master concepts of the forces 
and relations of production.”158 Furthermore, Marxism goes beyond the mere 
outlining of a model of the state by also entailing praxis; a practical political 
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program reflecting the reality that the only way out of inevitable and enduring 
class-conflict is a “total transformation of the mode of production.”159 Marxists 
view modern advanced-capitalist societies as a complex system of interacting 
political, economic and social phenomena. This perception of society motivates 
the central “holistic” methodological approach of a Marxist analysis of politics; 
the relating of the distribution of political power to wider patterns of social and 
economic inequality. 160  Marxism seeks to reveal the causal patterns of the 
dynamics of state-society relations and the complex nature of advanced 
capitalist society, and this must involve the consideration of multiple 
phenomena.161 
As alluded to above, pivotal to this perspective is what Marx himself 
referred to as the “relations of production.”162 These are considered to be the 
genesis of political struggle. 163  More specifically, Marxists accord central 
importance to the “social relations of production”, which are cited as giving rise 
to the division of society into classes. Due to these social relations of production, 
a minority of the citizen body, the “bourgeoisie” or “capitalist” class, are able to 
control the means of economic production and use this control to force the 
“direct producers” that collectively make up the “proletariat” or “working 
class”, and, historically, a majority of the demos, to perform “surplus labour” for 
the generation of profit. 164  As described by Marx, this relationship 
fundamentally involves the exploitation of workers. While nominally free 
agents, the structural arrangements of the capitalist system disguise the 
inherent inequalities that exist between capitalists and workers, especially 
because “capitalists and workers possess unequal ‘initial endowments’ of the 
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major means of production.” 165  The resulting underlying assumption of 
Marxism is that exploitation, that is the extraction of surplus labour, is at the 
centre of social and economic organisation in capitalist societies. As Marx 
succinctly encapsulates, “it is always the direct relationship of the owners of the 
conditions of production to the direct producers…which reveals…the…basis of 
the entire social structure, and with it…the corresponding specific form of the 
state.”166  
Such an analysis of capitalist society has significant implications for 
Marxist conceptions of both politics and the state. With exploitation at the 
centre of the model the political sphere will necessarily be shaped by the 
underlying relations of production. Consequently, Marxists see workers and 
capitalists as having distinct and antagonistic interests, particularly in the 
spheres of politics, production and the labour market.167 As Miliband observes, 
in each of these spheres, “the imperative necessity for the owners and 
controllers of capital to extract the largest possible amount of surplus value 
from the labour force comes into conflict with the attempts of workers to 
introduce reforms in the operation of capitalism” or even “its total 
transcendence.” 168  In the sphere of industrial relations, for example, this is 
manifested through the tension over the issue of worker organisation. 
Capitalists want to maximise profits by minimising costs, including labour costs. 
In contrast, workers seek higher wages, improved conditions of employment 
and greater employment security, which can combine to increase labour costs 
and reduce profit rates.169 This tension ultimately results in conflicting class-
based interests.170  Consequently Marxists generally conclude that what is good 
for business is often not good for workers, and exploitation can clearly be seen 
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to be the genesis of class struggle, the inevitable and fundamental dynamic of 
the Marxist conception of politics.171  
Due to its position as the ultimate coercive institution in capitalist society, 
with the ability to guarantee a particular class’s domination through its 
monopoly of legitimate force, the state is a major focal point of Marxist 
analysis.172  Centrally, the underlying exploitation inherent in the nature of the 
free enterprise system is seen to generate significant advantages for business in 
the struggle for influence over the state.173 This is primarily due to the state’s 
fiscal reliance on the process of capital accumulation, a process the state cannot 
directly control.174 In essence, the state’s fiscal dependence on capital entails a 
requirement to ensure the ongoing viability of the profitable accumulation of 
capital.175 Marxist analyses maintain that the result of this is that, over the long-
term, the state will often be predominantly influenced by capitalist interests. 
Marxists emphasise, however, that the balance of political power between 
capitalists and workers must be understood as dynamic and historically 
contingent.176 Therefore, the degree to which the state engages in modifying the 
process of accumulation in favour of business within its territory can at times be 
circumscribed. 
In addition, Marxists also emphasise the inaccuracy of considering the 
capitalist class to be a homogenous actor in the public sphere.177 As Cronin 
observes, fundamentally the capitalist class is not static, it is instead 
“constituted and reconstituted continually in the process of production and 
realisation of value. The flows of value in this process lead to a differentiation of 
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the capitalist class into distinct fractions.” 178  Industrial capital, commercial 
capital, and financial (or ‘bank’) capital form the principal fractions of the 
capitalist class.179 These fractions emerge from “the process of circulation of 
capital.” 180  Further internal differentiation within the principal fractions of 
capital arises from “the profit-distribution process.”181 The various fractions of 
capital are broadly “unified by a…hegemonic alliance among them.”182 This 
entails that they share many core overarching values and political objectives 
including, most notably, the maintenance of and maximisation of the 
profitability of the capitalist system. 183  However, their internal fractional 
divisions also mean that different capitalists will have interests that cross-cut 
the class at the micro-level.184 Furthermore, the balance of power between the 
fractions of the capitalist class is dynamic. For example, previously 
domestically-oriented industrial capital dominated the New Zealand 
economy.185 More recently (and mirroring broader international developments), 
globally-oriented financial capital has become much more dominant within 
capital accumulation in New Zealand.186 The key significance of such shifts in 
the intra-capital balance of power is that the specific content of the political 
pressures exerted on the state by business will be characterised by noticeable 
variances over time. Thus, as Roper observes, rather than being “simple, static 
                                                          
178
 B. Cronin 2001, The Politics of New Zealand Business Internationalization: 1972 to 1996. Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Auckland, 157. For useful accounts to Marxian analyses of the fractions of capital, see: K. 
van der Pilj 1984, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London: Verso), 1-8; R. Miliband 1968, The 
State in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson), 23-48. 
179




 ibid, 3. 
182
 Cronin, 157. 
183




 B. Jesson 1999, Only Their Purpose is Mad: The Money Men Take Over NZ (Palmerston North: 
Dunmore Press), 39. 
186
 Kelsey 2015. The broader financialisation of global capitalism which is a prominent feature of the 
neoliberal era was clearly foreshadowed by Rudolf Hilferding in his classic (1910) work, Finance Capital. 
See R. Hilferding 1981, Finance Capital (London; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul).  
Critical Realism and Neopluralism 49 
 
or homogeneous”, for Marxists the political interests of the capitalist class in 
relation to the state are instead “complex, dynamic, and heterogeneous.”187 
Furthermore, the structural constraints deriving from the state’s fiscal 
reliance on the taxation of incomes generated by private enterprise are 
considered to be historically dynamic in nature. Centrally, the structural 
pressures exerted on the state change according to the overall health of the 
economy. The capitalist system is naturally characterised by cyclical swings 
related to the underlying rate of investment. As a result, in the short-run, 
circumstances may arise where when the structural constraints imposed on the 
relative autonomy of the state will be considerably reduced in effect.188 As will 
be argued later in the thesis, such situations appear to have arisen in New 
Zealand during the periods from 1994 and 1997, and also from 2002 to 2008.  In-
effect, at these junctures “the capitalist context chang[ed], allowing state 
managers more freedom of action in relation to capitalists.” 189  However, 
Marxists also maintain that there is an inherent tendency within capitalism for 
the rate of profit to fall over time. As will be delineated in more detailed in the 
following chapter, this long-run tendency ultimately stems from the inherently 
competitive nature of the relationship between capitalists within the system.190 
For Marxists, the tendency for the rate of profit to fall within capitalism 
periodically generates economic crises.191 During such crisis periods (which can 
be prolonged) the structural pressures on the state to intervene in favour of 
business intensify considerably. Because it has the job of maintaining the overall 
conditions for capital accumulation, the state is implicitly pressed to mobilise 
‘counteracting tendencies’ to restore system-wide profitability.192 
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In summary, then, a central focus of the Marxist model is on the dynamic 
process of recurring class conflict. Antagonistic class-based interest groups 
struggle to obtain, retain or influence state power and in which the capitalist 
class’s dominant influence over government policy-making is open to 
challenge.193 Thus, unlike the classical pluralist perspectives, a Marxist analysis 
of contemporary liberal democratic societies acknowledges and makes an 
effective account of the observable inequalities of power between individuals 
and interest groups, as well as the structural power of corporations in advanced 
capitalist states. 
 
The Neo-Weberian Model 
In comparison to the Marxist perspective, the differentiating feature of a 
Neo-Weberian model is that it adopts a ‘state-centred’ approach to the analysis 
of the power dynamics operating within the liberal democratic state. That is, it 
is a perspective that conceives that the state “is an institutional ensemble or 
‘structured field of action’ with a unique centrality in both national and 
international formations.” 194  Centrally, exponents of a Neo-Weberian 
perspective are highly critical of the classical pluralist focus on the system of 
input politics and their ensuing neglect of the role of the government itself as an 
independent actor. As Skocpol outlines in the seminal Neo-Weberian volume 
Bringing the State Back In, many classical pluralist studies are seen as lacking the 
theoretical flexibility to account for government leaders taking primary roles in 
particular public policy decisions. 195  As a result, Neo-Weberians seek to 
demonstrate that the state possesses general operational autonomy. They posit 
that the state has significant structural and organisational capacity with which 
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to shape the formation of the claims of interest groups, as well as to implement 
public policy against the resistance of these groups.196  
Driving the Neo-Weberian conception of the state is Max Weber’s 
observation that, the “state is a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”197 This is 
interpreted as indicating that it is necessary for theorists to develop a 
conception of the state beyond “a mere arena in which social groups make 
demands and engage in political struggles.” 198  The Neo-Weberian model 
consequently posits several sources of capacity from which the state derives its 
operational autonomy, but this element of legitimate coercive power forms the 
effective basis of each. 
The first major source of state capacity is a state’s military power. This is 
also the most obvious manifestation of the state’s possession of a monopoly of 
legitimate coercion. Neo-Weberians consider military force to serve as an “an 
independent source of social power” that can be deployed to allow state elites 
to gain “collective and distributional power.”199 Ultimately, however, it also 
comprises a tool enabling state autonomy via the violent repression of society. 
Thus it can be seen that military power allows the state to pursue paths of 
action in open opposition to the resistance of politically weighty social forces 
and so, in-effect, it also forms the primary source of the state’s capacity for 
autonomous action.200  
The second major element upheld by Neo-Weberians as contributing 
significantly to the state’s autonomous operational capacity is the state’s linkage 
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into transnational structures. Particular stress is put on the importance of 
placing states within a theoretical framework that includes consideration of 
their position within systemic political, economic and military relations with 
other states.201 As Roper summarises this aspect of the Neo-Weberian model; 
“transnational linkages of individual states can greatly enhance the capacity of 
states to implement policy domestically because external support for policy 
change can strengthen the position of the state in relation to internal 
resistance.”202 Membership of international bodies and being signatory to bi-
lateral or multi-lateral economic or military treaties are exemplary of such 
linkages. 203  Neo-Weberians consider these to be capable of generating 
significant ideological and political-economic forces in support of government 
officials adopting public policy strategies formulated independently of 
domestic social and political interests.  
In practical terms, however, it is through the bureaucracy that Neo-
Weberians argue that the state is actually capable of exercising significant 
operational autonomy, including that which it derives from both its military 
power and its transnational linkages. Skocpol asserts that state autonomy is 
“instances in which unconstitutionally ruling officials attempt to use the state as 
a whole to direct…society and politics.”204 Thus we find that it is the public 
service or bureaucracy that forms the most comprehensive source of 
autonomous operational capacity of a state. It has at its disposal multitudes of 
highly trained career officials nominally insulated from both interest group and 
electoral pressures, and capable of formulating, implementing and evaluating 
public policy.205 These officials enjoy great organisational strength and often a 
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unified sense of ideological purpose, in addition to significant administrative 
resources of information that often includes awareness of foreign precedents 
and policy developments on which to emulate models of social policy.206  
Neo-Weberians conceive state actors (including collective agencies, 
individual bureaucrats and politicians) as being “collectively…self-interested 
maximisers, interested in maximising their power, prestige and wealth”, with 
their preferences noted as likely to diverge from those rooted in society because 
of the fact that they essentially derive their living from politics.207 As such it is 
argued that they can exercise significant agenda setting capacities, including the 
manipulation and, ultimately, the legislative or coercive restriction of the 
media. 208  The work of Heclo is cited as particularly demonstrative of this 
atomistic nature of state actors and their ultimately autonomous operational 
capacity.209 Skocpol notes that through numerous studies, Heclo found that 
“civil service administrators in both Britain and Sweden have consistently made 
more important contributions to social policy development than either political 
parties or interest groups.”210  
The bureaucracy is maintained by the considerable revenue-raising 
capacity it derives from the state’s previously mentioned “collective and 
distributional power”, usually (but not strictly) manifested by the operation of a 
sophisticated taxation system. 211  This can be conceptualised as legitimate 
financial coercion effectively lending the official agents of the state fiscal 
resources few societal interests could rival and, furthermore, offering state 
agents particular operational flexibility.  
Through its possession of the expansive base of bureaucratic power 
outlined above, Neo-Weberians argue that the state has significant institutional 
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and legislative capacity with which to engage and regulate the interest group 
system and the entire legal framework underpinning the economy and 
society.212 In essence the state is conceived “as a force which has an independent 
effect in social dynamics.”213 Bureaucratic power, then, provides the state with 
myriad sources of capacity for operational autonomy and, in practical terms for 
a liberal democratic state like New Zealand it forms the cornerstone of the 
state’s everyday ability to operate.  
The Neo-Weberian analysis offers a particularly strong critique of the 
classical pluralist perspective. It accurately maps the key sources of a state’s 
capacity for operational autonomy and emphasises the requirement for a 
theoretical model of the state to include a comprehensive consideration of the 
state as an autonomous actor. There is a key weakness in the Neo-Weberian 
analysis for my purposes, however, and this is derived from their conception of 
historical causality. 
Callinicos summarises the Neo-Weberian position on historical causality 
as that they “treat as, in general, indeterminate the relative contribution made 
by the three dimensions of power- economic, political-military and 
ideological.”214 The operative result of this is that when a sophisticated Neo-
Weberian approach is adopted, it makes extensive acknowledgement of how 
state autonomy must always be viewed as historically contingent.215 Skocpol’s 
work provides an excellent case in point, noting that “’state autonomy’ is not a 
fixed structural feature of any governmental system. It can come and go.”216 A 
similar tendency can also be observed in the work of Michael Mann; Callinicos 
remarks that “for Mann…the various power sources come and go…moving 
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according to the eddies of history, with none able to pretend to a permanent, 
structurally determined primacy over the others.”217  
What becomes apparent after observing this Neo-Weberian conception 
of historical causality is that, in their rush to delineate the sources from which 
states are capable of deriving capacity for operational autonomy, they 
inadvertently exaggerate the functional degree of this autonomy.218 Specifically 
speaking, the problem is that, as Roper notes, “while most scholars 
acknowledge that the state possesses a degree of autonomy with respect to 
policy formulation and implementation, key questions arise with respect to the 
nature and extent of the societal limitations to state power.”219 Of particular 
concern for my purposes, is the Neo-Weberian treatment of structural power; 
the cornerstone of both Marxist and neopluralist analyses of the liberal 
democratic state.  
The Neo-Weberian conception of historical causation and resulting 
uncompromising commitment to the historical contingency of power leads 
them to an inherent rejection of the structural sources of power. For example, 
while according to Marxian analyses the “relations of domination…spring from 
the requirements of class exploitation, and in particular the necessity of 
ensuring that surplus labour is regularly extracted from the direct producers”, 
Neo-Weberians, comparatively, insist that “relations of domination are 
omnipresent and irreducibly multiple.”220 Thus, as both Jessop and Wickham 
have observed, Neo-Weberians effectively gloss over giving any in-depth 
consideration to the implications of the social relations of production and the 
extractive process, consequently failing to account for the material base of the 
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domination of workers. 221  In order to illustrate the underlying historical 
contingency they see as inherent to the political system, Neo-Weberians focus 
on showing how state autonomy can be independent of social sources of power. 
But, as Block observes, by doing this it appears that Neo-Weberians are 
effectively claiming “that state-centred variables are more important than 
society-centered variables in explaining particular historic outcomes.” 222 
Subsequently, the model can be seen to give insufficient attribution of causality 
to society-based sources of power.  
Furthermore, steadfast commitment to their conception of historical 
causality effectively renders Neo-Weberian analyses impervious to empirical 
challenge, particularly from ‘society-centred’ theoretical perspectives. This 
point is best illustrated by comparing competing interpretations of the same 
power relations within a specific timeframe. The example I will employ is that 
between the New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBR) and the Fifth Labour 
Government (FLG) in the sphere of taxation policy during the period from 1999 
to 2006. Here the state implemented many policy prescriptions in direct 
opposition to the preferences of big business, represented by the NZBR.223 A 
Neo-Weberian would interpret this as a demonstration of state autonomy. In 
contrast, a neopluralist, for example, would posit the central role of other 
society-based forces in enabling the state’s resistance against the influence of 
capital interests.224 Neo-Weberians could accept that such factors were the most 
important during this restricted time-frame, but would simultaneously 
maintain that the state retained ultimate autonomy. The problem is, then, that a 
Neo-Weberian analysis can reduce the causal importance of the state to a 
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wraith-like parody of real autonomy, yet maintain its causal centrality. Such a 
situation is completely counter-intuitive to the basic denotation of 
“autonomy.”225 Clearly in such a context there is little value in maintaining the 
causal centrality of the state, above all because it serves only to divert attention 
away from the forces actually driving the power dynamics within a political 
economy, the economic forces emphasised by Marxists and neopluralists being 
a prime example.   
As indicated previously, this thesis aims to explain why financial capital 
is capable of exerting disproportionate influence over the New Zealand state 
and seeks to do this by highlighting a network of society-based forces as 
enabling it. The Neo-Weberian principle of historical causality therefore renders 
the perspective incompatible with the framework of the power dynamics of the 
liberal democratic state being developed in this thesis. While state theorists 
should acknowledge that the state possesses some operational autonomy, due 
to the significant emphasis placed on a high degree of historical contingency, 
Neo-Weberianism ultimately exaggerates the degree of this state autonomy and 
overlooks the role of society-based actors in the determination of specific public 
policy decisions. 
Both the Marxist and Neo-Weberian theoretical perspectives develop 
particularly strong arguments against the relatively simplistic classical pluralist 
model of the state. Although each differs markedly from the other, both these 
analyses poignantly critique the classical pluralist model; Marxism reveals the 
significant structural power that capital interests possess due to the underlying 
nature of the capitalist economic system, and Neo-Weberians conceptualise the 
state’s capacity to be an autonomous actor. In addition, however, each of these 
perspectives has been shown to have drawbacks in relation to the theoretical 
framework that this thesis is seeking to develop. The Neo-Weberian position 
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regarding historical causality renders the perspective fundamentally 
incongruous with a ‘society-centred’ theoretical framework that upholds the 
existence of a complex system of structural constraints on the operational 
autonomy of the state, such as this thesis develops. Comparatively, the Marxist 
perspective is rejected primarily on the grounds of its principle of praxis; I am 
unconvinced of the practicality of their ultimate solution to the problems of the 
capitalist system. As is demonstrated below, a neopluralist model can 
incorporate the strengths and weaknesses of both these perspectives and 
consequently presents a high degree of theoretical flexibility, a valuable 
attribute for the empirical analyses undertaken in the latter portions of this 
thesis. 
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1.4)  Neopluralism 
Neopluralism largely consists of the work of liberal scholars reacting to 
well-founded critiques of classical pluralism’s inability to account for the real 
dynamics of power in the modern liberal democratic state. 226  Although a 
comprehensive account is not possible here, core assumptions and principles 
can be identified to illustrate the general characteristics of a neopluralist 
analysis. Centrally, neopluralism seeks to describe, in a theoretically coherent 
manner, modern social organisation “in ways which are empirically realistic,” 
with a focus on the operations of business and the modern extended state.227  
A neopluralist methodology has several pivotal features and 
fundamentally differs from classical pluralist, Marxist and Neo-Weberian 
methodologies respectively. First, it rejects the classical pluralist’s atomistic 
level of analysis. Instead they adopt a Marxian macro-level approach and 
emphasise the importance of analysing the overarching issues of state-society 
relations, particularly those resulting from the operation of capitalism. 228 
Although it retains liberal democratic values, neopluralism recognises a 
situation of business privilege and is thus pessimistic about the ability of 
contemporary democracies to deliver an equitable distribution of political 
power.229  
Second, neopluralists observe that the structure of modern capitalist 
economies have shifted away from manufacturing towards service and 
information delivery. This fundamental shift is seen to have led to a relative 
decline in citizens identifying themselves according to class distinctions. Thus 
neopluralists reject Marxist class reductionism as anachronistic (although 
sophisticated neopluralists should acknowledge the potential for class to be an 
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influential factor in input politics).230 Further, some neopluralists also suggest 
that Marxist class reductionism leads them to focus too much on class-based 
struggle. Thus, they perhaps ignore the potential for the mobilisation of interest 
groups within civil society independent of economic interests and, further, for 
such groups to have significant power in relation to the state or big business. 
Consequently, contrasting with Marxism, neopluralism also maintains the 
superiority of the current system of politico-economic organisation, seeking its 
reform rather than its fundamental transformation.231 The difference between 
Marxism and neopluralism should not be over-stated, however, for as noted by 
Mulgan, we can expect to observe a degree of convergence among “self-critical 
and empirically minded” scholars analysing the same complex political 
processes.232 This point is neatly expressed through their shared macro-level 
focus; a neopluralist methodology also includes a preference for multi-causal 
explanations to account for the complexity of power relations in contemporary 
liberal democracies.233  
Lastly, as has been indicated previously, neopluralism (like Marxism) 
rejects the Neo-Weberian state-centred approach to explaining political 
phenomena.234 It only acknowledges a limited (although ultimately dynamic) 
degree of state autonomy. 
This reading of the classical pluralist, Marxist, and Neo-Weberian 
traditions provides the analytical foundation of two key insights that form the 
core of the neopluralist perspective; the state’s limited power and the privileged 
position of business. First, in stark contrast to classical pluralism, representative 
institutions are seen to be of limited effectiveness as controls on the formulation 
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of public policy. 235  Whereas classical pluralism develops a framework built 
around the role of interest groups and free and fair elections in influencing the 
state, neopluralists see the nature of contemporary governmental institutions as 
essentially pre-empting democratic controls. They observe the development of 
an “extended state” which has restricted the responsiveness of the state to 
legitimate democratic inputs. 236  State power and control has become 
concentrated in the hands of actors who are not uniformly accountable to 
democratically elected representatives, such as officials in an operationally 
independent central bank. This leads neopluralists to acknowledge Neo-
Weberian input into state theory and to conceive of the state as an institutional 
body of heterogeneous interests in regard to political power, consisting of a 
multiplicity of intra-governmental agencies and officials capable of enacting 
limited self-interested and significantly autonomous agendas.237  
Second, neopluralism also posits an alternate view of the interest group 
system that forms the heart of input politics. It notes that, in general, compared 
to other societal groups, business interests can deploy far superior resources to 
enhance their influence over society and the state. As Roper observes, the 
economic power of business enables it to: 
(i) fund advertising campaigns to improve the public image of 
business; (ii) maintain well resourced associations to both lobby 
government and generate public support for the adoption and 
implementation of desired policies; (iii) extensively fund…major 
political parties through large corporate donations; (iv) offer 
substantial inducements (principally in the form of future career 
advancement in the private sector) to state sector policy analysts 
to adopt, advocate, and implement policies desired by business 
interests; (v) fund academic policy research and the publication of 
books with a pro-business ideological orientation; and (vi) use its 
ownership of radio stations, television, and newspapers to 
maintain a general pro-business bias in the media. 
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Although various classical pluralist ‘countervailing influences’ are 
acknowledged as capable of potentially offsetting this, these influences are 
considered to be historically contingent and insufficient to prevent business 
interests dominating input politics most of the time. 
Beyond this consideration of the overt power wielded by business, 
neopluralism adopts the Marxian perspective that business interests also 
possess much more important latent and generally unobservable political 
power. Lindblom’s (1977) work Politics and Markets is a seminal neopluralist text 
in this regard, positing that in the sphere of public policy formulation, market-
oriented liberal democracies uphold a system inherently biased in favour of 
business interests. Lindblom offered two observations, in particular, which are 
fundamental to neopluralist conceptions of business power.  
First, Lindblom noted that business possesses significant “discretionary 
power”, a situation described as “the business executive as public official in the 
market system.” 238  This is the recognition that business owners or their 
appointed executive officers have the power to make decisions over the 
allocation of resources and the organisation of production processes. Such 
decisions, although relating specifically to their own business, simultaneously 
have serious implications for public policy. They directly affect levels of 
employment and economic growth, both major issues of political debate and of 
central importance to the welfare of the broader society. Essentially 
neopluralists see this as entailing that, in modern liberal democracies, 
significant power over issues of fundamental social and economic importance is 
actually vested in the hands of individuals external to the democratic process.239 
A centrally important manifestation of this discretionary power is the fiscal 
dependence of the state on the taxation of incomes generated in the process of 
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capital accumulation. Effectively, this forms a structural constraint on state 
neutrality by forcing policy-making officials to undertake an anticipatory 
consideration of the interests of business. Further, as this thesis posits later on, 
specifically in the context of New Zealand, this process has been significantly 
enhanced by the liberalisation of global financial markets and the consequent 
increase in the global orientation of capital interests; the government, for 
example, needs to provide attractive conditions for foreign investment or face 
the potential risk of reduced investment or capital flight.240 
Second, Lindblom observed the phenomenon of “circularity.” 241  This 
essentially entails that corporate interests are able to effectively establish the 
parameters of discourse in the public sphere. No homogenous capitalist 
conspiracy-type hierarchical agenda is suggested by this, simply that business 
interests can effectively prevent questions of alternative modes of production 
from being placed on the political agenda. The mass media is seen by many 
scholars of the political economy of the media as playing a key role in the 
maintenance of this corporate capitalist ideological hegemony, but Lindblom 
also identifies business domination of the interest group system, and 
governmental deference as enabling this.242 It should be noted that Lindblom’s 
identification of circularity is entirely consistent with the idea that, similar to 
the state, capital too consists of a diverse body of interests. A number of pivotal 
values generally underpin their unity, however, and it is these that circularity 
operates to maintain. 
Ultimately, then, as these key observations show, business interests are 
inherently advantaged politically by the structure of the capitalist system. 
Business possesses significant unobservable power that goes beyond the overt 
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influence business is capable of exerting due to its economic dominance. 
Because of this privileged nature of business power, but also through the 
operation of the modern ‘extended’ state, neopluralists conceptualise state-
society relations, as constituting a “Deformed Polyarchy”, the central aspect of 
which is termed the “dual polity.”243 In essence this means that contemporary 
liberal democratic societies are characterised by a duality of political power in 
which the state (although necessarily possessing some capacity for operational 
autonomy) is partly controlled by the classical pluralist conceptions of electoral 
competition and the interest group system, but to a significant degree the state 
simultaneously responds to both the overt and latent power of business. 
Thus, as we have seen, neopluralism fundamentally differs from each of 
the classical pluralist, Marxist and Neo-Weberian perspectives. It notes that 
business has significant power based on the nature of the capitalist system, but 
still emphasises the diversity of interests in modern societies. It acknowledges 
the importance of class but does not reduce all conflicts to this basis. It supports 
a limited degree of state autonomy but does not consider this to be outside the 
bounds of the structural power of either economic or societal interests. 
Neopluralism is instead concerned with expressing the complexity and 
chronologically unique nature of modern society and analysing overarching 
questions relating to state-society relations.  
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Conclusion 
Thus, in contrast to classical pluralism and the Neo-Weberian tradition, 
both the neopluralist and Marxist paradigms offer much more sophisticated 
accounts of the complex power relations that exist between citizens, business 
and the state in modern liberal democratic societies. This study will adopt a 
sophisticated neopluralist approach as it can be seen to provide a suitable 
theoretical framework on which to base an analysis of the implications of 
financial market liberalisation for the public macroeconomic policy formulation 
of the Fourth National Government from 1994 to 1999, the Fifth Labour 
Government (FLG) from 1999 to 2008, and the Fifth National Government (FNG) 
from 2008 to 2011. This does not entail the outright rejection of Marxism, but 
instead maintains a degree of skepticism in regards to the case for the 
revolutionary transformation of the capitalist system. 
According to the sophisticated and critical neopluralist theoretical model 
developed in this thesis (and as will also be shown empirically in this thesis), 
business possesses significant privilege in the political systems of contemporary 
liberal democracies. Fundamentally, despite the existence of myriad 
countervailing electoral and societal influences, business interests are generally 
able to exert disproportionate influence over government’s formulation of 
public policy most of the time. The privileged position enjoyed by business in 
contemporary liberal democracies is due to several key factors. First, business 
possesses considerable overt economic power. Principally, this means that, 
compared to competing society-based interests, business is generally able to 
more effectively engage in the interest group system and thereby exert 
extensive influence over society and the state. Second, in addition to its overt 
economic power, business also possesses significant structural economic power. 
Due to the state’s ultimate fiscal reliance on incomes generated by business 
activity under a market-driven economy, state-society power relations are 
inherently biased in favour of business. The state generally faces considerable 
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ongoing latent pressure to formulate public policy in the interests of business in 
order to ensure ongoing economic viability. Third, business possesses 
significant discretionary power. This derives from the direct control that 
businesses often have over the specific means of implementing key aspects of 
public policy. The key significance of discretionary power is that it serves to 
skew state policy making in favour of business. This is due to an effective 
requirement for government officials to anticipate potential business responses 
to public policy initiatives and adjust them accordingly. The final key factor 
contributing to the political privilege enjoyed by business is the phenomenon of 
circularity. Circularity results from the ability of business to exercise a 
significant degree of control over the broad parameters of political discourse. 
Fundamentally, it serves to maintain an overarching pro-capital ideological 
hegemony within contemporary liberal democracies, thereby helping to 
preserve the privileged position of business. 
The business community is not, however, an entirely homogenous actor 
within contemporary liberal democratic political systems. Instead, in 
accordance with Marxian analyses, business is internally differentiated, cross-
cut by various fractional divisions. Moreover, the balance of power between the 
various fractional groupings within the business community is historically 
dynamic. Consequently, while the business community generally shares wide 
ranging political interests and objectives within contemporary liberal 
democratic political systems, groups within business also often possess 
noticeably divergent views on particular issues of public policy. In addition, the 
specific policy preferences conveyed to the state by business interests varies 
over time. 
Furthermore, the state retains a limited degree of autonomy. As outlined 
previously, business possesses major political advantages in contemporary 
liberal democratic state. Thus, the state is often predominantly influenced by 
business interests. Business-dominated societal influences, however, are not the 
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sole driver of state action.244 Actors located within the state apparatus, including 
both elected representatives and unelected bureaucrats and officials, also often 
pursue their own discrete political agendas independent of the electorate and of 
business (although usually only within the bounds of the constraints imposed 
by business). Broadly speaking, governmental actors comprise an ensemble of 
myriad competing interests, which prominently feature variances in power 
distribution, and which are ultimately capable of simultaneously pursuing 
widely divergent political agendas within the state itself. 
The power of business is also historically contingent. While business 
indeed enjoys a “structurally determined primacy” within contemporary liberal 
democratic systems, its functional ability to exert effective influence over the 
state varies over time.245 The apparent political dominance of business interests 
is not, fundamentally, a fixed, inevitable feature of liberal democratic systems. 
Instead, the specific degree to which business is able to exert influence over the 
state (and, conversely, the degree to which the state can operate autonomously 
and respond to other societal influences) is ultimately dynamic. It reflects both 
the specific prevailing balance of societal power within the nation-state at a 
particular point in time, as well as the underlying strength of the economy. 
Most attempts at articulating theoretical frameworks of the modern 
liberal democratic state have tended to focus on societal, economic, and state-
based forces within a relatively restricted national context. This has been 
particularly the case for the study of New Zealand’s political economy. Much 
work has not taken ample account of the important role played by external 
forces in determining public policy outcomes. Consequently, integrating some 
of the key theoretical insights of critical international political economy, 
according to the sophisticated neopluralist theoretical model developed in this 
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thesis, major international business interests also exert considerable influence 
within New Zealand’s liberal democratic political system. In particular, as this 
thesis will subsequently demonstrate empirically, international private financial 
interests impose considerable structural constraints on the state in New Zealand.  
A critical realist methodology is used to apply the sophisticated 
neopluralist theoretical framework developed in this thesis. Comprising a 
derivative of Bhaskar’s transcendental realist philosophy of the natural sciences, 
critical realism forms an alternative social scientific methodology to the 
naturalist and anti-naturalist hermeneutical traditions that, together, have 
tended to dominate the philosophy of the social sciences. Critical realism 
prominently repudiates the crude methodological individualism characteristic 
of naturalist methods, which effectively reduces social scientific enquiry to an 
examination of the activity of individual human agents isolated from their 
discrete historical contexts. At the same time, critical realism rejects the 
methodological holism that is characteristic of the hermeneutical tradition, 
which over-emphasises the causal significance of broad structural factors in 
determining historical outcomes, and also critically understates the importance 
of individual agents.  
Operationalised by Bhaskar’s synthesised TMSA, a critical realist 
methodology centrally entails that both the activities of individual agents and 
the influences deriving from broader social structures will be examined in their 
discrete historical contexts as this thesis progressively develops a detailed 
explanation of the historic shift to, and subsequent retention and entrenchment 
of neoliberalism in New Zealand. Due to its adherence to the notion of the 
inherent non-neutrality of social scientific enquiry, deployment of a critical 
realist methodology also entails that the construction of a robust explanation of 
New Zealand’s neoliberalisation will require extensive use of qualitative data. 
Due to its adherence to the notion of epistemic relativity, meanwhile, a critical 
realist methodology additionally entails that in order to produce this robust 
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explanation of New Zealand’s neoliberalisation, the strongest extant social 
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If on the way to becoming “big time,” consortium banks promote the 
linking of national and international money and capital markets, and 
dampen the impact of nationalism and political ideologies on the 
expansion of world trade and commerce, then they will richly deserve their 
success. 
 




The previous chapter set out a neopluralist account of societal influences 
on the decision-making and policy-making of the liberal democratic state. In 
doing so it emphasised the importance of investigating the influence of global 
forces (especially those in the economic sphere) within New Zealand’s political 
system. Similarly, Roper has argued that extensive research is required that 
focuses on the political impact of globalisation in New Zealand.2 Moreover, as 
noted in the introduction, he points out that one of the most important 
dimensions of globalisation is that which encompasses “the New Zealand 
financial system and its relationship to shifting patterns of global finance, 
foreign investment, and the size of public and private offshore debt.”3 Indeed, it 
is important to observe that financial deregulation involving “synergistic” 
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interactions with “technological change” and an “information revolution” 
constitutes one of the most important dynamics of contemporary globalisation.4 
Exploration and critical evaluation of the impact of financial globalisation is 
thus, quite clearly, of the utmost importance to the proper understanding of 
New Zealand’s contemporary political economy.  
Contemporary financial globalisation has taken place under the auspices 
of what will be referred to here as the Dollar-Wall Street Regime (DWSR).5 
Consequently, the focus of this chapter will be on providing a comprehensive 
account of this centrally important financial structure. The chapter describes the 
key features and functions of the DWSR, and also explains how and why it 
became established as the overarching structure governing international 
financial relations. Addressing these latter issues involves, first, a brief 
discussion of the long post-war economic expansion and its relationship to the 
collapse of the so-called Bretton Woods System (BWS). Subsequently, the global 
rise and spread of neoliberalism will be discussed and some of the key changes 
that have helped cement the DWSR in place are delineated. 
Proper understanding of the DWSR and its key features will ultimately 
enable an effective analysis of the power and political influence that private 
internationally-mobile financial capital is capable of exerting over New Zealand 
due to financial globalisation. However, as Roper notes, “any assessment of the 
impact of global forces on New Zealand society and politics necessarily must 
clarify and consider what globalisation is.”6 Therefore, before the core issues 
relating to the DWSR are addressed, a brief account will be provided of the 
major underlying facets of the globalisation process and, more specifically, the 
extent to which it is generated by capitalism. 
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2.1)  Capitalism and Globalisation 
Because it is ground dealt with extensively elsewhere, it is outside of the 
scope of this study to deal with the broad range of issues encompassed in the 
so-called “globalisation debate.”7 Instead, as indicated by the section title, here 
the discussion is largely restricted to outlining the underlying relationship 
between the global capitalist economic system and the process of globalisation. 
As Roper observes, in order to understand the relationship between capitalism 
and globalisation it is necessary to engage with the sophisticated critical 
analysis of capitalism developed by the Marxist tradition. 8  This effectively 
demonstrates that the relationship between capitalism and globalisation is 
fundamentally rooted in the operation of what are termed the “laws of motion” 
of the capitalist mode of production.9  
According to Marx, the capitalist system has two central features, each 
corresponding to the two sets of relationships that underpin the workings of the 
capitalist system.10 The first of these, set out in Marx’s key political-economic 
work, Capital, is the exploitation of labour-power (simultaneously demonstrated to 
be the only commodity input to the production process that, on a system-wide 
basis, adds new value from the beginning to the end of the production cycle).11 
The second key feature, set out in another of Marx’s key political-economic 
works, the The Communist Manifesto, is the competitive accumulation of capital. It is 
the nature of the latter ‘horizontal’ relationship between capitalists that is of 
particular importance here.  
Marx argues that “capitalism is sufficiently competitive” for each 
individual capitalist to be under constant pressure to reduce their costs of 
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production in order to either maintain or expand their market share. 12  In 
practical terms this refers to a sustained pressure to reduce labour costs 
(thereby increasing the underlying rate of exploitation) whilst simultaneously 
endeavouring to increase market share through market leading innovation. In 
this way, as Callinicos points out, Marx effectively presents us with a 
“structural” theory of capital accumulation; the competitive pressure of their 
rivals compels capitalists to improve their productivity and productive capacity 
via the reinvestment of profits. It is this process that constitutes the 
“accumulation of capital.”13  
Conceiving of capitalism as a system of competitive accumulation in this 
manner enables us to reveal Marx’s underlying “laws of motion” of the 
capitalist system; the tendency of the average rate of profit to fall, leading to 
economic crisis and, ultimately, also globalisation.14 Centrally, for a capitalist 
firm, improving productivity (and thus profit) depends on increasing 
productive capital investment. However, when the profit-seeking behaviour of 
the individual capitalist is applied generally across the breadth of a market, a 
decline in the overall average rate of profit inevitably ensues.15 Such activity 
results in what Marx terms an increase in the “organic composition of capital” 
or, in other words, an increase in the ratio of constant to variable capital (the 
principle element of the latter being human labour). Because socially-necessary 
about time is the ultimate source of surplus value, unless the capitalist 
simultaneously increases the underlying rate of exploitation in the production 
process, the ultimate result of the individual capitalist’s endeavours to improve 
productivity is to require a relatively corpulent concentration of capital to 
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operate at a similar level of profitability.16 Furthermore, as Mandel observes, 
when it is extended even further, to encompass the economic system as a whole, 
the intra-capital competitive relationship in-built into the capitalist system 
ultimately becomes responsible for an inherent systemic “tendency of the rate 
of profit to fall.”17 “The inner contradictions of the capitalist mode of production 
come into their own and inexorably lead to…declines in the rate of profit.”18 
However, while a tendency towards a falling rate of profit pervades the 
capitalist system, it is important to note that this tendency can be temporarily 
offset by the effects of counter-tendencies. These counter-tendencies are often 
concealed due to their close enmeshment within the day-to-day operation of 
capitalism and can take a number of forms.19 As implied earlier, perhaps the 
most important counter-tendency to the falling rate of profit takes the form of 
an increase in the underlying rate of exploitation. If this accompanies further 
productive investment, additional surplus value is generated for capitalists that 
can effectively serve to offset some of the effects of a rising ratio of constant to 
variable capital – the key factor underpinning the tendency for the rate of profit 
to fall over time. As Panitch and Gindin observe, the tendency towards a falling 
rate of profit can also be offset by such things as “the development of new 
technologies and commodities, the emergence of new markets, international 
expansion, and innovations [and expansions] in credit provision.” 20 
Furthermore, state involvement in the economy can serve to delay a fall in the 
rate of profit which, as will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.3, is a factor 
that helps to explain the length of the long post Second World War economic 
expansion. 
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The long-term tendency of the rate of profit to fall periodically generates 
serious economic crises within capitalist systems.21 As Harvey observes: 
 
The historical geography of capitalism is littered with examples of 
such overaccumulation crises, some local and short-lived (such as 
the crash of the Swedish banking system in 1992), others on a 
somewhat larger scale (the long-standing depression that has 
afflicted the Japanese economy since about 1990), and at times 
system wide and, latterly, global (as in 1848, 1929, 1973, and 
2008).22 
 
Fundamentally, the historical propensity of falling capitalist profit rates over 
the long-term to result in crisis derives from the underlying relationship 
between profitability, investment, and output growth.23 Declining profitability 
progressively undermines incentives for the reinvestment of excess capital. This 
eventually results in a major blockage in the necessary “circulation of capital” 
required under capitalism. 24  As Harvey delineates, “growth then stops and 
there appears to be an excess or overaccumulation of capital relative to the 
opportunities to use that capital profitably.”25 
It is from this systemic tendency towards crisis that globalisation stems. 
As discussed at length by Harman (who draws extensively on the work of 
Lenin and Bukharin), the systemic economic crises of the capitalist system serve 
to accelerate a trend of increasing concentration and centralisation of capital 
ownership. 26  This ultimately spreads beyond national borders and into the 
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international arena.27 Under conditions characterised by a crisis of profitability, 
the intense market competition being experienced by capitalists results in a 
major upswing in takeover and merger activities amongst capitalist firms. 
Alongside this capitalists increasingly endeavour to seize and maintain more 
profitable production locations, new markets, and sources of raw materials.28 
Thus, we can consider the process known as ‘globalisation’ to be an expression 
of the micro-level capitalist ‘laws of motion’ at a macro-level; that is, in the 
arena of international economic relations. Indeed, as Bukharin observes, the 
imperialistic economic annexation that characterises contemporary 
globalisation can be considered “only a case of the general application of the 
general capitalist tendency towards centralisation of capital.”29 
Although globalisation is popularly conceived as constituting a 
contemporary cultural-geographic phenomenon, it is apparent that 
‘globalisation’ is in-fact an organic constituent dynamic of capitalism. Indeed, 
the long run tendency for “the geographic expansion of capitalism to 
encompass the globe” was observed by Marx as early as 1848. 30  In the 
Communist Manifesto, for example, he remarks that:   
 
The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases 
the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle 
everywhere, settle everywhere. Establish connections everywhere. 
The Bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market 
given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in 
every country.31 
 
As Harvey develops at length in his work Spaces of Hope, globalisation is, to a 
significant degree, merely an expression of an ongoing process of geographic 
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reorganisation oriented towards at least temporarily overcoming the tendency 
towards crisis within the capitalist mode of production. Due to the internal 
contradictions of capitalist logic, capitalism continuously requires ‘spatio-
temporal fixes.’ As a result, via both expansion and intensification, 
“capitalism...constructs a distinctive geographic landscape...a produced 
space...that facilitates [further] accumulation.”32 Essentially, it is such a process 
of spatio-temporal construction that is referred to as ‘globalisation’ in popular 
contemporary discourses. 
Globalisation, then, can be seen to constitute a product of an inherent 
tendency toward expansion located within capitalism. As McMichael succinctly 
puts it, ultimately globalisation is “immanent in capitalism.”33 A final important 
point to note, however, is that the actual historical manifestation of 
globalisation is not simply the outcome of the unfolding of some sort of 
mechanical ‘iron law’ of history.34 As suggested in the previous chapter, when 
analysing historical phenomena it is necessary to consider the role of both 
structural factors and human agency. Thus, as Panitch and Gindin advocate, it 
may be useful to also consider actual historical globalisation, as being 
simultaneously the product of “human agents and the institutions they [have] 
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2.2)  The Dollar-Wall Street Regime 
As developed by Gowan throughout his influential work The Global 
Gamble, the ‘Dollar-Wall Street Regime’ (DWSR) comprises the base financial 
structure under which contemporary financial globalisation has unfolded. A 
key function of the DWSR is to render unto the US what effectively constitutes 
“monocratic power over international monetary affairs.”36 Under the DWSR, 
US-dominated international private financial markets (IPFMs) are now at the 
very core of public macroeconomic management across the globe. The US 
government, via the operations of the Treasury Department and Federal 
Reserve, is capable of exerting unmatchable influence over the political and 
economic decision-making of virtually all of the other nations of the advanced 
capitalist and developing worlds. Alternatively, through the financial 
mechanism of the DWSR, the US can now, to a significant degree, manage the 
global macroeconomy directly in its own interests.37 As its name suggests there 
are two central pillars of this latest regime of international financial governance. 
The first is the adoption and maintenance of a pure US dollar standard in 
international monetary relations.  
A pure dollar standard in international financial relations was initially 
established via the cutting of the official link between the value of the dollar 
and the value of gold that prevailed under the Bretton Woods System (BWS) on 
15 August, 1971.38  From this point on the US Treasury Department was no 
longer responsible for maintaining a fixed-standard value for the dollar and, 
thus, established the dollar as the sole anchor of the international monetary 
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system.39 However, as Panitch and Gindin point out, it was not until the advent 
of the so-called ‘Volcker shock’ of 1979-82 that the dollar was firmly entrenched 
as the sole global monetary anchor. 40  During the 1970s, successive US 
administrations opted to fund persistent current account deficits via ‘loose’ 
monetary policy – that is, “printing money, or otherwise increasing the supply 
of credit.”41 The prolonged pursuit of a ‘loose’ monetary policy throughout 
much of the 1970s produced high inflation, an increasingly weak dollar, and 
large capital outflows.42  
The large outflows of capital from the US resulted in a commensurate 
accumulation of dollar-denominated assets in foreign hands. High inflation 
coupled with a rapidly declining dollar, in-turn, undermined the value of the 
dollar assets being accumulated offshore, thereby raising the very real prospect 
of a “market panic over the value of the dollar” resulting in a widespread 
dumping of the dollar.43 Thus, by the end of the 1970s, the position of the dollar 
as the international reserve currency was under serious threat.44 Foreign holders 
of dollar were becoming increasingly concerned about the reliability of the 
dollar as an effective cross-border store of value.45 The Volcker shock served to 
remedy this by ensuring “the value of the dollar as the international 
currency.”46 Fundamentally, the Volcker shock entailed “limiting the growth in 
the money supply and allowing interest rates to rise to whatever level – and at 
whatever short-term economic cost – was necessary to break the back of 
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inflation.”47 From an average rate of only 8 per cent in 1978, the base US interest 
rate “rose to over 19 per cent at the beginning of 1981 and didn’t consistently 
return to less than double digits until after 1984.”48 This signaled to the world 
that, from this point on, the US Federal Reserve would take explicit 
responsibility for the declaration of “an interest rate that would project an 
unwavering anti-inflationary commitment so as to become the global anchor of 
a dollar-based world economy.”49 As Paul Volcker himself put it, it gave the US 
Federal Reserve the principle “role in stabilising expectation [that] was once the 
function of the gold standard.”50 
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), serious questions have 
been raised about the sustainability of the dollar’s status in the international 
monetary system.51 Despite predictions of its imminent demise, however, for 
now the dollar continues to occupy the preeminent position in international 
monetary relations. 52  As the latest Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity 
states, “the role of the US dollar as the world’s dominant vehicle currency 
remains unchallenged. FX deals with the dollar on one side of the transaction 
represented 87% of all deals initiated in April 2013.” 53  In comparison, the 
dollar’s main potential rivals for currency supremacy - the euro and the yen – 
were on one side of only 33% and 23% of all FX deals respectively (see Table 
2.1). 54  Similarly, as Eichengreen observes, “there has been no discernible 
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movement away from the dollar as a currency in which to invoice trade and 
settle transactions.”55 Around half of global exports are dollar denominated.56 
Underpinning this is the ongoing commitment of OPEC to the pricing of 
petroleum in US dollars.57 Correspondingly, as an official unit of account, the 
dollar is the most commonly used ‘anchor currency’. Amongst countries that 
operate some form of a fixed – or ‘pegged’ – foreign exchange (FX) regime, 
around two-thirds use the US dollar. 58  In addition, the dollar remains the 
primary currency serving as a store of value in the international financial 
system. IMF data indicates that dollar-denominated financial instruments (most 
notably US Treasury bonds) currently comprise 61.2% of global official FX 
reserves (see Table 2.2).59 Respectively, in the private market arena, 48% of 
international bank deposits and 44% of the global stock of international debt 
securities are denominated in dollars.60 Thus, to paraphrase Richard Cooper, in 
the decade following the onset of the GFC, the status of the dollar has not been 
fundamentally altered; the dollar continues to provide “the monetary 
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Table 2.1) Distribution of Reported Foreign Exchange Market Turnover by 
Currency, 1995 to 2013 
 
Year USD Euro Yen 
1995 83 n.a. 24 
1998 86.8 n.a. 21.7 
2001 89.9 37.9 24 
2004 88.0 37.4 20.8 
2007 85.6 37.0 17.2 
2010 84.9 39.1 19 
2013 87 33.4 23 
Sources: BIS 2002, Triennial Central Bank Survey (Basel: BIS), 9; BIS 2005, Triennial Central 
Bank Survey (Basel: BIS), 9; BIS 2007, Triennial Central Bank Survey (Basel: BIS), 11; BIS 
2010, Triennial Central Bank Survey (Basel: BIS), 12; BIS 2013, Triennial Central Bank Survey 
(Basel: BIS), 5. 
 
The overarching significance of the dollar’s hegemonic position within 
the international monetary system is that it bestows upon the US what is 
sometimes referred to as its “exorbitant privilege.”62 This comprises its effective 
freedom from the balance of payments constraints faced by all other states.63 On 
the basis of the widespread demand for the dollar (due to its hegemonic 
position), the US has the capacity to finance its current account deficits via “the 
sale of Treasury bills…and [therefore] can run its economy without large 
[foreign exchange] reserves” for a prolonged period of time.64 Simultaneously, 
due to its ability to drastically alter the value of its currency without significant 
economic consequence, the US has the unique capacity “to deflect the costs of 
adjustment [to its current account deficits] onto foreigners.”65 
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An additional significant benefit accruing to the US on the basis of the 
dollar’s international role is what is termed seigniorage. By definition, seigniorage 
is essentially “the difference between the cost of creating new money – 
including interest payments – and its face value.”66 In practical terms, it entails 
that, as the originator of the dominant international currency, the US pays 
significantly less to borrow from foreigners than other states. As Helleiner and 
Kirshner outline, 
 
when foreigners have held dollars, they have provided the 
equivalent of an interest-free (in the case of Federal Reserve notes) 
or low-interest (in the case of Treasury securities) loan to the 
United States. According to some estimates, in recent years the 
“seigniorage” profit has totaled over $20 billion per year.67 
  
Significant commercial advantages also accrue to the US private sector 
on the basis of the global dollar standard. 68  US financial institutions, for 
example, enjoy significant competitive advantages over their overseas rivals 
due to their enhanced access to the US Federal Reserve.69 American firms that 
operate in foreign markets, meanwhile, generally do not have to contend with a 
fluctuating exchange rate and, thus, are spared the necessity of undertaking 
expensive foreign exchange hedging arrangements.70 
Beyond the economic sphere, the dominance of the dollar serves to 
enhance “the political influence and capacity of the US.”71 Due to other states’ 
dependence on US-based financial networks, the US is able “to exercise [an 
exceptional] degree of coercion internationally” to advance its own foreign 
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policy and international regulatory agendas.72 Simultaneously, involvement in 
the contemporary dollar-dominated international monetary system (and the 
accumulation of dollar-denominated reserves in particular), effectively serves to 
align the discrete economic interests of foreign states, as well as private-sector 
actors and institutions, with the broader economic, political, and strategic 
interests of the US.73   
The second focal pillar of the DWSR is the switch to US-dominated 
international private financial markets (IPFMs) as the primary site for the 
conduct of international financial relations. This was established through two 
key political moves undertaken by the US during the early 1970s. The first of 
these was Washington’s decision to recycle the vast quantity of petrodollars 
accumulated by OPEC oil producers as a result of the 1973 world oil crisis 
exclusively through New York investment banks. 74  As Held et al observe, 
following the virtual quadrupling of world oil prices in 1973, a massive new 
body of liquid cash, totaling almost US$50 billion during the period from 1974 
to 1976, came into the possession of a relatively small number of OPEC 
countries (including, most prominently, Saudi Arabia). 75  Despite vehement 
opposition from Japan, the major Western European powers, and certain sectors 
in the US, these funds were transferred through to countries experiencing 
balance of payments difficulties “via bank credits and bond issues” from 
private Wall Street investment banks. 76  The significance of this to the 
overarching project of shifting US-dominated IPFMs into the very centre of 
global financial relations is that by opting to recycle the glut of petrodollars in 
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the manner chosen, “the markets came to play a role once reserved (in principle) 
exclusively for official institutions such as the [International Monetary] Fund.”77 
In essence, through the process of petrodollar recycling,  
 
the private banking system took over the functions proper to an 
official institution possessed of the power to finance balance-of-
payments disequilibria through credit-granting and to create 
international liquidity…The function of creating international 
liquidity has been transferred from official institutions to private 
ones.78 
 
The second important political move undertaken by the US was the 
ending of the so-called financial ‘repression’ of the BWS through the final 
abolition of the capital and exchange controls that characterised that particular 
international financial regime.79 Under the BWS states’ central banks and states’ 
trade balances were the primary determinants of a currency’s overall stability. 80 
As will be discussed in more depth in the next section, the City of London did 
operate for much of the immediate post-war period as an almost entirely 
unregulated centre for private financial operations. However, beyond this, 
financial ‘repression’ was meant to largely exclude the involvement of IPFMs in 
the international monetary system. 
The final abolition of the BWS controls fundamentally transformed the 
role of private finance in international monetary relations. As Gowan observes, 
from this point on IPFMs largely took over the roles previously held by the 
central banks. The bulk of the world’s domestic financial systems and exchange 
rates became openly vulnerable to developments in Wall Street-dominated 
                                                          
77
 Cohen 2008, 36. As Cohen  points out, “the practice of private lending for balance-of payments 
purposes” was not new. However, “up to 1973, the private markets’ role tended to be relatively modest. 
It was only with the emergence of the petrodollar recycling problem that [IPFMS] came into their own as 
an alternative source of payments financing.” See ibid 36-37. 
78
 G. Carli 1976, Why Banks are Unpopular (Washington: IMF), 6, 8. 
79
 Although as will be discussed in more detail in the following section that ‘repression’ was something 
of a misnomer. 
80
 Gowan, 21-22. 
The Shift to Neoliberalism in New Zealand 86 
 
IPFMs, with the basis of a currency’s stability becoming the concerned state’s 
underlying ‘creditworthiness’ in IPFMs. 81  Moreover, the capacity for public 
supervision of private international financial operators was significantly 
reduced and, more importantly, what regulation is undertaken in the realm of 
international financial relations is predominantly determined by the unilateral 
decisions of the US government. Due to Wall Street’s pre-eminence amongst 
IPFMs, any regulatory moves undertaken by the US are transmitted through to 
the other domestic financial systems integrated into the DWSR. Essentially, the 
changes undertaken at the core of the system generate significant competitive 
pressures for similar changes to be undertaken in the periphery.82 
It is important to note that the two focal pillars of the DWSR are not to be 
considered mutually exclusive. Rather, as Gowan observes, they are inherently 
self-reinforcing.83 The international dominance of the dollar, for example, serves 
to orientate a majority of both states and private operators towards the major 
US IPFMs for their financial needs. This is primarily because with the majority 
of important internationally traded commodities being denominated in the 
dollar, most will likewise seek to hold the bulk of their FX reserves in dollars 
and also to seek to finance their operations though Wall Street or City of 
London operators.84 But, it is also because under the current prevailing system 
of floating FX rates there is a significantly increased onus on central banks and 
private trading firms to maintain more substantial dollar reserves in order to 
hedge against FX instability. 85  This pressure is clearly illustrated by the 
expansion of official FX reserves mapped out in BIS data (see Table 2.2 below). 
Together, these factors, deriving from the dollar standard, have served to 
substantially expand both the volume and velocity of capital turnover within 
the core IPFMs, thereby systematically reinforcing their existing competitive 
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advantages. 86  Respectively, the market dominance of Wall Street acts to 
reinforce the dominance of the dollar in world monetary affairs because its 
superior scope and resources generally render it both a safer and more 
competitive market. In principle, this serves as a significant attraction to either 
deposit and/or raise funds at the heart of the dollar-denominated system.87 
 
 
Table 2.2) Annual Changes in Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, 2008 to 
2013 
(US$billions, at current exchange rates) 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Advanced 
Economies88 
61 83 194 269 195 55 
Asia89 410 715 651 424 239 529 
Latin 
America90 
42 25 81 97 51 -6 
CEE91 6 13 14 3 15 20 
Middle 
East92 
150 -29 50 88 148 79 
Russia -56 -5 27 8 32 -17 
World 641 819 1100 941 747 733 
Source: BIS 2014, Annual Report (Basel: BIS), 102. 
 
So, in essence, the key features of the DWSR can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. The DWSR is the current system on which international monetary 
relations are based. It consists of two central pillars; a global dollar 
currency standard and US-dominated IPFMs playing a central role. 
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2. The significance of the dollar standard is that it endows the US with 
considerable balance of payments flexibility, seigniorage, commercial 
advantages for the US private sector, and enhanced influence and 
capacity in international relations. 
3. Correspondingly, the significance of the centrality of Wall Street in 
international financial relations is that sovereign states and their central 
banks have minimal control over international financial relations. The 
key implications of this are: 
 The US has significant control over the regulation of the 
world’s financial systems. 
 Domestic financial systems and currency values are rendered 
increasingly vulnerable to developments on Wall Street. 
4. The DWSR is also a self-reinforcing system of global financial 
governance. This is centrally because: 
 Dollar hegemony orientates financial operators towards Wall 
Street. 
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2.3)  The Establishment of the Dollar-Wall Street Regime: From Bretton 
Woods to Global Neoliberalism 
 
 
The historic shift from the BWS to the DWSR - initially signaled by the 
de-linking of the USD from gold - comprised a major development within the 
post-war global financial system. Indeed, Eatwell and Taylor go so far as to 
state that, “on 15 August, 1971, the world of international finance was changed 
forever.”93 From that point onward, the global economy would operate without 
currencies being anchored to a commodity. The global economy had effectively 
moved onto a fiat money system for the first time in the history of capitalism.94 
 Fundamentally, this appears to have signaled the beginning of a major 
shift in the basis of global US hegemony.95 While finance had certainly been 
important previously during the decades immediately after World War II 
(discussed below), US hegemony had primarily been predicated on industrial 
supremacy and preponderant military power. Now, as Harvey observes, 
“threatened in the realm of production, the US had countered by asserting its 
hegemony through finance.”96 It is worth noting that Arrighi contends that this 
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shift to financial power signals the onset of a period of hegemonic transition.97 
Ultimately, he avers, “it is the expression (and a factor) of a relative and 
absolute loss of the [American] nation’s capacity to retain its centrality within 
the global political economy.”98   
However, the establishment of the DWSR was not simply a case of the 
US state aggressively pursuing a particular preconceived unilateral imperial 
political-economic agenda. Instead, the establishment of the DWSR (and its 
subsequent elaboration through a global process of neoliberalisation, discussed 
below) was also heavily influenced by a broad range of other factors salient at 
that particular historical juncture. Most notably, this included (but was by no 
means restricted to) complex developments both within and between the core 
advanced capitalist economies. 
 
The Long Post-War Boom 
 As myriad authors have documented, western capitalism entered into a 
long economic boom following the conclusion of World War II. During the 
period spanning roughly from the late 1940s through until the early 1970s, the 
advanced capitalist world experienced a sustained period of historically 
unprecedented economic dynamism and growth.99 The significance of this long 
post-war boom should not be understated. As McNally observes, 
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The world economy had never seen anything like the Great Boom 
of 1948-73. For a full quarter century the dominant economies 
surged ever forward, generating jobs, robust profits, and rising 
incomes year after year. These were the golden years of western 
capitalism.100 
 
 Table 2.3 (below) provides a statistical overview of the long post-war 
boom. 101  As can be seen, western capitalism indeed achieved “levels of 
sustained growth…without historical parallel before or since”, during the 
period from 1950 to 1973.102 In Western Europe, annual compound economic 
growth averaged almost 5%, after it had averaged just 2.11% or less since 1820. 
Meanwhile, annual GDP growth in Japan averaged a remarkable 9.29%. In 
effect, as McNally observes, “the Japanese economy expanded eight times over 
during the boom.”103 The respective level of economic growth in the US was 
generally lower than these other two key centres of advanced capitalism. 
Annual average GDP growth averaged some 3.93% in the US from 1950 to 1973. 
It is important to note, however, that the US economy began the extended 
period of economic growth in a significantly more advanced position.104 
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Table 2.3) Global GDP Growth Rates 1820–2003 (Annual Average 
Compound Growth Rates) 
 
 1820-70 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-2003 
Western 
Europe 
1.68 2.11 1.19 4.79 2.19 
USA 4.2 3.94 2.84 3.93 2.94 
Japan 0.41 2.44 2.21 9.29 2.62 
Asia (excl. 
Japan 
0.04 0.98 0.82 5.13 5.71 
World 0.94 2.12 1.82 4.9 3.17 
Source: A. Maddison 2007, Contours of the World Economy, 1-2030 AD (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 380. 
 
 The long post-war economic expansion featured a boom in international 
trade.105 As Armstrong et al outline, 
 
Between 1951-3 and 1969-71 the volume of world trade in 
manufactures grew by 349 per cent whereas the volume of output 
grew by 194 per cent. The ACCs [(advanced capitalist countries)] 
expanded their exports of manufacturing by 480 per cent between 
1950 and 1971. By far the fastest growing part of that enormous 
growth was in the form of trade between the various advanced 
countries; their exports to the underdeveloped countries and the 
Eastern bloc grew far more slowly.106 
 
 But the expanding flows of international trade were easily eclipsed by a 
massive increase of foreign direct investment (FDI).107 As Panitch and Gindin 
observe, “FDI…increased twice as fast as GDP” during the 1960s, whereas 
“international trade…grew 40 percent faster than GDP.”108 The primary driver 
of this post-war growth of FDI was the international expansion of US 
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multinational corporations (MNCs), especially into Europe.109 During the period 
from 1956 to 1966, the number of US corporate manufacturing subsidiaries in 
Europe tripled (reaching a total of over 9000), with the average size of those 
subsidiaries also increasing considerably. 110  Eventually, with their domestic 
economies recovering from the devastation of World War II, important German 
and other European manufacturing firms initiated their own countervailing FDI 
seeking to penetrate the massive US domestic market.111 Japanese firms also 
began to increase their FDI into the US during the 1950s and 1960s. The relative 
scale of this, however, was not as significant.112 Thus, as Panitch and Gindin 
summarise, throughout much of the post-war boom, “the main action in 
relation to FDI and the internationalisation of production remained very much 
a North American-European affair.”113 
 US financial institutions followed their compatriot MNCs expanding into 
Europe and elsewhere during the long boom.114 Indeed, as Dumenil and Levy 
observe, “the [post-war] expansion of trade and investment worldwide would 
have been impossible in the absence of the parallel development of banking 
activity.”115 The international expansion of US banks began earlier, but ramped 
up particularly from the early 1960s onwards. As documented by Cassis, while 
there were only 131 individual foreign branches of US banks in Europe in 1960, 
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they subsequently proliferated.116 By the end of the decade the presence of 
American banks had increased to such an extent that they had become 
“significant financial actors inside Europe.” 117  Indeed, US banks were 
progressively coming to challenge the entrenched UK and European banks for 
dominance.  
 The vigorous offshore expansion of US banks during the long post-war 
boom coincided with (and was fed by), a significant financial expansion within 
the domestic US economy.118 As Magdoff and Sweezy observe, “the financial 
sector of the economy which had been moribund in the 1930s and under tight 
control throughout the war experienced a vigorous growth during the next 
three decades.”119 Principally, the post-war domestic US financial expansion 
was underpinned by the strong growth in the broader economy. 120  Private 
finance was, for instance, heavily involved in channeling funds for the 
prosperous manufacturing sector during the post-war era. 121  Developing 
industries required increasing amounts of capital for productive investment 
and financial institutions inevitably provided a portion of the necessary 
funding. 122  US banks also played an extensive role in capital intensive 
infrastructural ‘project financing’ during this period.123 This not only provided 
considerable opportunities for lending and balance sheet expansion, but also 
the generation of significant revenues from the charging of fees. The latter, it 
should be observed, would become an increasingly more important aspect of 
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private financial institutions’ overall business, especially during the subsequent 
neoliberal era. 
A strong current of innovation pervaded the “dramatic expansion of US 
domestic financial markets” that took place during the long boom. 124  US 
financial institutions pioneered, for example, the creation and exploitation of 
creative new corporate structures and entities. Most notably, this included the 
invention of bank holding companies. As Panitch and Gindin observe, the use 
of these structural arrangements “was undertaken explicitly to enable banks to 
develop the legal and market potential to span commercial, investment, 
insurance, and mortgage functions”, thereby effectively allowing major 
financial institutions to circumvent the market segmentation and specialisation 
regulations implemented via the Glass-Steagall Act as part of the New Deal.125 
US financial institutions also oversaw the creation of a host of new financial 
instruments (and also the creation of increasingly deep markets for the same).126 
Particularly crucial here was the US Federal Reserve’s decision to operate 
monetary policy through private Wall Street banks’ so-called ‘market making’ 
in Treasury bonds.127 By doing this, the market for US Treasury bonds was 
deepened considerably, as illustrated by the massive increase in the volume of 
Treasury securities made available to investors. 128  As Panitch and Gindin 
explain, “the [increased] liquidity of the Treasury bond market…had the 
subsequent effect of enabling the large banks to invent new financial 
instruments, such as certificates of deposit.”129  
                                                          
124
 Panitch and Gindin, 119. 
125
 Ibid, 120. 
126
 As Konings delineates, the previously discussed international expansion of American finance during 
the post-war boom actually relied extensively on this financial innovation, especially the process of 
securitisation that US commercial banks had initiated. See M. Konings 2008, “The Institutional 
Foundations of US Structural Power in International Finance: From the Re-Emergence of Global Finance 
to the Monetarist Turn”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 15, 35-61. 
127





The Shift to Neoliberalism in New Zealand 96 
 
But the post-war domestic financial expansion was not just restricted to 
the financial sector itself. It also featured a broader process of financialisation 
throughout the domestic US economy and society.130 Through a “proliferation 
of employer-sponsored pension plans” and a massive parallel expansion of 
consumer credit (and consumer credit facilities, such as credit cards), workers 
became increasingly enmeshed in financial markets as both savers and 
borrowers during the post-war economic boom. 131  At the same time, non-
financial firms, both large and small, were increasingly engaging in financial 
operations (and, like the previously mentioned workers, they were doing this as 
both borrowers and savers). Over the course of the long boom, non-financial 
firms became the largest originators of consumer credit. Indeed, as documented 
by White, by the end of the long boom, the three largest industrial firms and the 
three largest retail firms were (as discrete groupings) issuing more consumer 
credit than the three largest financial firms combined.132 Furthermore, it was 
major manufacturing firms that were ultimately behind the emergence of a 
nascent commercial paper market in the mid-1960s. These non-financial 
corporations were seeking a reliable channel of funds impervious to the state-
imposed credit shortages that periodically constrained the lending of the 
traditional financial system.133 
The long post-war boom was also characterised by significant 
technological progression. This notably included considerable advancements in 
the areas of electronic computing and telecommunications. The strong 
expansion of finance during the long post-war boom depended greatly on the 
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great strides in innovation made in these areas. Ultimately, they provided the 
necessary technological basis on which increasingly deep and sophisticated 
IPFMs could actually be created. 
There is a widespread view that Keynesian policies were responsible for 
the extended nature of the post-war capitalist expansion. 134  Centrally, state 
interventions to raise the level of system-wide expenditures on investment or 
consumption are considered to have been able to effectively counteract the 
tendency within capitalism towards overaccumulation (discussed in Section 
2.1). Unsurprisingly, this view is most commonly espoused within Keynesian 
and post-Keynesian analyses. However, a number of Marxists offer similar 
explanations of the long boom. For Harvey, for example, the post-war 
expansion of capitalism was underpinned by “a class compromise between 
capital and labour”, which enabled the state to deploy “fiscal or monetary 
policies usually dubbed ‘Keynesian’…to dampen business cycles and ensure 
reasonably full employment.”135 
This explanation is disputed by a number of other authors (most notably 
Harman and Callinicos), who instead posit that the key factor underpinning the 
long post-war boom was the emergence of a so-called “permanent arms 
economy” in the US (and, to a lesser extent in France and the UK) as part of the 
Cold War.136 According to Harman, ultimately “what kept the boom going was 
not Keynes, but the same thing that had brought the slump of the 1930s to an 
end – massive arms spending.” 137 While certainly not rivaling the situation 
during World War II itself, official expenditure on armaments by Western 
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governments as part of the post-war arms race with the USSR was nevertheless 
vast. 138  The US, in particular, undertook enormous investments in the 
development of nuclear weapons and other advanced weapons systems. As 
Callinicos observes, US military spending jumped from 4.3 per cent of gross 
national product in 1948 to a high of 13.6 per cent in 1953 and was still 9.0 per 
cent in 1969 – far above previous peacetime levels.”139  
 Harman and Kidron maintain that such extensive military spending as 
part of the post-war arms race had the effect of partially counteracting the 
inherent tendency within capitalism of the rate of profit to fall (discussed in 
Section 2.1). In their view, military spending absorbed considerable surplus 
value that would have otherwise been used for productive investment. This 
effectively slowed down the underlying rate of capital accumulation in the 
post-war US economy and, consequently, “the organic composition of 
capital…rose much more slowly than it otherwise would have.”140 As outlined 
in Section One, the increasing organic composition of capital – that is, “the ratio 
of plant and equipment to workers” – ultimately drives a long-term tendency of 
a falling rate of profit within capitalism.141 Hence, for Harman and Kidron, by 
partially offsetting the rising organic composition of capital, military spending 
by Western governments acted as a countervailing tendency to the falling rate 
of profit.142 This, in-turn, helped underpin and extend the long post-war boom. 
 
The Breakdown of the Long Boom 
 The countervailing effects of government intervention in the form of 
either Keynesian policies or of a “permanent arms economy” may have thus 
helped to sustain global capitalism for an extended period of time following the 
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conclusion of World War II.143  Certainly it appears that, for a time, strong 
countervailing tendencies enabled the core capitalist economies to achieve, and 
subsequently maintain, historically high rates of growth. 144  Regardless of 
whether or not Keynesianism or the “permanent arms economy” constituted 
the most significant causal factor, however, the long post-war boom 
nevertheless ultimately proved to be unsustainable.145  As Harvey summarises, 
 
By the end of the 1960s embedded liberalism began to break down, 
both internationally and within domestic economies. Signs of a 
serious crisis of capital accumulation were everywhere apparent. 
Unemployment and inflation were surging everywhere, ushering 
in a global phase of ‘stagflation’ that lasted through much of the 
1970s.146 
 
Figure 2.1 (below), graphically illustrates the breakdown of the long post-war 
economic boom and the onset of global stagflation in the advanced capitalist 
economies in the early 1970s. 
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Figure 2.1) The Onset of Stagflation in the Advanced Capitalist 
Economies147 
 
Source: World Bank historical data set. 
 
There is broad agreement within the radical international political 
economy literature that a key factor contributing to the collapse of the long 
post-war boom was the negative trajectory of the underlying rate of profit.148 
Centrally, from around the mid-1960s onwards, corporate profitability in the 
advanced capitalist economies began to quickly decline. 149  The empirical 
support for this development is considerable. “Indeed, the evidence for 
declining profits is so overwhelming that”, as McNally observes, “radical 
political economists of varying persuasions, who can agree on little else, all 
accept that the profit rate fell persistently from the mid-1960s until the early 
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1980s.” 150  Figure 2.2 illustrates the overarching trajectory of business 
profitability in the core centres of capitalism during the long boom.151 As can be 
seen, the US economy experienced a gradual decline in profitability during the 
1950s after having previously recorded high levels of profitability in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II. 152  This trend subsequently reversed 
between 1961 and 1966 with a pronounced spike in corporate profitability being 
registered.153 This reversal, however, was only temporary; the US rate of profit 
fell away rapidly from 1967 onwards.154 Respectively, profit rates in the major 
European economies maintained a reasonably “steady downward trend from 
their very high postwar rates” over the course of the long boom. 155  In all 
likelihood partially reflecting the extent of international economic competition 
that developed between the two (in the realm of manufacturing especially), the 
rate of profit in Japan broadly followed that of the US, albeit in reverse. During 
the 1950s, business profitability gradually increased in Japan. It then declined at 
the same time as the US experienced its mid-1960s profit spike. Profitability in 
the Japanese economy subsequently increased sharply during the late-1960s, 
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Figure 2.2) Business Net Profit Rates in Europe, Japan, and the US, 1951-
1975 (%) 
 
Source: Armstrong et al, 465. 
 
Businesses responded to the falling rate of profit from the mid-1960s 
onwards by undertaking extensive new investment.156 As McNally observes, 
“with competition for sales and profits intensifying”, throughout the late 1960s 
and on into the early 1970s, “firms frantically built up new capacity at an ever 
increasing pace.”157 On average, US non-financial corporations’ annual fixed 
asset investment increased by a historically high rate of 4.3 percent (adjusted for 
inflation) from 1967 to 1973.158 The upswing in new business investment was 
even greater in Japan and the major European economies.159 By 1970, increased 
investment in these ‘later-developing’ economies had dragged the global rate of 
accumulation up to 5.5 percent.160  
Ultimately, this wave of new corporate investment throughout the 
advanced capitalist world prompted the development of “a serious crisis of 
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capital accumulation.”161 As McNally observes, “while profitability was turning 
down “during the late 1960s and early 1970s, “over-accumulation was turning 
up in a classic pattern of over-investment.”162 The crisis of over-accumulation of 
the 1970s developed broadly in line with the underlying dynamics of capitalist 
accumulation described in Section 2.1. 163  Faced with declining profits (and 
largely unable to effect meaningful reductions in labour costs due to strong 
labour militancy), competing businesses sought to improve their productivity 
and productive capacity through additional capital investment. Following the 
analysis developed by Harvey, these system-wide efforts resulted in a major 
blockage in the necessary “circulation of capital” required under capitalism.164 
Economic growth subsequently ground to halt and “an excess or 
overaccumulation of capital relative to the opportunities to use that capital 
profitably” became manifest.165 
 
The Collapse of Bretton Woods 
Coinciding with (and, indeed, causally linked to) the falling aggregate 
rate of profit, from the mid-1960s onwards sizeable trade imbalances also 
emerged between the US and its major competitors, Germany and Japan.166 
Table 2.5 outlines the evolution of the US trade balance with Germany and 
Japan. As can be seen, “beginning in 1965, US trade balances with Japan and 
Germany…fell rapidly.”167  After an initial trade deficit of US$500 million being 
recorded with Japan in 1965, the combined trade deficit with both major US 
competitors deteriorated considerably. After falling to an average of around 
US$2 billion each year from 1968 to 1970, the annual combined trade deficit 
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reached US$4.1 billion in 1971. This was fueled by a US$3.3 billion trade deficit 
with Japan alone. 
 
Table 2.4) The Annual US Trade Balance with Germany and Japan, 1963 to 
1973 (US$ billions) 
 
 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Japan 0.3 0.2 -0.5 -0.8 
 
-0.3 -1.2 -1.6 -1.4 -3.3 -3.9 -1.3 
Germany 0.6 
 
0.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -1.0 -0.5 -0.4 -0.8 -1.4 -1.6 
Japan & 
Germany 
0.9 0.6 0.2 -0.9 -0.6 -2.2 -2.1 -1.8 -4.1 -5.3 -2.9 
Source: Brenner 2006, 125. 
 
The development of this combined trade deficit with Germany and Japan 
helped underpin a broader deterioration of the overall US balance of payments 
position. As Brenner outlines, mounting “merchandise trade deficits” combined 
with “rising foreign investment and bloated military expenditures associated 
with the Vietnam War” to bring about “skyrocketing US balance of payments 
deficits.” 168  Ultimately, the underlying “trade deficits were too large to be 
counterbalanced” by the US and, as a result, in 1971 the external balance “also 
went negative.”169  
The emergence of these significant US external macroeconomic 
imbalances fomented the development of the so-called “world money crisis.”170 
Centrally, they entailed a greatly increased accumulation of USD outside of the 
US. 171  During the initial stages of reconstruction a USD shortage had 
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prevailed.172 Subsequently, as the European and Japanese economies recovered, 
this shortage transmuted into a surplus. From the mid-1960s onwards, this 
surplus morphed into a veritable glut. As McNally observes, “so rapid was the 
growth of foreign dollar holdings that they doubled between 1968 and 1971 
alone – from $150 billion to $300 billion.”173 Such significant ongoing currency 
outflows ultimately resulted in a prolonged run on the USD by private 
international money market operators. 
In this regard, it is important to recognise that, despite the rigorous 
system of capital and exchange controls in place under the BWS, the previously 
discussed expansion of US banks and MNCs into Europe during the 1950s and 
1960s was also accompanied by the creation of major IPFMs. The most 
important of these was the so-called ‘Eurodollar market’ centred on the UK’s 
financial hub, the City of London.174 As Panitch and Gindin delineate, exploiting 
“an accounting loophole in the exchange control regulations, and facilitated by 
the Bank of England without either approval or oversight by the UK Treasury”, 
in the mid-1950s the merchant bankers of “the City created a completely 
unregulated international market for the dollar.” 175  This key financial 
innovation provided a new way to accommodate the mounting international 
USD surplus. Excess dollars were deposited in accounts in City of London 
banks and subsequently loaned out to fund further investment (often at better 
rates than available through the closely regulated domestic financial systems). 
The first Eurodollar accounts were set up by the USSR and China as a means of 
banking outside of the reach of the US.176 Later the major depositors became 
Western European central banks and US MNCs. As Panitch and Gindin observe, 
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these central banks were major depositors primarily because, following the 
restoration of currency convertability, “the [Bretton Woods] system of fixed 
exchange rates made it necessary for Western European governments to 
have…dollar reserves available for possible intervention in foreign exchange 
markets to maintain the value of their currencies.” 177  The latter MNCs, 
meanwhile, “were directed there by their US banks, which could offer higher 
rates for short-term deposits in London, due to the continuation of New Deal 
‘Regulation Q’ ceilings on the interest banks could pay on deposits at home.”178 
Led by the innovative Midland Bank, the UK merchant banking 
community initially controlled much of this important incipient IPFM.179 Indeed, 
as Schenk observes, “at the middle of 1956 Midland [alone] probably still 
accounted for at least half of total Eurodollar deposits.”180 However, the rapidly 
expanding Eurodollar market quickly came to be dominated by US commercial 
banks.181 Table 2.6 outlines the relative shares of the Eurodollar market in the 
early 1960s. As can be seen, while their external activities were hampered by 
considerable regulations at home, US banks operating in the City of London 
were certainly not precluded from becoming significantly involved in the 
Eurodollar market. 182  By the end of 1962 almost a full third of Eurodollar 
deposits were being made into the nine US banks that were operating in the 
City of London at the time.183 Thus, by the early 1960s, the City of London had 
already effectively become a satellite of Wall Street and, by extension, had 
become integrated into the nascent nexus of the US Treasury, Federal Reserve, 
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and Wall Street that would subsequently form the basis of the new regime 
governing international financial relations during the neoliberal era. 
 
Table 2.5) UK Banks’ Overseas Liabilities in All Currencies (£m) 
 












2.6 23 2.0 24 2.1 
British Overseas 
Banks 
236 23.0 258 22.1 255 22.2 
Accepting 
Houses 
191 18.6 199 17.0 196 17.1 
US Banks 277 27.0 362 30.9 370 32.3 
Japanese Banks 111 10.8 125 10.7 112 9.8 
Other Foreign 
Banks 
139 13.5 145 12.4 132 11.5 
Source: Schenk, 230. 
 
It is worth noting that orthodox accounts of post-war international 
financial developments often tend to uphold that it was only the global rise of 
neoliberalism (and the liberalisation and deregulation of finance this entailed) 
that finally unleashed the untrammeled expansion of IPFMs that characterises 
contemporary global capitalism. 184  Two respective eras of post-war 
international finance are typically distinguished; an era of financial ‘repression’ 
under the BWS, followed by an era of financial ‘liberation’ under global 
neoliberalism.185 As the development of the Eurodollar market demonstrates, 
however, it is, in-fact, quite simply “not the case that deregulation occurred first, 
followed by a financial explosion. Instead, the flare-up of unregulated markets 
came first.”186 Thus, the BWS era should not be viewed purely in terms of 
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providing for the international repression of finance. 187  Rather, as Battilossi 
points out, it is important that the Bretton Woods years are also “regarded…as 
the cradle of the global financial order that eventually emerged in the final two 
decades of the last century.”188 
With the massive global USD glut continuing to grow unabated, from 
the late-1960s onwards, the unregulated international money markets that had 
been restored (under the so-called ‘repression’ of the BWS) began to 
significantly undermine the international reserve position of the USD. As 
Brenner outlines, the money markets placed significant “downward pressure 
on the dollar and upward pressure on the mark and yen” via successive 
speculative runs versus the USD. 189  With their currencies “implicitly 
strengthened” against the USD, short-term speculative capital inflows into 
Germany and Japan from the Eurodollar market ramped up. Indeed, they 
“reach record proportions” by the close of the decade.190 This produced rapidly 
mounting pressures for the revaluation of both the mark and yen.191  
The resulting world money crisis culminated in the early 1970s. Centrally, 
enduring short-term speculative flows caused a blowout of the overall US 
external payments position. From a level of $10 billion in 1970, the external flow 
of USD increased to $30 billion in 1971.192 This quickly put unbearable pressure 
on the US government’s gold reserves that still ostensibly backed the value of 
the USD as international currency. Despite previously ceasing to honour its 
commitment to sell gold to private parties at $35 per ounce in 1968, US gold 
reserves nevertheless collapsed to a critical level, representing “less than a 
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quarter of its official liabilities.”193 As McNally observes, “once the reality of the 
1971 American trade deficit set in, the rush to convert dollars into gold went 
through the roof, reaching an annual rate of $35 billion that summer.”194  
The pressures on the broader BWS framework of fixed exchange rates 
anchored by a gold-backed USD became insurmountable at this point. As 
Harvey observes, in essence, “gold could no longer function as the metallic base 
of international money.”195 For the US, “the combined economic and political 
costs” of maintaining such an arrangement were, quite simply, unacceptable.196 
Consequently, as discussed in the previous section, in August 1971, the US 
suspended USD-gold convertibility; the signal moment in the establishment of 
the DWSR. 
The suspension of USD-gold convertibility immediately increased the US 
government’s room for maneouvre in the realm of macroeconomic policy 
formulation. As Brenner observes, in-effect, the US was freed “from the 
requirement to reduce its overseas deficits by deflating the economy in order to 
decrease imports and increase exports so as to hold the dollar at its assigned 
value.”197  Subsequently, the US took full advantage of the increased policy 
flexibility that it had now been invested with to advance its own discrete 
economic interests. From late 1971 until 1973, it proceeded to “pursue, 
untrammeled, expansionary monetary and Keynesian budget deficit 
policies.”198 The objectives of this were multiple: stimulating the domestic US 
economy by boosting demand; devaluing the currency in order to boost the 
international competitiveness of US industry; and depreciating the value of the 
international USD surplus in real terms.199 In-effect, the US sought to exploit the 
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enduring key role of the USD to deflect some of the costs of adjustment to the 
mounting global imbalances onto its main economic competitors, Germany and 
Japan.200 
As Brenner outlines, following the detachment of the USD from gold, up 
until the final scrapping of the Bretton Woods capital controls in 1973, efforts 
were made “to revive pegged exchange rates and a Bretton Woods-type 
framework.”201 “The other leading capitalist states, led by Germany, France, and 
Japan, sought through painstaking negotiations between 1972 and 1974 to 
secure a return to a system of pegged exchange rates to be buttressed by 
controls over the mobility of capital.”202 Following the analysis of Helleiner, 
Brenner maintains that the US had determined that it was not in its interests to 
cooperate.203 Enhanced capital mobility would allow further devaluation of the 
USD whilst, simultaneously, it would bolster the strength of private US 
financial capital in the international arena.204 Consequently, in February 1973 it 
prevailed on its economic rivals “to give up the Bretton Woods system…and go 
to the float.”205  
The underlying macroeconomic situation facing the main economic 
competitors of the US (and many other states, including New Zealand) now 
fundamentally changed. Essentially, from this point on, a given country’s 
capacity to govern their macroeconomy would be considerably impaired. 206 
While the closing of the gold window and the comprehensive scrapping of 
capital and exchange controls may appear to have freed international financial 
relations from the institutionalised ‘rigidities’ of the previous BWS, the reality 
was far different. For the vast majority of the world, the (subsequently 
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established) DWSR acts as a macroeconomic snare. The large-scale private 
trading of “currencies and government bonds means that exchange rates and 
interest rates, two critical variables in the formulation of national 
macroeconomic policy, are determined in the context of global financial 
markets”, and, consequently, for the bulk of the world’s states, the formulation 
of macroeconomic policy is effectively subsumed to the vagaries of both IPFMs 
and US public policy.207 
During the remainder of the 1970s, governments throughout the 
advanced capitalist world followed the example set by the US and proceeded to 
implement large-scale expansionary macroeconomic policy measures in 
response to the onset of stagflation. Freed from the policy constraints entailed 
by the BWS just as the US had been, states greatly expanded public 
expenditures and monetary policy was rapidly loosened. Adhering to the 
prevailing Keynesian economic orthodoxy, such measures were ostensibly 
aimed at simultaneously boosting flagging domestic demand and promoting 
business investment. It is worth noting that many states (most notably the UK) 
faced a situation of falling revenues as a result of declining growth combined 
with rising social expenditures due to rising unemployment. As a consequence, 
much of the increased public expenditures could not be readily paid for. This 
inevitably led to a significant expansion of public debt during the decade. 
Thus, as indicated above, for many authors, the jettisoning of the USD-
gold link (combined with subsequent efforts to enhance the power and mobility 
of private international financial capital and stamp out inflation) served to 
perpetuate the global hegemony of the US. 208  Gowan asserts in The Global 
Gamble, for example, that the Nixon administration’s decision to close the gold 
window effectively constituted “a Faustian bid for world dominance.”209 It is of 
course important not to overplay “the coherence and clarity with which US 
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policymakers responded to the crisis” of the dollar which developed in the late-
1960s (which Gowan may be guilty of doing).210  Nevertheless, the aggressive, 
unilateral action of the US in response to the dollar crisis, beginning in August 
1971, does indeed appear to have helped ensure its ongoing dominance in 
world affairs through the key medium of international finance (even if this was 
not fully appreciated at the time).211 
However, while the immediate primary motivation of the US certainly 
appears to have been the preservation of US political and economic power in 
the international arena, the decision to detach the USD from gold was also in 
response to significant changes that had taken place in the underlying economy 
during the prosperous post-war era. In essence, business had become 
increasingly internationalised (a process that also entailed a significant parallel 
financialisation of global capitalism), and cross-border flows of private capital 
had expanded accordingly. This put increasing pressure on the institutional 
arrangements of the BWS which were ostensibly designed to restrict this very 
eventuality. These developments were also closely linked to the deeper 
historical dynamics of capitalism (outlined in Section One). As the war-ravaged 
economies of Western Europe and Japan were restored, it was the impulses 
deriving from mounting inter-capitalist competition that saw major firms 
expand abroad and seek out new means of enhancing their profitability. 
Furthermore, while detaching from the dollar-gold link may have 
constituted a bold assertion of US power in the global economic system, it did 
“not provide a general solution to the [deeper] problems facing all the capitalist 
economies.”212 The major capitalist economies still faced a fundamental problem 
in the form of a system-wide crisis of profitability. It is to be observed that 
Keynesianism, in the form it was applied by numerous governments 
throughout the 1970s, did not appear to provide a viable solution. As, Brenner 
                                                          
210




 Ibid 2003, 49. 
The Shift to Neoliberalism in New Zealand 113 
 
notes, the widespread “resort to Keynesian stimuli proved to be profoundly 
ambivalent in its effects.” 213  Indeed, widespread application of Keynesian 
macroeconomic policies seemed to only make the economic situation worse by 
feeding a wage-price inflationary spiral. 214  The prevailing macroeconomic 
situation - which combined a high rate of inflation and mass unemployment 
with a greatly reduced, if not negative growth rate - was contradictory to the 
wisdom of the existing Keynesian economic orthodoxy. Keynesianism had 
traditionally upheld that a trade-off always existed in public macroeconomic 
management between the level of inflation on the one hand, and economic 
growth and full-employment on the other. As a result, during the 1970s a 
serious crisis in the ideological hegemony of Keynesianism ensued.  
In addition, for a system governing international financial relations 
based around a de-materialised USD and private financial capital to continue to 
operate effectively, other important political-economic changes were also 
required. 215 First, as Harvey delineates, “for this system to work effectively, 
markets in general and capital markets in particular had to be forced open to 
international trade.”216 Second, the balance of power and interests within the 
bourgeoisie” would have to be shifted “from production activities to 
institutions of finance capital.”217 Finally, as discussed in the previous section, 
inflation would need to be curtailed (because confidence in the USD as the key 
currency in international financial relations was being rapidly eroded by 
ongoing devaluation). Ultimately, both a solution to the ongoing crisis of 
profitability and each of these necessary political-economic changes required 
for the effective operation of the DWSR were provided by the global spread of 
neoliberalism.  
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Neoliberalism 
As a political ideology, neoliberalism derives from a mid-Twentieth 
Century revival of many of the ideas originally encapsulated in classical 
European liberalism.218 In accordance with classical liberalism, neoliberalism 
centrally enshrines individual freedom as its core value. From this it is 
maintained that the economic freedom of the individual should essentially be 
inviolable. The individual’s pursuit of their own rational, utility-maximising 
self-interest comprises “a profoundly political and moral force”, that is a 
fundamental prerequisite for the existence of a truly free and open society.219  
Neoliberalism can be readily distinguished from its classical predecessor, 
however, most notably by its treatment of the free market. 220  Free market 
exchange is accorded considerably elevated significance within neoliberal 
doctrine. Indeed, as Treanor delineates, under neoliberalism the free market 
effectively becomes “an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to all human 
action, and substituting for all previous held ethical beliefs.”221 Fundamentally, 
neoliberalism maintains that the free market operates as the central driving 
force of human freedom and “that the social good will be maximized by 
maximising the reach and frequency of market transactions.”222 Thus, as Harvey 
summarises, 
 
neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can be best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade.223  
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 Neoliberalism combines its steadfast dedication to principles of 
individual economic freedom and the free market with a revival of many of the 
key assumptions of neoclassical economics that had prevailed as the intellectual 
orthodoxy prior to the emergence of Keynesianism. 224  Most notably, it is 
assumed under neoliberalism that the free market is inherently efficient and 
self-regulating. As Roper observes, each of the major “schools of economic 
thought that have provided the intellectual foundations for neoliberalism” -  
including the influential Austrian and Chicago Schools especially - “accept the 
central neoclassical assumption that the economy is always tending toward 
general equilibrium with full employment of resources.”225 
With its core ideas upholding individual economic and market freedom 
(and also the inherent rationality of free markets) as paramount, extensive 
government involvement in the economy and society is anathema to 
neoliberalism.226 As Harvey observes, “neoliberal doctrine…[is] deeply opposed 
to state interventionist theories, such as those of John Maynard Keynes”, the 
author of the social democratic/corporatist orthodoxy that prevailed during the 
long economic boom that followed the Second World War. 227  According to 
neoliberal theory, the state should only have a minimal role in the regulation of 
economic activity. This role should be focused on providing and maintaining 
those specific institutional arrangements that are necessary to ensuring the 
freedom of the individual.228 “Beyond these tasks”, however, “the state should 
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not venture.”229 Policy decisions involving state intervention in the market are 
to be avoided because they have an inherent tendency towards political bias.230 
State interventions will inevitably be skewed by the efforts of vested interests 
seeking to maximise the economic benefits of state actions for themselves.231 In 
addition, state economic decision-making is also “bound to be wrong because 
the information available to the state…[can]not rival that contained in market 
signals.”232 
It follows from these guiding philosophical precepts that the key 
prescriptions of the neoliberal policy agenda are primarily oriented towards 
establishing and upholding private property rights, maintaining the rule of law, 
extending the reach of capitalist markets and market mechanisms (including 
into government and society), and establishing political and economic 
institutions capable of ensuring that free-market capitalism is able to operate 
without interruption (including across international borders). 233  In his well-
known treatise on the apparent merits of neoliberal globalisation The Lexus and 
the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman provides the classic summary of the neoliberal 
policy agenda. 
  
A country must either adopt, or be seen to be moving toward, the 
following golden rules: making the private sector the primary 
engine of its economic growth, maintaining a low rate of inflation 
and price stability, shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy, 
maintaining as close to a balanced budget as possible, if not a 
surplus, eliminating and lowering tariffs on imported goods, 
removing restrictions on foreign investment, getting rid of quotas 
and domestic monopolies, increasing exports, privatising state-
owned industries and utilities, deregulating capital markets, 
making its currency convertible, opening its industries, stock and 
bond markets to direct foreign ownership and investment, 
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deregulating its economy to promote as much domestic 
competition as possible, eliminated government corruption, 
subsidies and kickbacks as possible, opening its banking and 
telecommunications systems to private ownership and 
competition, and allowing its citizens to choose from an array of 





From the late 1970s onwards a strong and widespread global trend 
towards neoliberalism took place.235 Across the world a vast number of states 
implemented programmes of economic reform broadly in accordance with the 
neoliberal policy framework latterly codified in the so-called ‘Washington 
Consensus’.236 Consequently, facilitated in part by the decline and subsequent 
collapse of the USSR and its alternative command and control economic system, 
by the mid-1990s an almost complete international neoliberal order had been 
established.  
It is important to observe that this was not the outcome of an 
internationally uniform process. Rather, as Harvey observes, the global spread 
of neoliberalism has been “a process of significantly uneven geographic 
development” and “on the world stage has evidently been a very complex 
process entailing multiple determinations.”237 However, while each individual 
case of national neoliberalisation was the unique product of the operation of a 
complex nexus of multiple weakly-acting causal pathways specific to the 
prevailing political-economic conditions of each respective state, each unique 
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case of neoliberalisation should also be viewed as forming a constituent part of 
a larger global neoliberalisation project.  
In broad terms, the global neoliberalisation project has been 
characterised by a generalised dichotomy between the respective experiences of 
the states of the advanced capitalist world and the developing world. In the 
advanced capitalist world, the “drive towards neoliberalisation” was, for the 
most part, a voluntary process achieved through domestically-based democratic 
political projects.238 As Harvey outlines, “Neoliberalism…had long been lurking 
in the wings of public policy” in most Western liberal democracies, yet it largely 
“remained on the margins of both policy and academic influence until the 
troubled years of the 1970s.” 239 At this point, to some extent motivated by the 
previously mentioned crisis in the “ideological hegemony” of social democratic 
Keynesianism, neoliberalism underwent its ascent to ideological and political 
prominence throughout the advanced capitalist world.240  
In the majority of cases, the rise of neoliberalism in advanced capitalist 
states was enabled by increasingly powerful pro-neoliberal blocs of social forces. 
These usually included, most prominently, private financial interests, 
conservative financial officials and transnational business interests, but also, 
more generally, domestic business interests, wealthy urban professionals and 
social conservatives (including in the US specifically, the Christian right).241 As 
Harvey again outlines, “sufficient popular consent” to formally legitimise the 
shift to neoliberalism was generated by the exertion of significant influence on 
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behalf of these social bases through a number of key “channels.”242 “Powerful 
[neoliberal] ideological influences” were, for example, “circulated through the 
corporations, the media,… the numerous institutions that constitute civil 
society – such as the universities, schools, churches, and professional 
associations”, and the establishment of “various well-financed think-tanks” like 
the British Institute of Economic Affairs and the American Heritage 
Foundation.243 
As a result, from the late 1970s onwards, democratic preference for 
neoliberalism grew significantly amongst the citizens of the wider advanced 
capitalist world. This culminated in the consolidation of neoliberalism as the 
new “orthodoxy regulating public policy…in the advanced capitalist world.”244 
This was initially signaled by the election of the defining neoliberal 
governments of Margaret Thatcher in the UK in May 1979, Ronald Reagan in 
the US in the following year, and a pattern of similar electoral outcomes 
unfolding across the advanced capitalist world during the 1980s.245 Later, the 
ideological ascent of neoliberalism appeared to be confirmed by the collapse of 
the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991, an event which effectively brought to an end 
any other major alternative economic model (with the possible exception of 
China). 
The process of financialisation that, as we have seen, played an 
important role in the decision of the US to detach from the BWS in the early 
1970s was also causally significant to the broader shift to neoliberalism in the 
advanced capitalist countries that followed.246 Indeed, it has been asserted that 
“most, if not all, analysts on the left now agree that ‘neoliberalism’ is the 
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ideological expression of the reassertion of the power of finance.”247 As outlined 
in the previous chapter, business is cross-cut by various fractional divisions, 
and the balance of power between these fractions can shift over time. The 
ongoing process of financialisation within global capitalism appears to have 
eventually resulted in such a shift. The research of Krippner suggests that 
around the mid-1970s finance became the ascendant power within capital – at 
least in the US.248 It is of course important not to overplay the extent that private 
financial interests were able to dictate subsequent policy decisions, but  
neoliberalism nevertheless appears to be, to some extent, an ideological 
response to an underlying “shift in gravity of economic activity from 
production to finance.”249 
Dumenil and Levy have developed what perhaps comprises the most 
influential thesis along such lines. Centrally, they argue that while neoliberal 
“ideology was a crucial political tool in the establishment of neoliberalism”, 
“ideology was not the engine of the neoliberal revolution.” 250  Instead, they 
maintain, what took place essentially constituted a sort of “financial coup.”251 In 
their widely cited work The Roots of the Neoliberal Revolution they empirically 
outline how the onset of stagflation had posed a serious economic threat to the 
position of finance capital especially (as well as what they refer to as the ‘ruling 
classes’ more generally). Subsequently they argue that, in response to this 
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apparent existential threat, “finance took over the state and institutions of the 
Keynesian compromise”, thereby effectively establishing “a second financial 
hegemony.”252 
In direct contrast to the experience in the advanced capitalist world, a 
major driver of neoliberal restructuring in the developing world has been the 
coercive imposition of neoliberal state apparatuses by external forces. This 
dynamic is particularly evident in the neoliberalisation processes experienced 
in Latin America (although, now, increasingly reversed and challenged), East 
Asia, Africa, and Central and Eastern Europe. Externally imposed 
neoliberalisation has generally been achieved in two main ways. 
First, neoliberal institutional and policy arrangements have often been 
foisted directly onto other nations by the US via military means.253 This method 
was employed, most prominently, in the first historical case of imposed 
neoliberalisation in Chile in 1973. On 11 September, 1973, Augusto Pinochet led 
a military coup, overthrowing the democratically-elected, but left-leaning, 
government of Salvador Allende. Pinochet was backed by a body of domestic 
business elites, but also received significant direct support from major US 
corporations, the CIA, and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.254 Following 
the coup, violent repression of popular leftist social and political organisations 
was immediately undertaken and a group of economists trained at the 
University of Chicago (thus quite literally members of Milton Friedman’s 
previously mentioned ‘Chicago School’) were brought in to ‘revive’ the Chilean 
economy.255 Working in partnership with IMF, this group of economists (then 
referred to as ‘monetarists’) undertook a major project of economic 
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restructuring closely adhering to pure neoliberal policy prescriptions.256 Most 
prominently, the labour market was deregulated, import protections were lifted, 
nationalisations were reversed, public assets were privatised, the primary sector 
of the economy was opened up to untrammeled private and foreign 
exploitation (with the notable exception of the crucially important copper 
industry), welfare provision was privatised, and controls on FDI, trade and the 
repatriation of profits were greatly reduced.257  
Many similar processes of neoliberalisation were experienced in 
developing nations during the 1970s and 1980s. As part of its so-called ‘dirty 
war’ foreign policy strategy, for example, the US state backed the emergence of 
a number of brutal right-wing military regimes in Central America (and also in 
Argentina) and prompted them to implement neoliberal reforms. 258 
Furthermore, it is important to note that militarily imposed neoliberalisation 
was an ongoing phenomenon during the 2000s.259 This point is most cogently 
illustrated by the US’s imposition by force of a neoliberal state apparatus on 
Iraq in the months following its ‘pre-emptive’ invasion in 2003.260 As Harvey 
outlines, despite it overtly contravening the principles of both the Geneva and 
The Hague conventions, beginning on 19 September 2003, the head of the US-
led Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer, initiated a comprehensive 
program of neoliberal reforms in Iraq.261 This applied to all sectors of the Iraqi 
economy (except for oil) and included, most prominently: complete 
privatisation of all public enterprises (“getting inefficient state enterprises into 
private hands is essential for Iraq’s economic recovery”, claimed Bremer); 
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providing foreign ownership rights to Iraqi businesses; allowing unhindered 
repatriation of profits; opening Iraqi banks to foreign control; providing for the 
national treatment of foreign firms; the dismantling of external trade tariffs; the 
strict regulation of the labour market (legally restricting unionisation and strike 
activity); and the introduction of a highly regressive ‘flat-tax’ system.262 
The second main way in which neoliberalism has been externally 
imposed on the developing world has been through the exploitation of financial 
crises.263 This was, for example, a key instrument in bringing about a wave of 
neoliberal domestic transformations in Latin America in the 1980s.264 As was 
discussed in the previous section, the 1973 oil crisis generated a glut of 
petrodollars for OPEC members and, at US insistence, most of these excess 
funds were recycled through Wall Street investment banks. The dispersal of 
these funds by Wall Street was heavily concentrated amongst a small group of 
credit-hungry Latin American and East Asian economies. Indeed, Theberge 
notes that, via this process Latin America effectively quadrupled “its external 
debt from $75 billion in 1975 to more than $314 billion in 1983.”265 The loans 
made to these countries, however, were denominated in the now de-
commodified USD of the DWSR. This left the recipient countries increasingly 
vulnerable in the context of the rising US interest rates associated with the 
previously mentioned ‘Volcker Shock’. Financial markets chasing expanding 
interest rate differentials between the US and other countries drove up the 
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value of the USD and, simultaneously, the debt and interest burdens of those 
countries who had borrowed significant funds. Consequently, beginning with 
Mexico in August 1982, a host of overburdened Latin American countries were 
pushed into default on their loans. This left the governments concerned in the 
unenviable position of having to turn to the IMF for debt relief.266  
The IMF was subsequently deployed to organise the rescheduling of the 
debt. As Pastor observes, throughout the remainder of “the decade, Fund 
missions shuttled from country to country” across Latin America negotiating 
debt relief. 267  However, debt relief was only provided in exchange for the 
subject governments agreeing to undertake a radical programme of so-called 
‘structural adjustment’; the adoption and implementation of the comprehensive 
programme of neoliberal policy reforms of the Washington Consensus.268 
Thus, throughout most of the advanced capitalist world the historic shift 
to neoliberalism was largely a voluntary process. Neoliberal governments were 
generally installed into power via democratic processes. In contrast, the 
experience of neoliberalisation for much of the Global South was strongly 
characterised by elements of external coercion. As Dumenil and Levy 
summarise: 
 
the international neoliberal order – known as neoliberal 
globalisation – was imposed throughout the world, from the main 
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capitalist countries of the centre to the less developed countries of 
the periphery, often at the cost of severe crises as in Asia and 
Latin America during the 1990s and after 2000. As in any stage of 
imperialism, the major instruments of these international power 
relations, beyond straightforward economic violence, are 
corruption, subversion, and war. The main political tool is always 
the establishment of a local imperial-friendly government. The 
collaboration of the elites of the dominated country is crucial, as 
well as, in contemporary capitalism, the action of international 
institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank 
(WB), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).269 
 
 
Neoliberal Economic Recovery and the DWSR 
 A common refrain among radical political economists is that the great 
structural crisis of capitalism of the 1970s that, as we have seen, resulted from 
declining corporate profitability and over-accumulation has yet to be 
resolved. 270  While their views and subsequent arguments often vary 
significantly, centrally, as Callinicos (who includes himself in this group) 
observes, “all these theorists affirm the following: global capitalism has yet to 
exit from the era of economic crisis into which it entered in the late 1960s.”271 
Foster and Magdoff, for example, state that “the ‘golden age’ of prosperity” 
following World War II “turned…into a ‘leaden age’”, and that “this slowdown 
of stagnation has now persisted for four decades, and has only gotten worse 
over time.”272 Similarly, Brenner argues that “the sharp fall in manufacturing 
profit rates” in the late 1960s ultimately heralded nothing less than an “epochal 
shift from long expansion to long stagnation for the world economy.”273 
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Global neoliberalisation, however, was not simply some sort of “utopian 
project to realise a theoretical design for the reorganisation of international 
capitalism.” 274  Rather, it fundamentally constituted “a political project to re-
establish the conditions for capital accumulation.” 275 As McNally argues, “in 
truth, [it] was a pure and simple program for restoring corporate profits – 
nothing more, nothing less”, and it was ultimately successful.276 Following the 
widespread fall in profit rates which, as we have already seen, set in sometime 
during the late 1960s, profit rates continued to fall throughout much of the 
1970s. Then, from 1982 to 1997, “the average rate of profit rose persistently” 
throughout the advanced capitalist core.277 The onset of the East Asian financial 
crisis appears to have coincided with the rate of profit once again entering into 
a downward trajectory. As McNally observes, this downward trajectory “seems 
to have reversed for a time after 2001.”278 
 The recovery of profit rates under neoliberalism underpinned a period of 
relatively strong economic expansion. 279  Three distinct phases of economic 
growth can be distinguished during the era of global neoliberalism, with each 
of these phases separated by a brief (but often sharp) economic downturn. The 
first, beginning in 1982, ended in 1990. This was followed by a second, slightly 
longer growth phase – popularly dubbed ‘the roaring nineties’ in the US - that 
lasted from 1991 until 2000. The final phase of growth ran from after the 
bursting of the so-called dot.com bubble in 2001 until the onset of the GFC in 
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2007.280 The global economy did not, of course, generally witness a return of the 
historically elevated growth rates that had characterised much of the long post-
war boom. 281  But it is nevertheless evident that “the system underwent a 
sustained wave of expansion” during the period from 1982 to 2007. 282 
Furthermore, as can be seen from Table 2.3 (above), this expansion compares 
well against other major phases in the history of global capitalism.283 
The global spread of neoliberalism also provided the means for the 
effective curtailment of inflation. Indeed, it has been suggested that “the 
reduction and control of inflation is the only systematic success 
neoliberalisation can claim.”284 After being rampant throughout the course of 
the 1970s, high system-wide inflation has not reappeared since the neoliberal 
turn. Following on from Figure 2.1 (above), Figure 2.3 shows the rate of 
inflation across the advanced capitalist world during the period from 1984 to 
2011. As can be seen, following the implementation of the Volcker Shock, global 
inflation was progressively brought under control. Over the course of the 1980s 
and up until the late-1990s, inflation fell more or less continuously (minor 
temporary increases notwithstanding). Subsequently, throughout the first 
decade of the 2000s, a relatively low level of inflation was effectively 
maintained.285 
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Figure 2.3) Inflation in the Advanced Capitalist Economies during 
the Neoliberal Era286 
 
Source: World Bank historical data set. 
By greatly increasing real interest rates, the imposition of price stability 
privileged lenders.287 This contributed to the great expansion of processes of 
financialisation that have been a prominent feature of restored neoliberal 
capitalism. 288  In broad terms, financialisation can be accurately viewed as 
referring to “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial 
actors and financial institutions” in the operation of contemporary political 
economies. 289  Financialisation in contemporary capitalism has primarily 
involved significant growth in both “the comparative size and profit rate of the 
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financial sector.”290 Empirical evidence demonstrates that within the OECD, 
financial institutions and the share of overall profits accruing to them have 
grown considerably. 291  Financialisation in contemporary capitalism has also 
involved significant changes in virtually all other sectors of the economy. Non-
financial corporations are increasingly involved in (and often reliant on) 
financial activities as part of their day-to-day business operations, financial 
motives have become central to their corporate governance models via “the 
imposition of managerial criteria such as the creation of value for the 
shareholder”, and “the financial component of management” has also 
expanded.292 Furthermore, financialisation has entailed an increasing role for 
finance in everyday life.293 This notably includes the increased involvement of 
individuals in financial markets as both savers and consumers.294 
The tendency to privilege the interests of financiers over the creation of 
an environment immediately conducive to productive investment under 
neoliberalism also provided for the extensive growth in both the size and depth 
of IPFMs. As Epstein observes, “in the last thirty years, international financial 
transactions have grown by leaps and bounds.”295 International private financial 
flows constituted by FDI, international bank lending, international bond issues, 
international equity trading, derivatives and futures trading, and international 
currency trading have all increased significantly since the inauguration of the 
neoliberal era.296 As can be seen from Table 2.6, for example, annual FX market 
turnover has undergone immense, historically unprecedented growth. 
Moreover, as Table 2.7 emphasises, in recent years, in terms of the key FX 
market especially, this IPFM expansion has continued unchecked. As the BIS 
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reports, “turnover in the foreign exchange market has continued to expand 
rapidly in recent years.” 297  Between 2010 and 2013 FX turnover across all 
instruments increased on average by around 35% per annum. This easily 
eclipsed the 19% average yearly increase between 2007 and 2010.298 In addition, 
trade in exchange-traded derivatives continues to increase (although at a 
decidedly more sedate pace). Average daily turnover in exchange-traded 
derivatives increased from US$155 billion to US$160 billion between 2010 and 
2013. 299 
Table 2.6) Estimated Global Annual FX Market Turnover during the 
Neoliberal Era (US$trillion) 
 
1979 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
17.5 75 190 252 298 458 438 694 1163 1449 1951 
Source: BIS 2007, 4; 2013, 3, 9; Held et al, 202-211. 
 
Table 2.7) Average Daily Global FX and Derivatives Trading, 1998 to 2013 




1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 
FX Market 
Turnover 




11 12 26 80 155 160 
Source: BIS 2013, 9. 
 
The massive growth of IPFMs during the neoliberal era coincided with a 
significant expansion of their geographic reach. To paraphrase from the 
Communist Manifesto, no longer even partially curtailed by BWS capital and 
exchange controls, during the neoliberal era private financial capital has spread 
out over virtually the whole surface of the globe, establishing connections 
                                                          
297
 BIS 2008, Annual Report (Basle: Bank of International Settlements), 87. 
298
 BIS 2013, 4. 
299
 Ibid, 9. 
The Shift to Neoliberalism in New Zealand 131 
 
everywhere.300 As the BIS has comprehensively documented, the “breadth and 
depth of links between mature and emerging financial markets”, in particular, 
have increased considerably during the neoliberal era.301 While global financial 
flows remain heavily concentrated between the major advanced capitalist 
economies, international financial institutions have also rapidly established 
themselves as important, if not dominant, actors in the domestic financial 
systems of most so-called “emerging markets.”302 
Thus, in addition to delivering a sustained global economic recovery, the 
global spread of neoliberalism also provided the key bases necessary for 
cementing the financial dominance of the US globally including, most notably, 
the ongoing hegemony of the USD.303 Intra-capital power was shifted decisively 
towards finance across the advanced capitalist world. Simultaneously, cross-
border capital flows were progressively freed from constraints. In essence, then, 
the DWSR developed symbiotically with the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’, 
and global neoliberalisation ultimately provided the necessary regulatory 
infrastructure for the effective “diffusion of [US] power through the dollar.”304 
In his seminal work The New Imperialism, Harvey outlines that the 
simultaneous deepening and expansion of IPFMs (outlined above) has allowed 
the deployment of “an unholy alliance between state powers and the predatory 
aspects of finance capital” as “the cutting edge of a ‘vulture capitalism’ 
dedicated to the appropriation and devaluation of assets.”305 This process is 
referred to as “accumulation by dispossession.”306 In broad terms, accumulation 
by dispossession has tended to entail IPFMs, backed by the monetary 
                                                          
300
 Marx and Engels, 46-7. 
301
 P. Wooldridge, D. Domanski, and A. Cobau 2003, “Changing Links between Mature and Emerging 




 Foster and Magdoff, 75 
304
 Seabrooke, 68, 
305
 Harvey 2003a, 78. 
306
 Ibid. For a detailed account of what is meant by ‘accumulation by dispossession’ see 2003b, 137-182. 
The Shift to Neoliberalism in New Zealand 132 
 
institutions of the US Government and the IMF, exploiting foreign debt to 
externally impose successive major financial crises “upon one sector or upon a 
territory or whole territorial complex of capitalist activity.” 307  A stock of 
devalued assets is thereby created, which can then be appropriated by US-
dominated international capital. The quintessence of this key dynamic within 
contemporary global capitalism is captured most cogently by Wade and 
Veneroso’s discussion of the 1997-98 East Asian financial meltdown: 
…there is no doubt that Western and Japanese corporations are 
the big winners...The combination of massive devaluations, IMF-
pushed financial liberalisation, and IMF-facilitated recovery may 
even precipitate the biggest peacetime transfer of assets from 
domestic to foreign owners in the past fifty years anywhere in the 
world, dwarfing the transfers from domestic to US owners in 
Latin America in the 1980s or in Mexico after 1994.308 
 
 At this point it is perhaps worthwhile to briefly consider that, for a large 
number of authors, the extensive financialisation that has taken place under 
global neoliberalism - combined with the emergence of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ as a major feature of contemporary capitalism - is indicative of a 
deeper structural change in the underlying nature of contemporary 
capitalism.309 Exemplary of this is Krippner who has argued that since the mid-
1970s “a pattern of accumulation” has emerged “in which profit making occurs 
increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and 
commercial production.”310 As noted by Van der Zwan, the broader “regime of 
accumulation” thesis (as she terms it) is most commonly linked to the so-called 
Regulation School.311 Key Regulationist authors such as Aglietta and Boyer have 
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suggested that a finance-led, ‘post-Fordist’ capitalist growth regime has 
emerged and matured during the era of global neoliberalism.312 However, not 
entirely dissimilar arguments have also been advanced by others, including 
many Marxists and post-Keynesians. 313  A common theme amongst Marxist 
analyses of financialisation in particular is that the shift from industrial to 
finance capitalism ultimately stems from an ongoing decline of the ‘real’ 
productive economy.314 Due to the persistence of stagnation in the productive 
sectors of the economy a sort of parasitic ‘rentier’ economy has emerged that 
primarily relies on asset bubbles and speculation for the generation of profits.315 
In essence, the economy “as a whole”, to paraphrase Foster and Magdoff, has 
increasingly taken on “the colouration of speculative finance.”316 
The overarching thesis of this literature – that financialisation reflects the 
fact that “something has actually radically changed in contemporary capitalism” 
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– has considerable value. 317  It has, after all, proved to constitute a useful 
theoretical basis on which to develop numerous crucial insights into the inner 
workings of the advanced capitalist economies under global neoliberalism.318 
However, as Boyer quite usefully reminds us, we must remain mindful of the 
fact that ultimately “finance is an element in, but not the whole of, this complex 
emerging regime.”319 That is, the revival of capitalism during the neoliberal era 
has involved much more than simply an expansion of finance, predatory 
raiding, and asset-price speculation.320 To be sure, these have been increasingly 
prominent economic elements and, as Panitch and Gindin relate, there is no 
doubt that financialisation processes have effectively “blurred the old lines 
between financial and non-financial activities” during the neoliberal era. But 
finance and industry nevertheless retain their distinct characteristics. 321 
Furthermore, while the so-called ‘FIRE economy’ has expanded significantly, 
industry and commerce has been far from stagnant.322 Indeed, in many respects 
they have veritably thrived under neoliberalism. Global neoliberalisation has, 
afterall, been a catalyst for an acceleration of the globalising tendencies within 
capitalism that, as we have seen, were already advancing steadily under 
Keynesianism and the BWS. Cross-border investment underwent a massive 
expansion. Growing at an annual rate of 12%, the global stock of FDI rose from 
just 6.5% of GDP in 1980 to 32% of GDP in 2007.323 Simultaneously, during the 
period from 1980 to the onset of the GFC in 2007, global trade underwent a 
massive expansion. Growing at an annual rate of 8.7%, world trade as a share of 
GDP increased from 32% to 57%.324 Together, these dynamics reflect a massive 
geographic restructuring of capitalism which has resulted in the emergence of 
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what is now widely considered to be a truly “global capitalism.” 325  It is 
important to observe that this “expansion of trade and investment worldwide 
would have been impossible in the absence of the parallel development of 
banking activity and the globalisation of financial mechanisms.”326 
In essence, reflecting the shift in the intra-capital balance of power that, 
as we have seen, appears to have occurred sometime during the 1970s, it is only 
logical that many key aspects of the neoliberal policy agenda distinctly favour 
the interests of private financial capital. The seemingly unbending focus of 
neoliberal macroeconomic management on achieving and subsequently 
maintaining a low stable level of inflation, for example, is clearly to the 
advantage of financiers.327 But states have not just implemented policies that 
only favoured finance during the neoliberal era. They have also implemented 
policies favourable to private enterprise more broadly. Such things as labour 
and capital market liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation, served to 
systematically increase the underlying rate of exploitation, create new markets, 
and open up entirely new geographic spaces to capital penetration.328 In-effect, 
states took responsibility for implementing a policy agenda that successfully 
mobilised a series of major counter-tendencies to the falling rate of profit that, 
as we have seen, became manifest from the late 1960s onwards. On this basis, 
the rate of profit was temporarily restored, and “a volatile but nonetheless real 
process of sustained capitalist expansion” followed.329 
This is not, of course, to deny the “massive expansion of finance in global 
accumulation”, or its overall importance to the restoration of corporate 
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profitability and economic growth.330 After all, the economic growth wave of 
2001 to 2007 was based in considerable measure on the inflation of a series of 
speculative real estate bubbles in the US and elsewhere following a loosening of 
monetary policy by the US Federal Reserve.331 Nor, indeed, is it to entirely 
repudiate the possibility that a fundamental change in the regime of 
accumulation may have occurred. Rather it is to highlight a necessary empirical 
corrective to the apparent pervasive overstatement of the extent to which 
finance has come to dominate contemporary political economies.332 The typical 
counter-position of stagnating or declining production and thriving finance 
within many political economy explanations of neoliberal financialisation 
thoroughly misrepresents the actual historical nature of neoliberal capitalism.333 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the process popularly referred to as 
‘globalisation’ is fundamentally rooted in the expansive dynamics of the 
capitalist mode of production. Centrally, the dynamic of competitive 
accumulation that to a significant extent defines the capitalist system, produces 
an inherent tendency within capitalism for the rate of profit to fall over time. 
This inherent predisposition, in-turn, periodically generates systemic crises that 
profoundly shape the dynamics of globalisation. The crises inherent to the 
system primarily serve to promote a major ongoing process of geographic 
reorganisation that is ultimately oriented towards, at least temporarily, 
restoring the system-wide average rate of profit. 
In addition, it has also been argued that over the last several decades the 
prominent financial aspect of globalisation has taken place under the auspices 
of the DWSR. The DWSR has functioned to firmly entrench the US into a 
position of dominance in the realm of international financial affairs. Based 
around two main mutually reinforcing pillars – a US dollar standard and the 
centrality of US-dominated IPFMs in international monetary relations – the 
DWSR has served to shift the basis of the US’s global hegemony into the very 
structure of the international financial system. For the majority of the world, 
DWSR integration has effectively meant the virtual surrender of the 
formulation of domestic macroeconomic policy to the vagaries of IPFMs and US 
policy decisions. 
Given the considerable advantages that accrue to the US through the 
DWSR arrangements, it is clear that they were established at least partly as a 
means of sustaining the political and economic power of the US in the 
international arena. However, they were not formulated entirely unilaterally, or 
in historical isolation. Rather the DWSR initially emerged in response to 
significant economic developments that, while beginning earlier, became 
increasingly pronounced in the early 1970s. At this time economic growth 
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slowed considerably in the US and elsewhere as the rate of profit across the 
advanced capitalist world fell precipitously and a generalised crisis of over-
accumulation set in. Simultaneously, the increasingly internationalised and 
financialised nature of international economic activity (including the emergence 
of the unregulated Eurodollar market) placed what ultimately constituted 
unbearable pressure on the existing BWS arrangements. In order to counter 
these pressures, the US asserted its hegemony by abandoning the official link 
between the USD and gold, and subsequently overseeing the cancellation of the 
BWS capital and exchange controls. These moves temporarily alleviated some 
of the mounting economic and financial pressures being exerted on the US, but 
did not provide a viable long-term solution to the problems gripping both the 
US as hegemon and the rest of the advanced capitalist economies. Ultimately, 
the solution was provided by the geographically-disparate process of global 
neoliberalisation. The global neoliberalisation project formed the cornerstone of 
a Us-sponsored, finance-led business counter-offensive aimed at the 
reinvigoration of global capitalism (which was largely successful). 
Simultaneously, the global spread of neoliberalism also provided the key 
political-economic changes required for the ongoing viability of the DWSR as a 
system governing international monetary and financial relations. 
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The Shift to Neoliberalism in New Zealand: The Fourth Labour 




In the previous chapter, it was argued that what is popularly referred to 
as ‘globalisation’ is, in-fact, a product of the operation of a tendency towards 
expansion inherent within the capitalist mode of production. It was also argued 
that the prominent financial aspect of contemporary globalisation – of which, 
the influence on New Zealand’s political system is the focus of this thesis - has 
taken place under a US-dominated global financial structure referred to here as 
the Dollar-Wall Street Regime (DWSR). Under the DWSR, extensively 
liberalised and highly deregulated international private financial markets 
(IPFMs) dominate international monetary relations, with domestic-level 
macroeconomic policy formulation largely subsumed to the vagaries of these 
IPFMs and the financial decision-making undertaken by the institutions of the 
US state. The DWSR initially emerged in response to accelerating economic 
processes of internationalisation and financialisation that critically undermined 
the efficacy of the existing BWS, and the near contemporaneous onset of a major 
global economic downturn. Subsequently, it became fully developed and 
expanded in geographic scope through the geographically uneven, yet 
nevertheless comprehensive, global shift to neoliberalism.  
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This analysis has significant implications for our understanding of how 
major global financial forces influence developments within New Zealand’s 
domestic political economy. Primarily, this is because from 1984 onwards, New 
Zealand followed the international trend towards neoliberalisation. Indeed, 
New Zealand’s historic shift to neoliberalism has been widely upheld as 
constituting a model of such speed and purity as to warrant international 
emulation.334 So what, then, gave rise to neoliberalisation in New Zealand? It is 
this issue that will be the primary focus of this chapter.  
The discussion will begin with a brief overview of the political 
circumstances that prevailed during the key period of neoliberal reform 
between 1984 and 1990. It will then move on to provide a more detailed account 
of the program of financial deregulation and ‘monetarist’ macroeconomic 
management that was both at the very forefront of New Zealand’s neoliberal 
reforms and also effectively resulted in New Zealand’s full integration into the 
DWSR. Following this, each of the groupings of actors that played a key role in 
the initial promotion and subsequent shift to neoliberalism will be discussed. 
These are: the cabinet under the Fourth Labour Government; the government’s 
most important institutional advisors, the Treasury and the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand (RBNZ); and business. Finally, existing accounts of the broader 
set of changes within New Zealand’s political economy that underpinned the 
progress of the overt political project will be outlined.  
In anticipation, it will be argued that like much of the rest of the 
advanced capitalist world, New Zealand’s neoliberalisation was also the 
outcome of a distinctly domestic political project. It will also be argued that, 
fundamentally, the process of neoliberalisation in New Zealand was 
simultaneously moulded by a broader set of underlying political-economic 
developments including: the end of the post-war economic boom and the onset 
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of ‘stagflation’; a shift in the societal balance of power in favour of business; and 
a major shift in the prevailing international intellectual orthodoxy in the realm 
of economics from Keynesianism to neoliberalism during the 1970s. 
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3.1)  The Fourth Labour Government: A Political Overview 
The key point in New Zealand’s historic shift to neoliberalism was the 
election of the Fourth Labour Government to power on 14 July 1984. The 
Labour Party received 42.4% of the total votes cast at the election and secured a 
powerful parliamentary majority of 56 seats. The incumbent National Party, in 
comparison, received 35.7% of the vote and 37 seats. Social Credit, the only 
other party to gain representation at the election, secured 2 seats on the back of 
receiving 7.6% of the vote.335 As Roper outlines, Labour’s victory was aided 
significantly by the performance of the newly formed New Zealand Party. 
Founded by property magnate Sir Robert Jones, the New Zealand Party 
attracted 12.3% of the total vote (but no seats) at the 1984 election. It was able to 
achieve this primarily by securing “the support of traditional National voters 
who were alienated by [incumbent National Prime Minister Robert] Muldoon’s 
interventionism.”336 The New Zealand Party thus bolstered Labour’s result by 
effectively cannibalising a substantial portion of National’s support base. 
On coming into office, the new Fourth Labour Government was 
immediately faced with a serious foreign exchange (FX) crisis. 337  With 
expectations of an official devaluation following the announcement of a snap 
election by Prime Minister Robert Muldoon on 14 June, in June and July 1984, 
private international currency traders had launched a series of major 
speculative attacks on the New Zealand dollar.338 On the express orders of 
Prime Minister (and Minister of Finance) Muldoon, the RBNZ had subsequently 
spent an estimated $797 million worth of foreign reserves defending the 
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national currency (equivalent to 2.3% of GDP at the time). Consequently, as 
Dalziel and Lattimore detail, by the time of the 1984 election, the RBNZ’s 
official “reserves of overseas currencies, and its lines of credit with overseas 
lenders, were almost exhausted.”339 
Consistently reiterating the apparent seriousness of the situation, the 
newly appointed Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas, used this ‘inherited’ 
macroeconomic crisis to justify the rapid implementation of a broad ranging 
programme of neoliberal ‘structural adjustment’ during the Fourth Labour 
Government’s first term.340 This neoliberal policy agenda included: the adoption 
of a freely-floating foreign exchange regime and extensive deregulation of the 
local finance sector; the adoption of a ‘monetarist’ approach to macroeconomic 
management; extensive microeconomic reform; the abolition of state 
agricultural subsidies; regressive taxation reform reflecting the so-called 
‘supply-side’ school of economic thought;  and the adoption of a strategy of 
fiscal ‘austerity’ , including reduced social spending, and the privatisation and 
corporatisation of state-owned assets.341 
Such a radical shift in policy direction had not been signalled by Labour 
prior to the 1984 election.342 As Roper elaborates:  
 
most of those who voted Labour in 1984 expected the overall 
thrust of Labour’s policy-making to be left of the [Third National] 
Muldoon Government on a broad range of issues, including not 
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just sporting contacts with South Africa, nuclear ship visits, French 
nuclear testing in the South Pacific, and homosexual law reform, 
but also economic, social and industrial relations policy.343 
 
Thus, it is indeed dubious that the Fourth Labour Government possessed a 
legitimate democratic mandate for the hard line programme of neoliberal 
structural adjustment it subsequently enacted.344 
Labour was re-elected to power on 15 August 1987. Labour received 48% 
of the total vote and 57 parliamentary seats. National, in comparison, received 
44% of the vote and 40 seats. The Democrats (formerly Social Credit) received 
just 5.7% of the vote and lost both of the seats they had previously held.345 
Labour’s strong showing at the 1987 general election was underpinned by “a 
temporary [large scale] defection to it of traditional National voters.”346 The 
programme of radical neoliberal structural adjustment carried out by Labour 
during its first term resulted in the inflation of a large, but ultimately short-
lived, financial bubble.347 Having benefited disproportionately, many wealthy 
urban voters subsequently shifted their support from National to Labour in 
1987.348 
Mirroring developments on Wall Street and other major international 
financial markets, two months after the election, on 20 October 1987, the New 
Zealand sharemarket crashed. As Dalziel delineates: 
 
At the end of March 1985, the Barclays Share Price Index for the 
value of the New Zealand sharemarket had been 1463. Twelve 
months later, the index had increased by more than 50 per cent to 
2293 and by a further 42.5 per cent by the end of March 1987. The 
index peaked at 3969 on 18 September 1987 and was still at 3430 
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one month later on 19 October. The next day, however, the index 
fell by 14.7 per cent to 2925. It continued to slide for the rest of the 
year, settling at 1942 on 31 December, less than half its peak value 
three and a half months earlier.349 
 
Roger Douglas attempted to exploit the ensuing economic turmoil to 
extend his neoliberal reform agenda.350 “I believe the events of the last three 
weeks mean that we need to accelerate the process of reform”, he stated.351 On 
17 December 1987, a new package of neoliberal reforms was announced. The 
core of the package comprised major changes to the country’s tax and social 
support systems.352 The rate of company tax was to be reduced considerably, a 
uniform flat income tax rate was to be introduced, and GST was to be increased 
to 12.5%. 353  Simultaneously, as Kelsey outlines, previously “comprehensive 
welfare provision” would be replaced by “a new Guaranteed Minimum Family 
Income (GMFI).” 354  An extensive programme of privatisation was another 
prominent feature of the reform package. State assets were to be sold with the 
intention of raising $14 billion specifically for the purpose of retiring gross 
public debt by a full third by 1992.355 Other important elements of the new 
neoliberal reform package included: reductions in import protections; reform of 
local government operations; and liberalisation of the telecommunications 
industry.356 
Douglas’ aggressive moves to extend the neoliberal reform agenda 
fomented the emergence of “a crisis within the government.”357 Tensions had 
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been mounting for some time prior, but now full-blown intra-party conflict 
erupted. 358  Whilst generally supportive of the programme of free-market 
reforms implemented in the economic sphere (such as market and trade 
liberalisation), Lange and a number of other cabinet ministers were adamant 
that similar reforms would not be extended into the sphere of social policy. For 
Lange, however, the fundamental aim of Douglas’ December policy package 
was to do just that: 
 
The level of the flat tax was clearly designed to be the great push 
against the State...By then it had become completely transparent 
to me that what we had done by way of taxation was part of an 
agenda which said that there is only one way to make the 
Government get out of government and that is to tax as little as 
possible because then we’ll be able to say we don’t have any 
money to engage in social services.359 
 
Consequently, on 28 January 1988, Lange unilaterally cancelled significant 
portions of Douglas’ December policy package including, most notably, those 
relating the introduction of a flat tax and GMFI.360 Lange’s action precipitated 
the factional division of both the Cabinet and the wider Parliamentary caucus 
between the adherents of Rogernomics and those loyal to Lange. As Roper 
observes, “the ensuing political drama dragged on throughout the remainder of 
the Government’s second term in office”, even as “the Government continued 
zealously to implement neoliberal policies.”361 In November 1988, Lange sacked 
a close ally of Douglas, Richard Prebble, as Minister of State Owned 
Enterprises, and also Bevan Burgess, a key figure on Douglas’ staff. This 
induced Douglas’ effective resignation from Cabinet on 14 December 1988.362 
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Although “Lange easily survived a leadership challenge by Roger Douglas in 
caucus a week later”, Douglas and Prebble nevertheless continued to attack 
Lange’s leadership throughout 1989 with the support of a newly-formed 
neoliberal “Backbone Club.”363 Ultimately, this campaign was successful; on 7 
August 1989, Lange resigned as leader of the Labour Party and as Prime 
Minister.364 Lange’s deputy Geoffrey Palmer would temporarily succeed to the 
leadership before being replaced by Mike Moore in the lead up to Labour’s 
defeat at the 1990 election. Douglas and Prebble, meanwhile, were both 
returned to Cabinet.365  
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3.2) Financial Market Liberalisation and Monetarist Macroeconomic 
Reform 
The neoliberal policy agenda implemented in New Zealand during the 
period from 1984 to 1990 entailed a substantial programme of reforms affecting 
almost all major areas of public policy. As noted in the previous section, these 
reforms have already been covered by an extensive body of literature. The 
discussion here will focus on the Fourth Labour Government’s programme of 
financial liberalisation and its parallel adoption of a monetarist approach to 
macroeconomic management. 
 
Financial Market Liberalisation 
As documented by Harper and Karacaoglu, New Zealand’s pre-reform 
financial system was characterised by a high degree of direct government 
control. Interest rates, deposits, balance sheet structures, the direction and size 
of lending, external capital movements, market entry in financial services and 
banking, and segmentation barriers were all highly regulated. 366  The 
overarching function of the pre-reform financial regulatory regime was to 
enable the government to exercise a considerable degree of monetary control.367 
Prior to 1984, monetary policy was effectively dictated by government. Thus, 
tight “control over the growth of monetary aggregates” was a necessary 
prerequisite for the successful operation of monetary policy.368 Other key goals 
of the extant regulatory regime included: encouraging economic growth; 
promoting “equity in the financial intermediation process”; ensuring 
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government access to low-cost private funding; and the maintenance of macro-
level systemic stability.369 
From 1984 onwards, however, a “market-driven” approach to the 
management of New Zealand’s domestic financial system was adopted. As 
Kelsey observes, “Treasury’s solution was to replace the direct control of the 
state with the purportedly unbiased contractual mechanisms of insurance, 
common law and the market place.” 370  Overall, “the scope and speed of 
financial policy reform” programme implemented by the Fourth Labour 
Government “far exceeded those of the other components of the economic 
reform package.”371 The process of financial liberalisation began with a 20% 
devaluation of the dollar and the removal of interest rate controls.372 Thereafter, 
comprehensive financial reforms were rolled out at a blistering pace. Indeed, as 
Harper and Karacaoglu observe, “the scope and speed of financial policy 
reform in New Zealand [was] unequalled in the OECD.”373 By 1986: all price 
regulations in the financial sector and controls over the balance sheet structures 
of financial institutions (including those pertaining to borrowing and holding 
assets offshore) were removed; foreign exchange and capital controls were 
abolished; the dollar was floating freely; barriers to market entry or exit 
(including, most notably, controls over foreign involvement in domestic 
financial institutions) had been minimised to facilitate “contestability”; 
“prudent” supervision and liquidity management policies seeking to minimise 
system-wide effects of individual operator failure had been established; and 
“open market operations” had been adopted as the preferred instruments of 
monetary control for the RBNZ.374 Table 3.1 below provides a brief summary of 
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the key features of the liberalisation of New Zealand’s financial system carried 
out by the Fourth Labour Government between 1984 and 1990. 
 
Table 3.1) Financial Liberalisation in New Zealand 
1984 
 Run on the dollar leads to 
foreign exchange market 
closure. 
 Dollar devalued by 20%. 
 Interest rate controls removed. 
 Private offshore borrowing 
deregulated. 
 Credit growth guidelines 
abolished. 
 Exchange rate controls 
scrapped. 
1987 
 Rules governing operation of 
building societies liberalised and 
they are allowed to register as 
companies. 
1985 
 Reserve Asset Ratios and other 
ratio requirements abolished. 
 Dollar floated. 
 Controls on foreign ownership of 
domestic financial institutions 
scrapped. 
1988 
 Rules governing operation of 
Trustee Banks liberalised and 
requirement to register as 
companies introduced. 
 Postbank sold. 
1986 
 RBNZ’s powers of financial 
market oversight are extended 
and RBNZ given power to 
register banks. 
1990 
 Reserve Bank Act 1989 revises 
and extends RBNZ’s approach to 
prudential supervision of the 
financial system. 
Source: Goldfinch 2000, 86. For a more detailed list of financial market reforms between 1984 
and 1986 see Harper and Karacaoglu 1987, “Appendix: Reforms of Financial Regulation since 
July, 1984”, in Bollard and Buckle (eds.), Economic Liberalisation in New Zealand (Wellington: 
Allen and Unwin/Port Nicholson Press), 361-362. 
 
Fundamentally, it was the implementation of this programme of 
extensive financial market liberalisation and financial sector deregulation that 
constituted the integration of New Zealand into the DWSR.375 From this point 
on international private financial capital could freely penetrate and circulate in 
the New Zealand economy. Indeed, As Kelsey has pointed out, the 
comprehensive relaxation of capital and FX controls, in combination with the 
rapid deregulation of the financial system, essentially set in motion “market 
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forces which are free to generate monetary expansion” or contraction at will.376 
As a direct consequence of this control over international financial flows, the 
most important aspects of public policy formulation in New Zealand 
(monetary, FX, and fiscal policy) have been rendered susceptible to 
unprecedented levels of influence by the vagaries of IPFMs. 
 
Monetarist Macroeconomic Reform 
The adoption of monetarist policy prescriptions “which maintain firm 
control of increases in the monetary and credit aggregates, in a manner that 
does not accommodate higher inflation” was “a critical part of [the Fourth 
Labour] Government’s economic strategy.”377 Moreover, as will be shown in 
Chapter Five, it has continued to form the foundation of public macroeconomic 
policy in New Zealand since its inception in 1984. As set out in Treasury’s 1984 
post-election briefing paper, Economic Management, the official motivation for 
the Fourth Labour Government’s adoption of monetarism revolved around a 
concerted effort to reduce persistently rampant inflation. “Inflation is a 
problem...The key to reducing inflation over the medium term, and of 
ultimately achieving price-level stability, is a [monetary policy] aimed at 
restraining the growth of money and credit aggregates.”378 
The work of then Deputy Governor of the RBNZ Rod Deane indicates 
that the monetarist monetary policy strategy adopted by the Fourth Labour 
Government centred on “a brand of monetarism characterised by the simple 
quantity theory of (flexible) price determination”:379 
 
The principle objective of monetary policy... is to achieve suitably 
moderate and steady rates of growth of the major monetary 
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aggregates. Underlying this aim, of course, is the wish...to reduce 
the rate of inflation and to maximise the rate of increase in real 
national income.380 
 
In essence, it was conceived that in operating the monetarist 
macroeconomic management strategy the RBNZ would control “primary 
liquidity”, measured as “the broad aggregate (M3).”381 Whitwell outlines that, 
in order to avoid excess liquidity, “the key control technique was to be a public 
debt sales programme designed to ‘fully fund’ the net public sector injections 
from the Treasury and the Reserve Bank into primary liquidity.” 382  “This 
funding rule” was to “simulate the monetarist control rule, whereby close 
control over the monetary base” would ultimately enable “control over the rate 
of growth of the money supply and, therefore, [also] ...over the inflation rate.”383 
Based on the work of Whitwell, Figure 3.1 (below) comprises a stylised 
conception of “the official representation of the major theoretical links between 
the stated operating target – primary liquidity – and the ultimate policy 
objective – the inflation rate.”384 
As Whitwell has conclusively demonstrated, however, “in-spite of a 
single-minded adherence to the operating rules specified by its policy 
framework, from the outset the Bank experienced problems with the 
transmission lines that were supposed to carry its monetary signals to the 
inflation rate.”385 In particular, “major technical issues” existed with both “the 
role of money and credit growth in the disinflation process”, as well as the 
“monetary signals that were supposedly being transmitted to wage and price 
setters via the trade-off between unemployment and inflation embodied in the 
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‘naive’ Phillips curve.” 386  These major problems with the classical quantity 
theory and Phillips curve monetary policy transmission channels effectively left 
only the FX channel in operation.387 As Whitwell observes, “almost by default, 
the exchange rate became the ‘direct’ channel for transmitting monetary policy 
signals to the inflation rate.”388 Furthermore, the FX transmission channel itself 
did not operate as intended. The “monetary impulses” projected by the RBNZ 
acted in such a way as to “impact primarily on output and employment instead 
of on prices.”389 Whitwell points out that, as a consequence, the RBNZ was 
ultimately forced “to recast monetary policy into a thinly disguised incomes 
policy with a selective focus: the profitability of the traded goods sector.”390 
Figure 3.2 constitutes a stylised conception of the monetary policy transmission 
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Figure 3.1) The New Zealand Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism: The 
Theory of Monetary Disinflation
Source: Whitwell 1990, 106. 
 
Figure 3.2) The New Zealand Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism:  
The Evidence 










































The Shift to Neoliberalism in New Zealand 155 
 
Figure 3.2 shows that the MPTM ultimately relied on a capacity to 
completely undermine the profitability of the tradables sector and consequently 
force exporters and import-substituters out of the market.392 By inducing an 
appreciation in the FX rate via increasing domestic interest rates, the traded 
goods sector (that is, exporters and import-substituters) is effectively subjected 
to a marked “loss of international competitiveness.” 393  Indeed, it serves to 
ensure the traded goods sector experiences an “unsustainable fall in profits” 
due to both “a decline in revenues” and a significant appreciation in “debt-
servicing costs.”394 As Wooding outlines, this serves to offset upward pressure 
on domestic price levels because the resulting system-wide decrease in 
employment and output acts to reduce national incomes and “will therefore 
[also] moderate the rate of increase in prices.”395 Thus, rather than constituting 
the anti-inflation strategy upheld by the proponents of the neoliberal reforms, 
the monetarist approach to monetary policy adopted by the Fourth Labour 
Government effectively constituted what can be considered an “anti-
employment” strategy.396 As Whitwell summarises the point, in essence, when 
implementing a “tightening” of monetary policy what the Fourth Labour 
Government was actually doing was creating “a financial environment that was 
openly hostile” to the tradables sector.397 
This monetarist approach to New Zealand’s macroeconomic 
management was entrenched via the passing into legislation of the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand Act (RBA) 1989. The RBA ratified price stability as the 
sole policy objective of RBNZ operations, and simultaneously enshrined the 
operational independence of the RBNZ.398 Dalziel details that 
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the statutory objective of monetary policy is now given in Section 
8 of the Act, consisting of a single sentence: “the primary function 
of the Bank is to formulate and implement monetary policy 
directed to the economic objective of achieving and maintaining 
stability in the general level of prices.399 
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3.3)  Explaining the Shift to Neoliberalism in New Zealand 
With some similarity to the prominent cases of the US and the UK 
(discussed in the previous chapter), New Zealand’s historic shift to 
neoliberalism also necessarily took shape as an explicitly political project.400 
Fundamentally, it comprised “a systematic [policy] programme carried out 
with precision and discipline” by a small discrete network of strategically 
located political actors, closely integrated through both formal and informal 
linkages, and in possession of significant institutional support.401 As Don Brash 
described the situation in his 1996 Hayek Memorial Lecture, “the economic 
debate brought together a small but strategically influential team of civil 
servants, think tankers, policy-makers and politicians around Roger Douglas. 
This group of quite remarkable people understood clearly what needed to be 
done and was committed to seeing it through.”402 As this section progresses, 
this key driving group – Brash’s “small but strategically influential team” - will 
be collectively referred to as the ‘Wellington policy community’ (WPC).403 
 
Cabinet 
A core faction within the WPC was formed by a small group of cabinet 
ministers within the Fourth Labour Government; those who Easton refers to as 
the “troika.” 404  Although constitutionally the Prime Minister is the most 
powerful individual political actor in New Zealand, in practice the Minister of 
Finance, in most policy matters, has more practical power. This largely derives 
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from a combination of the central political importance of economic and finance 
issues in the sphere of public policy and the size, competence and, as will be 
examined in-depth in the following sub-section, the unique institutional power 
of the ministry serving the Minister of Finance - the Treasury.405 The key initial 
period of neoliberal reform from 1984 to circa 1988 was characterised by a weak 
Prime Minister, David Lange, in relation to an exceptionally strong finance 
“team.” 406  Indeed, Easton observes that in a development without recent 
precedent, three “extremely capable politicians” were appointed to the finance 
portfolio; Roger Douglas as the Minister of Finance, with Richard Prebble and 
David Caygill as Associate Ministers. 407 With respective cabinet rankings of 
fourth, fifth, and seventh, together these ministers constituted a powerful 
grouping within the state apparatus.408 It is this powerful grouping of cabinet 
ministers which Easton refers to as the troika. 
The troika effectively possessed the power of policy implementation 
under the Fourth Labour Government from 1984 to 1988. As Easton outlines, at 
each stage of the governmental decision-making process, this powerful 
grouping of pro-neoliberal figures could exercise a significant degree of control 
enabling a historically unprecedented capacity for pushing through free-market 
reform. 409  The troika would begin by developing economic policy in 
collaboration with their Treasury advisors. The Prime Minister and his deputy, 
Geoffrey Palmer, would then be persuaded of its necessity. Once this was 
achieved (which, as Easton observes, it almost invariably was due to the inter-
personal relationships involved), this group would proceed to present its 
hardline neoliberal proposals to cabinet.410 
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Within Cabinet, the troika and its allies were the dominant force. Douglas 
and his Associate Ministers combined with Lange and Palmer occupied five of 
the top seven positions. Close ally Mike Moore, the Minister of Overseas Trade, 
was also highly ranked.411 The dominance of the troika within Cabinet was 
facilitated, to some extent, by an apparent lack of a thorough understanding of 
the full implications of many of the troika’s policy proposals. Of much more 
importance, however, was a major reorganisation of the prevailing Cabinet 
Committee structure that was carried out almost immediately after the Fourth 
Labour Government took power. All of the existing Cabinet Committees were 
scrapped (including, most prominently, the powerful Cabinet Economic 
Committee) and were replaced by a single central Cabinet Policy Committee 
overseeing five sectoral Committees.412 This new structure effectively served to 
concentrate power within Cabinet. As Roberts observed at the time, under this 
regime “the Cabinet Policy Committee exercises considerable control over 
policy directions, sets the context of debate on major proposals and defines 
overall resource limits for the major areas of the Government’s programme.”413 
Unsurprisingly, the troika and its allies were at the centre of this new 
concentration of power. The Cabinet Policy Committee was chaired by Lange. 
Palmer, Douglas, Prebble, Caygill, and Moore were all members.414 
 From Cabinet, a policy decision would then move to caucus. Here, 
Easton notes, the troika’s historically unprecedented decision-making power 
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was most evident.415 In 1984 the cabinet (which generally operated under a 
principle of collective responsibility) along with the six under-secretaries 
formed a 26-strong bloc of MPs within the 56-strong Labour caucus. To its 
ranks could be immediately added several independently pro-neoliberal 
backbenchers, as well as party loyalists and party functionaries (such as the two 
Whips) that could be depended on to follow the leadership’s neoliberal policy 
direction. As Boston observes, during the period from 1984 to 1988, “this gave 
the [troika] virtual dominance” within the caucus and, thus, the troika could 
effectively impose their neoliberal policy agenda on a house of over 90 MPs and 
the entire country.416 
 
The State’s Institutional Advisors 
Key bureaucrats within Treasury and the RBNZ formed a further 
important group within the neoliberalisation-driving WPC network.417 Indeed, 
it has been argued that the adoption and implementation of neoliberal public 
policy prescriptions under the Fourth Labour Government from 1984 onwards 
“essentially involved little more than the uncritical acceptance of Treasury’s 
neoclassical explanation of the economic crisis, and the rapid and 
comprehensive implementation of Treasury’s policy prescriptions.” 418  This 
hypothesis is entirely unsurprising considering that, as Boston and Cooper have 
pointed out, “Treasury is the most powerful government department in New 
Zealand” and “its influence extends over the whole state apparatus and touches 
almost every important area of public policy.”419 
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The power and influence of Treasury derives from several key sources. 
First, Treasury possesses the capacity to set the overarching 
philosophical/theoretical framework within which all core public policy 
decisions must be made. In this manner, to a significant degree Treasury 
effectively establishes the boundaries of policy discussion.420 Second, Treasury 
serves as the public financial control agent. Through this Treasury has input 
into almost all public policy formulation, advice and implementation. Indeed, 
as Roper has emphasised, Treasury has considerable influence over the 
government budgetary process that funds and implements policy decisions, 
enabling it to not only establish the macroeconomic context (as indicated 
above), but also the subsequent fiscal strategy to be adopted, and to comment 
on all other governmental department’s policies and funding allocations. 421 
Treasury’s third major source of institutional the power can be effectively 
summarised as bureaucratic strength. Treasury employs a large staff, including 
an unrivalled number of highly trained economists and policy analysts, based 
on a relative level of funding that is far greater than any other policy oriented 
department or ministry. 422  It should be noted that Treasury’s position and 
bureaucratic strength is also maintained and enhanced by the traditionally high 
cabinet rank of its minister, through its links to the main opposition party, and 
also, very importantly, through linked career paths with the private commercial 
sector.423 Of course it must be remembered that Treasury is constitutionally only 
a policy advisory body, however, given these sources of power, it nevertheless 
possesses an unrivalled capacity to promote this advice. 
The genesis of a major paradigmatic shift in Treasury thinking (from 
social democratic Keynesianism to neoliberalism) is evident before 1980. It has 
been suggested that the shift towards neoliberalism may have begun as early as 
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the 1960s, but, as documented by McKinnon, it is during the period from 1978 
onwards that the neoliberal shift within Treasury became fully manifest. 424 
During this period “the intellectual climate [within Treasury] totally 
changed.”425 Central to this shift were the activities of a newly formed division 
within Treasury, officially titled ‘Internal Economics II’.426 This division was led 
for much of the period leading up to 1984 by figures that subsequently featured 
prominently in the WPC which drove the Fourth Labour Government’s radical 
program of neoliberal reforms. 427  The influence of this key division was 
particularly evident from the 1981 post-election briefing Economic Strategy 
onwards, which, while emphasising a commitment to neoliberal policy 
prescriptions, also simultaneously explicitly challenged the prevailing 
Keynesian macroeconomic policy orthodoxy.428 Due to the dominant influence 
of this division within Treasury, from this early period onwards there was 
simply no scope for a coherent alternative to the staunchly neoliberal line 
espoused by Internal Economics II.429 
From 1984 onwards the fundamental shift in Treasury thinking became 
much more publicly pronounced. Roper has observed, for example, that the key 
briefing papers Economic Management (1984), Government Management (1987), 
and Briefing to the Incoming Government (1990) all “extensively borrow from 
neoliberal schools of thought” in terms of both “theory and policy 
prescriptions, particularly the Chicago and Austrian schools, New Classical 
economics, Supply-side arguments…, and Public Choice and New Public 
Management analyses.”430 These key policy papers outlined and promoted the 
key features of the neoliberal policy regime that was subsequently 
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implemented. Before 1984, Treasury’s neoliberal agenda had essentially been 
blocked by the then Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Robert Muldoon. 
McKinnon notes, for example, that, in terms of its official policy advisory 
function, from around 1981 Treasury was essentially “under quarantine.” 431 
This all changed following the election of the Fourth Labour Government; there 
is “no doubt that Treasury provided the underlying analytical framework for 
the Labour Party’s policy-making throughout its two terms in office.”432 
With regards to the key areas of neoliberal policy being focused on in 
this chapter (financial deregulation and the adoption of monetarism), Treasury 
officials played a particularly central role in its formulation and 
implementation. As Goldfinch points out, for example, the broader programme 
of financial liberalisation, including the devaluation and float of the dollar (key 
elements of the above outlined monetarist macroeconomic strategy), was 
initiated and developed by officials from Treasury and the RBNZ, with cabinet 
largely following their advice.433 Oliver outlines that, within a more general 
shift towards neoliberalism from late 1983, the Labour Caucus rapidly adopted 
financial deregulation and monetarist macroeconomic management 
prescriptions and that “this shift can be shown to have coincided with a period 
of close collaboration between Douglas” and Doug Andrews, a Treasury 
adviser seconded to the opposition from the afore mentioned Internal 
Economics II division.434 
The RBNZ’s respective pattern of influence over New Zealand’s 
neoliberal shift broadly follows that of Treasury, although with some minor 
differences.435 Like Treasury, the RBNZ began espousing financial deregulation 
and monetarism from the late 1970s onwards. Through its research agenda and 
various resulting publications, such as The Stabilisation Role of Fiscal Policy, it 
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recommended the comprehensive liberalisation of the FX regime, amending the 
reserve asset ratios for financial institutions, and a number of other regulatory 
changes to interest rates and monetary policy settings.436 
  Again like Treasury, during the two terms of the Fourth Labour 
Government, the RBNZ was also closely involved with the adoption and 
implementation of the neoliberal financial liberalisation agenda. RBNZ Deputy 
Governor, Roderick Deane is noted to have played a particularly prominent 
role within the WPC. While its relative institutional power meant that the 
RBNZ’s influence was not as wide-ranging as that of Treasury, it was 
nevertheless centrally involved in the development of policy for its specialist 
areas (financial, FX, and monetary policy). Indeed, the RBNZ played a crucial 
role in formulating and implementing both the programs of financial 
deregulation and the monetarist macroeconomic strategy (including the RBA).  
 
Business 
As Roper has emphasised, although Treasury and the RBNZ together 
have substantial institutional power and influence at their disposal, if the policy 
agenda pushed by these agencies “was seriously at odds with powerful class-
based interest groups in civil society, and the dominant faction within cabinet 
was sympathetic to the concerns of these groups” it is unlikely that the 
neoliberalisation of New Zealand would have been undertaken in the rapid and 
comprehensive manner that it was.437 As we have already seen, due to the 
various sources of power at their disposal, generally “big” business is the most 
powerful set of interests within contemporary liberal democratic societies like 
New Zealand.438 Thus, unsurprisingly, a final key faction of the neoliberalism-
driving WPC is to be found within the ranks of private enterprise. 
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From 1975 to 1984 a major ideological-political shift to neoliberalism took 
place within business in New Zealand. This shift essentially involved all of the 
major sectoral business associations, the Employer’s Federation (NZEF), as well 
the general policy-oriented business associations.439 The one partial exception 
was the Manufacturer’s Federation (NZMF), traditionally the strongest 
defender of Keynesian protectionism. However, between 1974 and 1984, much 
of the manufacturing sector stagnated while a body of large export-oriented 
trans-national industrial corporations grew rapidly. Therefore, even within the 
ranks of the NZMF, a pro-neoliberal constituency began to emerge. 440  The 
comprehensiveness of business’s neoliberal turn was outwardly demonstrated 
by the ‘Assembly of Business’ held in August 1983. As Roper outlines, this 
“brought together representatives from all the major business associations” 
who endorsed a final communiqué centrally seeking “less state intervention in 
the economy”, fiscal austerity (reduced taxation, expenditure and government 
operating deficits), deregulation of industrial relations, and trade 
liberalisation.441  
Following its thorough shift to neoliberalism, New Zealand business has 
been documented as having exerted considerable influence over public policy 
formulation.442 Playing a leading role in this, especially up until the end of the 
first term of the Fourth National Government, was the New Zealand Business 
Roundtable (NZBR). Indeed, Roper has observed that “the remarkably close 
correspondence between the policy prescriptions of the Business Roundtable 
and the policies of the Fourth Labour Government and the… (Fourth) National 
Government constitutes one of the more conspicuous features of New Zealand 
politics after 1984.”443 The NZBR effectively formed the apex of corporate power 
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at this time, with its membership being comprised of the most significant 
business interests in New Zealand. This key representative of business interests 
is noted to have produced numerous policy submissions, funded visits, public 
seminars, and publications by right-wing academics, to have established the 
neoliberal think tank the Centre for Independent Studies, and NZBR businesses 
also gave substantial monetary donations to support the neoliberal factions of 
both the Labour and National parties.444 However, it needs to be noted that, to a 
significant degree, the activities of the NZBR were essentially a systematised 
expression of the policy preferences of the broader New Zealand business 
community. 445  Big business figures thus formed a further conspicuous bloc 
within the neoliberalisation-driving WPC, having documented links, both 
formal and informal with Treasury, the RBNZ, and the pro-neoliberal faction 
within the Labour caucus.446  
 
Systemic Pressures 
The practical implementation of radical neoliberal structural adjustment 
during the period from 1984 to 1990 thus involved a systematic political 
program carried out by a group of strategically placed individuals drawn 
mainly from the upper echelons of the Fourth Labour Government, Treasury, 
the RBNZ, and business. However, New Zealand’s comprehensive 
neoliberalisation also needs to be understood, fundamentally, as having been 
formulated in response to “mounting systemic pressures” within the domestic 
political economy.447 To date the work of Roper offers the most sophisticated 
and theoretically rigorous account of the underlying systemic pressures that 
prompted New Zealand’s historic shift to neoliberalism. Centrally, Roper 
upholds that the political activities of business (but implicitly also of the various 
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other factions within the influential WPC-network) should be considered to 
constitute a “a series of political responses to the prolonged economic crisis, 
intensified industrial conflict, ...faltering attempts of the Third National 
Government to manage that crisis using Keynesian policy instruments”, and a 
major shift in the international intellectual orthodoxy from Keynesianism to 
neoliberalism.448  
In the previous chapter it was shown that from the early 1970s onwards 
the global economy entered into a period of major downturn. New Zealand was 
not immune from this. Figure 3.3 (below) graphically illustrates the onset of 
‘stagflation’ – stagnant economic growth combined with high inflation – in New 
Zealand.  As can be seen, during the period from 1975 to 1984 the nation began 
to experience a prolonged period of relative economic weakness.449 Compared 
to a mean level of 4.47% in real terms during the period from 1950 to 1974, 
economic growth averaged just 1.53% during the period spanning from 1975 to 
1984. 450  Simultaneously, inflation increased dramatically. Inflation averaged 
5.46% between 1950 and 1974. Between 1975 and 1984, however, inflation rose 
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Figure 3.3) The Onset of Stagflation in New Zealand452 
 
Source: Dalziel and Lattimore 2001, 134, 138. 
 
Due to the onset of stagflation, Roper observes that “the economic 
pressures on the state increased greatly from the mid-1970s onwards.”453 More 
specifically, “as profitability and growth declined and unemployment rose, the 
state was faced with rising social expenditure on the one side..., and increasing 
difficulty in maintaining taxation revenue on the other.”454 The ultimate result 
of this was a mounting fiscal crisis of the state.455  
Simultaneously, the societal balance of power underwent a major shift.456 
Business, erstwhile dominated by organised labour, now came to occupy the 
preeminent position. 457  The onset of stagflation brought about mass 
unemployment in New Zealand for the first time during the post-war era. 
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Figure 3.4 illustrates this phenomenon. Rising unemployment on a scale 
unprecedented in recent contemporary history had a profoundly negative 
impact on the previously robust union movement. The unions’ organisational 
strength and bargaining power were both critically undermined.458 Business 
quickly took advantage of labour’s incipient weakness. From the mid-1970s 
onwards, a “counter-mobilisation of capital” took place.459 “Employers became 
increasingly industrially militant” thereby decisively wresting societal power 
back in favour of business.460 
 
Figure 3.4) The Emergence of Mass Unemployment in New Zealand 
Source: Dalziel and Lattimore 2001, 135. 
As a consequence, Roper argues, “successive governments from 1975 
onwards” were subject to both greatly increased economic and political pressure 
to take the side of business in the formulation and implementation of public 
policy.461 On the one hand, the worsening economic conditions were increasing 
the structural pressure on governments to provide for the needs of business. On 
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the other hand, having returned to the ascendance within society, business 
interests were rapidly becoming increasingly “politically active” and were 
primarily directing “this activism towards lobbying successive governments to 
adopt” pro-business policies.462 
  Roper outlines that “these [above discussed] economic, social and 
political developments gave rise to, and in turn were influenced by,” a major 
paradigmatic shift in economics.463 As the foremost advisor to cabinet, Treasury 
acted as the principle conduit through which this systemic international 
pressure was transmitted to the WPC (although other avenues of transmission 
certainly existed).464 During the period from 1984 to 1990, the crucial papers 
produced by Treasury “which provided the overall blueprint for the neoliberal 
policy regime, extensively borrowed from neoliberal schools of thought, often 
verbatim and without due consideration of the limitations of their theoretical 
arguments and empirical findings.”465 
Ultimately, the RBNZ also functioned as a major transmission line for the 
neoliberal shift in the international economic orthodoxy. This is unsurprising 
considering that, like Treasury, the RBNZ is one of the preeminent employers of 
professional economists in New Zealand. In relation to the RBNZ’s role as a 
principle neoliberal orthodoxy conduit, Dalziel’s analysis of the monetarist 
legislative lynch-pin, the RBA is particularly illuminating.466 Dalziel documents, 
for example, that the key Section 8, in particular, was in-fact largely based on 
“Friedmanite” monetarism or “Chicago School” economics, and “New 
Classical” economics. “Echoes of these monetarist and new classical theories in 
section 8 of the Reserve Bank Act (with its elimination of output and 
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employment objectives and its sole focus on price stability) are loud and 
clear.”467 
Roper argues that, essentially, “the shift from Keynesianism to 
neoliberalism within the economics profession and the growing 
disenchantment with Keynesian demand-management within the so-called 
business community mutually reinforced each other.” 468  Big business was 
quickly becoming aware that Keynesianism was “failing to reverse the decline 
of the economy”, while “neoliberal economists in the Treasury” and the RBNZ 
“provided a coherent explanation of stagflation and a set of policy 
prescriptions” that would ensure the restoration of economic prosperity. 469 
Consequently, from the late 1970s onwards, business and Treasury began to 
present “neoliberalism” to the state as constituting the only viable “broad 
intellectual and ideological paradigm” for the formulation of almost all aspects 
of public policy in New Zealand.470 
Overall, Roper’s account is very useful. It identifies and subsequently 
examines a number of important underlying factors exerting pressure on the 
decision making of the political actors of the WPC in the years leading up to the 
neoliberal turn in New Zealand. However, a further underlying factor should 
perhaps be added to those discussed by Roper. This factor comprises the 
ongoing transformation of the underlying structure of the economy. 
Mirroring developments elsewhere in the advanced capitalist world 
(discussed in the previous chapter), during the decade leading up to the 
neoliberal turn in New Zealand, the domestic economy became considerably 
more internationalised.  Crucial here is the comprehensive empirical work 
contained within the PhD thesis of Cronin, The Politics of New Zealand Business 
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Internationalisation 1972-1996.471 The close scrutiny “of the internationalisation 
activities of significant New Zealand companies” contained within this work 
reveals that well before the liberalisation of capital controls and international 
investment regulations, during “the 1970s and early 1980s”, “there was a rapid 
increase” in both “the extent and intensity” of business internationalisation in 
New Zealand.472  
Drawing mainly on historical company reports, Cronin identifies four 
main measures of outward business internationalisation activity. These are: the 
export share of sales; the offshore share of sales; the number of overseas 
subsidiaries; and the number of overseas subsidiaries engaged in production.473 
At a general level, each of these key measures show that outward business 
internationalisation increased significantly in New Zealand during the decade 
prior to the implementation of neoliberal reforms. As Cronin outlines, “exports, 
as a share of total sales,” expanded significantly “in four bursts, from 1972 to 
1975, from 1981 to 1983, 1984 to 1988, and 1991 to 1992.”474 The offshore share of 
sales “rose more steadily through the 1970s, more rapidly in the 1980s to an 
initial peak in 1988.”475 Outward internationalisation in terms of both measures 
relating to offshore subsidiaries, meanwhile, expanded throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, reaching a peak in 1988.476  
Again mirroring international developments, this trend towards 
significantly increased business internationalisation during the period from 
1972 to 1984 was accompanied by a strong trend towards financialisation within 
the New Zealand economy. Centrally, as the New Zealand financial sector 
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became increasingly dominated by a smaller number of large, foreign-oriented 
businesses (an issue discussed in more detail in Appendix A), the position of 
financial capital within the domestic capitalist hierarchy shifted. Whereas 
before 1972 financial capital had occupied a position supporting other areas of 
economic endeavor, during the period from 1972 to 1984 the banks, finance 
houses, and emerging investment companies came to occupy a much more 
central position within New Zealand’s economy. As Jesson observes, the focal 
points of economic activity (and, thus, also the primary sites of profit 
generation) began to move away “from the productive sectors of the economy” 
and became progressively more orientated around finance.477  
The overarching trend towards the increasing importance of finance 
within the New Zealand economy prior to 1984 is perhaps best illustrated by 
documented changes in the share of surplus value (profit) appropriated by the 
finance sector during the period. The New Zealand economy experienced a 
“large rise in the share of surplus value appropriated by the finance sector” 
from 1972 to 1990, with “the finance share of surplus value” rising “four-fold 
from 6 percent to 27 percent, in three steps: 1972 to 1975, 1977 to 1983, and 1984 
to 1990.” 478  This prominent trend towards financialisation is presented 
graphically in Figure 3.5 below. 
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Figure 3.5) The Financial Share of Surplus Value, 1972 to 1996 
 
Source: Cronin, 184. 
 
But, following Krippner, “the growing weight of finance in the economy” 
during the period from 1972 to 1984 was also registered “in the behavior of non-
financial firms.”479 Mirroring their offshore counterparts, major industrial firms 
began to increasingly turn to finance as a means of supplementing their 
traditional operations. Long established firms such as Fisher and Paykel 
established new finance arms. Simultaneously, major non-financial firms began 
to acquire interests in the finance sector. Most notable in this regard was then 
emerging conglomerate Fletcher Challenge which took control of a majority 
stake in major finance house Marac. It also appears that it was within this time 
period that the concept of ‘shareholder value’ first became established as a 
guiding principle of business operations in New Zealand.480 As Kelsey notes, for 
figures such as Ron Trotter of Fletcher Challenge (and also inaugural chair of 
the NZBR), “the new priority [for their businesses] was to maximise returns to 
shareholders through high dividends and rising share prices.”481 
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There is little doubt that the entry of the UK into the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1973 was a significant factor driving the increased 
internationalisation of New Zealand business. As Cronin explains, “the British 
accession to the EEC closed the door on New Zealand’s major export market, 
and prompted a major reorientation of the country’s international economic 
relations.”482 However, the prevailing economic climate (both in the domestic 
sphere and globally) must have also had some bearing on these underlying 
structural changes. Facing weak growth prospects, New Zealand business 
would have greatly increased incentives to look both offshore and to financial 
activities as viable options to boost profitability. 
Easton has observed that a generational shift occurred within the 
nation’s business elite in the years leading up to the reforms.483 But the shift 
observed by Easton can be seen to have been more than just generational; it also 
appears to have reflected the changes in the underlying structure of the 
economy documented above. These changes helped drive a decisive shift in the 
intra-capital balance of power occurring sometime during the period from 1975 
to 1984. Business people linked to the financial sector and increasingly re-
orienting their operations towards finance and the international arena now 
ascended to the apex of corporate power in New Zealand. It was the core of this 
new dominant faction within corporate New Zealand that would later coalesce 
to form the NZBR in 1986.  
This transformation of the balance of power within the business 
community would have inevitably influenced the specific character of the 
political-economic pressures being exerted on the state in New Zealand state 
prior to the neoliberal turn in 1984. As argued in Chapter One, the advanced 
capitalist state is fundamentally reliant on the taxation of the process of private 
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capitalist enterprise to maintain viability. Because of this, especially during an 
extended period of economic downturn (such as that being experienced in the 
period leading up to the reforms), there is significant implicit or ‘structural’ 
pressure on the state to implement policies to reinvigorate the process of capital 
accumulation. With increasingly powerful elements within domestically-
operating capital become progressively more internationally-oriented and 
financialised, there would have been rising pressures on the state to take 
responsibility for creating an economic framework specifically conducive to 
business in these areas. At the vanguard of this dynamic would have been 
increasing pressure for comprehensive financial deregulation, the relaxation of 
capital and exchange controls, and the reduction of inflation. The substantive 
degree of such pressure being exerted on the state is perhaps indicated by the 
subsequent primacy accorded to such policies within the broader programme of 
neoliberal reform. 
  
The Shift to Neoliberalism in New Zealand 177 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined how, from 1984 through to 1990, New Zealand 
underwent a comprehensive process of radical neoliberal reform. A key feature 
of this initial stage of New Zealand’s neoliberalisation was rapid and 
comprehensive deregulation of the country’s financial sector combined with 
extensive financial market liberalisation, and the parallel adoption of neoliberal 
monetarist macroeconomic policy prescriptions. Fundamentally, these policy 
initiatives served to integrate New Zealand into the DWSR and, therefore, also 
to expose the country to the vagaries of IPFMs. Existing accounts of New 
Zealand’s historic shift to neoliberalism place significant emphasis on the role 
played by a small but extremely influential body of individuals located within 
cabinet, the key institutional advisors to cabinet (Treasury and the RBNZ), and 
the business community, in first promoting and then subsequently driving 
through radical reform. The actions of this group, however, were influenced to 
a significant degree by a much broader set of underlying developments within 
New Zealand’s political economy. These included, most prominently: the onset 
of ‘stagflation’ during the mid-1970s; employers taking the place of organised 
labour as the dominant force within New Zealand society and simultaneously 
becoming much more industrially militant and politically active; a major shift in 
the international economic orthodoxy from Keynesianism to neoliberalism; and 
the increasingly financialised and internationally-oriented nature of business 
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Completing the Shift to Neoliberalism: The Fourth National 
Government’s Neoliberal Policy Agenda, 1990 to 1999 
 
Mr Speaker, the Prime Minister has outlined the scale and nature of the 
problems confronting this new Government. At the heart of these 
problems is the crushing burden of government spending. The 
continuing increase in the size of the State has resulted in growing debt, 
punitive tax levels and intolerable pressure on interest rates. These 
burdens have sapped the initiative and the energy of New Zealand’s 
wealth creators. We cannot prosper as a nation if we put spending 
ahead of earnings. 
 
- Ruth Richardson, 1990.1 
 
Introduction 
The last chapter documented how, during the period from 1984 to 1990, 
New Zealand underwent a process of radical neoliberalisation. It outlined how 
this process was primarily impelled by a relatively small, yet highly influential 
group of MPs within the Fourth Labour Government, Treasury and Reserve 
Bank (RBNZ) officials, and business leaders. It also outlined how the activities 
of this group were heavily influenced by a range of broader international 
developments. These developments included: the worldwide onset of 
stagflation; a sharp upswing in employer militancy; and the shift in the 
prevailing international economic orthodoxy from Keynesianism to 
neoliberalism. 
During the period from 1990 to 1999, New Zealand’s historic shift to 
neoliberalism continued. As Roper observes, the Fourth National Government 
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that succeeded the Fourth Labour Government “enthusiastically picked up 
where Labour had left off.”2  It moved rapidly to complete neoliberal reforms in 
the key areas of so-called ‘unfinished business’; industrial relations, social 
welfare provision, and government finances.3 This chapter examines this second 
key phase in New Zealand’s historic shift to neoliberalism. It does so by first 
providing a succinct overview of the New Zealand political environment 
during the period from 1990 to 1999. Following this, the key features of the 
Fourth National Government’s neoliberal fiscal austerity agenda are outlined. 
In the final section, the major factors influencing the Fourth National 
Government’s formulation of fiscal policy will be detailed.  
In anticipation, it will be argued that the same broad set of forces that 
drove the first stage of the neoliberal reforms under the Fourth Labour 
Government were again centrally involved in formulating and driving through 
the second stage of New Zealand’s neoliberalisation. Led by the newly 
appointed Minister of Finance, Ruth Richardson, and exploiting an apparent 
fiscal crisis, Treasury, the RBNZ, and major corporate interests exerted 
considerable influence over the public policy formulation of the Fourth 
National Government during the period from 1990 to 1994. It will also be 
argued, however, that following the removal of Richardson from office, the 
Dollar-Wall Street Regime (DWSR) played a key role in ensuring that the 
Fourth National Government continued to closely adhere to the neoliberal fiscal 
policy agenda laid out and implemented from 1990 to 1994.  
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4.1) The Fourth National Government: A Political Overview 
The Fourth National Government was elected to office on 27 October 
1990. The National Party received 47.8 percent of the total votes cast in the 
election and secured a healthy majority of 67 of the 99 parliamentary seats 
available. In comparison, the incumbent Labour Party gained only 35.1% of the 
vote and 29 seats.4 As Roper observes, “in electoral terms” this constituted “a 
crushing defeat for Labour and a resounding victory for National.”5 However, 
National’s victory was not secured via attracting a significant amount of new 
support.6 Rather, as documented by Vowles and Aimer, National’s victory was 
largely based on a massive rejection of the Fourth Labour Government’s prior 
policy direction on the part of the electorate.7 
National won the election campaigning on a platform of creating a 
“decent society.”8 Party leader Jim Bolger stated in his party’s 1990 election 
manifesto that:  
National’s vision is clear. We are going to build the Decent Society 
where people enjoy the opportunity of worthwhile work…the 
chance to enjoy the rewards of hard work and initiative…access to 
good education, quality healthcare, and a clean environment.9 
It was intimated that this policy platform would generally entail adhering to 
Labour’s neoliberal approach to public policy, albeit with a somewhat less 
extreme policy mix.10 In the pre-election policy document National’s Economic 
Vision, incoming Finance Minister Ruth Richardson stated that the Fourth 
National Government’s “principle first term economic targets” would be: 
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economic growth of at least 3% per annum; the halving of unemployment levels; 
an inflation rate of 0-2%; interest rates below 10%; a balanced budget; and 
reduced government spending and taxation as a percentage of GDP.11 
However, beyond these very general policy targets, National did not 
clearly outline the specific details of its intended policy agenda. As Vowles and 
Aimer observe in their detailed empirical study of the 1990 election, “it was 
unclear…which of their…objectives would be stressed” and what the overall 
“balance of National’s policies would therefore be.”12 Furthermore, “apart from 
a vague reference to the need to ‘redesign’ welfare with a view to achieving a 
more affluent and self-sufficient society”, “prior to October 1990, there was little 
or no indication of where National would make cuts it promised in government 
expenditure.” 13  As a result, it was somewhat unexpected when “National 
moved very rapidly to finish implementing Labour’s neoliberal program of 
structural adjustment” in the areas of industrial relations, social welfare, and 
fiscal policy.14 
Despite its apparently crushing victory at the 1990 General Election, on 
the back of its poorly signaled hard line neoliberal policy agenda, the Fourth 
National Government’s popularity quickly fell away. As Vowles et al outline, by 
late 1991 “National’s popularity in opinion polls reached an all-time low for any 
government. From a high of 50 per cent support just after the 1990 election, 
National dropped to a mere 22 per cent.” 15  Mass protests and widespread 
industrial action also erupted. Hundreds of thousands of New Zealanders took 
part in (amongst other things) a ‘Week of Action’ involving “strikes, stopwork 
meetings, rallies, and marches” in response to the introduction of the 
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Employment Contracts Bill (ECB).16 Simultaneously, a massive wave of Maori 
protests began, and thousands of tertiary students took part in “large protest 
marches and mass occupations against rising fees, inadequate living allowances 
and rapidly rising student debt.”17 
This historically unprecedented unpopularity lead to the development of 
major schisms within the Fourth National Government. In August 1991, 
National MPs Gilbert Myles and Hamish MacIntyre abandoned the party and 
formed the Liberal Party. Soon after, in October, populist conservative 
politician Winston Peters was ejected from cabinet. Peters (and also former 
Prime Minister Robert Muldoon) had been consistently outspoken about the 
Fourth National Government’s neoliberal policy direction. 18  Ongoing public 
criticism of the Government’s neoliberal policy agenda from Peters ultimately 
resulted in him being fully excluded from the National caucus in October 1992. 
Outside of the National Party, Peters forced a by-election in his North Island 
electorate of Tauranga. Peters won this contest comfortably. Running as an 
independent candidate, he gained 90.7% of the vote.19 Shortly after this decisive 
by-election victory, in mid-1993, Peters established the New Zealand First 
Party.20 
The substantial popular dissatisfaction with the performance of the 
Fourth National Government also helped foment the rapid emergence of the 
social democratic Alliance. Bringing together former Labour Party president 
Jim Anderton’s New Labour Party, with erstwhile electoral minnows the Green 
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Party, the Democrats, Mana Motuhake and the previously mentioned Liberal 
Party, the Alliance Party formed on 1 December 1991.21 As Roper outlines, soon 
after the Alliance was “surging ahead of both Labour and National in the 
polls.” 22  In a poll conducted by the weekly business publication National 
Business Review (NBR) in early December 1991, “37 per cent supported the 
Alliance compared to Labour’s 35 per cent and National’s 27 per cent.”23 
Thanks in a large part to the vagaries of the First Past the Post (FPP) 
electoral system, the Fourth National Government was nevertheless re-elected 
on 6 November 1993. National received just 35.1% of the vote, but still managed 
to secure 50 parliamentary seats. Labour, in comparison, secured 45 seats with 
34.7% of the vote and the newly formed Alliance and New Zealand First parties 
each acquired 2 seats on the basis of receiving 18.2% and 8.4% of the vote 
respectively.24 As Vowles et al outline, the outcome of the election was not 
initially clear, “with the party composition of the next government to remain 
unknown until the final count of special votes in several key contests.” 25 
National only secured power after the provincial South Island Waitaki 
electorate was confirmed as having been taken by National after the counting of 
special votes and Labour MP Peter Tapsell was made speaker of the house, 
thereby effectively propping up the Government by yielding National a two 
seat parliamentary majority.26 
The 1993 General Election was conducted in conjunction with a binding 
referendum on electoral reform. More specifically, the referendum was on 
whether to retain the existing FPP system or instead to adopt German-style 
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) representation. The referendum was a 
product of mounting disillusionment with the credibility of the country’s 
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electoral system. As Roper outlines, “a large majority of New Zealanders 
were…not happy that first Labour then National had taken power, having 
made promises to the electorate that were subsequently broken.”27 As a result, 
the Fourth National Government had held a referendum on the possible reform 
of New Zealand’s electoral system on 19 September 1992. The result of this 
initial indicative referendum was “an overwhelming rejection of the status 
quo.”28 Based on an overall turnout of 53.5% of registered electors, 84.7% voted 
in favour of scrapping the existing FPP electoral system, and 70.5% voted 
specifically in favour of adopting an MMP system.29 Such a powerful result 
effectively obligated the Fourth National Government to subsequently hold a 
corresponding binding referendum simultaneous with the 1993 election.30 Some 
54% of the 85.2% of eligible voters who took part in the 1993 election endorsed 
New Zealand adopting MMP while 46% supported the retention of the existing 
system.31 
As would be expected, the combined outcomes of the 1993 election and 
coinciding referendum “seriously weakened” the Fourth National 
Government.32 The Government faced considerable public opposition and could 
not conceivably claim a credible democratic mandate for further neoliberal 
reform. Thus, Jim Bolger dumped Ruth Richardson as Finance Minister, 
replacing her with close ally Bill Birch. Widely disparaged as the architect of 
National’s harsh first term welfare reforms (popularly dubbed ‘Ruthanasia’, 
discussed below), Richardson had become a major political liability for the 
chided Fourth National Government. 33  Bolger also sought to shift his 
government’s “rhetoric away from the overt and strident neoliberalism of the 
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early 1990s”, attempting to reframe his government as pragmatic and moderate 
in comparison.34 
However, as Roper observes, the Fourth National Government did have 
“one major factor operating in its favour during its second term – a strong 
economic recovery.”35 As can be seen from Figure 4.1 below, after averaging just 
0.8% per annum during the Fourth National Government’s first three years in 
power, real economic growth reached 6.8% in the year to March 1994, 4.8% in 
the year to March 1995, and 4.1% in the year to March 1996. This cyclical 
economic recovery significantly “reduced the fiscal pressures on the state.”36 
The upswing in economic activity served to substantially boost the 
government’s incoming revenues. Having declined markedly during the Fourth 
National Government’s first term, core government revenues increased from 
$27.6 billion in the year to March 1993 to $29.0 billion in the year to March 1994, 
$32.5 billion in the year to March 1995, and $33.8 billion in the year to March 
1996.37 At the same time, the upswing in economic activity acted to greatly 
reduce the government’s required outlays for welfare payments. The number of 
registered unemployed in New Zealand fell from approximately 207,300 to 
154,100 during the Fourth National Government’s second term.38 Indeed, the 
combined impact on the government’s finances was so significant that in 1994 
the Fourth National Government was able to post an operating surplus (of $755 
million); the first time a New Zealand government had been able to do so since 
1978.39 
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Figure 4.1) Real Economic Growth in New Zealand, 1990 to 199940 
   Source: RBNZ 2014, M5 Gross Domestic Product Data Series. 
At New Zealand’s first MMP election, held on 12 October 1996, the 
Fourth National Government once again retained power. At the election, the 
opposition Labour Party received 28.2% of the party vote and 37 seats, the 
Alliance 10.1% and 13 seats, the hardline neoliberal Association of Consumers 
and Taxpayers (ACT) 6.1% and 7 seats, and United 0.9% and 1 seat. 41 The 
Fourth National Government, meanwhile, secured just 33.8% of the party vote 
and 44 seats within the newly expanded 120 seat MMP parliament. 42 
Nevertheless, National was able to retain power by enlisting the support of 
erstwhile critic Winston Peters and his New Zealand First Party. Through 
opportunistic exploitation of issues such as political corruption, the undue 
influence of big business within politics, and Asian immigration, New Zealand 
First had been able to capture a healthy 13.4% of the party vote and 17 seats at 
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the 1996 election and, inadvertently, also the balance of electoral power. 43 
Despite previously indicating that “the only way to remove National was to 
vote New Zealand First” (and also a vast majority of party supporters being in 
opposition to the move), Peters entered his party into a coalition agreement 
with National on 10 December after a notoriously extended period of 
negotiations.44 
The nation’s much heralded economic upswing came to a swift 
conclusion soon after the re-election of the Fourth National Government in 
1996. As can be seen from Figure 4.1, after reaching over 4% of GDP in 1996, 
New Zealand’s economic growth rate fell to 2.4% in 1997, and then just 0.6% of 
GDP in 1998.45 Although regional droughts and tightening monetary conditions 
were certainly important contributing factors, the primary cause of this sharp 
downward correction in the nation’s short-term economic fortunes was the 
onset of the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis.46 The immediate trigger of the 
crisis was the bursting of a speculative property bubble in Thailand. The 
bursting of the Thai property bubble acted to severely undermine confidence in 
IPFMs. This sparked a mounting wave of financial turmoil that rapidly spread 
across the region, initially impacting on the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia, before expanding to Hong Kong, South Korea, and Japan. 47 The 
resulting period of severe regional macroeconomic instability significantly 
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curtailed New Zealand’s export earnings and, ultimately, overall economic 
activity.48 
Despite specifically stating that “the purpose of the coalition” was “to 
provide sound and stable Government for New Zealand” in its coalition 
agreement, the newly formed government proved to be almost inherently 
unstable.49 Support for both National and New Zealand First collapsed during 
1997. This prompted Ashburton MP Jenny Shipley to successfully challenge Jim 
Bolger for leadership of the National Party in November. Shipley’s leadership – 
characterised by a sharp turn back to the right – served to inflame already 
strained intra-coalition relationships. This culminated with Shipley sacking 
Winston Peters as Deputy PM and Treasurer in August 1998 and, ultimately, 
the New Zealand first caucus fragmenting. As a result, for the remainder of its 
final term (approximately a year), the Fourth National Government operated as 
a minority government propped up by ACT, United, and a handful of 
(primarily New Zealand First) defectors.50 
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4.2 Fiscal Austerity 
On coming into office, the Fourth National Government immediately 
moved to complete Labour’s “unfinished business.”51 As Roper outlines, “the 
Fourth National Government adopted and rapidly implemented the 
‘employers’ charter’ for industrial relations, advocated by the Business 
Roundtable (NZBR) and the Employers’ Federation (NZEF).”52 This ultimately 
saw a system of “centralised wage determination” replaced by “decentralised 
single-employer enterprise bargaining” via the ECA 1991.53 Simultaneously, the 
Fourth National Government announced a fundamental “redesign [of] the 
welfare state.”54 In order to “reduce the amount and improve the quality of 
government spending”, the Fourth National Government “recast the levels and 
forms of social assistance offered by the state” through “a major reorganisation 
of the institutional structures in housing, health, social welfare and 
education.”55 It is outside the ambit of this thesis to discuss in detail all of the 
major changes the Fourth National Government introduced in the area of 
industrial relations. However, as will be demonstrated in Section Three, the 
changes announced by the Fourth National Government in the realm of social 
policy are integral to our understanding of the role played by the DWSR in 
New Zealand’s historical shift to neoliberalism and its subsequent retention and 
entrenchment through to 2011. 
 
Redesigning the Welfare State 
The first tranche of reforms constituent of the Fourth National 
Government’s ‘redesign’ of the welfare state were introduced as part of the 
Economic and Social Initiative (ESI) announced on 19 December 1990, just two 
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months after the election. Within the ESI, the Fourth National Government 
outlined major cuts to the nominal value of core benefit entitlements. The single 
adult rate for the unemployment benefit was reduced by $14 per week, the 
widows and domestic purposes benefits were both cut by between 9% and 16%, 
and the age at which the youth rate for benefits abated was raised from 20 to 
25.56 As Kelsey observes, this last move effectively constituted a cut “of 24.7%, 
from $143 to $108 a week”, for those unfortunate enough to be caught within 
this age bracket. 57  The Fourth National Government’s Minister of Social 
Welfare, Jenny Shipley, justified this particularly harsh aspect of the welfare 
reforms on the somewhat dubious grounds that “generally younger single 
people are competing for jobs which attract lower wages and they generally 
have more ability to change their circumstances.”58 The only major benefit class 
not to suffer substantial cuts in nominal terms at this time was that for 
invalids.59 Simultaneously, eligibility criteria for state-funded assistance were 
tightened significantly. In particular, the stand-down period for those deemed 
to be ‘voluntarily’ out of work increased from 6 weeks to 6 months and the 
previously universal family benefit was abolished. 60  The latter was to be 
accompanied by a highly targeted “compensatory rise in Family Support for 
low income families.”61 As Dalziel observed, together, these cuts to “core benefit 
rate[s] and tighter welfare eligibility rules” were expected to slash “$1.275 
billion from the social welfare budget in a full fiscal year.” 62 This was the 
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equivalent of 1.8% of GDP in 1990/91.63 Alongside these reforms to benefit 
provision, the Fourth National Government also announced major policy 
changes relating to national superannuation in the ESI. Inflation indexing of 
state pension entitlements was cancelled for the following year (constituting an 
effective 4.5% cut in real terms), and the promised abolition of the 
superannuation tax surcharge that had been introduced by the previous Labour 
Government in 1985 was to be deferred indefinitely. 64  In addition, major 
ministerial expenditure reviews were announced for “welfare, housing, health, 
education, ACC, and defence”, to be overlooked by the Expenditure Control 
Committee - popularly referred to as the ‘Razor Gang’.65 
Budget 1991 formed the second stage of the Fourth National 
Government’s redesign of the welfare state. Dubbed the ‘Mother of all Budgets’ 
by Ruth Richardson, it set out a wide-ranging programme of long-term policy 
initiatives designed to fundamentally restructure the provision of public health, 
education, and housing along neoliberal lines.66 A new system of user part-
charges for public health services was announced. The public health system as a 
whole was to be redesigned according to neoliberal principles, with hospitals to 
become profit-driven Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs). Funding for early 
childhood education was to be cut significantly. Universal access to a student 
allowance while studying was abolished, government funding for tertiary 
education was slashed, a student loan scheme was introduced, and fee setting 
was shifted to individual universities under the so-called ‘Study Right’ 
scheme.67 Commencing on 1 July, 1993, state housing tenants were to be subject 
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to market-based rents. 68  A new ‘accommodation supplement’ would offset 
some of the associated increase in the cost of renting, but only for those on the 
lowest incomes.69 In addition, Budget 1991 continued the severe benefit cuts that 
the Fourth National Government had begun in the December ESI. 70  The 
minimum age of eligibility for the sickness, invalids and domestic purposes 
benefits were all raised from 16 to 18 years and the stand-down provision for 
‘high earners’ seeking to move onto the unemployment benefit was extended 
from six to ten weeks.71 
Budget 1991 also announced further significant changes in the area of 
superannuation policy.72 Indeed, it is apparent that it was intended for these to 
comprise an “integral part” of National’s broader policy agenda of 
‘redesigning’ the welfare state.73 The indexing for inflation of pension rates was 
delayed for a further two years, until 1 April 1993. 74  This constituted an 
additional cut of over 5.3% in real terms. The age of eligibility for National 
Superannuation was to be raised from 60 to 65 progressively over an extended 
period of 10 years.75 As had been promised during the 1990 election campaign 
(and reiterated in the post-election Speech from the Throne), the existing 
surcharge on the GRI was scrapped.76 But while the incumbent ‘claw-back’ 
policy was abolished as promised, it was ‘coincidentally’ replaced with an even 
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more harsh new income abatement scheme. 77  St. John delineates the main 
features of this new abatement scheme: 
The gross pension was to be abated at the rate of 90 cents in the 
dollar for any income above $4,160 per annum, with the 
exemption level exactly the same for a married couple as for an 
individual. For married couples under 70, the entire National 
Superannuation payment would be clawed back once joint income 
from other sources reached $23,740. For a single person under 70 
living alone, the cut-out point was $17,279. Those over 70 were to 
have only one half of the pension subject to the income test.78 
Thus, the existing GRI was in-fact “radically modified.” 79  Rather than 
constituting “a relatively generous universal payment to all regardless of need” 
(which, St. John notes, would obviously have been “seriously out of kilter with 
the philosophy expressed in the December [ESI] statement.”), from 1992 
onwards National Superannuation would instead “become a tightly income 
tested welfare benefit.”80 Ultimately aimed at slashing up to $650 million a year 
from the Government’s expenditure on National Superannuation, together 
these moves constituted major cuts to pension entitlements, especially for 
retirees on lower incomes.81 
However, the political sustainability of the Government’s budget night 
superannuation proposals quickly became doubtful. 82  National’s proposed 
reforms were “profoundly unwelcome” and generated widespread popular 
resistance. 83  With many of their members facing substantial cuts to their 
incomes, many retired groups – representing the so-called ‘grey’ vote - were 
especially ardent in their opposition to the Government’s plans. 84  Internal 
dissent was also rife. Several National back bench MPs broke party ranks and 
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refused to support the Government in passing the proposed legislation.85 A 
number of the same backbenchers “openly promoted meetings to help the 
retired avoid the consequences of the income test.” 86  The Government’s 
superannuation proposals were also a key factor motivating the defection of 
National MPs Gilbert Myles and Hamish MacIntyre (see Section One).87 Indeed, 
Myles specifically justified his decision to leave the party on the grounds that 
National were “looking at trimming the fat where there is no fat to trim.”88 As a 
result, and despite a party conference speech from Ruth Richardson that 
“insisted there would be no budging on the budget”, on 3 October 1991, the 
Fourth National Government publicly announced that it was backing down 
from the hard line it had taken on superannuation in Budget 1991.89 Just over a 
month later, on 7 November 1991, the Government unveiled a revised set of 
superannuation policy proposals. Under this adjusted policy package, the 
existing surcharge - long criticised by National for being “immoral” - was 
retained.90 However, as St. John delineates, it would be even more rigorous than 
before: 
The rate of surcharge was raised from 20 per cent to 25 per cent, 
and the exemption was lowered to $6,240 per annum for a 
married couple and to $4,160 per annum for an individual. The 
universal portion for those over 70 was quietly dropped, along 
with any suggestion of a joint income test.91 
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In addition, the budget night proposals to increase the age of entitlement in a 
series of steps from 60 to 65 over ten years and to halt inflation adjustment for 
the pension until 1 April, 1993 both remained in place.92 
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Table 4.1) Main Features of the Fourth National Government’s 
Redesign of the Welfare State, 1990 to 1993 
Social Welfare 
 Core benefit entitlement rates, including the unemployment, sickness and 
domestic purposes benefits, were cut significantly from 1 April 1991. 
 Age of applicability of youth benefit rates for unemployment, domestic 
purposes, sickness, and invalids benefits raised. 
 Stand-down periods prior to eligibility for the unemployment benefit 
lengthened substantially. 
 Eligibility criteria for most welfare entitlements tightened significantly. 
 
Superannuation 
 Pension rate frozen for three years, until 1 April 1993. 
 Age of eligibility for national superannuation raised from 60 to 65. 
 Promised abolition of the Superannuation tax surcharge deferred indefinitely.93 
 
Health 
 Universal health subsidies scrapped. Replaced with an extensive system of user 
part-charges and a highly targeted ‘Community Services Card’.94 
 Corporatisation of the public health system. 
 
Housing 
 Market-based rents for state housing introduced from 1 July 1993, with highly 




 Universal student allowance scrapped, replaced with highly targeted 
assistance. 
 Funding for tertiary education slashed, fee setting simultaneously shifted to 
universities. 
 Student Loans scheme introduced. 
 Early Childhood Education funding slashed. 
 
Source: Based on S. St. John and K. Rankin 2002, Entrenching the Welfare Mess (Auckland: 
University of Auckland Department of Economics). 
 
Table 4.1 (above) summarises the main features of the Fourth National 
Government’s fundamental redesign of the New Zealand welfare state that it 
implemented during its first term. Despite the Government’s late back down on 
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some of the harshest aspects of superannuation policy reform proposals and 
also on some unworkable aspects of its healthcare reforms, as they were 
intended to do these above outlined measures substantially reduced overall 
government “expenditure in real terms on a permanent basis.” 95  As a 
consequence, “the structural deficit [was] virtually eliminated in the 1992/93 
fiscal year.”96 The Fourth National Government achieved “a small but genuine 
financial surplus” in 1994.97 This was the first operating surplus recorded in 
New Zealand in nearly 30 years. Sizeable surpluses were recorded by the 
Fourth National Government in each year thereafter. 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act 
In July 1994, the Fourth National Government implemented the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (FRA). The FRA effectively sought to ‘lock in’ the Fourth 
National Government’s neoliberal fiscal austerity strategy. 98  It set into 
legislation five core “principles of responsible fiscal management.” Set out in 
Section 4, subsection 2 of the Act, these were: 
 Reducing crown debt to ‘prudent’ levels. 
 Operating budget surpluses on average over the medium term. 
 Maintaining a positive crown net worth so as to provide a buffer versus 
adverse economic or financial shocks. 
 ‘Prudent’ management of the Crown’s financial risks. 
 Pursuing a policy agenda which provided stable and predictable levels 
of future taxation.99 
In addition, the FRA also set out an extensive “cycle of financial 
reporting.”100 This cycle included a Budget Policy Statement (BPS) before 31 
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March each year, an Economic and Fiscal Update and Fiscal Strategy Report 
(FSR) accompanying the official budget speech in June or July, and, finally, an 
additional Economic and Fiscal Update in December each year and also prior to 
any general election.101 The purpose of this was to effectively make it unlawful 
for a future government to conceal any deterioration in its financial position, 
especially before an election.102 In theory any future government could reverse 
the FRA. However, as Kelsey observes, with the FRA firmly “embedded in law” 
this was unlikely to occur; whatever was set down in legislation was likely to be 
the standard to which future New Zealand governments would adhere.103 
Dealing to Debt 
In accordance with pre-budget publicity, the Fourth National 
Government announced the delivery of a so-called ‘social dividend’ as a 
prominent feature of new finance minister Bill Birch’s first budget in 1994.104 
Comprising a small number of new spending initiatives, Birch portrayed this 
‘social dividend’ as being indicative of the rewards that could now be expected 
going forward as payoff “for the years of pain” experienced by many New 
Zealanders as a result of the decade-long neoliberal ‘structural adjustment’ 
process.105 “Mr Speaker, tonight I have been able to report that New Zealand’s 
‘quiet revolution’ is now beginning to pay real dividends for New Zealand and 
New Zealanders.”106 However, as prominent journalist Colin James pointed out 
at the time, this ‘social dividend’ constituted “surely one of the most cynical of 
the public relations ruses dreamt up for Bolger over the past four years.”107 
Overall, the ‘social dividend’ totaled just $375 million. To put this into 
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perspective, the recorded operating surplus for the same 1994/95 financial year 
was $2.7 billion. Health received the bulk of the new funding. Some $241 
million of additional spending on health was announced for the 1994/95 
financial year.108 But, as James again points out, “most of the extra funding for 
health came in the shape of balance sheet restructuring for the struggling 
CHEs.”109 The Government was to write-off nearly $300 million of accumulated 
debt from CHE balance sheets, whilst simultaneously providing new equity of 
$100 million to CHEs and a conditional loan of up to $140 million. Moreover, 
both the equity injection and additional lending were only to be advanced 
against strict criteria. Education received a share of the ‘social dividend’ worth 
$151 million spread over three years. Over 10% - $17 million – “of this new 
expenditure, however, [was only] made possible through savings [made] 
elsewhere in education.” 110  Thereby, the Fourth National Government 
effectively masked what was in-fact a much smaller funding increase. The 
Family Support programme for low-income households was accorded a 
funding increase of $67 million a year. The Government expected this increased 
assistance to reach some 170,000 families. However, as Kelsey observes, “for a 
single mother with two children whose domestic purposes benefit had been cut 
in 1991 by $26 a week, it meant an extra $3 a week.”111 
Simultaneous to the announcement of this ‘social dividend’, the Fourth 
National Government outlined its broader short-term fiscal strategy. This 
encompassed the Government’s fiscal policy agenda for the period spanning 
the next three years. The over-arching objective of this strategy was “dealing to 
debt.”112 Indeed, as Bolger notes in his 1997 autobiography A View from the Top, 
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“Bill Birch made debt reduction the centerpiece of his budget presentation.”113 
As set out in the Government’s 1994 Fiscal Strategy Report, net public debt was 
to be reduced from 42.1% of GDP to the more “prudent” level of below 30% of 
GDP by June 1997.114 In more concrete terms, this entailed net public debt 
falling by $7.43 billion over three years, from $35.56 billion to $28.13 billion.115 
Within the overarching debt reduction strategy, “a key priority” would be to 
retire and, if possible, eliminate foreign currency-denominated debt.116 
The main driver of this ‘low debt’ fiscal strategy was to be the 
accumulation of large surpluses “for at least the next three years.” 117  The 
Government expected to record “a surplus on the adjusted financial balance” of 
$730 million in 1994/95. “Even larger surpluses…[were] projected for the 
[following] two years: $2.49 billion in 1995/96, and $4.53 billion in 1996/97.”118 
These “cash-flow surpluses” were to be primarily generated from within 
existing government operations; there was to be no increases made to statutory 
tax rates.119 A ‘tight rein’ would continue to be maintained over government 
expenditure. There was to be little new spending during the following three 
years. What new spending there was would be largely concentrated in the 
Government’s ‘priority areas’ of health and education. 120  Defence spending 
would be cut.121 “Chief executives in the public service”, meanwhile, would be 
required to work largely from within existing baselines, and also to cooperate 
“with Ministers to reprioritise their spending”, increase public sector 
“efficiency”, and “achieve savings.”122  
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An ongoing programme of privatisations would play an important 
secondary role in the Government’s debt reduction strategy, as would the 
progressive reduction of public debt itself. Prior to the budget, the Fourth 
National Government had outlined a renewed programme of state asset sales. 
This included “the divestment of Landcorp, Workscorp, and…Government 
Property Services Limited”, as well as the sale of Government Computer 
Services (GCS) Limited, the state-owned computer company.123 As stated in the 
1994 Fiscal Strategy Report, “the Government [was] not prepared to meet its debt 
objective from the proceeds of [such] asset sales.”124 However, “any surpluses 
from investing activities” would nevertheless “be used to make additional 
reductions in public debt.”125 Meanwhile, as noted in the 1994 budget document 
Public Debt Goal, as at 30 June 1993 the Government’s debt servicing bill 
amounted to some $3.6 billion per annum. This was equivalent to around 13% 
of total government spending that year.126 By opting to vigorously ‘deal to debt’ 
in the immediate term, the Government would effectively be acting to reduce 
this major component of overall expenditure. Not insubstantial tax-payer funds 
previously tied up servicing debt would be progressively freed up over the 
following three years, thereby allowing them to be applied to further 
repayment of the public debt principle. 
In the following year, the Fourth National Government announced that it 
would be adopting what it considered to be a “balanced approach” to the 
formulation of fiscal policy.127 As part of this, Finance Minister Birch announced 
a new programme of social spending. Overall, this new spending would 
“average around $600 million in each of the next three years” and would be 
largely concentrated “in the important social areas of education, health, and 
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welfare.”128 Accorded the distinction of being the “the top expenditure priority 
in this [1995] Budget”, education received the largest portion of the new 
funding - $654 million over three years.129 This included, most prominently: a 
$217 million increase for general operating expenses; $184 million for capital 
investment in the primary and secondary sectors; a $66 million increase in 
operating funding for tertiary institutions; and $57 million for Early Childhood 
Education (ECE).130 Health, respectively, was allocated additional funding of 
around $667 million, also spread over three years. As had previously been 
announced in late 1994, $152 million of this would be available for immediate 
use in the coming 1995/96 year, alongside a further $190 million (that is, 
additional to the $667 million) specifically for the purposes of “maintaining and 
upgrading hospitals.”131 Welfare funding, meanwhile, was increased by around 
$50 million a year, for the following three years.132 The main initiatives to derive 
from this funding increase were a slight easing of eligibility rules for Special 
Needs Grants and Special Benefits and extra funding for state housing.133 
But, despite appearances, this “balanced approach” did not diverge 
significantly from the “surplus-driven, low debt” fiscal strategy set out by the 
Fourth National Government the year before.134 Once again, debt reduction 
would be the primary focus in Budget 1995.135 Net government debt was to be 
reduced by a further $2.3 billion over the course of the 1995/96 fiscal year, 
bringing overall net government debt down to $30.8 billion or 33.6% of GDP.136 
In order to achieve this, the Government continued to maintain “firm overall 
expense control” in 1995, and this was “projected to be sustained over the next 
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three years.”137 As outlined in Treasury’s 1995 Fiscal Strategy Report, “in dollar 
terms”, overall government “spending [only rose] by around $900 million in 
1995/96.” 138  This constituted just a 3.0% nominal increase compared to the 
previous year. CPI inflation in the same year was 2.2%, meaning that the overall 
increase was minuscule in real terms. 139  The increased spending was also 
largely concentrated in the Government’s so-called ‘priority areas’. “Over 90% 
of the net increase in spending [was] accounted for by increases in education, 
health and welfare spending.”140 Most government departments and agencies 
received no additional funding. Instead, they were required to fund any new 
policy initiatives from within existing baselines by “shifting resources from 
lower priority areas”, whilst simultaneously seeking to achieve further 
“efficiencies.”141 The 1995 budget’s flagship programme of new priority social 
spending, meanwhile, was to a significant extent (though not entirely) fiscally 
neutral. As outlined above, the spending package entailed a $1.8 billion 
spending increase over three years. However, $1.2 billion of this was to be 
directly offset by a commensurate fall in public debt servicing costs, and 
another $60 million of the $149 million specifically earmarked for new welfare 
funding was to be derived from “firmer benefit administration.”142 
Moderation 
As previously discussed in Section One, beginning in late 1992, New 
Zealand experienced a strong cyclical economic recovery which had the effect 
of significantly boosting public revenues ahead of expectations whilst 
simultaneously reducing social welfare outlays. This, combined with the Fourth 
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National Government’s continued maintenance of a relatively tight fiscal stance 
(despite having dumped Ruth Richardson as Minister of Finance), meant that 
“substantial progress towards reducing net public debt” was made during the 
1994/95 fiscal year.143 Net public debt was reduced by around $2.5 billion in the 
year to 30 June 1995, bringing total net debt down to $33 billion or 37.9% of 
GDP (that is, 1.7% of GDP ahead of the schedule laid out in Budget 1994).144 Of 
even more importance, however, projections also revealed the future path of 
public debt reduction quickly moving far ahead of what had been previously 
anticipated.145 Based on budget night figures net public debt was set to almost 
halve during the following three years. The 1995 budget Executive Summary 
states that, with no alterations to current fiscal settings, “net public debt is 
projected to fall from 33.6% of GDP at 30 June 1996 to [just] 18.7% of GDP by 30 
June 1998.”146 Figure 4.2 compares this projected future track of public debt 
reduction with that originally set out in Budget 1994. Powering this forecast 
surge in debt reduction was a substantial increase in the expected size of future 
surpluses. The operating surplus was expected to blowout to the equivalent of 
over 8% of GDP in the very near future if the Fourth National Government’s tax 
and spending plans went unchanged.147 As can be seen from Figure 4.3, Budget 
1995 forecast the operating surplus to increase from around $3.3 billion in 1995, 
to $5.4 billion in 1996, and to a staggering $7.8 billion in 1997.148 
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Figure 4.2) Comparison of Actual, Forecast, and Projected Paths of 
Net Debt Reduction contained in the 1994 and 1995 Budgets (% of GDP) 
Sources: Dalziel and Lattimore 2001, 140; Treasury 1994, FSR, 34; Treasury 1995, FSR, 25-
26. 
 
Figure 4.3) Comparison of Actual, Forecast, and Projected 
Operating Balances contained in the 1994 and 1995 Budgets ($billion) 
Sources: Dalziel and Lattimore 2001, 139; Treasury 1994, “Speech”, 7; Treasury 1995, 
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Subsequently, although it had previously signaled that it would continue 
to maintain a relatively tight fiscal stance in the medium term, in 1996 the 
Fourth National Government noticeably “loosened the purse-strings.”149 The 
“centre piece” of the third Birch Budget, delivered at 2pm on Thursday, 23 May 
1996, was a “Tax Reduction and Social Policy Programme” (TRSPP).150 As Birch 
himself outlined, the “key components” of the TRSPP were a two year 
programme of personal tax cuts (policy which had been clearly signaled by the 
National Government since 1994), increased Family Support, and the 
introduction of a new “Independent Family Tax Credit [(IFTC)] for working 
low- and middle-income families.”151 In two stages, timed one year apart and 
commencing on 1 July 1996, the middle marginal income tax rate would be 
dropped from 24% to 19.5%, and the upper threshold to which the same rate 
applied would be progressively raised from $30,875 p.a. to $38,000 p.a. The top, 
company, and lower tax brackets would remain unchanged at 33%, 33%, and 
15% respectively.152 Constituting the first alteration of the country’s income tax 
scale since 1 October 1988, overall the personal tax cut package “was designed 
to return over $3 billion, over the next two years, to working New 
Zealanders.” 153  Family Support entitlements, meanwhile, would increase by 
$2.50 per week, per child coinciding with each stage of the proposed tax cuts, 
and working families earning $20,000 or less a year would receive an IFTC 
worth $7.50 per child, per week, rising to $15 in 1997.154 The Fourth National 
Government estimated that up to 150,000 households would be eligible to 
receive the new IFTC.155 Together, this latter pairing of initiatives was expected 
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to cost an additional $500 million.156 Other important components of the 1996 
TRSPP were an increase of the threshold for the superannuation surcharge by 
$20 per week for single retirees and $30 per week for couples, and a parallel 
increase of the guaranteed minimum family income from $278 per week to $290 
per week. As with the rest of the TRSPP, both of these initiatives were also to be 
implemented in two tranches, the last on 1 July 1997. 157 Table 4.2 below sets out 
all of the major components of the Tax Reduction and Social Policy Programme 
contained in Budget 1996. 
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Table 4.2) Key Components of the Budget 1996 Tax Reduction and 
Social Policy Programme 
Tax Cuts 
  1995 1996 1997 







Middle Income Rate 24% 21.5% 19.5% 













Company Rate 33% 33% 33% 
Family Support 
Family Support     
IFTC Rate 
(per child, p.a.) 
n.a. $390 $780 







Rate (per child, 
p.a.) 




Rate $80 $90 $100 




Rate $120 $135 $150 
Source: Birch 1996, 5. 
In support of the TRSPP, the Fourth National Government also pursued 
what it described as “an aggressive spending programme in priority areas” in 
Budget 1996.158 Corresponding with its previous second term budgets, the lead 
elements of this ‘aggressive’ new spending programme consisted of significant 
new spending increases in the areas of health and education. The Fourth 
National Government outlined $733 million of new expenditure on health to be 
delivered over three years in Budget 1996. Base operating funding was increased 
by $349 million over three years, acute services received a permanent, ongoing 
                                                          
158
 Treasury 1996 “Ministerial Statement”, 6. 
Completing the Shift to Neoliberalism 209 
 
funding increase of an extra $45 million per year, and elective services received 
$40 million over two years as well as with a one-off provision of an additional 
$130 million specifically for the purpose of clearing a growing – and politically 
damaging - backlog of elective surgeries in the public health system. 159 
Simultaneously, the Fourth National Government announced $419 million of 
new spending spread over three years for education. The base operations grant 
- “funds allocated to schools to spend at their own discretion” - was increased 
by $75 million over three years, Special Education received “a major gain” of 
$55 million over three years, and an additional $206 million over three years 
was provided for a variety of “new education initiatives” spread across early 
childhood, primary, secondary, and tertiary education.160 Other lesser, but still 
relatively substantive, elements of the Fourth National Government’s 
‘aggressive’ new spending programme included a three-year, $110 million 
‘Green Package’, and $119 million over three years for the purpose of 
“Strengthening our communities.”161 Cumulatively, this “aggressive spending 
programme” pursued by the Fourth National Government in Budget 1996, 
combined with the other new spending and revenue initiatives, was expected to 
amount to a further $1.7 billion of new spending spread over three years.162 
It is worth noting that there was little in the TRSPP for beneficiaries.163 
Indeed, they were effectively excluded from almost all of it. 164  As Herbert 
observes, because “benefits are paid on an after tax basis” in New Zealand, 
beneficiaries were completely left out of the new tax cut programme and, as 
they were not in paid full-time work, they were also ineligible for the IFTC.165 
Conversely, as Boston et al point out, “middle- and upper-income households 
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gained significantly” from the TRSPP.166 The bulk of the value of the tax cut 
package accrued to those earning middle incomes and higher.167 
Further “fiscal easing” was announced as a key plank of the Coalition 
Agreement eventually signed by the new National-New Zealand First 
Government. 168  Centrally, this comprised a “comprehensive social policy 
programme” worth an aggregate of $5 billion spread over three years.169 That is, 
“up to $1.2 billion in 1997/98; up to $1.7 billion in 1998/99; and up to $2.1 billion 
in 1999/2000.”170 This constituted the largest increase in discretionary public 
expenditure announced in a single year since Muldoon’s 1983 ‘Think Big’ 
programme. Funding for the extra social spending was provided, in part, by 
delaying the second round of 1996 tax cuts by a year (excluding “the increases 
to the Independent Family Tax Credit and Family Support”), and also by 
accepting lower surpluses of around 2.5% of GDP (instead of the potentially 8% 
of GDP forecast in Budget 1995) over the three years to 1999/2000.171 
The first tranche of the Coalition Government’s three year, $5 billion 
social policy package was delivered as part of their debut budget presented on 
26 June, 1997.172 The core component of the new social spending was to be a 
substantial increase in the funding available to the Coalition’s “principle 
priority areas” of health and education.173 New spending worth $355 million 
over three years was announced for the education portfolio by the Fourth 
National Government in Budget 1997. New spending worth $900 million over 
three years (three tranches of $300 million a year) was announced for health.174  
“On top of this” the Fourth National Government signaled that it also intended 
to allocate the health portfolio “a further $180 million per year in the 1998 
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Budget, increasing to $450 million [per year] in the 1999 Budget.”175  Other 
important components of the Coalition’s new social expenditure programme 
delivered as part of Budget 1997 were the abolition of the politically-charged 
superannuation surcharge from 1 April 1998 and increases to the 
Accommodation Supplement and Special Benefit at a cost of $554 million and 
$151 million (over three years) respectively. 176   Alongside these announced 
increases in operational funding, Budget 1997 also allocated $350 million for 
new capital expenditure. This was primarily for hospitals ($148 million) and 
schools ($120 million), but there was also “a significant allocation for the justice 
sector” ($85 million).177  In addition, a further $1 billion was earmarked as a 
“policy contingency” in order to enable the funding of further social spending 
initiatives in the future.178 In total, Budget 1997 allocated $900 million in the 
1997/98 financial year and $3.3 billion over three years to newly announced 
social policy initiatives.179 
As expected, Budget 1998 continued the delivery of the Coalition 
Government’s three-year, $5 billion social policy programme.180 Building on the 
measures implemented during the Coalition’s first year, the core of this second 
installment consisted of additional funding increases for public health and 
education provision, as well as law and order enforcement.181 The Coalition 
Government announced $1.03 billion of new spending over three years on 
health, and $340 million of new spending over three years on education in 
Budget 1998. Law and order, meanwhile, received additional funding worth a 
total of $257 million over three years. This included, most prominently, the 
provision of the resources required for the recruitment of 214 additional police 
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officers (114 in 1998/99 and 100 in 1999/2000).182 Budget 1998 also “increased the 
overall level of resources available for implementing [the Coalition 
Government’s] employment strategy.” This entailed increased funding for a 
number of different initiatives worth a total of “$142 million in 1998/99 and 
$125 million in 1999/2000.”.183 
The 1997-98 East Asian Crisis and the Return to Austerity  
The specific combination of fiscal policy initiatives implemented during 
the period spanning from mid-1996 to mid-1998 entailed a noticeable 
‘loosening’ of the Fourth National Government’s previously persistently tight 
fiscal stance.184 Having been held more or less steady (in nominal terms) at a 
depressed level for several years after Ruth Richardson’s successful imposition 
of fiscal austerity, Government expenditure increased markedly as the Budget 
1996 tax and spending initiatives took effect. As can be seen from Figure 4.4 
below, from a level of $31,743 million in 1996, total government spending 
increased by over $1200 million to $32,953 million in 1997. This trend gained 
further momentum with the implementation of the Coalition’s social spending 
package in 1997 and 1998. Total government expenditure increased a further 
$1206 million to $34,211 million in 1998 and another $1600 million to $35,825 
million in 1999. 185  So, to clarify, between the end of the Fourth National 
Government’s first term and mid-1996, total government spending increased 
just $314 million in nominal terms. Then between mid-1996 and mid-1999, 
annual government expenditure increased by almost $4100 million (and this 
does not include the cost of tax cuts). 
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Figure 4.4) Total Annual Government Expenditure, 1990 to 1999 
($billion) 
Source: Dalziel and Lattimore 2001, 140. 
However, this fiscal ‘loosening’ only constituted a moderation of the 
Fourth National Government’s overarching neoliberal fiscal strategy. 186 
Although undoubtedly lower than those forecast in Budget 1995 (documented 
above), both the initial Fourth National Government and succeeding New 
Zealand First-National Coalition Government continued to record not 
inconsiderable operating surpluses during the period from 1996 to 1998. 187 
Following the $3.3 billion surplus recorded for the 1995/96 fiscal year, the 
Government accumulated surpluses totaling $1.9 billion in 1996/97, $2.5 billion 
in 1997/98, and $1.8 billion in 1998/99. 188  Further, “reflecting the ongoing 
application of cash surpluses to debt repayment”, net crown debt also 
continued to decline quickly over the full period of the ‘fiscal easing’.189 Figure 
4.5 compares the forecast path of debt reduction contained in Budget 1995 to the 
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actual recorded path of public debt reduction. As can be seen, while “the 
decline in crown debt is [generally] slower and the debt profile higher” than 
projected in the 1995 budget, the actual debt reduction track nevertheless did 
not deviate substantially from the Fourth National Government’s previous 
policy direction (that laid out in the Budget 1994 FSR and documented 
previously). From a level equivalent to 31.3% of GDP in 1995/96, net public debt 
fell to 26.7% of GDP in 1996/97, through 24.6% of GDP in 1997/98, and reached 
21.9% of GDP by the end of the 1998/99 fiscal year. Thus, despite some 
contemporary claims to the contrary, the expansion of government expenditure 
during the period from mid-1996 to mid-1998 did not represent a policy 
direction “radically at odds” with the previous direction of National party 
policy.190 Rather, as Dalziel observed at the time, during the period from mid-
1996 to mid-1998, the Government had in-fact persisted with its previous fiscal 
strategy but had “softened it at the edges.” “It [was] essentially in the same 
direction but with more money available on the fringes.”191 
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Figure 4.5) Budget 1995 Debt Reduction Forecast versus Actual Path of 
Public Debt Reduction (% of GDP) 
Source: Treasury 1995, FSR; Dalziel and Lattimore 2001, 140. 
In addition, this moderation proved to be only temporary. In the 1996 
Coalition Agreement document, the new Government’s flagship social spending 
package featured prominently. Ostensibly “aimed at addressing the economic 
and social issues facing New Zealand” (specifically defined as: “economic 
soundness, fairness, equity, inclusion and consultation”), the three-year, $5 
billion social programme was set out over 49 pages in the very first schedule of 
the 68-page agreement.192 But there was also a second schedule in the Coalition 
Agreement. This comparatively short 2-page schedule stated that, while overall 
spending was expected to increase during the forthcoming parliamentary term, 
the Coalition would nevertheless continue to “maintain a prudent approach to 
fiscal policy.”193 Any further expenditure would be balanced by further tax 
reductions and public debt repayment, and, most importantly, would be 
entirely “subject to the [continued] availability of adequate surpluses.”194 As Easton 
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points out, “despite the ordering it appears that the second schedule was 
[always] intended to dominate the first.”195 
The broader process of ‘fiscal easing’ was also predicated on an 
assumption of continued robust economic growth. 196  As Easton observes, 
despite the fact that the economy was already showing signs of slowing down 
before the 1996 general election, “the established forecasters remained broadly 
optimistic” about New Zealand’s medium to long-term economic prospects.197 
In the 1996 December Economic and Fiscal Update, for example, the Treasury 
projected “GDP growth of 3.4% on the average over the three years to March 
2000.” 198  Similar, though somewhat less rosy, forecasts were presented by 
Treasury in Budget 1997.199 Essentially, continued strong economic growth was 
expected to progressively reduce the fiscal pressures faced by the state. 
Employment would increase and unemployment would commensurately 
decrease thereby reducing social welfare outlays. 200  Simultaneously, tax 
revenues would increase (even with the Fourth National Government’s 
promised tax cuts).201 Ultimately, these factors would grant the state greatly 
enhanced flexibility in relation to fiscal policy formulation.    
It is apparent that both the Treasury and the Fourth National 
Government had bought into their own hype regarding the fundamental 
success of the decade-long neoliberal reform process. Budget 1997 states, for 
example, that “over the medium term, the Treasury’s analysis suggests that the 
economy should be able to sustain growth rates of around 3% to 3.5% per 
annum. In part this reflects the ongoing benefits of a more open and 
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competitive environment created by the extensive reforms of the last decade.”202 
According to the official narrative, as “a paragon of free-market economics and 
fiscal and monetary prudence”, it was now “springtime in the New Zealand 
economy.” 203  As a direct consequence of the so-called ‘New Zealand 
Experiment’, the country had moved onto a fundamentally higher plane of 
economic endeavor: 
 
Today’s [economic] performance is very different to the short-
lived recoveries we have experienced over the past 20 years. It is 
not the result of extra Government spending, or a big pickup in 
overseas prices or demand for a few of our agricultural products. 
In a major break from the past, the economy is not expected to go 
into the “boom-bust” pattern we have so often seen.204 
New Zealand had instead entered into a “virtuous circle” of perpetually strong 
economic growth and prosperity.205 But the expected continuation of strong 
economic growth failed to materialise.206 As discussed in detail in the previous 
section, beginning in late 1997, New Zealand experienced a relatively sharp 
economic downturn due in part to regional droughts, tightening monetary 
policy, and, most significantly, the impact of the Asian financial crisis and 
associated financial market volatility.  
Consequently, at the same time as it delivered the second installment of 
its three-year, $5 billion social spending package, the Coalition Government 
moved to tighten up its fiscal stance.207 The as yet unallocated portion of the $5 
billion allowance for new spending was cut by $300 million, from $1.7 billion to 
$1.4 billion. This involved an immediate $150 million reduction in the current 
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1998/99 fiscal year, followed by a further $150 million reduction in 1999/2000. 
This trimming back of planned social spending was accompanied by a revision 
of the Fourth National Government’s debt reduction targets. With the existing 
“goal of net debt of 20% of GDP…forecast to be met by 2000/01”, the Coalition 
established a new target of net debt being reduced to below 15% of GDP within 
five years.208 
Further fiscal retrenchment was announced in late 1998. It formed the 
core feature of the ‘Policies for Progress’ package introduced by new Prime 
Minister Jenny Shipley on 29 September. Described by opposition leader Helen 
Clark as “a cowardly, vicious, and underhanded move”, the cornerstone 
initiative of this policy package was a reduction in the minimum rate of 
national superannuation provision.  Beginning on 1 April 1999, the extant level 
of 65% of the average wage was to be cut to 60%. This was “to be phased in by 
not increasing the pension until the new floor was reached.”   While only 
expected to provide the Government with minimal immediate fiscal benefits 
(estimated at just $22 million during the remainder of the 1998/99 financial 
year), implementing this cut to future pension rates was ultimately “expected to 
save the Government NZ$2.6 billion over ten years.”  The other major fiscal 
initiative announced as part of the ‘Policies for Progress’ package was the 
Government’s intention to sell the country’s second largest power producer, 
Contact Energy. With a book value of some $860 million at the time (according 
to Treasurer Bill Birch), this move was expected to generate a revenue boost of 
more than $1 billion.  In addition to this one-off cash-injection, the sale of 
Contact was also “expected to cut the Government’s debt servicing costs by 
about $35 million a year.”  In total, the initiatives announced as part of the 
‘Policies for Progress’ package were expected to cut government spending by a 
total of $400 million over the following three years. 
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To the apparent chagrin of the New Zealand Business Roundtable 
(NZBR) who sought “an alternative medium-term strategy of vigorous 
expenditure and tax cuts”, Budget 1999 did not continue to cut government 
spending.209 Nevertheless, it did effectively curtail it. As indicated in Figure 4.4 
above, total government expenditure increased just $346 million in 1999/2000. 
This was just a 0.96% nominal increase compared to the previous fiscal year 
which, in a year when CPI inflation stood at 1.5%, actually constituted a slight 
reduction in real terms.210 Overall, the 1999 budget policy package had included 
initiatives worth some $1.6 billion spread over the following three years. The 
leading element of the package, however, was a new programme of “tax 
reductions worth more than $200 million a year to the tax paying public.”211 The 
abolition of the public broadcasting fee accounted for around half of the value 
of the programme ($97 million a year), with the abolition of stamp duties ($77 
million a year), and the introduction of a new parental tax credit making up the 
rest ($29 million) a year.212 This left just $1 billion available for actual new 
spending over three years. Of this, Health was the only Vote to receive a 
substantive portion; $644 million over three years was earmarked for new 
spending in this area.213 Education, the second largest spending component in 
the 1999 Budget package, in comparison received just $179 million over three 
years.214 Delivered in the form of 1.6% increase in general operational funding, 
in essence, Budget 1999 only provided for the indexation of education funding 
for inflation for the following three years.215 All other policy areas combined 
received additional funding of just $279 million over three years in Budget 
1999.216 
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4.3) Explaining Fiscal Austerity  
Implementation  
Corresponding with the situation that had prevailed under the previous 
Fourth Labour Government, Treasury again played a major role in the 
development and implementation of the neoliberal policy agenda pursued in 
New Zealand during the period from 1990 to 1994. As Kelsey observes, 
Treasury’s “influence [had] waned somewhat during the later 1980s.”217 The 
marginalisation of Roger Douglas within the Labour cabinet due to mounting 
intra-party tensions over the policy direction of the Fourth Labour Government 
resulted in a parallel side-lining of Treasury. However, “under Richardson’s 
patronage in the early 1990s” Treasury’s previously high level of “influence 
[was] revived.”218  Once more, the Treasury became a central player in public 
policy making. To have an accurate indication of what the Fourth National 
Government actually intended to do, one would be far better served reading 
Treasury’s briefing papers than official party programmes.219 
As noted in Section 4.1, by early 1990 significant deterioration was 
becoming apparent in the New Zealand economy “despite the magnitude of the 
policy reforms undertaken” by the Fourth Labour Government over the 
previous six years.220 Many critics placed blame for the country’s continuing 
poor economic performance on the “over-vigorous monetary disinflation” that 
had been steadfastly pursued by the Fourth Labour Government (with the 
vocal backing of Treasury). 221  Overly tight domestic monetary conditions - 
ostensibly aimed at stamping out inflation – were considered to have produced 
a drastic “contraction in aggregate demand” which, in turn, had resulted in 
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significantly curtailed domestic economic activity and employment.222 Treasury 
acknowledged that the economy had not performed well in recent years: 
The results of New Zealand’s economic reforms in terms of 
growth and employment have been disappointing. Some pain was 
inevitable during economic restructuring. But the costs of 
adjustment have been higher than they needed to be, and the 
benefits have been delayed.223 
However, Treasury rejected the notion that tight monetary policy was the main 
cause of the country’s economic underperformance.224 Instead, primary blame 
was placed on a lack of overall coherence in the formulation of government 
macroeconomic policy.225 In particular, overly loose fiscal policy was cited as 
undermining the efficacy of Labour’s disinflation strategy.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, during the period from 1984 to 
1990 the Fourth Labour Government had made a “determined” effort to pursue 
a neoliberal fiscal austerity agenda. 226  State subsidies of agriculture and 
industry were cut, Government departments were corporatised and other state 
assets privatised, the regressive GST consumption tax was introduced (and 
subsequently raised), and various tax exemptions were scrapped. As Dalziel 
outlines, these measures “did much to bring the [Fourth Labour] Government’s 
accounts back towards balance.”227 However, in terms of achieving its goal of 
‘fiscal restraint’ the Fourth Labour Government ultimately came up short; 
significant and ongoing budgetary deficits were passed on to the incoming 
Fourth National Government at the 1990 election.228 
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Treasury argued that these ongoing fiscal deficits had generated upward 
pressures on domestic interest rates, with the resulting high interest rates 
suppressing new investment and simultaneously increasing the exchange 
rate.229 The unnecessarily inflated New Zealand currency had, in-turn, placed 
considerable extra competitive pressures on exporters by undermining their 
price competitiveness, resulting in both a “reduction in output” and “a major 
loss of jobs.”230 
In order to eliminate the apparent inconsistency in the country’s 
macroeconomic policy framework, and thus ameliorate New Zealand’s sclerotic 
economic performance, Treasury advised the incoming National government to 
pursue what it was now terming “fiscal consolidation.”231 Centrally, this would 
entail an array of major spending cuts. “Reductions in government expenditure 
should be the primary means of reducing the deficit”, argued Treasury.232 Social 
welfare, education, and health – the core elements of the New Zealand welfare 
state – were to be the focus of these cuts. 233  Treasury advised haste in 
implementing its proposed fiscal austerity agenda. “The fiscal problem is very 
large and it should be dealt with as quickly as is practicable. The timing of 
actions should be as fast as is consistent with careful decision-making and 
sound implementation.”234 Raising additional taxes, meanwhile, was rejected 
outright as a viable method of deficit reduction.235  
National’s incoming Minister of Finance, Ruth Richardson, was highly 
amenable to the Treasury message. 236   Richardson was a committed, long-
standing Libertarian and member of the neoliberal Mont Pelerin Society. She 
accepted Treasury’s neoclassical explanation of New Zealand’s on-going 
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economic difficulties at face value and subsequently implemented the bulk of 
Treasury’s policy prescriptions. 237  However, as Richardson herself observes, 
“there was no question of Treasury capturing the [policy] agenda.”238 A free-
market faction (led by Richardson) had taken effective control of the National 
Party in the years leading up to 1990. After their defeat at the 1984 election, the 
National Party had endured a prolonged period of factional infighting and 
electoral ineffectiveness. 239  This came to an end in late 1987. Following an 
unsuccessful challenge for the deputy leadership, Ruth Richardson, was 
elevated to the position of party finance spokesperson by new National Party 
leader Jim Bolger.240 Richardson quickly moved to build a powerful team of 
like-minded, pro-neoliberal MPs around her. 241  As journalist Denis Welch 
observed, by mid-1988, “Richardson’s team” had become “the engine-room of 
party policy direction and growth.”242 
Richardson’s free-market faction had already determined the broad 
direction a new National Government would take well in advance of the 1990 
election. “We came to office ready to hit the ground running”, states 
Richardson, “we had our agenda.” 243  Government spending was “to be 
substantially reduced” and the fiscal deficit was to be eliminated.244 A radical 
restructuring and downsizing of the welfare state was determined to be the 
primary means by which this would be achieved.245 Funding for the welfare 
state was easily the largest component of government expenditure at the outset 
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of the Fourth National Government’s first term.246 Furthermore, social spending 
is characterised by a prominent ‘cyclical demand’ aspect which, as Kelsey 
observes, makes it “difficult to control without changing levels of benefits and 
eligibility.”247  Therefore, in order to rebalance the nation’s public finances, 
Richardson determined that it was necessary for the Fourth National 
Government to seek to make considerable savings in this area. 
As Kelsey observes, the free-marketeer’s policy agenda was primarily 
driven by “deeply ideological, rather than fiscal, considerations.” 248 
Fundamentally, the goal of National’s neoliberal caucus faction was to 
substantially reduce the size of the state in New Zealand.249 “We are determined 
to shift the balance of resources from the state towards the private enterprise 
sector”, stated Jim Bolger in one pre-election speech.250  National’s neoliberal 
caucus faction firmly believed that it was the size of the state that was the 
ultimate cause of New Zealand’s ongoing economic problems. “The state was 
stifling us as New Zealanders and was knocking the stuffing out of the 
economy”, recalls Richardson.251 At around 40% of GDP, public sector spending 
was “a crushing burden” that was having a profound negative impact on New 
Zealand’s economic growth by undermining “the initiative and the energy of 
New Zealand’s wealth creators.”252 
Therefore, in contrast to the situation that prevailed from 1984 to 1990, 
the continuation of the neoliberal revolution in New Zealand from 1990 to 1994 
did not entail a “case of the bureaucratic and ideological capture” of the Fourth 
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National Government by Treasury.253 Instead, it was Richardson’s neoliberal 
cabinet faction that crafted the agenda. Treasury’s role was more of a 
supporting one, primarily involving the provision of higher-level technical 
advice relating to effective policy implementation.254 As Richardson relates, the 
Treasury’s “advice was more the action stations, not the ideas.”255 Treasury 
officials did, however, help Richardson and her faction to persuade some of the 
less enthusiastic cabinet ministers of the veracity of Richardson’s austerity 
agenda. Iain Rennie, a Treasury official seconded to the National opposition in 
1989, is noted to have been particularly important. According to Richardson he 
exerted a considerable degree of influence over Jim Bolger, “helping to educate 
[him], and steadying him at crucial times.”256  
National’s free-market faction was aided significantly in the 
advancement of their pre-formulated fiscal austerity agenda by “the specific 
institutional structure of the state in New Zealand.”257 As discussed in detail in 
Chapter Three, due to “the institutional dominance of the executive within New 
Zealand’s machinery of government” and New Zealand’s unicameral 
parliament, during the period from 1984 to 1987, just three cabinet ministers – 
the so-called ‘troika’ of Roger Douglas, David Caygill, and Richard Prebble – 
were able to rapidly drive through Labour’s radical neoliberal policy agenda.258 
As Kelsey outlines, for much of National’s first term, “Richardson enjoyed 
considerably more strategic Cabinet support than Douglas initially had. 
Observers estimate that at least twelve of the 1990 cabinet were free-market 
ideologues, giving them effective control.”259 Consequently, like Douglas under 
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Labour, Richardson and National’s neoliberals were able to, at least initially, 
rapidly advance their agenda against little effective opposition.260 
The DWSR also played an important supporting role in the further 
promulgation of neoliberalism in New Zealand during the early 1990s. Indeed, 
for Richardson, “the financial markets would prove to be” a key “ally.”261 As 
McKinnon observes, although they were a powerful faction within the National 
caucus by October 1990, “Richardson[’s neoliberals were] not the National 
Party.”262 A large number of National MPs, including, most prominently, the 
new Prime Minister Jim Bolger and his chief supporters Don McKinnon and Bill 
Birch, remained more traditional National Party members; conservatives 
“habituated to pragmatic approaches to policy.”263 Consequently, the question 
of whether the new government would steadfastly pursue a fiscal austerity 
agenda to the far-reaching extent sought by Richardson and her allies was by 
no means a fait accompli. 264  The financial markets, however, ensured that 
Richardson was able to garner sufficient support from amongst her colleagues 
for the immediate implementation of the neoliberal austerity agenda and also 
that, once successfully initiated, “the momentum of reform continued over into 
the new year.”265 
On arriving in office, the Fourth National Government was immediately 
faced with an impending fiscal crisis. In its official Briefing to the Incoming 
Government, Treasury advised that, “with no change from current policy,…the 
Government [would] confront financial deficits of $3.7 billion, $4.5 billion and 
$5.2 billion over the next three years.”266 Table 4.3 (below) compares Treasury’s 
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post-election fiscal projections with those presented in July as part of Budget 
1990. As can be seen, Treasury’s new figures represented an extremely sharp 
deterioration in the New Zealand Government’s apparent financial position 
within a very short space of time. In Budget 1990, the Labour Finance Minister, 
David Caygill, had announced a small maiden financial surplus for the 1989/90 
fiscal year. This was expected to be followed by deficits of 2.8% of GDP in 
1990/91 and 1.9% of GDP in 1991/92.267 Just a few months later, not only had 
Caygill’s surplus disappeared (replaced by a sizeable deficit), the forecast 
deficits for the ‘out’ years had also increased dramatically.268 
 
Table 4.3) Treasury’s Projected Fiscal Deficits, 1990 
 
Fiscal Year 
1990 Budget Treasury Post-Election Briefing 
$billion % GDP $billion % GDP 
1990/91 $0.089 billion    
1991/92 -$2.2 billion 2.8% -$3.7 billion 4.8% 
1992/93 -$1.6 billion 1.9% -$4.5 billion 5.7% 
1993/94 n.a. n.a. -$5.2 billion 6.3% 
Source: Dalziel 1992, 24. 
There is some contention over the extent to which a serious fiscal crisis 
actually existed in the wake of the 1990 election. McKinnon, for example, 
suggests that it merely served as a pretext for Treasury to advance its own 
preferred policy agenda. 269  However, as Dalziel delineates (in contrast to a 
previous position), “the fiscal crisis announced by Treasury was certainly 
real.”270 In addition to “uncosted Budget night items” (adding $140 million to 
the deficit in 1990/91, $334 million in 1991/92, and $747 million in 1992/93) from 
the previous Labour Government’s last budget, “revised economic 
assumptions” since budget night meant that in October 1990 the Fourth 
National Government also found itself facing much higher debt servicing costs 
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and social welfare outlays, coupled with declining tax revenues. Combined, 
these were expected to add $1.2 billion to the deficit for 1991/92 and $1.7 billion 
for 1992/93. Further, the new National Government “found itself needing to 
inject $620 million into the Bank of New Zealand, $240 million into Government 
Property Services and $112 million in the failed Development Finance 
Corporation.”271 
New Zealand already had a weak extant public debt position at the time 
of the 1990 election. As discussed in more detail above, the previous Fourth 
Labour Government had run persistent large budget deficits throughout its two 
terms in power. These fiscal shortfalls had been necessarily funded by debt. 
Figure 4.6 below illustrates the path that New Zealand’s net public debt took 
under the previous Labour Government. As can be seen, despite some 
temporary improvement due to Labour’s asset sales between 1987 and 1988, by 
1990 the New Zealand government had accrued net liabilities equal to 50.5% of 








 Treasury 1990, 69. 
Completing the Shift to Neoliberalism 229 
 
Figure 4.6) Net Public Debt, 1984 to 1990 and Forecast Net Public 
Debt, 1991 to 1994 
 
Source: Dalziel and Lattimore 2001, 140; Treasury 1990, 64. 
The impending fiscal crisis threatened a rapid build-up of additional 
public debt.273 Figure 4.6 (above) also shows the projected future path of net 
government debt contained within Treasury’s Briefing to the Incoming 
Government. As can be seen, net public debt was expected to fall sharply during 
the 1990/91 fiscal year, primarily due to the privatisation of Telecom and the 
subsequent use of the proceeds to pay down public debt.274 However, thereafter 
net public debt was forecast to rise substantially. From a level of around 43.1% 
of GDP in 1991, net public debt was expected to increase by around 5% of GDP 
annually, to reach some 53.3% of GDP by 1993/1994.275 In effect, under existing 
fiscal policy, the benefit of New Zealand’s largest single privatisation would 
have been nullified within just two years. 
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Richardson states that “Jim Bolger was never more solidly behind me 
than during the government’s pre-Christmas period.”276 The growing public 
debt problem was integral to this. Treasury advised Bolger that an increase in 
debt of the magnitude forecast raised the prospect of significant increases in 
domestic interest rates and the foreign exchange rate, both of which would have 
serious negative consequences for the country’s economic performance in the 
immediate future.277 Furthermore, accruing additional public debt would also 
generate ongoing “fiscal risk”, thereby increasing “the prospects of adverse 
reactions in financial markets.”278 As Treasury states: 
throughout this period and beyond, there would be an ever 
increasing risk of a major break in financial market confidence. 
This could see a very sharp depreciation in the exchange rate take 
place, further upward pressures on interest rates and the need for 
urgent corrective action.279 
Such threats compelled Bolger’s endorsement of the Richardson agenda; “the 
Government cannot go on spending money it does not have”, he averred in the 
1990 ESI.280 
 Thus, the second major stage of New Zealand’s historic shift to 
neoliberalism also constitutes a prime example of what Naomi Klein terms the 
“Shock Doctrine” in action.281 The 1990 fiscal crisis effectively created a pretext 
for ostensibly necessary emergency public policy measures and this situation 
“was…methodically leveraged” by Richardson’s neoliberal cabal in order to 
rapidly advance the unfinished aspects of their neoliberal policy agenda.282 
Indeed, it is particularly noteworthy and interesting that the 1990 fiscal crisis 
was not only exploited to justify the imposition of draconian fiscal austerity on 
                                                          
276
 Richardson 1995, 83. 
277






 Bolger 1990 in ESI, 5. 
281
 N. Klein 2008, The Shock Doctrine (London: Penguin). 
282
 Ibid, 156, 164. 
Completing the Shift to Neoliberalism 231 
 
the New Zealand electorate, but also extensive labour market deregulation and 
further privatisations. Richardson, with the help of her allies in Treasury, 
successfully “obfuscated” the difference between macroeconomic policies 
actually oriented towards alleviating the immediate threat to New Zealand’s 
macroeconomic stability and neoliberal microeconomic policies that ultimately 
“had nothing to do with ending [the] crisis” but, instead, had everything to do 
with boosting the power and profitability of capital in New Zealand.283 
Ultimately, however, the Fourth National Government was, to a 
significant extent, serving the particular interests of an increasingly 
financialised and internationally-oriented business elite. Indeed, to borrow 
from Jesson, “there is not the slightest reason for treating this [(National’s 
neoliberal policy agenda)] as anything other than the self-serving programme of 
a self-serving elite.”284 In this regard it is important to recognise that business 
shifted its support from Labour to National in the two years prior to the 1990 
election. After Roger Douglas’s exit from cabinet in December 1988, the Fourth 
Labour Government’s programme of neoliberal reform was continued by his 
replacement, David Caygill. 285  “Without consulting the Treasury”, recalls 
Graham Scott, “[Caygill] just announced, “We’re going to have Rogernomics 
part II”.”286 Labour continued to adhere to the monetarist “anti-inflationary 
policy that had been pursued fairly consistently since 1984.”287 The privatisation 
programme announced by Douglas as part of Budget 1988 proceeded as 
planned, culminating with the sale of Telecom in 1990. 288  GST was raised, 
import protections were reduced further, and the State Sector Act (SSA) was 
passed.289 Caygill also ensured that both the Public Finance Act 1989 (PFA) and 
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the Reserve Bank Act 1989 (RBA) were successfully steered through the house 
and enshrined into legislation. 290  Thus, in-fact, two of the most important 
legislative pillars of the overarching neoliberal policy regime (the PFA and 
RBA) were implemented by Caygill.291 
Yet, despite this, the business community was not exceedingly 
enamoured with the overall policy direction being taken by Labour under the 
leadership of Palmer. “At present…the government is drifting aimlessly” 
claimed key NZBR figure Alan Gibbs in 1989. 292  From the viewpoint of 
business, the Fourth Labour Government had failed to complete what they 
considered to be some of the most important aspects of the neoliberal reform 
agenda that they had been vigorously advocating since 1984.293 First, Caygill’s 
continuation of the neoliberal reform programme had not extended into the 
realm of social policy. Public health, housing, and education all remained 
uncommercialised by free-market policies, and existing social welfare and 
income maintenance programmes had been maintained and, indeed, 
“enhanced…in some respects.” 294  Second, the New Zealand labour market 
remained largely untouched by wholesale deregulation. 295  Speaking in 
Hamilton in early 1989, the then vice-chairman of the NZBR and CEO of brewer 
Lion Nathan, Doug Myers, noted that, for business, “it [was] astounding that so 
little [had] yet been achieved, or even attempted, by the Government in these 
areas.”296 
Palmer did his utmost to placate business in order to keep them onside. 
Throughout late 1989 and on into 1990, Palmer actively endeavoured to 
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reassure the business community that Labour was still fundamentally a 
“government of momentum and reform.”297 Despite Palmer’s desperate efforts, 
however, business shifted its support decisively to National – or, more 
specifically, to their finance spokesperson Ruth Richardson - in 1988.298 While 
her party was distracted with internal conflict between 1984 and 1987, 
Richardson had been busy “doing the rounds of the major corporates”, largely 
on her own initiative.299 As Richardson relates, during this time “I was putting a 
lot of time into meeting and networking with the business sector. I also met 
regularly with participants in the financial markets.”300 Through this activity, by 
1987 Richardson had developed for herself personally a very strong and vocal 
constituency amongst the nation’s business elite.301 
Through this support, business exerted a considerable degree of 
influence over the subsequent direction of National Party policy. 302  Most 
notably, business ensured that Richardson was appointed Minister of Finance. 
As Richardson recalls, while “I had been fairly confident of securing the job [of 
Finance Minister] ever since the publication of the vision document,…I had 
never been 100 per cent confident.” 303  “Despite the success of the Vision 
document”, for some time afterward, there was continued “speculation over 
whether Jim would appoint me.”304 Business quickly put any doubts about the 
matter to rest. As Kelsey observes, “business interests made it clear [to Bolger] 
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that they expected her to be appointed Minister of Finance in return for 
supporting National, both financially and electorally; and she was.”305 
 
Sustaining the Changes 
Although subsequent to the successful implementation of labour market 
reform and fiscal austerity there was a general consensus within the business 
community that the Fourth National Government’s “policy framework [was 
now] fundamentally sound”, following the 1993 election, business nevertheless 
continued to press for the further extension of the neoliberal policy agenda.306 
As Roper has comprehensively documented, throughout the period from 1994 
to 1999, “business…vigorously promoted further [neoliberal] reforms that it 
considered to be in its interests, which it equated with those of the nation as a 
whole.”307 Most prominently, business advocated:  
Further reduction of import protection through the lowering of 
tariffs; further tax cuts for companies and high income earners, to 
be funded by a general reduction in social spending; elimination 
of the Employment Court, with labour disputes to be dealt with in 
the civil courts; further privatisation of state- and local body-
owned enterprises; increasing fees for tertiary students; the 
introduction of market rents for tenants in state houses, and the 
privatisation of state housing.308 
For the Fourth National Government, however, further substantive 
neoliberal reform had “become politically untenable” after the 1993 general 
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election. 309  As discussed in more detail in Section One, National’s poorly 
signaled continuation of Labour’s radical neoliberal reform agenda had been 
extremely unpopular.310 At the 1993 election voters had expressed their dissent; 
National’s vote share fell precipitously and National only retained power with 
a bare majority. As Easton observes, having only just scraped back into office, 
“Bolger had neither the mandate in the House nor the personal inclination to 
continue” the neoliberal revolution.311 
Consequently, the second phase of New Zealand’s historic shift to 
neoliberalism effectively came to an end. Richardson, chief architect of the 
reforms and also the focal point of business political influence from 1990 to 
1993, was not re-appointed to the finance portfolio. Bolger replaced her with 
close ally Bill Birch, whilst simultaneously shuffling Cabinet in order to 
promote MPs “of a more pragmatic or moderate stance.”312 When explaining 
the changes, Bolger stated “we believe the time has come to recognise the big 
moves are behind us and a different form of management is needed.”313  
Yet, although the political climate was no longer conducive to 
substantive neoliberal reform, the Fourth National Government nevertheless 
persevered with a distinctively neoliberal approach to macroeconomic 
management. As outlined in detail in the previous section, throughout the 
period from 1994 to 1999, the Fourth National Government – in each of its 
various guises - adhered to a surplus-driven, low-debt fiscal strategy coupled 
with a monetarist low-inflation monetary strategy. A number of factors 
contributed to the Fourth National Government not “deviating from the free 
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market path” in the realm of macroeconomic policy. 314  As Roper has 
documented, for example, throughout the period from 1994 to 1999, major 
business interests “vigorously opposed any perceived “rolling back” of the 
neoliberal policy reforms of 1984-93.” 315  Treasury also directed much of its 
policy advice from 1994 onwards towards persuading the Fourth National 
Government to maintain the recently established neoliberal policy 
framework. 316  A particularly important factor contributing to the Fourth 
National Government’s steadfast adherence to a neoliberal fiscal strategy, 
however, was New Zealand’s integration into the DWSR. In a context of open 
capital controls, a flexible exchange rate, an extensively deregulated domestic 
financial system, and a highly liberalised foreign investment regime, New 
Zealand’s extremely high level of offshore debt meant that IPFMs and 
international credit rating agencies exerted a significant degree of influence 
over government fiscal policy formulation during the period from 1994 to 1999. 
Figure 4.7 (below) illustrates New Zealand’s current account deficits 
during the decade leading up to 1994. As can be seen, New Zealand recorded 
large current account deficits throughout the period.317 From an already weak 
level of -5.5% of GDP in 1984, the country’s balance of payments position 
initially deteriorated significantly, with an average deficit of -8.7% of GDP in 
each of the following two years. The current account deficit subsequently 
improved (although still remained sizeable) in the following three years, 
reaching a nadir of 0.8% of GDP during the depths of the severe recession in 
1989.318 Following this, the overall balance of payments position worsened once 
                                                          
314
 Kelsey 1999, 77. 
315
 Roper 2006. 
316
 See, most notably, Treasury 1993, Briefing to the Incoming Government (Wellington: Treasury); 1996, 
Briefing to the Incoming Government (Wellington: Treasury). 
317
 Perhaps with the exception of 1989. 
318
 Since at least the 1980s, there appears to be a strong correlation between economic growth and 
current account deficits in New Zealand. During periods of relatively strong economic growth, current 
account deficits tend to widen due to import expansion, while the opposite tends to occur during 
economic downturns. It is thus unsurprising that New Zealand’s current account deficit narrowed 
Completing the Shift to Neoliberalism 237 
 
more; the country recorded average annual current account deficits of -3.14% of 
GDP during the period from 1990 to 1994. Thus, despite an apparent 
turnaround in a number of other important measures of economic performance 
(noted above), the previous decade of radical neoliberal reform had failed to 
alter the underlying nature of New Zealand’s balance of payments position. 
Fundamentally, as Kelsey observes, the country continued to regularly earn 
significantly “less from exports and income from its investments overseas than 
it paid for imports and income from foreign investment in New Zealand 
(including interest and profits remittable on loans and investments).”319 
 
Figure 4.7) New Zealand’s Current Account Deficits, 1984 to 1994 
Source: Dalziel and Lattimore 2001, 135. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
considerably during the late 1980s and early 1990s as the country endured its worst economic downturn 
since the Great Depression. 
319












1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Current Account Deficits (% of
GDP)
Completing the Shift to Neoliberalism 238 
 
Table 4.4) New Zealand’s Net International Investment Position, 
March 1994 
New Zealand’s IIP $million 
Total International Assets 32,417 
Total International Liabilities 99,789 
New Zealand’s Net International Asset Position -67,371 
Nominal GDP 80,824 
Net IIP as % of Nominal GDP 83% 
Total International Liabilities as a % of Nominal GDP 123% 
Source: Statistics New Zealand, New Zealand’s IIP (Wellington: Statistics New 
Zealand); Nominal GDP figures from Dalziel and Lattimore 2001, 135. 
Persistent current account deficits of the magnitude indicated above 
necessarily entailed a concurrent accumulation of an increasingly large body of 
offshore debt.320 The best official measure of the overall significance of New 
Zealand’s external indebtedness is contained within Statistics New Zealand’s 
regularly updated International Investment Position (IIP) data series. 321  The 
pertinent aspects of this data series are presented in Table 4.4 (above). As can be 
seen, by the end of March 1994, the New Zealand economy as a whole had 
amassed a net external liability of $67.4 billion, equivalent to just over 83% of 
GDP.322 This “level of (net) dependence on foreign capital” was particularly 
high compared to other small developed economies at this time.323 
New Zealand was “not facing an incipient crisis” at the beginning of the 
Fourth National Government’s second term. 324  Unlike the situation when 
National first took office in late 1990, there appeared to be no immediate danger 
of a major national financial crisis developing. However, New Zealand’s large 
ongoing current account deficits and corresponding heavy reliance on foreign 
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capital nevertheless rendered New Zealand particularly vulnerable to one.325 As 
Woolford, Reddell, and Comber observe, while “all countries that borrow 
internationally face the same potential risks”, an exceptionally high level of net 
external indebtedness exposed New Zealand to the distinct possibility of a 
sudden reversal in capital flows. 326  A material deterioration in the nation’s 
underlying economic fundamentals, a marked increase in risk aversion within 
IPFMs, or a major disruption in IPFMs resulting in “a widespread retreat from 
the ready international cross-border flow of capital” (such as what occurred in 
2008 during the GFC) could all have resulted in a major outflow of private 
foreign capital (or, alternatively, a so-called “sudden stop” involving an 
inability to attract new offshore capital inflows).327 The likely outcome of such 
an episode would have been significant downward pressure on the currency, 
rapidly rising domestic interest rates, and, ultimately, a period of severe 
macroeconomic instability.328 
New Zealand’s elevated vulnerability to “future financial shocks” 
emanating from IPFMs placed significant pressure on the Fourth National 
Government to implement macroeconomic policies that would help to preserve 
the country’s ongoing financial stability. 329  Centrally, the Fourth National 
Government was responding to this latent IPFM-derived pressure when it 
moved to make rapid reduction of public debt “the major objective of its fiscal 
strategy” in 1994.330 As Bill Birch explained in Budget 1994, “Lower debt is a 
means to an end, not an end in itself.” “Lower debt makes the country less 
vulnerable to adverse international events like trade shocks, interest or 
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exchange rate movements.”331 Figure 4.8 shows the overall structure of New 
Zealand’s total overseas debt at the end of March, 1994. As can be seen, central 
government borrowing made up a sizeable component of the nation’s 
substantial external liabilities at the beginning of the Fourth National 
Government’s second term. Official government overseas debt totalled some 
$26.3 billion. This constituted 36.2% of New Zealand’s substantial external 
liabilities, and was the equivalent of around 32.5% of nominal GDP. 332 
Therefore, the prioritisation of large operating surpluses for the specific 
purpose of “dealing to debt” (as Birch termed it) would make a significant 
contribution towards alleviating New Zealand’s overall external indebtedness, 
the primary cause of the country’s elevated level of macroeconomic 
vulnerability.333 
 
Figure 4.8) Total New Zealand Overseas Debt, March 1994 ($billion) 
Source: RBNZ 2013, Discontinued Statistics, E6: NZ’s Overseas Debt. Available at 
www.rbnz.govt.nz. 
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The specific targeting of foreign currency denominated debt within the 
broader drive to reduce debt, meanwhile, was primarily designed to mitigate 
the risk of adverse movements in exchange rates sparking a financial crisis.334 
Previously, when tapping international debt markets in order to finance 
successive budget deficits, New Zealand governments had effectively been 
obliged to borrow offshore funds denominated solely in foreign currency. Due 
to the country’s relatively high level of indebtedness, IPFMs would simply not 
accept the risk of providing funding denominated in the local currency (the 
New Zealand dollar).335 Consequently, at the start of its second term, the Fourth 
National Government found itself in possession of a considerable body of 
foreign currency debt. This foreign currency denominated debt exposed the 
Fourth National Government to considerable exchange rate risk. In the event of 
a sudden major depreciation in the value of the New Zealand dollar, the local 
currency value of the Government’s debt would have simultaneously increased, 
as would the cost of servicing that debt. Due to the Government’s relatively 
high levels of foreign currency debt, the compounding effects on the overall 
pubic debt burden would have been significant. This is highlighted by the fact 
that a relatively minor 10% currency depreciation in 1991 (linked to the fiscal 
crisis discussed earlier) resulted in a $2.4 billion appreciation in “the New 
Zealand-dollar value of gross public debt.”336 Thus, a serious exchange rate 
shock could have potentially fomented the development of a broader financial 
crisis. Rapidly mounting government debt levels on a sufficient scale would 
have undermined investor confidence, resulting in major capital outflows and a 
severe macroeconomic disruption. Moving the Government to a “zero net 
foreign currency debt” position over the following three years would effectively 
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eliminate the Crown’s direct exposure to such risks. 337  Exchange rate 
fluctuations would simply no longer have any bearing on “the burden of 
[public] debt in domestic currency terms”, and thereby also the Government’s 
perceived creditworthiness in IPFMs.338 
Moving decisively to reduce the government’s share of the nation’s 
accumulated overseas debt and to eliminate official foreign currency debt in 
particular, quickly served to boost the nation’s underlying creditworthiness in 
IPFMs. This was confirmed when international credit rating agency Standard 
and Poor’s upgraded New Zealand’s sovereign credit rating from AA- to AA in 
December, 1994.339 Fundamentally, the immediate improvement in the Fourth 
National Government’s own financial position, combined with being seen to be 
clearly prioritising the generation of large operating surpluses for the specific 
purpose of paying off additional public debt, significantly increased “investor 
confidence in the New Zealand economy.”340 New Zealand was essentially now 
a more attractive destination for increasingly mobile international financial 
flows.  
New Zealand’s enhanced creditworthiness in IPFMs undoubtedly lent 
the Fourth National Government an increased degree of flexibility in relation to 
the formulation of fiscal policy. For example, the Fourth National Government 
was able to moderate its overarching fiscal strategy (by accepting “a lower 
surplus and a slower reduction in debt”) in order to accommodate a brief 
period of so-called ‘fiscal easing’ between mid-1996 and mid-1998.341 However, 
New Zealand’s large ongoing current account deficits did not simply come to 
an end in 1994. Figure 4.9 (below) illustrates New Zealand’s current account 
balances during the period from 1991 to 2000. As can be seen, despite the 
                                                          
337
 Bill Birch 1996, quoted in Kelsey 1999, 140. 
338
 Hargreaves and Watson, 19. 
339




 Despite protestations that the 4NG’s moderation was not politically motivated, it was almost 
undoubtedly undertaken in order to address mounting counter-veiling electoral pressures to increase 
social spending. 
Completing the Shift to Neoliberalism 243 
 
apparent turnaround in a number of other important measures of economic 
performance (noted above), New Zealand continued to experience sizeable 
current account deficits throughout the period from 1994 to 1999. Indeed, the 
country’s average annual balance of payments positions actually worsened 
significantly. From 1991 to 1994, New Zealand’s annual current account deficit 
had remained broadly steady. The annual average current account deficit for 
the period was just over $2.13 billion.342 In 1995, however, the current account 
deficit increased markedly. From a level of around -$1.86 billion in 1994, the 
annual current account balance deteriorated to reach -$4.11 billion. 343  It 
subsequently remained at an elevated level throughout the remainder of the 
Fourth National Government’s time in office.344 During the period from 1996 to 
1999, the average annual current account deficit totaled almost $5.2 billion.345 
Due to these ongoing large current account deficits, New Zealand’s total 
overseas debt continued to grow unabated throughout the period from 1994 to 
1999.346 Figure 4.10 shows New Zealand’s net stock of external liabilities during 
the period from 1991 to 2000. As can be seen, despite the Fourth National 
Government dramatically reducing its own external indebtedness, “over the 
decade as a whole…New Zealand’s [overall] dependence on international 
capital (both debt and equity)…increased substantially.” 347  From the 
(previously noted) level of -$67,371 in 1994, New Zealand’s net external debt 
position deteriorated by some $20 billion (in nominal terms) to reach -$87.084 
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Figure 4.9) New Zealand’s Current Account Deficits, 1991 to 2000 ($billion) 
Source: Dalziel and Lattimore 2001, 136. 
Figure 4.10) New Zealand’s Net External Liabilities, 1991 to 2000 
($billion) 
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New Zealand’s “increased external indebtedness” during the 1990s was 
wholly driven by the private sector. 348  As Woolford, Reddell, and Comber 
observe, “over the decade as a whole”, the saving and investment decisions of 
private “households’ [and firms’ were] the largest single factor in [the 
country’s] increased need for foreign capital.” 349  Government offshore 
borrowing had previously dominated New Zealand’s external debt. As 
documented by Bertram, by the late 1980s, the country had accumulated a total 
foreign debt equivalent to 70% of GDP, “of which the government accounted 
for half.”350 “During the 1990s”, however, New Zealand’s “overseas debt [was] 
privatised.”351 Initially, increasing private external liabilities took the form of a 
“surge of inward equity investment.” 352  Foreign multi-national corporations 
(MNCs) effectively took control of an increasing share of New Zealand-
domiciled companies.353 Subsequently, following the onset of the 1997-1998 East 
Asian financial crisis, foreign private direct investment inflows were replaced 
as the main driver of New Zealand’s increasing external indebtedness by 
greatly expanded offshore borrowing by the nation’s largely foreign-owned 
banking system. 354  As Bertram delineates, from around 1997 onwards, “the 
banks…moved to offshore funding on a grand scale.”355 This was primarily in 
order “to finance domestic credit expansion within New Zealand, much of 
which went to fund speculative activity in the housing and property 
markets.”356 As will be discussed in more detailed in Chapter Seven, heavy 
offshore borrowing by the banks continued through until the onset of the 
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Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, and also for a number of years 
thereafter.357 
As a result, despite a marked improvement in the Crown’s own financial 
position between 1994 and 1999, New Zealand nevertheless remained 
“vulnerable to any downturn in [international] investor confidence.”358 Adverse 
developments in IPFMs – such as what occurred during the 1997-98 East Asian 
financial crisis – continued to pose a very real threat to the country’s ongoing 
macroeconomic stability. This now seemingly perpetual vulnerability to 
externally induced financial crises ensured that significant IPFM-derived 
“nonconstitutional constraints” remained firmly in place. 359  Throughout the 
period from 1994 to 1999, the Fourth National Government faced considerable 
pressure to commit “to running fiscal surpluses and repaying government 
debt.”360 As outlined above, the major driver of New Zealand’s current account 
deficit during the 1990s was, in-effect, significant private sector dis-saving. As 
then RBNZ Governor Don Brash described the situation at the time (in typical 
neoliberal obfuscating fashion), private individuals, households, and corporates 
were simply exercising “a strong demand for additional funds within New 
Zealand.” 361  By running sizeable fiscal surpluses, the Fourth National 
Government would effectively lean against the private sector’s extensive 
offshore borrowing activity. Strong government savings would bolster 
otherwise weak national savings, thereby improving the overall balance on the 
current account.362 Using these same fiscal surpluses to secure further public 
debt reduction, meanwhile, would help maintain New Zealand’s 
creditworthiness in IPFMs. It would do this by ensuring that New Zealand was 
                                                          
357
 At the time of writing the situation remains largely unchanged, although the overall maturity profile 
of offshore bank funding has lengthened. 
358
 Treasury 1998, “Speech”, 6. 
359
 Evans et al 1995, “Economic Reform in New Zealand: The Pursuit of Efficiency”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 34, No. 4 (December), 1856-7. 
360
 Treasury 1998, “Speech”, 7. 
361
 D. Brash 1998, “New Zealand’s Balance of Payments Deficit: Does it Matter?”, Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand Bulletin, Vol. 61, No. 1, 6. 
362
 Ibid, 12’ Treasury 1998, “Speech”, 6. 
Completing the Shift to Neoliberalism 247 
 
well situated to weather any significant future financial shocks which might 
eventuate. Principally, lower public debt levels would endow the state with a 
balance sheet “sufficiently robust” to be able to intervene as an emergency 
source of working capital to banks and major corporates otherwise facing acute 
funding issues in the event of a ‘sudden stop’. 363  The government would 
effectively be capable of providing a fiscal “cushion”, absorbing much of the 
impact of a major external financial shock on its own balance sheet.364  
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Conclusion 
During the period from 1990 to 1994, the Fourth National Government 
rapidly moved to complete the previous Labour Government’s programme of 
neoliberal structural adjustment.365 In the realm of fiscal policy this entailed a 
fundamental redesign of the welfare state. During its first term in power, in two 
main stages – the ESI announced in December 1990 and the 1991 ‘Mother of all 
Budgets’ – the Fourth National Government initiated sweeping changes 
affecting all of the major facets of the New Zealand welfare state including 
health, education, superannuation, housing, and social welfare (see Table 4.1). 
These efforts significantly curtailed overall public expenditure and served to 
eliminate the fiscal deficit by the end of its first term. In order to help lock in 
this neoliberal fiscal austerity strategy, in July 1994 the FRA was passed into 
legislation. The Fourth National Government initially persevered with a 
relatively austere approach to fiscal policy during its second term in office. 
Adopting what Kelsey refers to as a ‘surplus-driven, low debt’ fiscal strategy, 
the National Government consolidated its underlying fiscal position by 
reducing public debt. The level of progress made in ‘dealing to debt’ in the 1994 
and 1995 fiscal years meant that during the period from mid-1996 to mid-1998, 
the Fourth National Government was able to significantly loosen its fiscal 
stance. A major programme of tax cuts was implemented and several large new 
social spending packages were introduced. However, this period of what 
Fowlie terms ‘fiscal easing’ constituted only a temporary moderation of the 
Fourth National Government’s overarching fiscal strategy. As the 1997-98 East 
Asian financial crisis began to have an impact on the economy, the Coalition 
Government quickly moved to tighten up its fiscal stance once again. Under the 
leadership of Shipley, this tight fiscal stance was maintained by the minority 
National Government in 1998/99. 
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In the first instance, the primary driver of the second major phase of 
neoliberalisation that was implemented in New Zealand from 1990 to 1994 was 
the Fourth National Government Finance Minister Ruth Richardson and her 
allies in cabinet. Richardson was an ardent free-market fundamentalist and had 
successfully maneuvered to ensure that the Fourth National Government 
would pursue (amongst other things) a radical neoliberal fiscal austerity 
strategy on coming into office. Richardson and her pro-market cabinet faction 
were aided significantly in the advancement of their neoliberal fiscal policy 
agenda in New Zealand by the specific institutional structure of the state, the 
country’s recent integration into the DWSR, and also a largely compliant and 
ideologically aligned Treasury. However, the Fourth National Government’s 
pursuit of fiscal austerity from 1990 to 1994, to a significant extent, also reflected 
the preferences of big business. Having previously supported the Fourth 
Labour Government, the nation’s business elite shifted its support to the 
National Party prior to the 1990 general election, and subsequently exerted a 
considerable degree of influence over the public policy programme pursued by 
the Fourth National Government during its first term in office.  
Ongoing business political activism and pro-market policy advice from 
Treasury undoubtedly played important roles in the Fourth National 
Government’s subsequent close adherence to a neoliberal fiscal strategy during 
the period from 1994 to 1999. However, another key factor was New Zealand’s 
integration into the DWSR. Ongoing large current account deficits meant that 
throughout the period New Zealand was one of the most heavily indebted 
nations in the developed world. This exceptionally high level of reliance on 
foreign capital posed a persistent threat to the country’s macroeconomic 
stability, which effectively served to constrain the Fourth National Government 
in the realm of fiscal policy formulation. The Fourth National Government 
faced significant implied pressure from IPFMs to closely adhere to a neoliberal 
fiscal strategy focused on running budget surpluses and reducing public debt 
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so as to mitigate the potential threat posed by destabilising external capital 
flows. 
As will be shown throughout the remainder of this thesis, integration 
into the DWSR continued to place significant constraints on the formulation of 
fiscal policy in New Zealand subsequent to the defeat of the Fourth National 
Government at the 1999 election. During the period from 1999 to 2008, the Fifth 
Labour Government (FLG) faced considerable pressure to closely adhere to a 
neoliberal fiscal strategy oriented around public debt reduction funded by large 
operating surpluses. But the DWSR-derived constraints were not just restricted 
to fiscal policy. Fundamentally, New Zealand’s integration into the DWSR 
placed pressure on the FLG to retain all of the key features of the neoliberal 
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The Fifth Labour Government and Macroeconomic Policy: 
1999 to 2008 
 
Introduction 
As the previous two chapters have shown, New Zealand underwent a 
process of radical neoliberalisation during the period from 1984 to 1999. Indeed, 
the speed and scope of the ‘New Zealand experiment’ was such that it has been 
lauded in some circles as a model of voluntary neoliberal structural adjustment 
worthy of international emulation.1 This political project was initially advanced 
by the Fourth Labour Government. Extensive neoliberal restructuring of the 
economy was implemented throughout their two terms in power from 1984 to 
1990. The succeeding Fourth National Government subsequently continued the 
rollout of the neoliberal policy agenda. Most notably, National completed 
Labour’s ‘unfinished business’ in the key areas of industrial relations, social 
welfare, and fiscal policy. 
New Zealand’s historic shift to neoliberalism was impelled, in the first 
instance, by a relatively small, yet highly influential group of MPs, Treasury 
and Reserve Bank (RBNZ) officials, and business leaders. Prominent figures 
within this group included: Labour Government ministers Roger Douglas, 
David Caygill, and Richard Prebble; National’s first-term Finance Minister Ruth 
Richardson; Treasury Secretary Graham Scott; RBNZ deputy governor Roderick 
Deane; and former Treasury official and New Zealand Business Roundtable 
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head Roger Kerr. However, the highly important political activities of this key 
group of actors were heavily influenced by a number of broader international 
developments. These included, most prominently: the worldwide onset of 
‘stagflation’ in the mid-1970s; a sharp upswing in employer militancy and 
business political activism; the shift in the prevailing international economic 
orthodoxy from Keynesianism to neoliberalism; and the political ascendency of 
the ‘New Right’ internationally (including, most prominently, Thatcher and 
Reagan). 
This chapter shifts our attention to the Fifth Labour Government (FLG), 
in power in New Zealand from 1999 to 2008. It begins by providing a broad 
descriptive overview of the prevailing political and economic conditions during 
this period. The FLG’s so-called ‘Third Way’ approach to public policy making 
is then briefly outlined. Following this, a detailed examination of the core 
features of the FLG’s macroeconomic policy nexus – monetary policy, fiscal 
policy, and foreign exchange (FX) policy – is undertaken. The core findings are 
summarised by way of conclusion. 
The principal argument asserts that while the FLG’s ‘Third Way’ 
approach to public policy formulation included an undeniable softening of the 
prevailing policy regime, it nevertheless only constituted a mild social 
democratic moderation of neoliberalism in New Zealand. An overarching 
‘monetarist’ approach to macroeconomic management primarily (if not solely) 
focused on maintaining low, stable levels of inflation was adopted, and day-to-
day power of policy implementation was ceded to an operationally 
independent RBNZ. The FLG also continued to closely abide by a largely 
unchanged Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA), pursuing a mutually reinforcing 
conservative fiscal strategy focused on generating operating surpluses and the 
reduction of public debt. The currency, meanwhile, was essentially allowed to 
float freely according to the vagaries of IPFMs. Fundamentally, the FLG 
retained and entrenched all of the key features of the neoliberal macroeconomic 
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policy nexus constructed by the previous Labour and National governments 
during the period from 1984 to 1999. 
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5.1)  The Fifth Labour Government: A Political Overview 
 On 27 November, 1999, the centre-left FLG was elected to power in New 
Zealand. Having received just 30.5% of the party vote, the incumbent Shipley-
led minority National Government was soundly defeated by a coalition formed 
by Labour and the Alliance, with additional support from the Greens on issues 
of confidence and supply. 2  Labour, under the leadership of Helen Clark, 
secured 38.7% of the party vote and 49 parliamentary seats, while the social 
democratic Alliance secured 7.7% of the party vote and 10 seats. Combined 
with the seven seats secured by the Greens, this easily gave the Labour-led 
coalition control over the house, with 66 out of the 120 total seats in parliament.3  
As Roper observes, “widespread popular disillusionment with 
neoliberalism played a key role in the election of the Labour-Alliance coalition 
government.”4 15 years of radical neoliberal reform had served to progressively 
alienate a significant portion of the population from the neoliberal policy 
agenda being propagated in Wellington. Labour and the Alliance successfully 
exploited this during the election campaign. Both parties vigorously attacked 
the National Government’s policy record. Particular attention was drawn to 
issues related to chronic underfunding in the public health system, the 
increasingly prohibitive cost of tertiary education, cuts to national 
superannuation, and increased economic hardship and inequality.5 
The election of an ostensibly left-wing government elicited a profoundly 
negative response from business. This culminated in a “crisis of business 
confidence” in mid-2000, latterly dubbed the ‘winter of discontent’.6 Business 
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political opposition largely derived from deep-seated fears over the extent to 
which the new Coalition Government intended to substantively roll back the 
neoliberal policy agenda. As Roper outlines, in specific terms, 
 
business opposition to the incoming Government [was] focused 
on the increase in the marginal rate of income tax for those 
earning over $60,000 from 33 per cent to 39 per cent, the repeal of 
the ECA and introduction of the Employment Relations Act, the 
renationalisation of the ACC scheme, and the introduction of paid 
parental leave.7 
Ultimately, business opposition was largely ameliorated once it was made clear 
that, while the FLG would seek to address some of its harshest aspects, all of the 
key features of the neoliberal policy regime would nevertheless be retained.8 As 
Prime Minister Helen Clark quite succinctly explained the situation to one 
meeting of prominent business people held in late 2000, “the government [did 
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Figure 5.1) Real Economic Growth in New Zealand, 1998 to 200810 
Source: RBNZ 2014, M5 Gross Domestic Product Data Series. 
Despite initially facing significant public opposition from the business 
community, the FLG nevertheless enjoyed a prolonged period of popularity 
throughout its first term in power. As Church observes, “after building steadily 
throughout 2001, Labour was consistently scoring 50 per cent in polls” 
published during April, 2002. 11  A key factor contributing to this surge in 
popularity was the onset of a sustained period of strong economic growth in 
1999. As can be seen from Figure 5.1 (above), from a level of just 0.6% 
immediately following the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 (see the previous 
chapter), real economic growth measured as a percent of GDP rose to 2.7% in 
1999 and then 6.4% in 2000. After falling dramatically again in 2001 due to the 
bursting of the so-called ‘Dotcom bubble’, the rate of real economic growth 
subsequently rebounded strongly. Real economic growth averaged almost 4% 
of GDP between 2002 and 2007, peaking at 5.4% of GDP in 2004. Overall, the 
years spanning 1999 to 2007 constituted the strongest period of prolonged 
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economic expansion experienced in New Zealand since the onset of ‘stagflation’ 
in the mid-1970s (see Chapter Three). This relatively high level of economic 
growth served to significantly reduce the rate of unemployment in New 
Zealand. The official rate of unemployment during the tenure of the FLG is set 
out in Figure 5.2 below. As can be seen, from a level of 7.4% in 1998, the official 
rate of unemployment declined significantly during the following decade to 
reach a nadir of 3.8% in 2008.12 Fundamentally, strong economic performance, 
in concert with these historically low levels of unemployment, acted to create a 
widespread sense of relative economic security, thereby greatly enhancing the 
standing of the Government amongst the voting public.13 
Figure 5.2) Official Rate of Unemployment in New Zealand,  
1998 to 200814 
Source: RBNZ 2014, M5 Gross Domestic Product Data Series. 
As the parliamentary term progressed, the Alliance found itself 
becoming increasingly dominated by the resurgent Labour Party.15 Comprising 
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the junior coalition partner, it found itself largely unable to advance any of its 
major policies.16 As Miller outlines, Prime Minister Helen Clark  
either postponed or rejected a range of policy proposals, including 
several by senior Alliance ministers. Among those she vetoed 
were proposals for an extra week’s annual leave, employer-
funded parental leave, and an increase in the minimum youth 
[wage] rate.17 
 
Subsequently, significant internal conflict developed within the Alliance. 
Undoubtedly, a number of factors fed the incipient factional infighting within 
the party.18 However, a particularly salient factor was disagreement over the 
Government’s support of the US ‘war on terrorism’ following the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September, 2001.19 As Levine and Roberts delineate, ultimately, “the 
problems within the Alliance [became] so acute” that they induced a 
fundamental split within the party. 20  “An ‘official’ Alliance party led by a 
cabinet minister, Laila Harre (and supported by the extra-parliamentary party)” 
remained in existence, while a minority faction led by Anderton splintered off 
to form what would later become the Progressives.21 
The FLG was re-elected to office at an early election held on 27 July, 
2002.22 Although pre-election polling had hinted at the possibility of an outright 
majority, Labour received only 41.3% of the party vote and gained control over 
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a total of 52 seats in parliament.23 Labour was joined in a formal coalition by the 
Progressives who, while only attracting 1.7% of the vote, gained two seats 
thanks to Jim Anderton’s continued domination of the Christchurch electorate 
of Wigram.24 Not unsurprisingly, the now divided Alliance did not return to 
parliament. Their respective share of the vote collapsed to just 1.3%.25 The new 
minority coalition government formed by Labour and the Progressives were 
supported on the right via a formal agreement with the “broadly centrist 
United Future Party.”26 Largely on the back of one strong performance by its 
leader Peter Dunne at a televised campaign debate (and the associated effect of 
the so-called ‘worm’), United Future had secured 6.7% of the vote and eight 
parliamentary seats.27 The Greens, meanwhile, aligned themselves on the left of 
the new government.28 They had increased their share of the party vote to 7% 
and thus increased their parliamentary presence to nine seats.29 Amongst the 
opposition parties, the neoliberal ACT party attracted 7.1% of the vote and 
thereby secured nine seats. New Zealand First, respectively, received 10.4% of 
the vote and 13 seats. Perhaps most significantly, however, the main opposition 
party, National, won just 20.9% of the party vote and 27 seats. 30 As Roper 
observes, this constituted “the worst performance in the history of the party.”31 
National’s dismal result at the 2002 election played a key role in 
precipitating a change in the party’s leadership soon thereafter. On Tuesday, 28 
October 2003, former RBNZ governor and erstwhile finance spokesperson Don 
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Brash took over control of the parliamentary caucus from Bill English.32 In his 
illuminating work The Hollow Men, investigative journalist Nicky Hager reveals 
that Brash’s leadership campaign was not actually widely supported within the 
National Party. 33  Instead, “most assistance came from people with no 
connection to the party.”34 Those backing Brash primarily constituted a loose 
grouping of individuals closely linked to the neoliberal ACT Party, including a 
number of prominent business leaders. Familiar figures such as Roger Douglas, 
Ruth Richardson, and Roger Kerr are amongst those identified as being 
centrally involved.35 As Hager delineates, 
attempts [by this group] to move Don Brash into the leadership 
had begun only eight months after he became an MP [in April 
2003]. Despite denials, it is likely that this had [in fact] been the 
plan of at least some people since the party president Michelle 
Boag first approached Brash to be a candidate in April 2002.36 
 
It is now apparent that the overarching goal was to re-establish the National 
Party as a politically viable “vehicle to introduce [further] free market 
policies.” 37  Indeed, Brash and his close political allies “referred to [this] 
privately as the ‘Grand Plan’.”38 
The elevation of Brash to the leadership served to quickly rejuvenate the 
National Party’s flagging electoral fortunes. After spending most of 2003 
languishing in the polls at around 25%, National soared to 45% in February, 
                                                          
32
 B. de Malmanche 2007, “Appendix 8: Events, My Dear Boy”: The Political Scene, 2002-2005”, in S. 
Levine and N. Roberts (eds.), The Baubles of Office: The New Zealand General Election of 2005 
(Wellington: Victoria University Press), 559. 
33
 N. Hager 2006, The Hollow Men (Nelson: Craig Potton). 
34
 Ibid, 43. 
35
 Ibid, 40-56, 66. See also S. Levine and N. Roberts 2007, “The Baubles of Office: Winning and Losing 
under MMP”, in S. Levine and N. Roberts (eds.), The Baubles of Office: The New Zealand General Election 
of 2005 (Wellington: Victoria University Press), 27. 
36
 Hager, 41. 
37
 Ibid, 62. 
38
 Ibid, 69. 
The Fifth Labour Government and Macroeconomic Policy 261 
 
2004.39 Central to National’s rapid resurgence was the issue of race relations. 
National successfully exploited deep-seated prejudice and mounting frustration 
within the broader populace (but especially amongst older Pakeha New 
Zealanders) relating to perceived preferential treatment of Maori in society in 
order to regain political ascendancy.40 This process was initiated on 27 January, 
2004 in an address made by Brash to the Orewa Rotary Club. In this speech 
(entitled “Nationhood”), Brash proposed that New Zealand should have just 
“one people, living under one set of laws.”41 To this end, Brash boldly called for 
the abolition of so-called “special privileges” for Maori (including separate 
Maori seats in parliament) and an end to an “entrenched Treaty grievance 
industry.”42 
In mid-2004, a small but important new force also emerged onto New 
Zealand’s political landscape. On 7 July, former Labour Party MP Tariana Turia 
formed the Maori Party.43 The formation of the Maori Party was precipitated by 
Labour’s announcement of controversial Seabed and Foreshore legislation.44 On 
19 June, 2003 the New Zealand Court of Appeal ruled that the Maori Land 
Court had jurisdiction to determine ownership claims made on the seabed and 
foreshore.45 In response, the FLG proposed legislation that would essentially 
ensure perpetual Crown control over the foreshore and seabed. 46  The 
Government’s proposal created widespread discontent amongst Maori. It also 
impelled Tariana Turia to resign as a Labour MP.47 Turia successfully defended 
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her Maori electorate seat of Te Tai Hauāuru at the resulting by-election, and 
subsequently returned to parliament at the head of the newly-formed Maori 
Party. 
Consequently, the outcome of the 2005 general election was far from a 
fait accompli.48 The emergence of the Maori Party constituted a serious threat to 
Labour’s historical dominance of the Maori electorates.49 This was borne out in 
the final election result, with the Maori Party claiming four of the seven Maori 
seats. 50  Meanwhile, the rejuvenation of National under Brash’s leadership 
meant that, on the broader political stage, the “intensely fought” election 
campaign was a particularly close-run contest. 51  Indeed, the National Party 
leadership claimed that it came extremely close to being able to form an 
alternative centre-right government in the weeks following the 17 September 
election.52 
However, as Johansson observes, “ultimately, the Labour Party 
prevailed”, securing “a third successive term for only the second time in its 
history.”53 Labour won 41.1% of the party vote and a total of 50 parliamentary 
seats at the 2005 election. This result endowed Labour with “a narrow two-seat 
advantage over National”, who respectively won 39.1% of the party vote and 48 
seats. 54  Labour again entered into a formal coalition with the Progressives. 
Leader Jim Anderton, however, was their only successful candidate. 
Consequently, support on issues of confidence and supply was solicited from 
New Zealand First and United Future (who secured seven seats and three seats 
respectively) in exchange for ministerial roles outside of cabinet.55 Additional 
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support on issues of confidence and supply was garnered from the Greens who 
won 5.3% of the popular vote and six seats.56 
Labour’s victory at the 2005 election was at least partly due to superior 
campaign tactics.57 The announcement of interest-free student loans for tertiary 
education in conjunction with a major new expansion of Working for Families 
(WFF, discussed further below), for example, proved a broadly effective 
counter to popular tax cut proposals announced by National. Another salient 
factor, however, was undoubtedly leadership. As Levine and Roberts observe, 
“the inexperienced Brash committed various gaffes and blunders during the 
campaign”, which contrasted markedly with the “experienced Clark, fluent and 
competent.”58 This significant disparity in the quality of leadership on offer was 
of crucial significance. Fundamentally, it meant that while National under 
Brash “was able to occupy much of the political space previously taken up by 
ACT, New Zealand First, and United Future”, it was largely unable to dent 
Labour’s large base of electorate support and thereby take control of 
parliament.59 
Despite successfully staving off National’s strong challenge at the 2005 
election, the political tide had nevertheless turned against the FLG. Support for 
Labour began to fall away dramatically subsequent to the election, a process 
that continued throughout its third term in office. Driving Labour’s fading 
electoral appeal was a widespread perception that it was over-taxing the 
populace, whilst simultaneously fostering the creation of a so-called ‘nanny 
state’. The trend was accelerated, however, by John Key’s replacement of Don 
Brash as leader of the National Party in November, 2006. Key’s elevation to the 
position of Leader of the Opposition quickly enhanced National’s appeal to the 
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political centre, directly at the expense of the FLG. The FLG did make a last-
ditch attempt to be returned to power in 2008, highlighting their record of 
sound economic management and the desirability of strong leadership during 
times of economic uncertainty following the onset of the GFC (see Chapter Seven). 
This attempt, however, ultimately failed; as discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven, 
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5.2)  The Fifth Labour Government’s Third Way 
As Roper observes, “with respect to its broad ideological and policy 
orientation” under each of its various guises the FLG “presented itself as 
treading a middle path between the extensive interventionism of the old Social 
Democratic Left and the extreme free-market orientation of the New Right.”60 
“Ours is a third way government striving to achieve a better balance between a 
dynamic market economy and a fair society which offers opportunity and 
security to all” averred Prime Minister Helen Clark at the end of her first year 
in office.61 Globally, the term ‘Third Way’ refers to a broad ideological stream 
generally associated with the political programmes pursued and advocated in 
the US in the 1990s by the Clinton Administration, and later in the UK by the 
Labour Government under Tony Blair.62 An extensive literature covering the 
various facets of this so-called Third Way already exists, so here the discussion 
is restricted to only a brief excursus on its central tenets.  
According to Anthony Giddens, widely acknowledged as the most 
prominent intellectual exponent of the Third Way, three key transformations 
have fundamentally altered the contemporary socio-political landscape: the 
advent of fully realised ‘globalisation’; the rise of the ‘knowledge economy’; 
and the rise of individualism.63 On the basis of these changes, Giddens upholds 
that “as a theory of the managed economy, socialism barely exists any longer” 
and, furthermore, that the “Keynesian welfare compromise…has been largely 
dissolved.”64 In addition, however, Giddens and other intellectual exponents of 
the Third Way have also acknowledged that “the electorate has recoiled” from 
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the market-driven policy prescriptions of neoliberalism.65 In reaction to these 
developments, the Third Way is couched by its advocates as a pragmatic 
renewal of social democracy in response to changing contemporary social and 
economic conditions. 66  Consequently, it is considered to constitute “a very 
fundamental paradigm shift in politics.”67  
It is important to note that while the Third Way fundamentally rejects 
substantive traditional ideas of socialism, its respective criticism of the 
prevailing neoliberal policy framework is much more restrained. As many 
authors have observed this raises serious questions relating to the accuracy of 
Giddens’ claims that the Third Way represents a fundamentally ‘new’ 
framework for public policy. Indeed, Kelsey goes so far as to state that the Third 
Way functions simply in order for ‘centre-left’ governments to be able to 
“rationalise their role in consolidating neoliberalism” as the dominant global 
political paradigm.68 
The broad policy orientation of the Third Way has been developed at 
length by Giddens, although as Kelsey and others have observed, it generally 
suffers from a marked lack of specificity when it comes to establishing a 
substantive policy framework.69 According to Giddens the Third Way involves 
the implementation of various ‘structural reforms’ aiming to ‘modernise’ the 
role of the state in response to the ‘fundamental transformations’ that have 
occurred within the contemporary socio-political arena. Centrally, the state 
should look to “preserve a core of collective social justice, while defending individual 
autonomy of action.”70 As Roper argues, however, the broad policy programme of 
the Third Way can be more succinctly and accurately summarised as involving 
a generalised commitment to most of the key features of neoliberalism. The 
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Third Way continues to uphold: a leaner bureaucracy; “a commitment to 
continuing private ownership of formerly state-owned enterprises”; a smaller, 
more targeted welfare system; a taxation system characterised by a historically 
low level of progressiveness; a “lightly regulated” economic arena (including 
industrial relations and international trade); fiscal austerity; and, most 
importantly, monetarist macroeconomic management and a highly liberalised 
and deregulated financial system. 71  The Third Way does acknowledge the 
requirement for governmental involvement in the economy, but the 
government’s capacity for involvement is largely restricted to the stimulation of 
“technological innovation and economic investment.” ‘Social justice” is also 
recognised as an important element of Third Way politics and for this reason a 
Third Way agenda supports the retention of a limited degree of progressive 
taxation and rejects the neoliberal ‘safety-net’ welfare system.72 
As documented by Kelsey, the Third Way was adopted by the Labour 
Party in New Zealand in mid-1998. Labour’s Third Way was to seek a balance 
between Keynesian Social Democracy’s overemphasised “commitment to the 
collective”, and neoliberalism’s ‘overstressing’ of atomistic self-interest. 73  In 
terms of an actual substantive guiding policy framework, however, there was 
little beyond vague, Giddens-esque policy-lines. The incoming FLG indicated 
their intention as being “to implement a policy platform which reduces 
inequality, is environmentally sustainable, and improves the social and 
economic wellbeing of all New Zealanders.”74  
In substantive terms, the core of the FLG’s social democratic agenda 
initially took the form of ‘closing the gaps’. As Minister of Finance Michael 
Cullen stated in his first budget speech, “for too long, New Zealand 
governments have ignored the growing gap between rich and poor. This 
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Government is committed to closing the gaps.”75 The major features of ‘closing 
the gaps’ included: an increase in the top marginal rate of income tax from 33% 
to 39% on all income over $60,000 per annum; the restoration of income-related 
state-housing rents (set at 25% of income); the restoration of the married couple 
superannuation provisions to no less than 65% of the average wage; progressive 
increases in the statutory minimum wage; and the indexing for inflation of 
social welfare benefits.76  
From 2004 onwards, the focus of the FLG’s social democracy agenda 
shifted to the WFF policy package. Involving expenditure of $1.1 billion at 
maturity, the “centerpiece of Budget 2004” was intended to deliver “a social 
dividend to low income families.”77 Measures encapsulated within this broad 
program included more targeted assistance through “increases to Family 
Support, a new in work payment, [an] increase in the family tax credit and 
changes to abatement rates and thresholds.”78 Budget 2004 claimed that by 1 
April 2007, over 300,000 households would be receiving direct assistance, with 
an average benefit for households earning between $25,000 and $45,000 per 
annum being in the vicinity of $100 a week.79 2006 saw a significant expansion 
of the package with additional funding of $1.845 billion over four years 
announced, including tax relief for 350,000 people and improved overall access 
to the programme.80 
However, the substantive progressiveness of the FLG’s measures 
towards reviving social democracy in New Zealand should not be overstated.81 
In the preceding chapters it was argued that the process of neoliberalisation 
undertaken in New Zealand between 1984 and 1999 was exceptionally swift 
and comprehensive in comparison to other states of the advanced capitalist 
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world. Indeed, New Zealand has been characterised as a paragon of voluntary 
neoliberal ‘structural adjustment’. The measures undertaken by the FLG in 
order to ‘close the gaps’ and ‘work for families’ constituted only a limited 
retreat from this hardline neoliberal policy agenda. Although Working for 
Families was expanded further after their work was published, St. John and 
Craig argue, for example, that the money being directed to the Working for 
Families programme in particular was actually small in both absolute and 
relative terms.82  
As will be argued throughout the rest of this chapter, in essence the 
FLG’s Third Way largely operated to entrench the existing neoliberal policy 
framework. 83  All of the economic fundamentals of the neoliberal policy 
framework remained, yet it was precisely these factors that would ultimately 
determine the sustainability of a meaningful shift towards social democracy.84 
All of the “legislative ‘lynch-pins’” of the neoliberal program of macroeconomic 
management remained in place: “the Reserve Bank Act 1989, the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 1994, and the Public Finance Act 1989 (the last two 
essentially incorporated within, rather than being fundamentally changed by, 
the Public Finance Management Amendment Act 2004).” 85 Furthermore, the 
financial markets, including the FX market, and the domestic finance sector 
remained highly liberalised and deregulated. This suggests that the DWSR 
retained significant capacity to influence public policy formulation in New 
Zealand, and that, in particular, interests closely-linked to IPFMs continued to 
exert considerable pressure on the New Zealand state. We will return to this 
specific issue in the following two chapters where it will be addressed in detail. 
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In May 2000 internationally recognised monetary policy expert Professor 
Lars Svenssen of Stockholm University was appointed to undertake an 
independent review of monetary policy in New Zealand. 86  The aim of the 
review was to examine how the legislative framework underpinning monetary 
policy and the RBNZ’s operations within this framework aligned with “the 
characteristics of the New Zealand economy” and, subsequently, whether they 
were “consistent with best international practice.”87 The results of the Svenssen 
review were announced by the Minister of Finance, Michael Cullen, on 7 
August, 2001.88  
As Archibald outlines, there were two main areas that received the most 
attention and where the “most far-reaching changes were proposed.”89 The first 
major area of focus of the review was the monetary policy decision-making 
framework. Centrally, Svenssen argued that “vesting responsibility for 
monetary policy decisions in a single individual carried an inherent risk.”90 He 
suggested that instead the monetary policy decision-making framework should 
be altered to assign responsibility to a committee and, further, that this 
committee should necessarily include more external members (non-RBNZ 
employees) and private sector consultation.91  The second key strand of the 
review focused on the arrangements for ensuring that monetary policy 
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formulation was “subject to effective accountability and monitoring.”92 Here 
Svenssen was primarily “concerned about the conflicts of interest that could 
potentially arise from having the Governor and Deputy Governors of the Bank 
as Board members, given that the Board’s primary role is to monitor the 
performance of the Governor and the Bank.” 93  Svenssen suggested “that it 
would be preferable to remove the Governor and the Deputy Governors from 
the Board completely.”94  
Beyond these central strands of critique, Svenssen only recommended 
various “marginal improvements, mostly of a technical nature” for the RBNZ to 
pursue. Perhaps most prominent amongst these was the recommendation that 
“at the beginning of the next term of the Governor, the Policy Targets 
Agreement (PTA) should be marginally modified to include the medium-term 
point target directly.”95 Although it was already effectively standard RBNZ 
operating practice, this latter recommendation was implemented, as suggested 
by Svenssen, when the FLG signed its next PTA with the new RBNZ Governor, 
Allan Bollard, on 17 September, 2002.96  
The broader body of recommendations made by the Svenssen review 
that were subsequently accepted by the FLG were implemented as a major 
portion of an amendment of the Reserve Bank Act 1989 (RBA) announced in 
August 2003.97 In regard to the first focal area of the Svenssen review, the 
Government maintained - with the support of both the RBNZ and its non-
executive directors - “that there was little to be gained, …in terms of clarity of 
accountability and communications, by substantially altering a governance 
framework that has served this country well since its inception in 1989.”98 
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Finance Minister Michael Cullen did admit, however, “that the monetary policy 
decision-making process might be further enhanced by expanding…its external 
consultation processes.”99 Likewise in relation to the second key focal area of 
the Svenssen review “some, but not all, of Professor Svenssen’s 
recommendations with respect to the Board were adopted by the 
Government.”100 It was “agreed that the Deputy Governors should cease to be 
on the Board”, however the Governor was retained (although not as Chairman) 
“principally for the sake of facilitating information flow between the Bank’s 
executive and the Board.”101 
A further amendment of the RBA was passed in October 2006.102 This 
legislation primarily served to implement the FLG’s response to the 
recommendations of the Trans-Tasman Council of Banking Supervision. The 
2006 Amendment was focused on adjusting Part 5 of the RBA in particular 
(introducing a new section; 68A). However, as DeSourdy observes, the 2006 
Amendment essentially only served to formalise cooperation between New 
Zealand and Australian financial authorities that was already occurring.103 
The above account reveals that, fundamentally, the neoliberal legislative 
framework governing the operation of monetary policy in New Zealand 
underwent only very minor adjustment during the period from 1999 to 2008. 
This point is clearly highlighted through an examination of the content of the 
RBNZ and FLG’s final PTA, signed on 24 May, 2007.104 The key element to note 
here is the first and most important section of the PTA, Section 1a. This section 
states that “under Section 8 of the Act the Reserve Bank is required to conduct 
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monetary policy with the goal of maintaining a stable general level of prices.”105 
This demonstrates that, despite obviously having ample opportunity to 
undertake substantive policy transformation in this area, at no point were the 
most integral features of the RBA considered for alteration. Indeed, it is worth 
noting that: 
in announcing the terms of reference of the (Svenssen) review, the 
Treasurer, Hon. Dr Michael Cullen, emphasised that some central 
features of New Zealand’s monetary policy framework were not 
open for review. Dr Cullen stated that the statutory objective of 
monetary policy – price stability – was a critical feature of the 
monetary policy framework and would not be subject for review. 
The Government also indicated that it would not be considering 
changes that would lessen the Reserve Bank’s autonomy in 
formulating and implementing monetary policy.106  
Thus, the various legislative adjustments implemented by the FLG did 
“not herald a major change” in their approach to monetary policy. 107 In 2001 
then RBNZ Governor Don Brash stated that “the reality is that, beyond the 
contribution they can make by maintaining inflation at a low level, central 
banks cannot have a substantial effect on trend growth in output or trend 
growth in employment.” 108  It is apparent that those responsible for the 
formulation of the FLG’s monetary policy also subscribed to this core principal 
of neoliberal monetarist macroeconomic management. A “strong emphasis” 
continued to be placed on market-oriented self-discipline for the financial 
sector.109 The various adjustments simply aimed to “assist the Bank to reinforce 
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market and corporate governance mechanisms for promoting a sound” 
financial system “through the…use of a more focused regulatory” regime.110 
Within this broader legislative framework guiding the RBNZ’s operation 
of monetary policy, it is also obvious that there was little change from the 
incumbent neoliberal policy regime in terms of policy implementation. The 
RBNZ’s overarching strategy for the implementation of monetary policy during 
the period from 1999 to 2008 continued to be based around the management of 
the level of settlement cash available to the domestic banking system. 
Moreover, the operation of this strategy continued to involve directly targeting 
levels of employment as a means of controlling the rate of inflation. 
In Chapter Three it was shown that the post-1984 ‘monetarist’ 
macroeconomic reforms entailed a fundamental transformation of New 
Zealand’s monetary policy implementation strategy. The existing system based 
on strict regulatory controls was replaced with an approach oriented around 
the operation of significantly deregulated and liberalised financial markets. 
Under this new system the RBNZ’s main monetary policy implementation tool 
was (arguably) its control over the aggregate level of overnight settlement cash 
available to the domestic financial system. 111  Based on Milton Friedman’s 
maxim that inflation was always a purely monetary phenomenon, official 
accounts maintained that control over the quantity of settlement cash available 
to the system enabled the RBNZ to, in turn, exert a significant degree of control 
over primary liquidity (and consequently inflation) in the New Zealand 
economy.  
In February 1999, the RBNZ adopted a new “primary instrument for 
implementing monetary policy” in New Zealand. 112  This new tool was the 
Overnight Cash Rate (OCR) system. Under the OCR system, the RBNZ no 
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longer strictly controls the quantity of settlement cash, but instead controls its 
price. This price is known as the OCR.113  The main features of the OCR regime 
are summarised in Table 5.1 below.  
 
Table 5.1) The Main Features of New Zealand’s OCR Monetary Policy Regime 
 
 The RBNZ reviews the domestic situation in regard to inflation every six weeks and 
adjusts the OCR accordingly. 
 Banks have “Standing Facilities” with the RBNZ allowing them to obtain overnight 
settlement cash in unlimited quantities at an interest rate 25 basis points above the 
OCR and deposit overnight at 25 basis points below the OCR. 
 The RBNZ continues to operate open market daily liquidity management operations 
(OMOs) by injecting or withdrawing settlement cash at market rates. 
 The RBNZ’s OMOs aim to leave a quantity of settlement cash in the system 
approximate to a specified (but inherently adjustable) level. 
 
Source: A. Brookes and T. Hampton 2000, “The Official Cash Rate One Year On”, Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Vol. 63, No. 2 (June), 54. 
 
The main implication of the adoption of the OCR system has been the 
establishment of a much more stable relationship between the RBNZ’s key 
monetary policy tool and the rest of the bank bill yield curve (broadly referring 
to the domestic interest rate markets).114 Under the previous regime, the RBNZ’s 
market intervention rate was tied to an inherently volatile market-determined 
interest rate. As Brookes and Hampton observe, however, because under the 
OCR-based regime the RBNZ “is now willing to borrow and lend unlimited 
quantities overnight to the market at predetermined rates, the new regime 
                                                          
113
 Dalziel 2004, 59; A. Drew and R. Sethi 2007, “The Transmission Mechanism of New Zealand Monetary 
Policy”, Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 2 (June), 9.  
114
 Brookes and Hampton 2000, 56. 
The Fifth Labour Government and Macroeconomic Policy 276 
 
effectively constrains (but does not set directly) the overnight interest rate.”115 
This point is highlighted in Figure 5.1 below. As can be seen, fluctuations in 
overnight interest rates have reduced considerably since the adoption of the 
OCR system. 
 
Figure 5.3) Daily Changes in New Zealand Overnight Interest Rates, January 1995 
to January 2000 
 
  
Source: Brookes and Hampton 2000, 54. 
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Figure 5.4) International Volatility of Three Month Interest Rates 
 
 
Source: Brookes and Hampton, 60. 
 
As Dalziel outlines, “the OCR is the interest rate that financial 
institutions have to pay the Reserve Bank to borrow cash.”116 Because of this, it 
effectively serves as a base rate on which all other domestic interest rates are 
set.117 Due to the existence of the RBNZ’s standing facilities “no bank would 
normally pay another bank a higher interest rate for overnight cash than the 
rate at which it could borrow from the Reserve Bank.”118 Likewise, “no bank 
would deposit with another bank at an interest rate lower than that offered by 
the Reserve Bank.”119 Thus, the RBNZ effectively controls domestic overnight 
interest rates because “the Bank’s willingness to transact in large volume 
effectively eliminates the need to do so.”120 
Further, as can be seen from Figure 5.4 above, the introduction of the 
OCR has also had a marked impact on the short-term interest rate market. As 
Brookes and Hampton observe, “under the previous implementation 
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regime…day-to-day movements in the exchange rate were, to varying degrees, 
prompting movements in the 90 day and other short-term rates.” 121  The 
introduction of the OCR system, however, has served to remove “the strong 
day-to-day link between exchange rate fluctuations and short-term interest rate 
fluctuations.”122 The OCR has tended to have a noticeable impact on forward 
interest rates out to around a year, but its impact has been most clearly signified 
by a marked decrease in volatility in the high-profile 90-day interest rate, both 
in actual volatility and expected volatility, as evidenced by trends in options 
prices.123 
However, despite the adoption of the OCR system, the FLG nevertheless 
continued to operate what Whitwell accurately labels an “anti-employment” 
monetary policy regime. 124  New Zealand’s monetary policy implementation 
strategy during the period from 1999 to 2008 was still fundamentally “a thinly 
disguised incomes policy with a selective focus: the profitability of the traded 
goods sector.”125 The key difference was that the unemployment element of 
New Zealand’s monetary policy strategy was no longer implicit; 
unemployment is a crucial in-built aspect within official accounts of the RBNZ’s 
contemporary monetary policy transmission mechanism (MPTM). 
A detailed flow chart illustrating the main features of New Zealand’s 
MPTM can be seen below in Figure 5.5. As can be seen from this, New 
Zealand’s OCR-based MPTM operates along three main channels: the interest 
rate channel; the exchange rate channel; and the expectations channel. It is also 
important to observe that especially in the latter portions of the monetary cycle 
there are significant overlaps of these channels. 126  Briefly summarising the 
general operation of New Zealand’s OCR-based MPTM, Drew and Sethi 
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describe three major stages in the contemporary monetary cycle. At the first 
stage of the monetary cycle, “the most immediate impact of a change in 
monetary policy settings is seen in the markets for short-term bank bills and 
bonds, and in those for highly liquid financial assets such as foreign 
exchange.”127 The markets for longer-term bonds, equities and real estate will 
also respond during this first phase of the monetary cycle, but generally not to 
the same degree as the former. These comparatively illiquid asset classes are 
based around both a broader and longer ranging market-scope beyond the 
short-term changes in the OCR.128 At the second stage of the monetary cycle, 
“the net effect of a change in these bond and asset prices is to prompt 
households and firms to re-assess their consumption, investment and other 
business decisions.”129 Following an indeterminate lag, “these decisions” then 
“percolate through to aggregate spending in the economy.”130 At the final stage 
of the monetary cycle, again usually following a lag, “these changes in 
aggregate activity influence pricing pressure in the economy” and thus exert 
control over inflation. 131  Overarching the whole monetary cycle, the 
expectations channel serves to reinforce the effectiveness of the RBNZ’s policy 
stance. 
It is important to observe that the RBNZ now largely ignores the role of 
the money supply in the MPTM. As discussed above, under the incumbent 
OCR-based monetary policy regime the RBNZ effectively only controls the 
price of money. The quantity is now “created either directly by the Bank or by 
the banking system as necessary to satisfy demand for money.” 132 
Consequently, the quantity of money in the domestic economy is not a policy 
target in itself. As Drew and Sethi observe, “this may seem at odds with Milton 
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Friedman’s maxim that ‘inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon’.”133 However, the RBNZ now upholds (in-line with Whitwell’s 
initial critique outlined in detail in Chapter 3) that “in practice the links 
between money growth, output and inflation are often quite weak and 
unstable” and that “as a result, monetary aggregates have generally not proven 
to be particularly useful indicators for monetary policy.”134 
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Figure 5.5) The Transmission Mechanism of New Zealand Monetary Policy
 
       Source: Drew and Sethi, 6. 
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Instead, as can be seen from Figure 5.5 above, the RBNZ’s OCR-based 
monetary policy regime is now quite openly oriented towards impacting on 
real economic activity, with unemployment constituting a key in-built feature of 
the MPTM. As Drew and Sethi delineate, “the dominant theory…for thinking 
about the link between aggregate activity and inflation is an economic 
relationship known as the expectations-augmented Phillips curve.”135 The key 
features of this relationship in New Zealand’s specific context are set out in 
Table 5.2 below. 
 
Table 5.2) The Key Features of New Zealand’s Expectations-Augmented Phillips 
Curve 
 
 When aggregate output expands above the economy’s “supply capacity” (also known 
as potential output) a positive “output gap” opens up and non-tradables inflation rises. 
 A rise in inflation causes expectations of future inflation to increase. 
 To prevent ever-increasing inflation and inflation expectations, a more than one-for-
one monetary policy response is required to return output to potential levels and to 
re-anchor inflation expectations at the target rate. 
Source: Based on Drew and Sethi, 16. 
 
Centrally, the RBNZ’s conception of New Zealand’s Phillips curve 
upholds that “economic booms that expand the level of output significantly 
above its potential level are usually followed by a pick-up in domestic or non-
tradables inflation.” 136  In response the RBNZ initiates its monetary policy 
response via the raising of the OCR, which, as detailed above, serves to raise 
both short-term domestic interest rates as well as the FX rate (Figure 5.5 boxes 1 
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and 5). Put succinctly, these developments serve to prompt a decline in broader 
economic activity. The non-tradables sector, dominated by the real estate 
industry in New Zealand, is affected primarily in the form of declining demand 
for mortgages and other forms of consumer credit. However, it can be seen that 
the tradables sector will be especially negatively affected. Tradables are directly 
exposed to both the real-time transmission channels; the interest rate channel 
and the exchange rate channel. Thus while, like other firms, the tradables sector 
will find it more expensive to finance investment, New Zealand’s export 
producers will also experience declining profitability based on a generalised 
reduction in international competitiveness. (Figure 5.5 box 13). 137  As a 
consequence, firms will look to rationalise overall activity and reduce 
employment (Figure 5.5 boxes 11 and 13). Drew and Sethi observe that, thus, 
the combined interest rate and exchange rate channels place “downward 
pressure on various income streams flowing to households, reducing overall 
discretionary consumption” (Figure 5.5 boxes 7 and 8).138 As can be seen from 
Figure 5.5 (box 15), this is the most significant contributor to the response of net 
output to the change in the RBNZ’s monetary policy stance, which, in turn, is 
shown to be the key driving factor behind domestic (non-tradables) inflation 
(box 16).139 
Thus, it can be seen that the OCR-based monetary policy strategy the 
RBNZ operated under the FLG from 1999 to 2008 worked in the same effective 
manner as the previous quantity-based settlement cash system. It provides a 
more stable link between the RBNZ’s official policy stance and their intended 
target (short-term financial asset markets), however, official RBNZ accounts 
now also uphold a central position within the MPTM for the impacts of their 
implementation on real economic activity, particularly the tradables sector 
(with the exchange rate channel being the main contributor to this). Indeed, the 
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RBNZ now specifically avoids any pretense of being able to exert any 
meaningful control over primary liquidity. 
 
Foreign Exchange Policy 
As outlined in Chapter Three, New Zealand adopted an independent 
floating exchange rate regime in 1985. During the period from 1999 to 2008, the 
FLG continued to endorse the operation of a free floating FX rate, “albeit with 
varying degrees of periodic intervention in foreign exchange markets.”140 The 
maintenance of a floating FX regime essentially fits standard international 
practice. As illustrated by Table 5.3 below, since the beginning of 2000, of 22 
‘developed market economies’ “ten have opted to join the euro area, nine float 
their currencies independently, and the remaining three [Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Denmark] are special cases…”141 Fundamentally, under the FLG, the 
RBNZ supported the retention of an independently floating currency. “The 
Bank believes strongly in the virtues of a floating exchange rate within a well 
managed economy”, it averred.142 Indeed, in line with the prescriptions of the 
international neoliberal economic orthodoxy, the RBNZ upheld that “in 
general…the (floating) exchange rate can act as a significant buffer for the 
economy.”143 In particular, the floating FX regime “helps the economy to adjust 
to ever-changing domestic and global conditions” by allowing “efficient 
absorption of shocks to the current account.”144 
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Table 5.3) Exchange Rate Arrangements in Developed Market Economies (as of 
31 December 1999) 
Key:  NS = Arrangements with no separate legal tender  CB = Currency Board 
HB = Pegged rate in horizontal band   IF = Independently Floating 
 MF = Managed Float with no pre-announced exchange rate path 
 
Euro Area Other 
Austria NS Australia IF 
Belgium NS Canada IF 
Finland NS Denmark HB 
France NS Hong Kong SAR CB 
Germany NS Japan IF 
Ireland NS New Zealand IF 
Italy NS Norway IF 
Netherlands NS Singapore MF 
Portugal NS Sweden IF 
Spain NS Switzerland IF 
 United Kingdom IF 
 United States IF 
Source: Based on Bjorksten and Brook, 15. 
Following a two-part review of the RBNZ’s intervention capacity, on 30 
March, 2004, the FLG adopted a new FX intervention policy into its monetary 
policy framework and simultaneously implemented minor changes to the 
existing ‘crisis management’ intervention policy.145 Since the inception of New 
Zealand’s floating FX regime, the RBNZ has possessed a limited scope for FX 
market intervention. Under the RBA, the RBNZ has a standing order from the 
Minister of Finance “to intervene at any time to ensure the continuous 
operation of the foreign exchange market.” 146  The RBA also established an 
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obligation for the RBNZ “to hold foreign reserves in order to carry out” this 
“intervention at short notice.”147 For this reason the RBNZ always maintains 
possession of a significant “portfolio of liquid, high quality, foreign currency 
assets.”148 As Gordon notes, the target level of reserves had remained largely 
unchanged at $4-5 billion since the policy’s inception in 1988.149 Consequently, 
the RBNZ recommended that its intervention capacity for ‘crisis management’ 
should be increased as ‘insurance’. The FLG Minister of Finance, Michael 
Cullen, agreed with this advice and in February 2004 increased the target level 
of foreign reserves “to a minimum of $7 billion.”150 
However, as Eckhold and Hunt outline, the focus of the RBNZ’s existing 
intervention capacity was purely “on preserving the functioning of the foreign 
exchange market in a crisis, rather than preserving any given level of the 
exchange rate per se.”151 In contrast, the new FX intervention policy adopted by 
the FLG equips the RBNZ with “the capacity to use foreign exchange 
intervention in order to influence the level of the exchange rate.”152 In essence, 
RBNZ FX intervention involves the purchase/borrowing or sale/repayment of 
New Zealand dollars (NZD) in exchange for foreign currencies. Under the new 
approach to currency intervention, the RBNZ will intervene in the FX market 
when the NZD is considered to have “moved well in excess of any relevant 
economic fundamentals, such as relative productivity, commodity prices, 
growth, or inflation.”153 As detailed by Eckhold and Hunt, “intervention near 
the peaks of the exchange rate cycle will leave the Bank with an open 
(unhedged) net “long” foreign currency position.”154  Conversely, “intervention 
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at troughs will result in an open net ‘short’ currency position.”155 The RBNZ 
subsequently closes its foreign currency position when it considers that the 
exchange rate has returned to near its long-term equilibrium value.156  
Centrally, the FLG introduced this new intervention tool into its FX 
policy framework to serve as an auxiliary monetary policy tool. “Foreign 
exchange intervention can be viewed as another instrument for the Bank, 
consistent with achieving our monetary policy objectives, albeit a very 
secondary instrument to our most powerful one of the Official Cash Rate.”157 As 
previously indicated, the OCR operates to achieve price stability while 
minimising unnecessary short-term financial market volatility. However, the FX 
market, forming one of the three major monetary transmission channels, 
remains inherently volatile. Indeed, Eckhold and Hunt observe that short-term 
speculative behavior and other “non-fundamental drivers may at times push 
the exchange rate to extreme levels”, rendering “the task of achieving price 
stability while minimising unnecessary volatility difficult.”158 The FLG’s new 
intervention element “is aimed specifically at trimming the peaks and troughs 
of medium-term fluctuations in the NZD exchange rate.”159 Thus, while the 
OCR forms the core of the RBNZ’s monetary policy tool-set, sometimes 
intervention may also be used to assist the RBNZ in upholding its PTA 
obligations.160 
Ultimately, however, in line with its monetary policy stance outlined 
above, the changes undertaken by the FLG in regard to New Zealand’s FX 
policy regime constituted only a very minimal shift away from the incumbent 
neoliberal macroeconomic policy regime. As indicated by the criteria for 
intervention set out in legislation by the RBNZ, on the electoral defeat of the 
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FLG on 8 November 2008, New Zealand’s FX regime was still fundamentally 
oriented towards the minimisation of interference in financial markets. In order 
to fulfill the criteria for intervention under the FLG’s new intervention policy, 
the RBNZ must be satisfied that: the exchange rate is exceptionally high or low; 
the exchange rate is unjustified by economic fundamentals; intervention is 
consistent with the requirements of the PTA; and conditions in the market are 
opportune and will allow intervention a reasonable chance of success.161 But, as 
Eckhold and Hunt point out, “instances where there is a significant 
misalignment between the exchange rate and its fundamental value are 
probably few and far between. Further, it can be hard to identify exchange rate 
misalignments. Consequently, it is likely that we will intervene…rarely.”162 As 
Orr observes, “by far the bulk of foreign exchange risk management 
responsibility remains in the hands of the businesses and individuals within 
New Zealand.”163 Thus, despite the adoption of an additional monetary tool 
enabling FX intervention targeting the value of the NZD, the FLG still 
ultimately intended to operate its FX policy regime within bounds of a 
‘monetarist’ framework. Like its broader monetary policy stance it still sought 
to operate its FX policy regime in a way that maintained its credibility with 
financial markets in order to enable the achievement of price-level stability. 
 
Fiscal Policy 
A close examination of the overarching fiscal strategy pursued by the 
FLG during the period from 1999 to 2008 also highlights a fundamental 
commitment to maintaining the existing neoliberal macroeconomic policy 
framework. The FLG continued to exercise fiscal policy in accordance with all 
of the central tenets of the key neoliberal legislative lynch-pin in relation to 
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fiscal policy; the 1994 Fiscal Responsibility Act (discussed in the previous 
chapter). The FLG did eventually implement changes to this key piece of 
neoliberal legislation. In late 2004 it implemented the Public Finance 
Management Amendment Act (PFMA). This was to come into effect on 25 
January, 2005.164 The ostensible purpose of the PFMA was to “amend the law 
governing the use of public financial resources.” 165  However, as Roper has 
observed, rather than altering them in any fundamental way, the PFMA 2004 
essentially only incorporated the existing Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 and 
Public Finance Act 1989. 166  Indeed, the FLG’s 2004 Fiscal Strategy Report 
specifically states that “the Public Finance (State Sector Management) Bill 
integrates the Fiscal Responsibility Act into the Public Finance Act.”167 
As stated in Budget 2000, the FLG’s overarching fiscal strategy for the 
period from 1999 to 2008 was to adopt what it termed a “cautious approach” to 
fiscal policy.168 In his first budget speech as Finance Minister, Michael Cullen 
averred that: “we have promised to be a fiscally conservative government and 
we will hold to that promise.”169 Latterly, in what would be his last budget 
speech as Finance Minister, Cullen reiterated that promise. In Budget 2008 he 
stated that the FLG was still primarily focused on ensuring “sensible fiscal 
management.”170 Under the guiding principle of fiscal ‘caution’, the FLG’s fiscal 
strategy was formed of three main elements: a ‘conservative’ stance in relation 
to public expenditure; the retirement of the public debt position; and a 
commitment to “a robust, broad based tax system” that ensured strong revenue 
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generation.171 A detailed statistical account of this broader fiscal policy stance is 
set out in Table 5.4.   
The FLG’s ‘conservative’ expenditure stance was centred around the 
running of successive large structural surpluses, whilst simultaneously building 
up a significant financial asset in the form of the New Zealand Superannuation 
Fund (NZSF).172 As can be seen from Table 5.4, the FLG consistently achieved 
sizeable fiscal surpluses throughout the period from 2000 to 2008. On average 
these surpluses were worth around $4.5 billion per annum. Simultaneously, 
from 2002 onwards, the FLG successfully corralled a substantial portion of these 
surpluses into the newly established NZSF. The cumulative value of the NZSF 
totaled over $14.2 billion by 2008. Furthermore, it was projected “to reach $29 
billion by 30 June 2012.”173  
To ensure the successful operation of this approach to the management 
of public expenditure, the FLG initially adopted a fiscal cap. In Budget 2000 the 
FLG maintained “a fiscal cap of $5.9 billion over four years.” 174 This fiscal 
restriction was effectively upheld through until to 2002, although it was 
increased by $200 million in 2001 due to unforeseen defense spending 
outlays. 175  Budget 2000 included an allocation of just $420 million for new 
spending. 176  The largest component of this allocation was $200 million 
earmarked for new education initiatives.177 Budget 2001, meanwhile, included an 
only slightly larger allocation for new operating spending of around $476 
million (excluding contingency funding).178 Health received the largest portion 
of this new funding. Some $246 million of new operating funding was allocated 
to public healthcare provision in 2001. The bulk of the remainder went to 
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education and social services, which received $76 million and $87 million 
respectively.179 
Budget 2002 began a trend of expanding new governmental expenditure 
through to 2008.180 Table 5.4 shows, for example, that after remaining relatively 
stable during the first term of the FLG, total government expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP began to trend upwards from 2003 onwards. This expansion 
of new spending during the period from 2002 to 2008 was underpinned by a 
significant increase in government revenues, which, as is discussed in more 
detail below, primarily derived from the prolonged upswing in the domestic 
economy (described above, see Figure 5.1). Indeed, Budget 2008 states 
unequivocally that it was the Government’s successful conservative fiscal 
management acting in combination with the strength of the domestic economy 
that ultimately enabled “the Government…to deliver growth dividends to New 
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Table 5.4) A Statistical Overview of the Fifth Labour Government’s Fiscal 
Policy Stance 



























































































































































Source: Treasury 2014. Fiscal Time Series (Wellington: Treasury). Available at 
www.treasury.govt.nz/government/data. 
 
However, increased government spending during the period from 2002 
to 2008 did not signal an underlying shift in the FLG’s broader expenditure 
stance. Simultaneous to their expansion of expenditure, the FLG issued 
proclamations of their commitment to “fiscal prudence” ad nauseum.183 Thus, it 
appears that under less favourable economic circumstances the FLG would 
have demonstrated a markedly reduced degree of enthusiasm for increasing 
overall expenditure. Furthermore, the actual value of the spending needs to be 
viewed with a degree of caution. As Figure 5.6 shows, over much of the period 
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of study New Zealand experienced levels of inflation either close to or, indeed, 
in breach of the top of the RBNZ’s 1-3% target band. Cumulatively, this acted to 
significantly undermine the value of the FLG’s major new spending programs 
in real terms. 
 
Figure 5.6) CPI Inflation, 2000 to 2008 (%) 
Source: Treasury 2014, Fiscal Time Series. 
As can be seen from Figure 5.7 below, the FLG steadily reduced debt 
throughout their three terms in power. When the FLG was elected to office 
gross sovereign-issued debt excluding Reserve Bank settlement cash (GSID) 
stood at 33.7% of GDP.184 From this starting point GSID was reduced each year 
so that by 2008 it stood at just 17.5% of GDP.185 In Budget 2000 the FLG set public 
GSID and net debt targets of 30% and 20% respectively.186 Progress towards 
these goals was so strong that in Budget 2004 the FLG reduced both these debt 
targets. The FLG’s new debt management goal involved GSID as a percentage 
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of GDP being “slowly reduced over the longer term and passing through 20 per 
cent of GDP before 2015” and net debt being reduced “towards minus 15% of 
GDP by 2015 (that is., a net financial asset position).”187 As can be seen from 
Figure 5.7, by the end of its third term the FLG was on track to meet both of 
these debt targets.188 GSID was cited above as being below the target level well 
in advance and, further, “in 2006 the Crown moved into a net positive financial 
asset position for the first time in New Zealand history.”189 
 
Figure 5.7) Gross Sovereign-Issued Debt (excluding settlement cash) and 
Net Debt, 1994 to 2008 
 
 
            Source: Treasury 2008, “Executive Summary”, 18. 
At the heart of the FLG’s stance in regard to revenue generation was its 
overseeing of a burgeoning of government revenues. Table 5.4 shows that total 
government revenue almost doubled in nominal terms during the period from 
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1999 to 2008. From $41.6 billion in 2000, total government revenues had 
increased to $81.5 billion in 2008. As indicated above, the significant expansion 
of revenues under the FLG can be largely attributed to the impact on the 
revenue base of the strong cyclical economic upswing experienced in New 
Zealand from 1999 to 2007. Centrally, prolonged strong economic growth 
entailed strong parallel growth in New Zealand’s tax base (company profits, 
personal incomes and consumer spending) and also the Government’s other 
major sources of revenue (particularly income from investments and sales of 
goods and services).190 Table 5.4, for example, shows that while Government tax 
receipts increased significantly, from $33.9 billion in 2000 to $59.2 billion in 
2008, the tax take remained relatively stable as a proportion of GDP, trending 
up only slightly in the latter years of the FLG. This indicates that revenue 
growth was indeed closely linked to the strong corresponding growth in the 
wider economy. 
However, it also needs to be observed that the tax system maintained by 
the FLG was an important element contributing to the increase in revenues. As 
predicted, the FLG’s taxation policy did not involve any significant increases 
within the structure of the taxation system. Indeed, beyond the initial re-
establishment of a top tier of 39% for personal income over $60,000 (as 
necessitated by its 1999 election campaign promise), for much of its time in 
office the FLG undertook little effective action to reverse the regressive taxation 
reforms it inherited from the Fourth National Government. The FLG’s 
overarching priority in the realm of taxation policy was to ensure that it was 
able to generate a level of revenue sufficient to fund each of the key facets of its 
‘conservative’ fiscal policy stance. For Labour Finance Minister, Michael Cullen, 
the best way to achieve this was by retaining “a direct tax system augmented by 
broadly based indirect taxes.”191 
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During the second half of their time in office, the FLG did begin to 
undertake significant reforms of the tax system. These began in 2004 with the 
expansion of family tax credit provisions as part of the WFF package.192 But the 
FLG’s tax reform programme did not begin in substantive terms until the 
implementation of the Business Tax Reform package as one of the central 
features of Budget 2005. This had an initial costing of $1.9 billion over four years 
and formed the bulk of the 26% of Budget 2005 spent on tax reductions.193 Budget 
2007 introduced a significant additional cut to business tax. The core of this 
reform consisted of a reduction of the tax rate on company profits from 33% to 
30% at a forecast cost of $3.4 billion over four years.194 In 2008 a comprehensive 
package of personal tax cuts was adopted and implemented. The details of this 
are set out in Table 5.5 below. Michael Cullen stated that: “Budget 2008 delivers 
a meaningful reduction in tax for all New Zealanders. It will return a dividend 
of $10.6 billion to hard-working New Zealanders over the next four years.”195  
 
Table 5.5) Overview of the 2008 Personal Tax Reforms 
 Tax Rates and Thresholds 
Current 15% 21% 33% 39% 
 Up to $9,500 $38,000 $60,000 Above $60,000 
New 12.5% 21% 33% 39% 




























Source: Treasury 2008, Key Facts for Taxpayers (Wellington: Treasury). 
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Overall, however, the fiscal significance of the FLG’s various tax reforms 
was restricted. The business tax reforms, for example, while significant in 
nominal terms (cumulatively approximately $1.5 billion per year by 2008/09), 
were implemented via a staggered process. Respectively, the FLG only began to 
deploy its 2008 personal tax cuts programme a mere 38 days before it was 
ousted from power and New Zealander’s would not feel its full effects until 
April 2011. Ultimately, each of the FLG’s major tax reforms were introduced 
relatively late in their time in office and, further, full funding of the tax 
packages was generally delayed. This effectively served to severely curtail the 
impact of the tax reforms on the FLG’s overall revenue stance. 
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Conclusion 
From 1999 to 2008 the FLG presented itself as operating a so-called 
“Third Way” policy agenda. The Third Way is couched by its proponents as a 
pragmatic social democratic policy paradigm responding to the dynamic nature 
of contemporary social, economic and political conditions. The defining 
characteristic of the FLG’s Third Way policy agenda, however, was the 
retention and entrenchment of the core pillars of the neoliberal macroeconomic 
policy nexus pursued in New Zealand since 1984.  
In the realm of monetary policy the FLG made only minimal adjustments 
to the RBA 1989. The FLG’s monetary policy framework remained 
fundamentally oriented around the achievement of the core monetarist goal of 
maintaining a low stable rate of inflation coincident with minimal financial 
regulation. To achieve this, the RBNZ continued to operate what effectively 
constitutes an incomes policy. With the RBNZ no longer upholding particular 
concern for the level of primary liquidity, the MPTM explicitly operated to 
squeeze out inflation through crude efforts at crushing profitability in the 
tradables sector. Further, the FLG remained committed to an independently 
floating FX regime. The FLG expanded the RBNZ’s intervention capacity, but 
this represented only an extremely limited adjustment of the incumbent regime. 
The FLG’s FX policy stance remained fundamentally aligned towards enabling 
the effective achievement of their overarching monetarist goal of achieving and 
maintaining low and stable inflation. Respectively, the FLG pursued a 
conservative fiscal policy strategy in accordance with the distinctively 
neoliberal FRA. Centrally, the FLG restricted expenditure while overseeing a 
significant expansion of revenue. This enabled the building of substantial 
operating surpluses in order to fund the establishment and growth of a 
significant new financial asset, the NZSF, and the substantial retirement of the 
Government’s debt position. 
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As will be explored in the following chapter, the FLG was subject to a 
variety of political economic influences seeking to ensure its continued 
adherence to the neoliberal macroeconomic regime. Amongst these, 
considerable pressures deriving from New Zealand’s ongoing integration into 
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Financial Market Liberalisation and the State: The Constraints 




The overarching macroeconomic policy programme developed and 
deployed by the FLG during the period from 1999 to 2008 was described in 
Chapter Five. It was emphasised that, despite adopting the ideas of the (at least 
nominally) social democratic ‘Third Way’, the FLG nevertheless retained all of 
the key features of the existing neoliberal macroeconomic policy regime. A 
‘monetarist’ approach to macroeconomic management primarily focused on 
achieving and maintaining low stable inflation, an independently floating 
foreign exchange (FX) regime, and a conservative approach to fiscal policy –
emphasising the retirement of public debt, restricted public expenditure and 
low, broad-based taxation - were all firmly entrenched during the period from 
1999 to 2008.  
Respectively, this chapter seeks to provide an account of why the FLG 
retained all of these key features of the incumbent neoliberal policy regime as 
the core of its own macroeconomic policy nexus. Particular focus will be placed 
on the impact that integration into the Dollar-Wall Street Regime (DWSR) – via 
the program of financial market liberalisation and deregulation outlined in 
Chapter Three - had on the New Zealand state’s operational autonomy and the 
operation of the New Zealand democratic political system during the period 
from 1999 to 2008. This comprehensive account will ultimately be used to 
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discern the value that Gowan’s DWSR analysis provides for a sophisticated 
neopluralist interpretation and explanation of the shift from Keynesianism to 
neoliberalism in New Zealand. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the major domestic factors 
constraining the FLG’s autonomous formulation of macroeconomic policy 
during the period from 1999 to 2008. To this end, the macroeconomic policy 
agendas of the FLG’s key institutional advisors, the Treasury and the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), and the groups representing New Zealand’s 
major business interests will be outlined. The significant countervailing impact 
of the historically specific economic and electoral contexts will then be briefly 
delineated, before the nature of the constraints imposed on the FLG’s 
macroeconomic policy formulation by New Zealand’s integration into the 
DWSR are explored and explained. In the final section, the subsequent apparent 
political implications of financial market liberalisation in New Zealand are 
identified. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the central argument. 
In anticipation, the central argument asserts that New Zealand’s 
integration into the DWSR significantly constrained the FLG’s capacity to 
autonomously formulate and implement macroeconomic policy during the 
period from 1999 to 2008. It did this, in the first instance, by fundamentally 
altering the structural relationship between the state and international private 
financial capital in New Zealand.  
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6.1)  The Domestic Constraints on Government Macroeconomic Policy 
Formulation, 1999 to 2008 
The main set of domestic constraints that prevailed on the FLG’s 
macroeconomic policy formulation during the period from 1999 to 2008 
ultimately derived from the same powerful group of political forces which, as 
was shown in Chapters Three and Four drove the initial neoliberalisation of 
New Zealand’s political economy from 1984 onwards.1 As one contemporary 
newspaper editorial observed, “the trouble for Labour is that the forces which 
triumphed under the New Right Revolution are still here. They are powerful 
forces – perhaps too powerful for any Third Way government to resist.”2 Both 
of the Government’s key economic advisory bodies - the Treasury and the 
RBNZ - continued to actively propagate a pro-neoliberal policy agenda during 
the period from 1999 to 2008. Simultaneously, they also continued to import 
and promote within New Zealand developments in the international 
intellectual economic orthodoxy. Business interests, meanwhile, vigorously 
opposed any perceived attempt by the FLG at rolling back the existing 
neoliberal policy framework whilst concurrently advocating for its further 
extension.3 
As Roper argues, Treasury policy advice during the period from 1999 to 
2008 was primarily “directed towards persuading the Fifth Labour Government 
to retain all of the key elements of the neoliberal policy regime established from 
1984 to 1999.”4 The essential features of the Treasury’s macroeconomic policy 
agenda are set out in numerous publications and policy papers, most notably 
their post-election briefing papers of 1999, 2002 and 2005.5 The 2005 briefing 
paper Sustaining Growth, for example, argues that “while New Zealand has a 
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sound macroeconomic framework”, “future budgets must involve 
less…spending” and the “high marginal personal tax rates (33% and 39%) and 
the company tax rate” must be reduced.6 Respectively, the key discussion paper 
New Zealand Economic Growth: An Analysis of Performance and Policy, stated that: 
“the main roles for monetary policy” continue to be “to ensure the stability and 
efficiency of the financial system and to achieve low inflation.” 7 Further, it 
upheld that “fiscal policy requires…balances over time”, with the “foundational 
principle” of the taxation system being a “broad based-low rate” for both 
personal and corporate tax rates.8 Put succinctly, then, “the central message of 
the working papers and the briefs is to retain and extend, rather than abandon, 
the monetarist macroeconomic strategy”, including a conservative fiscal 
strategy primarily aimed at reducing public debt and maintaining tight 
expenditure control.9 
Comprehensive coverage of the RBNZ’s continued endorsement and 
implementation of a monetarist macroeconomic strategy has already been 
provided indirectly in Chapter Five. What is perhaps not particularly evident 
from this account, however, is the degree to which the RBNZ continued to 
actively serve as a major conduit for the importation and promotion of the 
international neoliberal economic orthodoxy into New Zealand. The most 
prominent example in this regard is the previously discussed Independent 
Review of the Operation of Monetary Policy in New Zealand. While the FLG, RBNZ 
and non-executive directors were each documented in the preceding chapter as 
opposing many of the Svenssen Review’s recommendations, the overall 
assessment of the review nevertheless concluded that “monetary policy in New 
Zealand is currently entirely consistent with international best practice of 
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flexible inflation targeting.”10 But, the Svenssen Review represented only one 
aspect of the RBNZ’s academic importation activities. As could be reasonably 
expected, myriad articles within the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin 
provide commentaries on the apparent relevance of various developments in 
the international economic literature to macroeconomic policy in New Zealand. 
Furthermore, the RBNZ also volunteered for New Zealand’s financial sector to 
undergo an assessment by the IMF in 2003.11 
Constituting a “strong continuity” of business political activism from the 
late 1970s through into the 2000s, business political activity in New Zealand 
from 1999 to 2008 involved intensive lobbying of the FLG to retain and extend 
the neoliberal policy framework constructed from 1984 to 1999.12 As Roper has 
documented, the initial political response of business to the election of the FLG 
was focused on “opposition to the incoming government’s policies.”13 Policies 
considered not to be ‘business friendly’, included “the increase in the marginal 
rate of income tax for those earning over $60,000”, the “introduction of the 
Employment Relations Act [ERA], the re-nationalisation of the ACC scheme, 
and the introduction of paid parental leave.”14 Such sentiments were expressed 
by all of New Zealand’s major business associations - the New Zealand 
Employer’s Federation (NZEF), Federated Farmers (FF), the New Zealand 
Manufacturer’s Federation (NZMF), and the New Zealand Business Roundtable 
(NZBR) - during the period from 1999 to 2001.15  
However, as outlined in the previous chapter, it was soon made clear to 
business that, beyond limited peripheral adjustments, the FLG remained 
fundamentally committed to retaining all of the key elements of the neoliberal 
policy regime. As Kelsey details, at a business forum held in October 2000 the 
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FLG Prime Minister, Helen Clark, clearly indicated to those assembled that the 
FLG “intended to build on, rather than revisit, the neoliberal policy 
paradigm.”16 Thereafter, the focus of business political activism began shifting 
back towards the extension of neoliberal policy agenda.17 For example, NZBR 
Chairman Rob McLeod stated that: “to its credit”, the FLG “has not 
fundamentally reversed the post-1984 reforms – indeed its main legacy may be 
to have advanced a consensus around them.” 18  Nevertheless “economic 
progress doesn’t pause for breath, and nor should the economic reform 
process.”19  
As Roper again documents, fiscal policy was “at the core” of the broader 
New Zealand business political agenda from circa 2001 through to the end of 
the FLG’s tenure in 2008. 20  In particular, business desired a substantial 
reduction in government expenditure and a parallel reduction of the higher 
personal and company tax rates. 21  A number of media releases made by 
Business NZ (a new business association formed in 2001 through an 
amalgamation of the NZEF and NZMF), for example, espoused that there was a 
need to exercise “great discipline” and “tight control” over government 
expenditure. This was alongside calls for “effective policy solutions” involving 
“well designed tax reform.”22 Roper notes that such messages were “echoed in 
multiple submissions and publications” by Business NZ, Chambers of 
Commerce, FF, and the NZBR.23  
In regard to the other major areas of macroeconomic policy - monetary 
policy and foreign exchange (FX) policy - business political activity was 
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comparatively muted from circa 2001 onwards. Indeed, as exemplified by the 
Business NZ discussion paper Business NZ Recommendations: Response to the 
Financial Crisis, to a significant extent it merely involved the voicing of support 
for the FLG’s retention of the existing monetarist regime. “The Finance and 
Expenditure Select Committee…confirms that New Zealand’s monetary policy 
framework is fundamentally sound and rules out the need for any changes to 
the [1989 Reserve Bank] Act or the conduct of monetary policy.”24 Similarly, the 
major Business NZ submission on the 2007 “inquiry into the future monetary 
policy framework”, OCR: The Sharpest Tool in the Box?, states that “the overall 
conclusion that [has] emerged is that the essential elements of New Zealand’s 
macroeconomic policy are still fundamentally sound.”25 
As was discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, outside of Cabinet, 
the Treasury and the RBNZ comprise the most influential institutional bodies 
within New Zealand’s state apparatus. In addition, as was argued at length in 
Chapter One, business generally represents the most powerful set of society-
based interests in contemporary liberal democratic states such as New Zealand. 
Therefore, the combination of the Treasury, the RBNZ, and the broader 
business community undoubtedly constituted a major array of pressures from 
within the domestic political economy for the FLG to not only retain, but to also 
continue to extend the neoliberal policy agenda during the period from 1999 to 
2008.  
However, it is evident that, simultaneously, there were significant 
countervailing influences being exerted on the FLG during the period from 1999 
to 2008.26 These primarily derived from the combined economic and electoral 
contexts prevalent from 1999 to 2008. 27  It has already been shown in the 
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previous chapter that the FLG presided over a prolonged upswing in economic 
growth during its period of tenure.28 Real economic growth averaged 3.8% 
between 1999 and 2007. As I have argued elsewhere, this served to significantly 
offset the inherent structural power that business possessed over the FLG due 
to New Zealand’s status as a specifically capitalist nation state.29 The prolonged 
period of relatively strong economic growth effectively served to reduce the 
fiscal pressures being exerted on the state by domestic capital. As a 
consequence, the FLG was endowed with a significant degree of scope with 
which to endeavour to formulate policy to help sustain its position of power 
electorally.  
Vowles et al have documented that, at least initially, the FLG was 
electorally reliant on a predominantly working class voter base. Their statistics 
show, for example, that political support for the FLG was partly derived from a 
partial rebuilding of its traditional working class support base to close to its 
1984 election level.30 Moreover, as Roper documents, the FLG also maintained 
relatively strong links with trade unions. While only three unions remained 
official affiliates of the wider New Zealand Labour Party (the “Engineering, 
Printing and Manufacturing Union; Service and Food Workers Union, and the 
Dairy Workers Union”), the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (NZCTU) 
nevertheless remained listed as a “partner” of the FLG.31  
Thus, it is unsurprising that, especially in the realm of social 
expenditure, “the data reveals a clear political business cycle in which fiscal 
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policy was strongly expansionary in election years.”32 Budget 2002, for example, 
introduced $1.0 billion of new spending and significantly expanded outlays 
over the following four years.33 Budget 2005, meanwhile, introduced $2.0 billion 
of new spending, largely focused on expansions of the flagship Working For 
Families (WFF) and the interest-free student loans schemes. 34  Respectively, 
Budget 2008 committed $4.8 billion in new spending, and simultaneously 
delivered “a dividend of $10.6 billion to hard-working New Zealanders over 
the next four years” in the form of the previously documented 2008 personal 
tax cuts package.35  
This evidence suggests that the political influence of the powerful array 
of pro-neoliberal interests within the New Zealand political economy 
(principally composed of Treasury, the RBNZ, and business), was, at least to 
some extent, diminished during the period from 1999 to 2008, relative to the 
situation which prevailed from 1984 to 1999. The prevailing economic and 
electoral conditions effectively combined to offset the pressures being exerted 
on the FLG by its principal institutional economic advisors and the business 
community. This serves to raise a question of central importance to this thesis. 
If the political influence of this powerful grouping of pro-market forces was 
indeed diminished (as the above analysis suggests), why did the FLG 
nevertheless display such a steadfast commitment to the core features of the 
neoliberal macroeconomic policy regime? As will be argued throughout the 
remainder of this chapter, a key factor contributing to the FLG’s documented 
retention and entrenchment of the key neoliberal macroeconomic policies was 
New Zealand’s continued integration into the DWSR. 
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6.2)  The Dollar-Wall Street Regime’s Constraints on Macroeconomic 
Policy Formulation, 1999 to 2008 
Continued integration into the DWSR placed considerable constraints on 
the macroeconomic policy formulation of the FLG.36 In essence, it created an 
economic environment requiring the adoption and maintenance of an 
overarching policy stance oriented towards the minimisation of “country 
specific macroeconomic fragility.”37 As outlined in Chapter Two, major IPFM-
related crises (particularly, but not exclusively, in ‘emerging markets’) have 
become an inherent feature of the global financial system under the DWSR. 
Indeed, it is worth reiterating that since as late as 1994 Mexico (1994), Thailand, 
Indonesia, Korea (1997), Russia, Brazil (1998), Turkey (2000), Argentina (2000 
and again in 2003), and more recently Iceland (2007 and again in 2008), Ireland 
(2008), Portugal, Greece (2010), Cyprus, and Spain (2012) have all undergone 
significant ordeals of this order. The FLG’s macroeconomic nexus was 
formulated, at least in part, in order to diminish New Zealand’s susceptibility to 
such crises. 
A principle factor underpinning the FLG’s overarching macroeconomic 
policy stance was the existence of what the international economic orthodoxy 
refers to as the “impossible trinity.”38 Also sometimes known as the ‘trilemma’ 
of contemporary macroeconomic management, this concept contends that it is 
impossible for a government to simultaneously uphold “a fixed exchange rate, 
capital mobility, and a monetary policy dedicated to domestic goals.” 39  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, following the establishment of the DWSR in the mid-
1970s, international financial transactions associated with investment and 
securities (as opposed to those associated with financing international trade 
flows) grew rapidly. New Zealand was not excluded from this broader 
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development. Indeed, as Rosborough has documented, by 2001 international 
trade in goods and services accounted for less than 2% of FX market turnover in 
New Zealand.40 Munro delineates that “as foreign exchange market turnover 
has become dominated by financial transactions rather than those related to 
trade, the exchange rate has increasingly come to be viewed as an asset price.”41 
As an asset price, in the absence of capital controls “the exchange rate responds 
to the market’s current expectation of a discounted sum of returns to holding 
assets denominated in New Zealand dollars relative to those denominated in 
other currencies.”42 Consequently, ceterus paribus “the expected relative return 
to holding New Zealand dollar” denominated assets should be zero; “there is 
no incentive for arbitrage”, and thus, “uncovered interest rate parity [UIP] is 
said to hold.”43 Because, in theory, under contemporary conditions of financial 
‘globalisation’ UIP holds, “the domestic interest rate must equal the world 
interest rate.”44 Therefore if, for example, a government seeks to maintain a 
pegged FX regime, national monetary authorities must respond to the 
experience of an ‘economic shock’ that shifts the ‘fundamentals’ underpinning 
the equilibrium value of the official FX rate by targeting “the domestic money 
supply” (by adjusting domestic interest rates) in order to “sustain exchange rate 
parity.”45 In this way, for countries with liberalised capital controls, an effective 
FX policy option trade-off exists. A pegged FX regime is practicable, but only at 
the cost of subsuming domestic monetary policy to IPFMs. Likewise, it is 
possible for governments to exercise significant autonomy in the sphere of 
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monetary policy, but only “provided they are prepared to accept the exchange 
rate consequences” via the simultaneous adoption of a floating FX regime.46  
The existence of this ‘impossible trinity’, did not rule out the possibility 
of occasional strategic FX market forays being undertaken by the RBNZ during 
the period from 1999 to 2008. Indeed, as outlined in the previous chapter, in 
2004 the FLG specifically equipped the RBNZ with the capacity to undertake 
such measures (provided certain strict criteria were first met). It is also now 
“widely accepted” that the RBNZ exercised its intervention capacity on several 
occasions during mid-2007.47 The RBNZ first intervened on Monday, 11 June.48 
Targeting the New Zealand dollar after it reached a (up until that point) post-
float high of US76.40c, this constituted the first FX currency intervention since 
the Fourth Labour Government decided to float the dollar in 1985 (see Chapter 
Three).49 Fresh interventions soon followed: the RBNZ sold a net total of $702 
million worth of New Zealand currency in foreign exchange markets in June 
2007; an additional $1.5 billion in July; and, after a brief lull in August, a further 
$138 million in September.50 
Ultimately, however, the presence of the ‘impossible trinity’, coupled 
with contemporary global financial conditions primarily characterised by deep 
and highly integrated IPFMs, effectively rendered unsustainable the adoption 
of a fixed-rate or ‘pegged’ FX regime by the FLG.51 Centrally, this is because, as 
Fischer observes, it is likely that “sooner or later, an irreconcilable conflict” will 
arise between the FX and monetary policy goals of a country seeking to 
maintain a pegged FX regime.52 If a disequilibrium resulting from an economic 
shock is substantial and persistent, “either because policy was slow to react or 
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because the country has been hit by a strong and lasting shock”, the required 
monetary policy response may not be sustainable; abnormally high domestic 
interest rates would severely undermine the viability of both the domestic 
economy and banking system. 53  If the required domestic interest rate 
adjustment is not made, however, an effective currency overvaluation exists 
and, as Fischer observes, “under these circumstances, speculators can be 
expected to attack the currency.”54 Such actions are likely to be successful in the 
current global financial environment. As Held et al point out, “since capital 
controls were dismantled…defences against speculative attack are very 
limited.” 55  “Speculators can mobilise massive funds through derivatives 
markets” and “institutional investors and [multi-national corporations 
(MNCs)]…tend to move out of a currency if they believe it to be under threat.”56 
In New Zealand’s specific case, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) has 
documented that daily FX market turnover in New Zealand averaged $US12 
billion in April 2007. 57  Further, average daily ‘Over the Counter’ (OTC) 
derivatives turnover constituted an additional $US3 billion. 58  When these 
historically unprecedented levels of financial flows are compared with the level 
of reserves available to the RBNZ for the management of crises (documented in 
Chapter Five), the significance of the divergence between the relative resources 
of IPFMs and the New Zealand state is stark. As outlined in the previous 
chapter, from February 2004 onwards, the RBNZ maintained minimum FX 
reserves of only $7 billion specifically earmarked for emergency crisis 
management. The expected outcome of any attempt to defend the New Zealand 
dollar at a fixed rate is thus obvious. As Harvey summarises the point, hedge 
funds can potentially arm themselves “with trillions of dollars of leveraged 
                                                          
53
 Ibid, 11. 
54
 Ibid; Held et al, 231. 
55




 BIS 2007, 9. 
58
 Ibid, 14. 
Financial Market Liberalisation and the State 313 
 
money”, which means that any attempt at staging a fixed FX-rate defence is 
virtually impossible under the DWSR.59 
Consequently, as Bjorksten and Brook observe, during the period from 
1999 to 2008 the view of the FLG and its key economic advisors (Treasury and 
the RBNZ) was that, in terms of the formulation of the FLG’s macroeconomic 
policy nexus, “pegging the exchange rate” was simply “not an option to 
consider seriously.” 60  Instead, the existence of the impossible trinity 
necessitated that the FLG retained New Zealand’s floating FX regime in order 
to maintain economic viability. In contrast to a pegged regime, in principle an 
independently floating regime can act as an effective “buffer against shocks to 
the current account” such as those that would be constituted by a transmutation 
of the underlying fundamentals of the value of the nominal exchange rate.61 
Under a floating regime “the exchange rate moves to offset any difference 
between world and domestic interest rates”, effectively leaving monetary policy 
to be deployed discretely for the purpose of maintaining domestic economic 
stability.62 
However, just as major problems existed with attempting to maintain a 
pegged FX regime under the DWSR, so too has a significant problem emerged 
with the adoption of the trade-off floating FX option required under conditions 
of liberalised capital controls.63 Principally, since the establishment of the DWSR 
and the parallel expansion of financial transactions in IPFMs, unexpected global 
FX market volatility has increased dramatically.64 New Zealand’s experience 
has been no exception to this broader global trend. Munro’s (2004) correlation 
of recent RBNZ empirical work documents the key factors acting to determine 
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the nominal FX rate of the New Zealand dollar.65 She identifies “factors that 
affect relative returns – short-term interest rates, commodity prices”, and “a 
notion of medium-term exchange rate equilibrium” as being very important in 
helping to “explain exchange rate movements.” 66  However, Munro also 
observes of these factors that, whilst very important, they simply “do not 
explain all, or even most of, short-term exchange rate movements.”67 Some large 
currency fluctuations are clear market over-reactions disconnected from 
underlying economic determinants.68 
In other words, even after taking into account the explanatory power of 
the fundamental nominal FX rate determinants, during the period from 1999 to 
2008, significant amplitude in the New Zealand FX rate persisted. 69  The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) notes, for example, that prior to 2006, 
despite an “uncomfortably large current account deficit”, the New Zealand 
dollar remained overvalued for an extended period and appeared “to have 
decoupled from the traditional fundamental determinants of the currency’s 
value” (see Figure 6.1).70 Following this, in the first quarter of 2006, the New 
Zealand dollar underwent a large depreciation of around 10%. The currency 
subsequently bounced back, but the onset of the GFC in late 2007 saw the 
currency once more take a large dive.71 As Cassino and Wallis observed, “the 
NZD fell, on a trade-weighted basis, by 35 percent over the period from 2007 to 
early 2009 during the peak of the crisis.” 72 It is important to note that the 
movements of the New Zealand dollar during the GFC, what was undoubtedly 
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“one of the most volatile periods in the history of financial markets”, were 
again not driven by domestic determinants.73 Instead, the RBNZ’s “in-house 
empirical model of the exchange rate” shows that “to a large extent, the NZD’s 
moves against other major currencies [were] driven substantially by the moves 
in fundamentals of the other economy or by shifts in risk appetite” in IPFMS.74 
Such an empirical reality constitutes a significant divergence from a 
logical expectation of outcomes if UIP did indeed hold as predicted by 
economic theory. Stiglitz details that, as a consequence, within the international 
economic orthodoxy the “notion that markets are rational has been called into 
question.”75 Instead, he states, it is now commonly upheld that “markets may 
suffer from irrational exuberance as well as irrational pessimism, and the 
swings between the two can be rapid.”76 As Rude points out, these dynamics 
are essentially an expression of “an increase in the tendency for the financial 
markets to over-and-under-estimate future profits.”77 
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Figure 6.1) Movement in the New Zealand Dollar Trade Weighted Index 
and Real Exchange Rate, 1985 to 2009 
     Source: Cassino and Wallis 2010, 20. 
The systemic escalation of FX market volatility represented a major 
problem for the FLG’s formulation of its core macroeconomic policy nexus – 
monetary policy, FX policy, and fiscal policy.78 Primarily, this is because of its 
serious potential consequences for domestic economic stability.79 Unduly large 
appreciations of the exchange rate will clearly undermine the profitability of the 
export sector by reducing the competitiveness of their products on the 
international market. 80  Conversely, as Stiglitz argues, if firms and financial 
institutions have uncovered balance sheet positions, large sudden depreciations 
in the FX rate will undermine “normal trade adjustment” (that is, an increase in 
export activity and a parallel decrease in import activity) by imposing 
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destabilising capital outflows and higher domestic interest rates. 81  Thus, 
significant unpredicted swings in the exchange rate either way could result in 
serious economic contractions deriving from “corporate distress.” 82 
Furthermore, as Bjorksten and Brook observe, “the more important external 
trade is to an economy”, the greater the likely impact of such developments.83 
Thus, in New Zealand’s case - as with other “relatively small, open, developed 
economies” such as “Iceland, Norway, Australia and Canada” - “with a 
moderately large tradables sector” the potential costs are comparatively high in 
the context of the global economy.84 
Thus, the FLG’s retention of New Zealand’s floating FX regime, itself, 
effectively generated significant ancillary pressures on the scope for 
government autonomy in the sphere of macroeconomic policy formulation.85 
Centrally, the FLG faced pressure from IPFMs to adopt policies to mitigate the 
substantial threat to the domestic macroeconomy posed by destabilising 
international financial flows. 86  In more specific terms, rather than being 
endowed with a significant degree of policy autonomy (as suggested by the 
underlying principle of the impossible trinity), during the period from 1999 to 
2008, the FLG faced significant pressure from IPFMs to adhere to the neoliberal 
rules of the international monetary system. Due to the fact that the FX rate now 
effectively constitutes an asset value, inflation amounts to a key determining 
                                                          
81
 J. Stiglitz 2001, “Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in Small Open Economies: The Case of Iceland”, 
Central Bank of Iceland Working Papers, No. 15 (November), 1, 4. It should be noted that there is a body 
of literature that upholds that the market only provides firms with limited means of covering FX 
positions. Indeed this empirical reality has been cited as a key factor contributing to the seriousness of 
the 1997-8 East Asian crisis. 
82
 ibid, 3. See also R. Shiller 2005, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
83




 Richards 2010, 41. 
86
 As numerous authors have observed, such pressure has been experienced by most governments 
throughout the developed world. This is reflected in the well documented phenomenon of significant 
convergence towards similar overarching macroeconomic policy stances seeking to dampen malign 
financial transactions. See, for example, Held et al, 229; L. Mosely 2007, “The Political Economy of 
Globalisation”, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds.), Globalisation Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press), 106-
125; M. Webb 1995, The Political Economy of Policy Co-ordination: International Adjustment since 1945 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press), ch.6. 
Financial Market Liberalisation and the State 318 
 
factor of the risk premia attached to the New Zealand dollar by IPFMs. 87 
Consequently, the FLG retained and entrenched the incumbent ‘monetarist’ 
approach to monetary policy focused primarily on the achievement and 
maintenance of a stable low rate of inflation. As Held et al observe, integral to 
this was also the establishment and maintenance of the “credibility of domestic 
monetary authorities” to be able to successfully operate such a stance. 88 
Therefore, the FLG also preserved the RBNZ’s operational and constitutional 
autonomy within the state apparatus, while, as Munro observes, the RBNZ 
respectively promoted “a clear objective for monetary policy, a published 
model and regular OCR review dates.”89 
However, it is important to note that while exerting pressure on the FLG 
to retain a broadly monetarist approach to monetary policy, the DWSR 
simultaneously undermined the effectiveness of many “traditional 
instruments” of New Zealand’s domestic monetary policy.90 First, as Held et al 
delineate, the extensive domestic financial sector deregulation, the 
unprecedented international mobility of capital, and the high levels of financial 
innovation that have accompanied DWSR integration, effectively acted to 
subvert the RBNZ’s capacity to autonomously determine the domestic money 
supply and price level.91 Indeed, as was noted in Chapter Five, the RBNZ no 
longer even attempted to specifically target the domestic monetary supply. 
Second, as was also seen in Chapter Five, while the RBNZ could still wield 
some effective control over short-term interest rates operating under the aegis of 
the OCR system, determination of longer-term interest rates was effectively 
surrendered to IPFMs. 
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New Zealand’s integration into the DWSR also placed significant 
constraints on the FLG in the realm of fiscal policy formulation.92 Most notably, 
DWSR integration exerted considerable pressure on the FLG to retire its 
underlying debt position. Held et al observe that, in theory, one of the key 
advantages of liberalised capital controls is that international borrowing by a 
government should tend to put less upward pressure on domestic interest 
rates.93 As noted earlier, the resulting shift in the country’s current account 
position should be offset by a parallel adjustment of the FX rate. However, 
IPFMs are not just concerned with parity in relative returns, they are also 
interested in the likelihood of default. As a result, IPFMs “tend to impose a risk 
premium on borrowing countries.”94 Governments perceived to have weak debt 
positions may end up facing IPFMs seeking to reduce their exposure to 
perceived risk, resulting in both rising domestic interest rates in concert with a 
falling FX rate.95 It is at least partially for this reason that during the period from 
1999 to 2008, the FLG placed the retirement of gross debt as a percentage of 
GDP as a major pillar of its overarching fiscal strategy. Indeed, the work of 
Faruqee implies that the long-run sustainability of New Zealand’s FX rate 
required a substantial reduction of foreign-held financial claims/assets. 96  In 
essence, then, the FLG can be interpreted as seeking to be perceived as 
“responsible economic managers.”97 After “having scared the markets in the 
year 2000 in their first year of office” (see Chapter Five), the FLG was 
endeavouring to be seen as making a credible move towards achieving a more 
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structurally sound current account position aimed at dampening the impact of 
FX volatility deriving from public debt.98 
However, it should also be noted that, for the same fundamental reasons, 
New Zealand’s integration into the DWSR also exerted considerable influence 
over the FLG’s approach to expenditure.99 In particular, due to the constraint 
posed by volatile IPFMs over the current account, the FLG would have 
experienced mounting difficultly if attempting to adopt and implement any 
substantive new social democratic policy measures.100 Centrally, this is because, 
as Brawley observes, “states implementing social democratic...policies tend to 
have higher interest rates, and therefore have to pay more to carry their public 
debt.”101 Furthermore, in a similar manner to monetary policy (as discussed 
above), the FLG also had to be mindful of the potential inflationary effects of its 
expenditure.102  
Thus, while it may be observed that government expenditure expanded 
under the FLG (see Table 5.4), it is important to recognise that New Zealand’s 
integration into the DWSR was simultaneously exerting downward pressure on 
the scope of this new expenditure.103 Perhaps most illuminating in this regard is 
the fact that, as documented in the previous chapter, despite overseeing the 
largest economic upswing in New Zealand since the end of the post-war ‘long 
boom’ (and, corresponding with this a veritable mushrooming of government 
revenues), FLG Finance Minister Michael Cullen constantly reiterated the need 
for a ‘cautious approach’ to fiscal policy in his annual budgets and fiscal 
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strategy reports. 104  The vast increase in government revenues undoubtedly 
freed the FLG’s scope for increased government spending, especially from 2005 
onwards. 105  However, it is apparent that despite this, an underlying 
commitment to fiscal conservatism remained and at least partly derived from 
consideration of potential market reactions. As Michael Reddell (then a RBNZ 
official on secondment to the Treasury) observes, reflection on “the reaction to 
2000” when the FLG’s proposed new policies brought about extremely negative 
reactions from both domestic business and IPFMs was one of “the factors of 
most importance to the Government’s approach to macro management.”106 
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6.3)  Explaining the Constraints: The Political Implications of Financial 
Market Liberalisation in New Zealand 
It is perhaps worth highlighting from the outset that, in terms of an 
explanatory account, the influence of the DWSR does not, of course, explain 
everything in relation to the FLG’s formulation of macroeconomic policy. Other 
factors, such as: the major economic upswing from 1999 to 2007; continued 
business opposition to any substantive retrenchment of the neoliberal policy 
regime; the specific composition of parties making up the FLG in its various 
forms; and the specific prevailing electoral and domestic political conditions, 
also played significant roles in shaping the FLG’s macroeconomic policy 
decisions.107 As the evidence assembled above reveals, however, during the 
period from 1999 to 2008, New Zealand’s ongoing exposure to the increasingly 
deep and mobile IPFMs of the DWSR nevertheless constituted an important 
(yet often neglected) external variable that had a significant disciplinary effect 
on the macroeconomic policy formulation of the FLG.108 This IPFM-derived 
discipline ultimately served to enforce an ongoing commitment to all of the core 
pillars of the existing neoliberal macroeconomic policy framework. 
Centrally, as Rude observes, New Zealand’s integration into the DWSR, 
via the maintenance of extensive financial market liberalisation, supported the 
existence of an economic environment in New Zealand where “recurrent 
financial crises set the pace and rhythm of economic activity.”109 Corresponding 
with the argument made in the previous section, 
financial crises occur because imbalances build up between the 
financial system and the underlying macroeconomy – imbalances 
between stocks of financial assets and liabilities, on the one hand, 
and flows of national income, on the other – and they occur when 
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these macroeconomic financial stock/income flow imbalances 
become unsustainable.110  
 
The tendency for such macroeconomic imbalances to develop has increased 
significantly under the DWSR. The various financial instruments that constitute 
the global financial system exist “as discounted future expected profit streams”, 
and the increasingly deep and mobile nature of IPFMs has increased the 
propensity for both over and underestimation of the future profits to be derived 
from these streams.111 The result of this is the repeated substantial misallocation 
of capital by IPFMs, the rectification of which usually involves a sudden radical 
evolution in a country’s financial stock/income flow balance which has the 
distinct potential to destabilise “the underlying macroeconomy.”112 
The FLG’s retention of all of the key features of the incumbent neoliberal 
macroeconomic policy regime – a monetarist approach to macroeconomic 
management, an independently floating FX regime, and a commitment to fiscal 
conservatism – was formulated, at least in part, in response to this endemic 
instability and potential for crisis.113 As Held et al argue, this is because the 
global financial conditions prevalent under the DWSR have fundamentally 
“altered the costs and benefits associated with different national 
macroeconomic policy options, at times so radically as to make some options 
prohibitively expensive.”114 In particular, because the government may have 
eventually faced “rising interest rates and a falling exchange rate as markets 
reduced their exposure to what they perceived as ‘high risk borrowers’”, 
integration into the DWSR has significantly raised the potential costs of 
adopting expansionary monetary and/or fiscal policy stances (including 
maintaining an overly large public debt position) in New Zealand. This means 
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that in the realm of social policy, for example, there was significant pressure on 
the FLG to curtail government expenditure in key areas such as health, 
education, and social welfare. Prime evidence of such pressures being exerted 
on the FLG can be found in the formulation of Budget 2004. Here the scope of 
the newly announced WFF package was officially restricted due to the probable 
interest rate increases that (marginally) higher levels of gross government 
borrowing would induce.115 As Finance Minister Michael Cullen observed in his 
2004 budget speech, because “the gross sovereign-issued debt to GDP ratio will 
decline more slowly", “there is very little room…for any further substantial 
fiscal loosening.”116 Any additional “loosening – whether by way of tax cuts or 
by way of expenditure increases – would place significant pressure on 
monetary policy with the likelihood of higher interest rates.” 117  Further 
evidence of such pressures being exerted on the FLG can be found in the 
formulation of Budget 2006. The 2006 Fiscal Strategy Report states that “spending 
more than currently projected or reducing taxes would lead to an increase in 
gross debt and put further pressure on monetary policy.”118 
Moreover, due to the valuable ‘dampening’ effects that may be gained 
from the reduction of risk premia attached to New Zealand dollar-denominated 
financial assets, contemporary financial conditions also expanded the expected 
macroeconomic benefits to be gained by the FLG from retaining the fiscal and 
monetary policy elements of the existing neoliberal macroeconomic policy 
regime.119 This meant that in the realm of monetary policy there was significant 
pressure to continue to closely adhere to the incumbent monetarist approach 
with its singular focus on achieving and maintaining a stable low level of 
domestic inflation. Additionally, in the realm of taxation policy, it meant that 
there was pressure on the FLG to look to reduce corporate tax rates. Reducing 
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corporate taxes serves to increase business profitability and, thus, strengthens 
the underlying macroeconomy. 
Thus, continued integration into the DWSR during the period from 1999 
to 2008, imposed significant external constraints on the FLG’s “regime of 
financial autonomy.”120 The state’s capacity to autonomously “determine and 
implement its own independently formulated macroeconomic strategy” was, in 
effect, severely curtailed. 121  Rather than reflecting the preferences of the 
democratic plurality to whom the state was nominally accountable, it is 
apparent that the “real underlying momentum” of the FLG’s macroeconomic 
policy formulation was consideration of the “discipline” imposed by the 
vagaries of inherently volatile IPFMs.   
Yet, as Panitch and Gindin observe, while the serious crises that served 
to discipline the FLG’s macroeconomic policy formulation are seemingly 
inherent to the global financial system under the DWSR, “the relative 
containment of these crises in terms of their depth, duration and tendency to 
spread has been remarkable.”122 The analysis of Panitch and Gindin suggests 
that, in New Zealand’s specific case, we should look at the state action of the 
FLG as having played the vanguard role in increasing the capacity of New 
Zealand’s national financial system to withstand recurrent shocks. In effect, 
while it was subject to ruthless discipline deriving from the operation of IPFMs, 
it is evident that the FLG simultaneously played a key role in “regulating, but 
not eliminating, the turmoil” that New Zealand’s financial system is subjected 
to under the hegemony of the DWSR. 
The basis of the FLG’s attempts to manage the systemic financial turmoil 
of the DWSR was “the institutional learning and development that has occurred 
over time” within the RBNZ and Treasury “in cooperation with international 
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institutions such as the BIS, the IMF and the World Bank.” 123  As Rude 
documents, following the 1997 Asian financial meltdown and 1998 Long Term 
Capital Management (LTCM) crisis, this body of learning would have been 
largely guided by the standards of what has come to be termed the “New 
International Financial Architecture” (NIFA).124 While the core features of the 
NIFA had been established by the early 1990s, the NIFA “took its final form in a 
New BIS Capital Accord” – popularly referred to as ‘Basel II’ - signed in 2004.125 
Essentially, following the guidance provided by the NIFA, the FLG ensured the 
“prudential supervision and regulation” of the national banking and financial 
system and, if necessary, the provision of addition support via a properly timed 
relaxation of monetary conditions.126 This served to maintain a “robust and 
resilient” national “banking and financial system” better “able…to survive and 
function in a financial crisis.”127 
During the period from 1999 to 2008, then, the DWSR disciplined the 
FLG, in-effect constraining the scope for the independent formulation of public 
macroeconomic policy and undermining the democratic aspects of New 
Zealand’s liberal democratic political system. It did this through a particularly 
potent form of “economic intimidation” that ultimately necessitated the 
retention of the core features of the existing neoliberal macroeconomic policy 
nexus.128 While it was being disciplined by the vagaries of IPFMs, however, the 
FLG simultaneously provided a rigorous regulatory and supervisory 
framework in support of the national banking and financial systems aimed at 
ameliorating a system-wide collapse.129 In view of this, what is the ultimate 
contribution of Gowan’s Dollar-Wall Street Regime analysis to a sophisticated 
neopluralist theoretical model of New Zealand’s liberal democratic state?  
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Of most importance in answering this question is the demonstration that 
a major shift in the structural relationship between the New Zealand state and 
globally-mobile international private financial capital has taken place.130 The 
economic interests of the state and IPFMs appear to have become much more 
closely intertwined under the DWSR. This has resulted in a discernable 
refinement of the structural constraint being exerted on the state.131 As argued 
in Chapter One, due to the fact that the contemporary liberal democratic state is 
fiscally reliant on the taxation of incomes generated by private capitalist 
enterprise, the state faces an implied pressure to formulate public policy in a 
manner that ensures the maintenance of conditions viable to the pursuit of 
profitable accumulation. To reiterate my previous argument, the state’s 
condition of fiscal dependence effectively forms a structural constraint on state 
neutrality by forcing policy-making officials to undertake an anticipatory 
consideration of the interests of business. Following integration into the DWSR, 
however, malign international flows have been shown to pose a constant threat 
to domestic economic viability regardless of whether or not business conditions 
are otherwise profitable. This is most pertinently demonstrated by the 
devastating experience undergone by Korea, Indonesia and Thailand at the 
hands of private hedge funds operating out of the advanced capitalist world’s 
major IPFMs during the 1997-1998 East Asian financial melt-down. Harvey has 
documented that otherwise profitable concerns were driven into bankruptcy 
after being deprived of sufficient credit following the massive speculative 
attacks carried out on their national currencies.132 As a consequence, there is 
now strong and constant economic and financial pressure for governments 
integrated into the DWSR to formulate their public macroeconomic policy 
frameworks in the interests of IPFMs, regardless of domestic economic 
conditions. States are now essentially “competing to provide macro- and micro- 
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economic, regulatory, and broader political frameworks” desired by IPFMs in 
order to induce the international financial flows necessary to ensure the 
integrity of their independently floating FX regime and underlying 
macroeconomy.133 
Within the field of critical international political economy, this 
perceptible alteration of the structural relationship between capital and the 
modern liberal democratic state has generated a significant amount of scholarly 
debate. In particular, it has been interpreted by many as heralding a “decline of 
the nation state.”134 But, as Wood convincingly demonstrates in her widely 
praised work Empire of Capital, the establishment of the DWSR has not “made 
the national state increasingly irrelevant.”135 Instead, the evidence suggests that 
the reality is to the contrary; it is apparent that the state continues to play an 
“indispensable” role in the operation of the global system under the hegemony 
of the DWSR.136 Centrally, during the period from 1999 to 2008, it was the state 
that provided the necessary “extra-economic help” required by the DWSR to 
sustain the “imposition” of IPFM-derived discipline on New Zealand in order 
to keep the country “vulnerable to economic manipulation” by IPFMs.137 The 
FLG worked to ensure a certain level of “stability and predictability” in the 
complex national financial system “by supplying an elaborate legal and 
institutional framework” based around the principles of the NIFA, that was 
ultimately “backed up by coercive force.”138 As Wood points out: “no other 
institution, no transnational agency, has even begun to replace the nation state” 
as such “an administrative and coercive guarantor” of the financial order, 
stability and predictability required by contemporary IPFMs in their day-to-day 
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operations.139 Instead, she continues, “in the final analysis” the reality is that “it 
is…the state that has created the conditions enabling IPFMs to survive” their 
own inherent volatility, “and to navigate the world” by providing and 
maintaining the ‘circuits’ of the global financial system.140 
The financial discipline imposed by IPFMs has certainly reduced the 
overall flexibility of the state in the sphere of its macroeconomic policy 
formulation. As argued in the previous section, for example, the FLG was 
required to retain all of the core features of the neoliberal macroeconomic policy 
nexus during the period from 1999 to 2008 in order to maintain macroeconomic 
stability. But, in contrast to the perspective of the so-called ‘hyperglobalisers’, 
the inherent volatility of the global financial system under the DWSR has 
simultaneously served to increase the necessity for the New Zealand state to 
play its traditional functions. Fundamentally, IPFMs still require the 
“regularity, predictability, and legal order” provided by the state to help reduce 
the likelihood of a system-wide collapse.141 
Furthermore, as Wood observes, it is important to note that the system is 
fundamentally hierarchical; the DWSR operates through a system of nation-
states “structured in a complex relation of domination and subordination.”142 In 
essence, what this means is that the degree to which a state’s operational 
autonomy is constrained under the DWSR is, to a significant extent, contingent 
on its position within the global political-economic hierarchy. 143  The most 
important general dichotomy is between the states of the advanced capitalist 
world and those of the developing economies, but the states of the advanced 
capitalist world are also ordered hierarchically. At the top, of course, is the US, 
along with Japan and the Euro area, while the smaller advanced capitalist 
economies “outside of the [euro zone], such as New Zealand, Iceland, Norway, 
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Australia and Canada” are relegated to lower positions in the advanced 
capitalist hierarchy.144 As Bjorksten and Brook outline, this is primarily because 
the “unsubstantiated” FX swings intrinsic to the global financial system are 
substantially more disruptive to relatively small open economies with a reliance 
on foreign trade and high levels of foreign debt. 145  “Corresponding 
fluctuations” are documented as having a substantially reduced impact on the 
larger advanced capitalist economies.146 
Thus, in contrast to the perspective of so-called ‘hyperglobalisers’, the 
power and operational autonomy of the New Zealand state is not simply 
“fading away” as a result of financial market liberalisation.147 Indeed, as Held et 
al argue, such metaphors as “the loss, diminution or erosion of state power” can 
wholly misrepresent the true underlying nature of the transformation of the 
conditions of state power. 148  Instead, the distinctive transformation of the 
conditions of state power in New Zealand should be conceived of as 
constituting a reproduction and refinement of conditions of international 
economic domination within the domestic political economy.149  The central 
political implication of this has been a growing trend towards an 
‘internationalisation’ of the state. Following the analysis of Panitch and Gindin, 
during the period from 1999 to 2008, “the nature of [New Zealand’s] integration 
into the global economy tended to tie the successful reproduction of [it’s] own 
social formations [i.e. the profitability of domestically-operating business] to the 
rules and structures of the American-led global order.”150 As a consequence of 
this (above discussed) disciplinary action, the FLG essentially “took 
responsibility for creating the necessary internal conditions for sustained 
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international accumulation [in New Zealand], such as stable prices…and no 
restrictions on capital outflows.”151 Thus, paralleling Poulantzas’ observations 
made in the early 1970s, the tendency that appears to have emerged in relation 
to the operation of state power in New Zealand post-DWSR integration, is an 
‘internalised transformation’ “of the national state itself, aimed at taking charge 
of the internationalisation of public functions on [international financial] 
capital’s behalf.”152  
In other words, what is evident is that the state has actually effectively 
added to its responsibilities; it is no longer simply concerned with maintaining 
profitable business conditions for domestic capital, DWSR integration has also 
effectively made it responsible for maintaining an overarching macroeconomic 
framework (including the national financial regulatory and supervisory 
architecture) sufficient for profitable accumulation to be undertaken by highly 
mobile foreign financial capital. 153  This is not to say, of course, that this 
transformation was/is in any way inevitable or permanent. As Panitch points 
out, such a perspective would establish “a false counterposition between 
globalising capital and the power of states” by inferring a degree of economic 
determinism that cannot be empirically substantiated. 154  There is, after all, 
“nothing in the economic logic of accumulation” that “requires that ideological 
and political struggles must subsume other institutional orders and their logics 
under the principle of capital accumulation.”155 Instead, as Cox emphasises, it is 
to say that this major transformation of the conditions of state power is still a 
fundamentally historically contingent phenomena; we must always remember 
that “in order to comprehend the real historical world it is necessary to consider 
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distinctive forms of state… [and] the characteristics of their historical blocs, i.e., 
the configuration of social forces upon which state power ultimately rests.”156 
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Conclusion 
During the period from 1999 to 2008, the main constraints on the FLG’s 
macroeconomic policy formulation derived from the same powerful set of 
constraints that drove New Zealand’s initial neoliberalisation. Both of the 
Government’s key institutional advisors, the Treasury and the RBNZ, as well as 
all of the country’s major business interests continued to propagate the 
retention of all of the key features of the incumbent neoliberal macroeconomic 
policy nexus. Electoral and economic conditions appear to have enabled the 
exertion of significant countervailing influences over the FLG’s broader 
program of public policy formulation, however New Zealand’s integration into 
the DWSR created an economic environment that ultimately necessitated the 
retention of all of the features of neoliberal macroeconomic policy agenda. 
Underpinning this was the existence of what is known within the 
international economic orthodoxy as the ‘impossible trinity’. The impossible 
trinity necessitated that the FLG remain fundamentally committed to the 
existing independently floating FX regime. This was because its market-based 
adjustment serves to cushion the domestic economy from the impact of shocks 
on the nation’s current account. But a further crucial factor constraining the 
macroeconomic policy formulation of the FLG was the persistence of 
significant, unsubstantiated amplitude in IPFMs. The inherent volatility of 
contemporary IPFMs posed a serious, persistent threat to domestic 
macroeconomic stability. This effectively served to discipline the FLG in the 
sphere of its macroeconomic policy formulation. The FLG faced significant 
implied pressure from IPFMs to retain each of the other core features of the 
existing neoliberal macroeconomic policy framework – a monetarist approach 
to macroeconomic management and a conservative or ‘prudent’ approach to 
fiscal policy - so as to mitigate the potential impact of destabilising international 
financial flows. 
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Consequently, it appears that New Zealand’s continued integration into 
the DWSR during the period from 1999 to 2008 fundamentally acted to constrict 
the FLG’s scope for autonomous action in the realm of public finance. Centrally, 
this suggests that the major political implication of financial market 
liberalisation in New Zealand has been a major shift in the underlying 
structural relationship between the New Zealand state and globally-mobile 
international financial capital. The structural constraints exerted on the state by 
capital have been refined. There is now a strong and constant implied pressure 
on the DWSR-integrated state to adopt and implement all of the core features of 
the neoliberal macroeconomic policy regime in order to ensure the maintenance 
of national economic viability. 
However, as numerous authors have observed, “the distinctive 
attributes” of the underlying structural shift that DWSR integration has entailed 
“by no means simply prefigure the demise of the nation-state or even the 
erosion of state power.”157 Rather, the state remains critical to the maintenance 
of the DWSR by providing the necessary ‘extra-economic’ power required by 
IPFMs, and, furthermore, the vulnerability of the state to IPFM-derived 
discipline is largely contingent on its position within the global political-
economic hierarchy. Thus, the apparent shift in the structural relationship 
between state and capital only constitutes a refinement of the current conditions 
of economic domination in New Zealand. While the state’s operational 
autonomy can be severely curtailed by IPFM-derived discipline, this outcome is 
still historically contingent; the state remains the ultimate site of political power 
within New Zealand. 
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The Global Financial Crisis and the Fifth National 
Government, 2008 to 2011 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the constraints on the macroeconomic 
policy formulation of the Fifth Labour Government (FLG) during the period 
from 1999 to 2008. It emphasised that, despite the existence of significant 
countervailing influences that endowed the government with a significant 
degree of flexibility in relation to the formulation of its broader public policy 
agenda, New Zealand’s integration into the Dollar-Wall Street Regime (DWSR) 
nevertheless imposed significant constraints on the FLG’s capacity to 
autonomously formulate and implement macroeconomic policy. Continued 
integration into the largely privately-operated and US-dominated global 
financial system ultimately required the FLG to retain and entrench all of the 
key features of the neoliberal macroeconomic policy nexus. 
This chapter will seek to exemplify and corroborate the overall 
importance and explanatory power of this DWSR-based analysis for our 
understanding of the operation of the New Zealand state during the neoliberal-
era. The account will focus on the significant degree of influence that 
international private financial markets (IPFMs) were able to exert over the 
formulation of the Fifth National Government’s (FNG) macroeconomic policy 
response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) during the period from 2008 to 
2011. The discussion will begin with a detailed descriptive overview of the 
onset and subsequent evolution of the GFC during the period from mid-2006 to 
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late 2008. A brief account of the political circumstances that prevailed in New 
Zealand during the period from 2008 to 2011 will follow. The discussion will 
then move on to provide a more detailed account of the main features of the 
macroeconomic policy strategy pursued by the FNG during its first term in 
power. In the final section, the influential role played by IPFMs in determining 
the overall shape and scope of the FNG’s macroeconomic policy response to the 
GFC will be examined. Centrally, it will posited that due to the threat of a 
severe negative reaction from IPFMs, the FNG’s capacity to autonomously 
articulate a macroeconomic policy strategy was significantly constrained during 




















The Global Financial Crisis and the Fifth National Government 337 
 
7.1)   The Global Financial Crisis 
In 2007, the world entered into what has come to be known as the global 
financial crisis. IPFM liquidity collapsed precipitously as vast swathes of 
participants endeavored to exit asset markets as swiftly as possible. The 
immediate trigger of the crisis was a mounting wave of defaults in the now 
infamous US ‘subprime’ mortgage market beginning in late 2006 and early 
2007.1 Initially confined to a few states in the mid-west (Michigan and Ohio 
especially), the wave of defaults quickly spread to states in the south and west. 
Florida, California, Arizona, and Nevada were particularly hard hit.2 
Ultimately, the rapid spread of subprime mortgage defaults instigated 
the collapse or near collapse of a number of major US mortgage brokers in 
February and March 2007. 3  Included amongst the ranks of these stressed 
institutions were the highly publicised New Century Financial, as well as other 
less well known, but nevertheless important lenders such as Ameriquest 
Mortgage, Fremont General, Ownit, ResMAE, and the General Motors 
subsidiary Residential Capital (which required a $1 billion bailout from its 
parent).4 As Blackburn observes, however, “the true scope of the problem only 
began to register in the late [northern] summer.”5 At this point, around July 
2007, a significant number of leading financial institutions in both the US and 
Europe began to be seriously hit by faltering values for ‘residential mortgage-
backed securities’ (MBSs).6  
The first major bank to report a problem was Wall Street investment 
bank Bear Stearns, the most active underwriter of MBSs.7 In July, two large 
hedge funds sponsored by Bear – the ‘High Grade Structured Credit Enhanced 
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Leverage Fund’ and the ‘High-Grade Structured Credit Fund’ - got into serious 
trouble when they attempted to liquidate their substantial holdings of MBSs.8 
But Bear Stearns was soon followed by many other US banks including 
powerhouses Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, and Merrill Lynch.9 Merrill 
Lynch had made the unfortunate mistake of becoming a ‘prime broker’ lending 
significant amounts to Bear Stearns for the purposes of establishing those same 
troubled subprime-laden hedge funds.10 In early August, it was the turn of 
European banks, in particular German bank IKB Deutsche Industriebank. IKB 
had become heavily involved in the US MBS market in previous years as a 
means of bolstering otherwise lacklustre profits. IKB ultimately required public 
rescue due to what the markets essentially deemed to be extremely “reckless 
exposure” to the subprime market.11 The attrition continued throughout August 
with attention variously turning to several Canadian banks and hedge funds, 
Citigroup in the US, several German ‘landesbanks’ (including, most 
prominently, WestLB and SachsenLB), major British banking groups Lloyds 
and HBOS, and French bank BMP Paribas.12 
The significant and, indeed, mounting losses being suffered by major 
banks due to their exposure to the collapsing market for MBSs fomented the 
emergence of a ‘credit crunch’ in the critically important interbank lending 
market in August 2007.13 Centrally, as Gamble outlines, this interbank ‘credit 
crunch’ was constituted by a “growing divergence” between the interest rates at 
which the central banks governing the world’s leading financial centres - the 
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European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the US Federal Reserve - 
were “prepared to lend to the banks and the interest rate[s] at which banks 
were prepared to lend to one another.”14 As The Economist reported, “on any 
normal business day the spreads would be only a few hundredths of a 
percentage point.”15 But  
 
on August 9th and 10th the rates commercial banks charge each 
other for overnight borrowing spiked on both sides of the Atlantic. 
In America the rate hit almost 6%, well above the Fed’s target of 
5.25%. In the Euro Area, money market rates peaked briefly at 4.7% 
sharply above the benchmark of 4%.16 
 
In essence, despite generally being considered to be one of the most secure and 
highly liquid aspects of the global financial system, the interbank lending 
market had suddenly become dominated by a breakdown in mutual trust. 
Banks began to charge increasingly punitive rates when lending to one another, 
whilst simultaneously hoarding cash and other highly liquid assets in order to 
ensure the stability of their own balance sheets.17 
Two factors played a key role in feeding the emergence of this credit 
crunch. The first of these was the practice of ‘securitisation’ that had developed 
around the subprime mortgage market. In the decade leading up to the crisis, 
many leading banks and hedge funds had actively engaged in the bundling 
together of thousands of subprime and only marginally better ‘Alt-A’ loans into 
MBSs. These asset-backed securities were then divided up and grouped 
together with other loans, mortgages and credit derivatives to be formed into 
further financial instruments known as ‘collateralised debt obligations’ or 
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CDOs. From here, the cash flows from the resulting collective pool of debt were 
subdivided into ten segments known as ‘tranches’. Each tranche, now 
representing a claim on a portion of the income accruing to the CDO, was rated 
according to its credit worthiness. This would begin with the bottom tranche, 
known as the ‘equity’, which represented the portions of the CDO most 
vulnerable to default (and thus the lowest credit rating), and would proceed on 
through to the more senior levels which, in theory, became progressively less 
vulnerable to default (and thus often attracted an ‘investment grade’ triple A 
credit rating).18 Finally, “the different tranches’ vulnerability to default was 
hedged by taking out insurance” and the product was sold off.19 
This complicated, but ultimately extremely innovative process of 
securitising subprime mortgages into CDOs was believed to have eliminated 
serious risk from the system.20 In theory, by bundling risky loans into CDOs 
and then selling them off, any losses sustained as a result of default would be 
dispersed thinly across the entire system thus avoiding the possibility of any 
single lender facing overwhelming losses and subsequent collapse.21 The reality 
was, however, that the process left entire CDOs tainted. As Blackburn observes, 
a key “feature of the securitising and tranching process is that the holders of a 
tranche would not know which specific mortgages they held.”22 Consequently, 
when the rate of mortgage delinquencies increased dramatically (as occurred in 
late 2006) such assets could no longer be reliably valued; the market for 
subprime MBSs rapidly became illiquid because, essentially, no one could be 
sure where liability for potentially up to US$1.1 trillion of shaky subprime 
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lending lay.23 Former US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill aptly described the 
problem as follows: “If you had ten bottles of water and one bottle had poison 
in it, and you didn’t know which one, you probably wouldn’t drink any one.”24 
As events transpired, it was many of the major Wall Street and 
international European banks that were in possession of significant portions of 
the contaminated subprime securities when the bottom fell out of the market in 
July-August 2007. Many had bought up senior, ‘investment grade’ structured 
financial instruments in anticipation of new international bank capital 
regulations coming into effect as part of the new ‘Basel II’ agreement.25 Because 
of this, banks grew increasingly reticent about lending to one another. With the 
contamination of subprime-linked assets so widespread, few institutions 
wished to expose themselves to the ‘impaired’ asset base of another.26 
The second factor that played a key role in feeding the development of 
the credit crunch was that a significant number of major US and European 
financial institutions had become heavily involved in a ‘shadow’ banking 
system that had developed during the decade prior to the onset of the crisis.27 
This secondary, ‘hidden’, banking system was made up of an abundance of 
obscure ‘structured investment vehicles’ (SIVs), ‘conduits’, and “bank 
sponsored hedge funds” owned and controlled by the major banks.28 Often 
based offshore for ‘tax planning’ purposes, these so-called ‘shadow’ investment 
vehicles were generally used to issue high quality (and thus lower yielding) 
commercial bonds which would in turn be used to fund the purchase of what 
turned out to be low quality but high-yielding assets, such as tranches of the 
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afore mentioned subprime MBS-based CDOs. 29  The shadow investment 
vehicles would then generate significant profits for their parent institution by 
exploiting the differential between the rate at which they borrowed funds and 
the rate of return on the assets they purchased with said funds (a common 
investment practice known as ‘arbitrage’). Profits would often be multiplied 
many times over by becoming highly ‘leveraged’ through further debt issues.30 
The banks’ involvement in this so-called shadow banking system played 
a key role in feeding the development of the credit crisis because it effectively 
acted to “hide much of their exposure” to the cancerous subprime mortgage 
market.31 In July-August 2007, US and European banks’ SIVs, conduits and 
hedge funds “held scores of billions of dollars” worth of now toxic MBSs and 
CDOs. But, as Blackburn observes, the major banks’ various shadow investment 
vehicles were, as a rule, generally retained “off balance sheet, so that the bank’s 
stake in them was an asset, while the liabilities stowed away did not show 
up.”32 As a result, when the markets for MBSs and CDOs collapsed, banks 
quickly became cagey about lending to one another. It was apparent that many 
banks (but no one knew exactly which ones) were likely to be hiding significant 
problems created by major off-balance sheet lending sprees and so prudence 
dictated subscription to risk aversion lest “poisonous securities turned out to 
constitute a major portion of their [counter-party’s] asset base.”33 
In response to the onset of the severe interbank credit crunch, the world’s 
central banks began to inject large amounts of official liquidity into the system 
in order to try and restore liquidity to the interbank lending market.34 The first 
to take action was the European Central Bank. On 9 August the European 
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Central Bank provided some US$131 billion of funds on easy terms to the 
banking sector. This would form the first of four progressively smaller 
interventions carried out by the European Central Bank on successive days.35 
Other central banks quickly followed suit; the US Federal Reserve injected 
significant amounts of cash into the money market on 9, 10, and 15 August, and 
the respective central banks of a significant number of other countries, 
including Canada, Japan, England and Australia, undertook similar 
operations.36 Led by the US, additional official liquidity operations continued 
sporadically throughout late 2007 and on into 2008.37 
The repeated provision of fresh reserves by central banks had some 
limited success in pushing interbank lending rates back down.38 However, the 
impact was only temporary.39 During the period from July 2007 to March 2008, 
“the Wall Street investment banks and brokerages hemorrhaged $175 billion of 
capital.”40 In addition, in September the persistently high cost of liquidity led to 
a run on major British mortgage lender Northern Rock.41 As a consequence, the 
combined liquidity measures of the world’s central bankers were, quite simply, 
insufficient; the interbank lending market remained tightly gripped by fears of 
the potential exposure of other banks to significant liabilities arising from the 
collapse in the market for MBSs.42 
On 16 March 2008, the seemingly irrepressible credit crunch claimed its 
first major victim on Wall Street. In a Federal Reserve sponsored deal, the fifth 
largest Wall Street investment bank, Bear Stearns, was bought out in a ‘fire sale’ 
by rival JP Morgan Chase for $2 a share (a year before Bear shares had topped 
                                                          
35




 Blackburn, 65; Gamble 2009, 26-29. 
38
 The Economist 2008, “Stepping Beyond Subprime”, 12 January, 65. 
39
 Blackburn, 64. 
40
 Ibid, 63. 
41
 N. Hume and P. Larsen 2007, “Bank of England to bail out Northern Rock”, Financial Times, 14 
September. 
42
 Ibid; Lapavistas, 17. See also M. Phillips and Y. Hayashi 2008, “Markets at Risk of Additional Shocks”, 
Wall Street Journal, 11 February. 
The Global Financial Crisis and the Fifth National Government 344 
 
$170 each).43 During the week prior to its forced sale, from 13 March onwards, 
Bear Stearns’ clients had withdrawn some $17 billion from the company.44 Bear 
could not readily withstand the pressure this run placed on its balance sheet; 
more so than any of the other major Wall Street investment banks, Bear was 
heavily reliant on short term borrowing and the so-called ‘repo’ market for its 
funding.45 With a gaping hole apparent in its balance sheet, Bear could not 
readily ‘roll-over’ this crucial source of financing. 46  Thus, as The Economist 
details, with Bear effectively facing bankruptcy, “the Fed moved in with 
emergency funding, using JP Morgan Chase, Bear’s clearing bank, as a conduit. 
But it was clear that no one would want to do business with a bank reliant on 
28-day loans from the central bank.”47 Consequently, JP Morgan Chase moved 
in, picking up its long-time Wall Street rival for just $236 million, and with 
some $29 billion of backing finance for Bear’s weakest assets from the Federal 
Reserve.48 
As would be expected, the near collapse of Bear Stearns drove global 
financial markets into turmoil. Centrally, as Marco Annunziata, chief economist 
at UniCredit (a major Italy-based financial institution) observes, because Bear 
was “rescued by selling it at such a large discount”, the financial markets 
assumed “its balance sheet was seriously and fundamentally impaired.” 49 
Concerns consequently arose “that other institutions might be in a similar 
predicament.”50 Subsequently, led by banking and other financial sector stocks, 
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global equity markets sank. The US dollar plunged to record and near record 
lows against other ‘safe haven’ currencies (the euro, yen, and Swiss franc). Gold 
and US Government bond prices soared, and credit spreads (a measure of the 
market’s appetite for risk) “widened to record levels on both sides of the 
Atlantic.”51 Interbank lending, meanwhile, “virtually ground to a halt.”52 
In order to restore confidence in the system, the world’s major central 
banks responded by launching a fresh wave of liquidity provision initiatives. In 
quick succession, the US Federal Reserve announced a pair of additional $50 
billion auctions of one-month loans to banks through its ‘Term Auction Facility’ 
(TAF), the European Central Bank announced €50 billion worth of additional 
six-month loans (also to be distributed via two separate auctions) and renewed 
€100 billion of existing three-month loans, and the Bank of England began to 
offer a new three-month loan service.53 These initial measures in March were 
followed on 21 April by the Bank of England introducing a ‘Special Liquidity 
Scheme’. As Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England, stated, this scheme 
was fundamentally intended to “take the liquidity issue off the table in a 
decisive way” by allowing UK banks to swap MBSs for highly liquid Treasury 
bills for up to three years.54 Shortly thereafter, the US Federal Reserve again 
moved aggressively against the seemingly intractable interbank lending market. 
It increased the size of its TAF by an additional $50 billion, bringing it to a total 
of $150 billion.55 
Following these various moves made by central banks, market sentiment 
improved. As The Economist observed at the time, “just six weeks later, 
everything seems a lot calmer. Stockmarkets have stabilised and corporate 
credit spreads (the excess interest rates paid by risky borrowers) have come 
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down sharply. Gold is cheaper. Bankers talk about having put the worst behind 
them.” 56  It was widely acknowledged amongst market participants and 
observers that a significant amount of ‘deleveraging’ would need to take place 
and that downside risks remained. But it was also considered that the credit 
losses from the turmoil were likely to be significantly overstated. Consequently, 
the widely held view was that “the most likely path ahead” was that the severe 
financial instability would decrease gradually, as “confidence and risk appetite” 
returned to the market.57 
Improving market sentiment enabled many banks and other financial 
institutions to seek to rebuild their balance sheets. Through various new share 
and debt issues the Royal Bank of Scotland (£12 billion), HBOS (£4 billion), 
Barclays (£4.5 billion), UBS ($15.5 billion), Wachovia ($7 billion), Citigroup ($9 
billion), and Lehman Brothers ($4 billion) were amongst dozens of banks both 
in the US and Europe to raise significant new capital during the period from 
April to early July.58 However, despite improving sentiment and such efforts at 
recapitalisation, a number of significant problems remained. Firstly, the malaise 
afflicting the US housing market that was the genesis of the financial crisis, was 
only getting worse. Defaults were continuing to mount and more were 
inevitable; declining house prices were placing more and more households in a 
negative equity position.59 Secondly, significant credit losses were beginning to 
emerge “in areas other than housing.”60 A weakening US labour market was 
fuelling major increases in consumer credit defaults, and corporate loan 
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defaults were also beginning to mount.61 Finally, in the global money markets, 
banks were still being faced with having to pay “high margins over official rates 
to borrow short-term money”, with the LIBOR remaining well above average 
historical levels. 62  As Peter Oppenheimer, a Goldman Sachs investment 
strategist, summed up the overall situation at the time, “the Fed may have 
underwritten the solvency of the banks but the economic problems haven’t 
gone away.”63 
Consequently, “although most serious analysts thought the worst was 
over in the [northern] spring”, the crisis proceeded to deepen.64 In early July, a 
leading US mortgage lender, Pasadena-based IndyMac Bank, collapsed in what 
was then the third largest bank failure in US history. IndyMac’s seizure by 
federal regulators followed an 11 day ‘run’ on the bank, during which $1.3 
billion was withdrawn by depositors. 65  The collapse of IndyMac was 
immediately followed the next day by official intervention to prevent the 
collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the veritable cornerstones of the US 
housing market.66  
The rapid demise of IndyMac, coupled with the apparent distress of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac clearly indicated that serious problems continued 
to afflict the US financial system. It was not until September, however, that this 
latest phase of the financial crisis culminated. First, on 7 September, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac were nationalised. The massive debts these two institutions 
had accumulated were seen by the US authorities to pose an unacceptable 
threat to systemic stability. 67  Then, on 15 September 2008, Wall Street 
investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed. Lehman had posted a crippling 
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third-quarter loss of $3.9 billion on 10 September and, despite some 
considerable government-facilitated efforts, had failed to find a buyer willing to 
take over its assets.68  
As Gamble observes, “the failure of Lehman Brothers seemed to open the 
floodgates.”69 Over the following days and weeks in the US, Lehman’s fellow 
Wall Street investment bank Merrill Lynch was bought by Bank of America for 
$50 billion; the US’s largest insurance company AIG was nationalised in a $85 
billion rescue operation; Washington Mutual was seized by federal regulators 
and underwent a fire sale to JP Morgan Chase in order “to prevent the largest 
bank failure in US history”; and the fourth-largest bank in the US, Wachovia, 
was taken over by Citigroup.70 Similar events occurred on the other side of the 
Atlantic. In the UK, Bradford and Bingley, a buy-to-let mortgage specialist, was 
nationalised and some of its assets sold to Spanish bank Santander, and “HBOS, 
the country’s largest mortgage lender”, was bought out by Lloyds. In Germany, 
the second-largest mortgage lender, Hypo Real Estate required a €35 billion 
loan from German banks and the German government to prevent its collapse. 
Elsewhere in Europe, Fortis bank was partially nationalised by the Dutch, 
Belgian and Luxembourg governments, Belgian-French bank Dexia obtained a 
€6.4 billion capital injection from government, and Iceland’s third-largest bank, 
Glitnir, was fully nationalised.71 
Facing what appeared to be the threat of systemic financial collapse, the 
world’s governments were forced to intervene. After an initial plan was rejected 
on 29 September, the US took the lead in this with a $700 billion bailout package 
passed by Congress on 3 October. On 8 October the UK followed suit, 
announcing a £50 billion bailout plan as well as up to £200 billion in new short-
term loans to banks. Similar measures were undertaken in Sweden, the 
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Netherlands, France, Germany and Russia.72 Other European governments also 
undertook assorted actions in support for their banking systems. In Ireland, for 
example, the government announced a guarantee covering all deposits in the 
country’s six largest banks, potentially exposing itself to up to €400 billion of 
liabilities. 73  The Icelandic government meanwhile, nationalised their second 
largest bank, Landsbanki. 74  Coinciding with all these various government 
interventions, central banks liberally slashed official interest rates.75 
In support of these initial measures, several governments purchased 
large equity stakes in major banks in order to be able to inject new capital 
directly into key financial institutions. 76  The UK government was in the 
vanguard of this action. Following a meeting of the G7 finance ministers in 
Washington on 11 October, it announced that it would provide £20 billion of 
new capital to the Royal Bank of Scotland in exchange for a massive 60% stake 
and a further £17 billion of new capital to newly merging HBOS and Lloyds in 
exchange for a 40% shareholding. Other governments quickly followed suit. 
The US announced that it would provide $250 billion for bank recapitalisation 
in exchange for “non-voting preference shares.” Included in the queue for this 
government-sponsored recapitalisation were Wall Street survivors (but now 
legally commercial rather than investment banks) Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley, as well as behemoths Bank of America, Citibank, and JP Morgan Chase. 
Respectively, the French government announced the provision of €40 billion of 
funds for bank recapitalisation, and the Swiss government took a 9% equity 
stake in UBS in exchange for a $60 billion fund to write off toxic assets.77 
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Despite all of these measures, the crisis continued to widen and deepen. 
In the global money markets interbank lending effectively ceased.78 Short-term 
lending – for periods of three-, six-, or twelve-months – disappeared, and 
overnight borrowing costs skyrocketed. As the Economist reported, 
 
banks used to borrow from each other at about 0.08 percentage 
points above official rates; on September 30th they paid more than 
four percentage points more. In one auction to get dollar funds 
overnight from the European Central Bank, banks were prepared 
to pay interest of 11%, five times the pre-crisis rate.79 
 
Moreover, as McNally observes, the geographic scope of the financial crisis was 
“no longer largely about the US.” Instead, it had “gone global.”80 A wave of 
systemic financial instability was spreading throughout the advanced capitalist 
and ‘emerging market’ economies, igniting a string “of devastating national 
and regional crises” as it went.81 
By November, the prospect of a deep generalised global economic 
downturn had emerged. The Eurozone economies were already mired in 
recession. As The Economist reports, “output in the Euro area fell at an 
annualised rate of 0.8% in the second quarter. GDP shrank in the currency 
zone’s three largest countries – Germany, France, and Italy. The fourth largest, 
Spain, barely grew.” 82  The Japanese economy was faring even worse. “Its 
economy shrank at an annualised rate of 3% in the second quarter as exports 
fell, investment slowed and high food and fuel prices dented consumer 
confidence.”83 The other economies of the advanced capitalist ‘triad’, the US and 
the UK, were on the very brink, if they had not already slipped into recession. 
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As Harvey observes, by this stage “all segments of the US economy were in 
deep trouble” and “the British economy was in equally serious difficulty.”84 
Consumer spending, construction, and manufacturing output were all in steep 
decline. Added to this, unemployment was increasing rapidly, with hundreds 
of thousands of jobs disappearing from the US economy alone. 85  China’s 
economy, for so long the apparent driver of global economic growth, was also 
slowing. “In the third quarter” of 2008, “GDP growth had slipped to 9%, the 
slowest quarterly pace since 2003.”86 
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7.2) The Fifth National Government: A Political Overview  
It was into this extremely unstable international financial and economic 
environment that the centre-right FNG came into power in New Zealand. On 
Saturday 8 November, 2008, the New Zealand National Party was elected to 
office, decisively defeating the incumbent Labour-led Government that had 
held power for almost a decade. National secured 44.9% of the party vote and 
58 parliamentary seats to Labour’s 34% and 43 seats, having attracted the votes 
of significant numbers of previously Labour supporters, as well as large 
numbers of votes from previous supporters of the conservative centrist New 
Zealand First and United Future parties.87 Combined with the 5 MPs secured by 
the hardline neoliberal ACT Party, the sole surviving United Future MP, and 
the 5 MPs gained by the Maori Party (with all of whom National now formed a 
multi-party coalition), this electoral result enabled National to call on support 
from 68 MPs out of a total house of 122, a decisive majority.88 
National won the 2008 election campaigning on a platform of change and 
renewal in government. At the party’s election campaign launch, party leader 
John Key stated that: 
You are all rightly sick of political sideshows, bossy government, 
and yesterday's fights… You are looking for a Government 
with…fresh ideas and the energy to meet the challenges this 
country faces.  At this election National is offering exactly that.89 
 
National clearly signaled, however, that a change in government would not 
necessarily entail radical changes in public policy. If elected, National promised 
to pursue only a moderate centre-right agenda that would notably entail the 
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retention of many of Labour’s most popular policies, including Working For 
Families (WFF), interest-free student loans, and free early childhood education.90 
A National Party victory at the 2008 general election was widely 
anticipated within both the electorate and commentariat.91 Indeed, as noted by 
Levine and Roberts, “even those intending to vote for parties other than 
National fully expected a change of government, with Labour going into 
opposition against a government led by National.” 92  Widespread electoral 
fatigue appears to have been an important factor in National securing power. 
After nine years in office, Labour’s politicians were increasingly seen as 
arrogant and its policies as ‘out of touch’.93 Ultimately, however, it appears that 
the leadership of John Key was the deciding factor.94 Unlike his predecessor, 
Don Brash, “the apparently amiable (and ideologically flexible) John Key” 
appeared to offer voters a safe and viable alternative to Helen Clark as the 
nation’s leader.95 
As expected, global economic conditions continued to deteriorate 
following the election of the FNG. After having already slowed considerably in 
2008, the world economy underwent a sharp contraction in 2009. Total world 
economic output for the year declined by 0.7%.96 The specific performance of 
the major advanced capitalist economies was far worse. The US, the Euro area 
and Japan recorded official growth rates of -3.5% -4.3% and -6.3% respectively.97 
Global economic growth subsequently rebounded in 2010, but nevertheless 
remained relatively weak throughout the remainder of the FNG’s first term in 
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power. Overall global economic performance during the period spanning from 
the onset of the GFC to the end of 2011 is illustrated below in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1) World Economic Growth, 2005 to 2011 (%GDP) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
World Output 4.8 5.1 5.2 2.8 -0.7 5.1 3.9 
US 3.1 2.8 2.1 0.0 -3.5 2.4 1.8 
Euro area 1.5 2.8 2.7 0.5 -4.3 2.0 1.5 
Japan 1.9 2.4 2.3 -1.2 -6.3 4.5 -0.6 
China 10.4 11.6 13.0 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.3 
Australia98 2.9 2.9 4.5 3.4 1.2 2.1 1.7 
Sources: IMF 2007, World Economic Outlook (Washington: IMF), 8; Ibid 2008, World Economic 
Outlook (Washington: IMF), 5; Ibid 2009, World Economic Outlook (Washington: IMF), 2; Ibid 
2010, World Economic Outlook (Washington: IMF), 2; Ibid 2011, World Economic Outlook 
(Washington: IMF), 2; Ibid 2012, World Economic Outlook (Washington: IMF), 2; Ibid 2013, 
World Economic Outlook (Washington: IMF), 2; Reserve Bank of Australia 2014, H1 Gross 
Domestic Product and Income Data Series (Sydney: Reserve Bank of Australia), 
http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/index.html (accessed 28 October, 2014). 
 
Despite being sheltered somewhat by the relative resilience of its largest 
trading partners (Australia and China, see Table 7.1), New Zealand was not 
immune to these international economic developments. The real economic 
growth rate slumped in 2008, falling from 3.4% in 2007 to just 1.3%.99 In 2009 the 
New Zealand economy entered into a short, sharp recession. The economy 
contracted by 2.9% in real terms that year. 100  Although the economy 
subsequently recovered, it nevertheless remained fragile through until the end 
of the Fifth National Government’s first term; the real rate of economic growth 
was only 1.2% in 2011.101 The manifestation of the global recession in New 
Zealand is set out statistically in Figure 7.1 below. 
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Figure 7.1) Real Economic Growth in New Zealand, 2005 to 2011102 
Source: RBNZ 2014, M5 Gross Domestic Product Data Series. 
On 22 February, 2011, New Zealand’s second largest city, Christchurch, 
was struck by a powerful earthquake. Measuring 6.3 on the Richter scale, the 
earthquake caused significant damage throughout the city and killed a total of 
185 people.103 The official estimate of the cost of rebuilding Christchurch was 
$40 billion.104 As Prime Minister John Key observed in 2013, this made it “the 
largest and most complex, single economic project in New Zealand’s history.”105 
Through the EQC, a substantial portion of the rebuild costs were covered by 
insurance. However, the earthquake nevertheless entailed sizeable fiscal costs 
for central government. In particular, “the Government bore the cost of 
repairing damage to capital assets it owned, and some of the cost to local 
government too.”106 In 2014, “the Government's contribution to the rebuild [was] 
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expected to be $15.4 billion, of which $7.3 billion [would] be incurred by the 
Earthquake Commission, net of reinsurance proceeds.”107 
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The FNG’s initial macroeconomic policy response to the onset of the 
global financial crisis and subsequent recession was centred around the 
implementation of a modest ‘discretionary’ fiscal stimulus package. 108  This 
fiscal expansion broadly mirrored the actions of most other advanced capitalist 
economies, and was fundamentally designed to “create much needed jobs and 
economic stimulus” and to “equip New Zealanders with some much needed 
extra cash in tough economic times.”109 The cornerstone of the FNG’s initial 
fiscal stimulus package was “a three-year programme of personal tax cuts” in 
concert with a “step-up” in public infrastructure investment.110 As can be seen 
from Table 7.2, over three years, from 1 April, 2009, the top marginal income tax 
rate would be dropped from 39% to 37%, the upper threshold for the lower 
middle income tax bracket would be raised from $40,000 p.a. to $50,000 p.a., 
and the lower middle marginal rate reduced from 21% to 20%. A new 
‘Independent Earner Tax Credit’ worth around $10 a week would also come 
into effect. Overall, the personal tax cut package introduced from 1 April, 2009 
was expected to inject around $1 billion into the domestic economy. 111 
Simultaneous to these tax cuts, the FNG advanced around $500 million of 
planned infrastructure spending on roads, housing, and schools which would 
start ahead of schedule. 112  Other important elements of the fiscal stimulus 
package implemented by the FNG were a new tax assistance package for small 
and medium-sized businesses (SMEs), injecting over $480 million of extra cash 
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into SMEs over four years (including $270 million immediately for the five 
remaining months of the 2008/2009 financial year through “changes to the 
timing and payment of provisional tax”), and the introduction of a ‘ReStart’ 
package, providing extra financial support for four months to “Kiwi families hit 
hard by redundancy.”113  
Table 7.2) Details of FNG’s April 1 2009 Tax Cuts 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 
Lower Income Rate 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 
 Bracket <$14,000 <$14,000 <$14,000 <$14,000 
Lower Middle 
Income 




















Higher Income Rate 39% 38% 37% 37% 
 Bracket >$70,000 >$70,000 >$70,000 >$70,000 
Source: Treasury 2009, Personal Tax Cuts Info Sheet. 
In support of its initial stimulus package, the FNG held a so-called ‘jobs 
summit’ on 27 February, 2009. This gathering brought together around 200 
business leaders, union officials and industry sector interest group 
representatives for the purposes of generating “ideas for keeping Kiwis in work 
and providing new job opportunities.”114 The key outcomes of the FNG’s jobs 
summit were the adoption of a new ‘Jobs Support Scheme’ (JSS) and the 
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announcement of the construction of a national cycleway. With significant 
support from both employers and unions, the FNG’s new JSS essentially 
involved allowing struggling businesses to adopt a nine-day working fortnight, 
with government subsidised training made available to workers for the tenth 
day.115 The proposed national cycleway, meanwhile, was intended to create up 
to 4000 extra jobs at the cost of tens of millions of dollars and, ultimately, to 
provide a boost to tourism.116 
The FNG also maintained New Zealand’s retail deposit and wholesale 
funding guarantee schemes. These had been introduced with cross-party 
support by the previous Fifth Labour Government on 12 October and 1 
November 2008 respectively, in order to ensure the continued stability of the 
domestic financial system. New Zealand was sheltered from much of the 
international banking instability surrounding the global financial crisis due to 
the generally sound balance sheets of the major Australian banks that dominate 
the New Zealand finance system. Nevertheless, vulnerability did exist in their 
heavy reliance on international short-term credit markets for funding due to a 
generalised paucity of sufficient domestic savings.117 Consequently, the retail 
deposit and wholesale funding guarantees were implemented to “facilitate 
improved access to international funding markets for New Zealand banks”, 
while at the same time giving “assurance to New Zealand depositors.”118 
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Budget 2009 
A major focus of Budget 2009, the FNG’s first, was to provide further 
fiscal stimulus to the flagging New Zealand economy.119 The lead elements of 
this extended fiscal stimulus program took the form of increased spending on 
public services and infrastructure. The FNG announced $5.8 billion of new 
spending on front-line services, “particularly in health, education, and justice”, 
to be delivered over four years in Budget 2009. Some of this new public services 
spending was also “front-loaded into 2009/10” in order to further ameliorate the 
“worst...effects of the recession.”120 Alongside this, the FNG introduced $1.45 
billion of new capital initiatives to be commenced in the following five years, 
and a further $6 billion (for a total of around $7.5 billion) of new capital 
initiatives to be announced in the following four budgets (starting from 2010).121 
Key elements included within this new infrastructure spending were: $1 billion 
over three years for roading (in addition to the $142 million announced as part 
of the FNG’s initial fiscal stimulus package); $258 million for newly re-
nationalised KiwiRail (as well as a new operating debt facility); $1.5 billion over 
six years for the accelerated roll-out of ultra-fast broadband; and $243.7 million 
for the ‘HeatSmart’ home insulation and clean heating initiative.122 
Coupled with these further stimulus measures, the FNG also allowed 
“the so-called automatic stabilisers” to operate in Budget 2009, so as to provide a 
fiscal cushion sufficient to protect “New Zealanders from the hardest edges of 
recession.”123 The FNG ensured the continued provision of the country’s various 
income support entitlements and maintained at existing levels “New Zealand 
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Superannuation, [unemployment, domestic purposes, sickness, and invalids] 
benefits, and the Working for Families scheme.”124 This policy stance would 
effectively allow social welfare disbursements to increase substantially, as 
required, as the recession began to take hold.125 
The combination of new stimulus measures and the operation of New 
Zealand’s automatic fiscal stabilisers resulted in a sizeable short-term fiscal 
expansion.126 The operating balance before gains and losses (OBEGAL) was a 
deficit of $7.6 billion (equivalent to 4.3% of GDP) in the 2009/10 financial year, 
and a deficit of $8.6 billion (4.2% of GDP) was recorded in the following 2010/11 
financial year. 127  However, this was only to be a temporary emergency 
measure. 128  Alongside the various expansionary policy moves “laid out” in 
Budget 2009, the FNG also outlined its broader, medium-term fiscal strategy. 129 
This fiscal strategy was fundamentally aimed at “ongoing expenditure 
restraint” and the limitation of public debt growth.130  
The “main driver” of this ongoing ‘austerity’ program was a permanent 
reduction in budget operating allowances for new government expenditure.131 
The Budget 2009 operating allowance was “revised” down by $300 million from 
$1.75 billion to $1.45 billion, and “the operating allowance for future budgets” 
was cut even more severely, by some 37% “from $1.75 billion to a maximum of 
$1.1 billion from 2010/11, growing at 2% thereafter.”132 Another major facet of 
the FNG’s ongoing drive for fiscal austerity was a significantly increased focus 
on efficiency and savings in the public sector. The core government 
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bureaucracy was officially capped, and “a line-by-line review” of all 
government expenditure (some $64 billion in 2009) was conducted, resulting in 
“a total of more than $2 billion in spending over four years” being earmarked 
for redeployment to the FNG’s “priority areas.”133 Other important components 
of the FNG’s austerity strategy announced in Budget 2009 were the delaying of 
“the second (1 April, 2010) and third (1 April, 2011) tranches” of the FNG’s 
planned tax cuts “until such a time as economic and fiscal conditions allow a 
reconsideration”, and the suspension of the FNG’s “required capital 
contributions” to the New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZSF) “until the 
operating balance is sufficient in terms of cash flow to meet contributions and 
other capital spending” – estimated to be around 2020/21.134 Figures 7.2 and 7.3 
(below) illustrate the intended cumulative impact of the FNG’s fiscal austerity 
strategy on future government expenditure and debt respectively. 
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Figure 7.2) Forecast Impact of FNG’s medium-term Fiscal Strategy on 
Future Government Operating Expenses, 2009 to 2023 
 
 
Source: Treasury 2009, Fiscal Strategy Report, 44. 
 
Figure 7.3) Forecast Impact of FNG’s medium-term Fiscal Strategy on Future 
Government Debt, 2009 to 2023 
 
 
Source: Treasury 2009, FSR, 42. 
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Budget 2010 
Ostensibly marking “a new phase in the Government’s economic 
strategy”, a major focus of Budget 2010, delivered on Thursday, 20 May, was on 
“strengthening the recovery” of the domestic economy that had begun in the 
latter stages of 2009. 135  Although it identified “six key drivers of stronger 
economic performance”, an extensive program of regressive taxation reform 
formed the “centrepiece” of the FNG’s efforts to “accelerate” New Zealand’s 
economic recovery in Budget 2010.136 As can be seen from Table 7.3, from 1 
October, 2010, the top marginal income tax rate would be reduced from 38% to 
33%, the top middle income tax bracket would be reduced from 33% to 30%, the 
lower middle income tax bracket would be reduced from 21% to 17.5%, and the 
rate on personal income of $14,000 or less would fall from 12.5% to 10.5%. 
Simultaneous to these cuts to personal tax rates, the company tax rate would be 
dropped from 30% to 28%, and “the top tax rate for portfolio investment 
entities (PIEs), superannuation funds, unit trusts, group investment funds and 
life insurance policyholder income” likewise reduced so as to remain in 
alignment. 137  Other important components of the FNG’s ‘recovery 
strengthening’ policy program included within Budget 2010 were a significant 
increase in spending on science, research and development, and the initiation of 
a number of “major infrastructure investments.” 138  New spending of “$321 
million over four years” was announced “for a range of science, research and 
development initiatives, lifting total spending to $750 million a year”, and 
“around $1 billion over four years to support key infrastructure projects” 
including “the electrification of Auckland commuter rail” and the roll out of a 
nationwide, ultra-fast Broadband network.”139 
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But Budget 2010 ultimately adhered to the medium-term austerity 
strategy set out by the FNG in Budget 2009. New spending stayed within the 
strict $1.1 billion operating and $1.45 billion capital allowances provided in 
Budget 2009. The only other source of new funding was $1.8 billion over four 
years freed up from existing baselines following another ‘line-by-line’ review of 
departmental spending.140 Aside from the new outlays on science, research and 
development outlined above, most new funding was redirected to the FNG’s 
‘priority areas’ of health and education; as in Budget 2009, “most agencies 
received no additional funding.”141 The tax reforms implemented as the official 
“centrepiece” of Budget 2010, meanwhile, were intended to be ‘fiscally neutral’. 
The package of personal tax cuts to come into effect on 1 October, 2010 
effectively constituted a $4.5 billion per annum reduction in personal taxes. 
However, the FNG’s broader taxation reform program as a whole was fully-
funded by a corresponding increase in GST (increased from 12.5 to 15%) and 
the implementation of other so-called ‘base-broadening’ and ‘integrity’ 
measures.142 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
boosting investment and innovation in New Zealand’s forestry, food, and other primary production 
sectors. 
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Table 7.3) Details of FNG’s October 1 2010 Tax Cuts 
  Existing New 
Lower Income Rate 12.5% 10.5% 
 Bracket <$14,000 <$14,000 
Lower Middle 
income 
Rate 21% 17.5% 
 Bracket $14,001-$40,000 $14,001-$48,000 
Higher Middle 
Income 
Rate 33% 30% 
 Bracket $40,001-$70,000 $48,001-$70,000 
Higher Income Rate 38% 33% 
 Bracket >$70,000 >$70,000 
GST Rate 12.5% 15% 
Company Profit Rate 30% 28% 
PIEs and “other 
savings vehicles” 
Rate 33% 28% 
Source: Treasury 2010, “Executive Summary”, Budget 2010 (Wellington: Treasury), 6, 8. 
 
Budget 2011 
As could be reasonably expected, a major aspect of Budget 2011 was the 
provision of funds for the rebuilding of Christchurch. Treasury estimates put 
“the direct impact on Crown expenses from the two earthquakes” at $8.8 
billion. This overall cost was comprised of two main components: 
“$3.3 billion to recognise the Crown’s Earthquake Commission 
(EQC) obligation ($1.5 billion for each event) and Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC) costs, and $5.5 billion for 
central government’s costs, such as its share of local government 
infrastructure, roads, insurance excesses on schools and hospitals, 
temporary housing and other policy responses.”143 
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Budget 2011 established “a Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Fund” 
(CERF) in order to “ensure transparency and control” over these costs.144 The 
CERF had an initial endowment of $5.5 billion, including $740 million sourced 
from within relevant agencies existing funding baselines. The remaining $3.3 
billion of the anticipated costs of the earthquakes were to be covered from levy-
funded EQC and ACC reserves. 145 Table 7.4 (below) sets out the expected costs 
of the earthquakes and the methods proposed to fund them.  
 
Table 7.4) Christchurch Earthquake Costs and Funding Sources 
Instrument Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Fund EQC + ACC 
Estimated costs $5.5 billion $3.3 billion 









Source: Treasury 2011, “Executive Summary”, 7. 
 
Table 7.5) Summary of Budget 2011 Spending versus the Operating Allowance 
 $million increase/(decrease) 
Operating 
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total 
New spending 110 1,096 990 787 966 3,948 
Savings (including revenue 
initiatives 
145 700 1,338 1,459 1,526 5,168 
Net increase/(decrease) (35) 396 (348) (671) (560) (1,219) 
Source: Treasury 2011, “Fiscal Strategy Report”, 43. 
Aside from this, however, in Budget 2011 the FNG ‘pressed ahead’ its 
medium-term fiscal austerity agenda, “exercising [even] greater spending 
restraint” than it had in previous budgets.146 Operating allowances for new 






 Ibid, 1, 5. 
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spending were reduced by $400 million over four years, from the $4.4 billion 
level established in Budget 2009 to just $4 billion.147 Simultaneously, $5.2 billion 
was cut from existing government expenditure over five years.148 The bulk of 
these latter cuts were made to the core public service and major social policy 
initiatives: Government contributions to the ‘Kiwisaver’ retirement savings 
scheme were reduced by $2.5 billion over four years; funding for the previous 
FLG’s flagship Working For Families (WFF) programme was cut by $448 million 
over four years; student loan accessibility was tightened (reducing the 
Government’s expected outlays by $447 million over five years); and $980 
million over three years of so-called “efficiency savings” were imposed “across 
the state sector.”149 The cumulative result of this ‘acceleration’ of the FNG’s 
medium-term austerity agenda was to slash discretionary new operating 
spending by $1.2 billion over four years and, more importantly, to achieve a 
$5.6 billion reduction in the FNG’s overall expenditure over the same period.150 
Table 7.5 (above) provides a year-by-year breakdown of these intended funding 
cuts. 
Thus, in response to the global financial crisis and ensuing economic 
recession, the FNG initially implemented a modest fiscal stimulus package and 
a so-called ‘jobs summit’ in order to support economic activity and 
employment, thereby providing a counter-cyclical fiscal buffer for the economy. 
The FNG also maintained the wholesale and retail deposit guarantee schemes 
implemented by the FLG in order to ensure the stability of the nation’s financial 
system. This was immediately followed by further ‘discretionary’ stimulus 
measures, as well as a substantial generalised fiscal expansion in Budget 2009. 
However, this macroeconomic policy response was only a temporary 
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emergency measure.151 Before the economy was even fully recovered, the FNG 
reverted back to a neoliberal austerity agenda fundamentally aimed at cutting 
back public spending and reducing public debt. Budget 2010 implemented a 
number of measures designed to help boost the economic recovery, but it did so 
from within the limited means prescribed by the FNG’s medium-term austerity 
agenda it set out in Budget 2009. Budget 2011, respectively, primarily acted to 
extend the FNG’s broader fiscal austerity agenda even further. 
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7.4) “A Dark Cloud on the Horizon”: The ‘Dollar-Wall Street Regime’ and 
the Fifth National Government’s Macroeconomic Policy Agenda 
The FNG implemented its distinctively neoliberal macroeconomic policy 
response in the wake of the GFC primarily because there was, in Finance 
Minister Bill English’s own words, “a dark cloud on the horizon.”152 This ‘dark 
cloud’ constituted the prospect of a decline in New Zealand’s ‘creditworthiness’ 
in IPFMs. Other factors were of course important in influencing the formulation 
of the FNG’s overarching policy program. Roper notes, for example, that 
Business New Zealand played a key role in pushing for the 90-day trial period 
for new workers in SMEs that was introduced by the FNG in 2009.153 But in 
terms of the formulation of macroeconomic policy, the ‘dark cloud’ of a 
potential decline in the country’s international creditworthiness should be 
considered to be the determining factor. As Prime Minister John Key himself 
admitted immediately prior to the unveiling of Budget 2009, the “primary focus 
of this Budget is to avoid a credit ratings downgrade.”154 
As numerous authors have documented, prior to the onset of the GFC, 
New Zealand was already a heavily indebted nation by international 
standards.155 New Zealand has consistently run high current account deficits 
since the mid-1970s which has necessarily resulted in the progressive 
accumulation of a substantial stock of overseas debt. As noted in Chapter Four, 
the best measure of this stock of external liabilities is contained within Statistics 
New Zealand’s regularly updated International Investment Position data series.156 
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The key relevant elements of this extremely detailed data set are set out in Table 
7.6 (below). As can be seen, by early 2008, just before the full onset of the GFC 
in September, New Zealand had accrued net external liabilities totaling $-
138,659 million, or 76% of nominal GDP. 157  This level of international 
indebtedness was particularly high in an international context.158 
Table 7.6) New Zealand’s Net International Investment Position at  
March 2008 
New Zealand’s International Assets $million 
Banks 26,673 
General Government 8,813 
Monetary Authorities 19,737 
Other Sectors 33,041 
Total International Assets 88,264 
New Zealand’s International Liabilities  
Banks 137,513 
General Government 17,616 
Monetary Authorities 540 
Other Sectors 71,254 
Total International Liabilities 226,923 
New Zealand’s Net International Asset Position -138,659 
Nominal GDP 182,478 
Net IIP as % of Nominal GDP 76% 
Total International Liabilities as a % of Nominal GDP 124% 
Source: Statistics New Zealand, New Zealand’s IIP; Nominal GDP 
figures from Treasury Fiscal Time Series data, published 17 
November 2010, available at www.treasury.govt.nz/government/data.  
 
The main component of New Zealand’s external debt prior to the onset 
of the GFC was comprised of the overseas borrowing undertaken by New 
Zealand’s largely Australian-owned banks (see Table 7.7). 159  As Bertram 
outlines, New Zealand’s persistent current account deficits since the 1970s have 
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been financed “by borrowing offshore, in three successive waves.”160 From 1975 
through to the late 1980s, the bulk of offshore borrowing was undertaken by 
government. Total offshore debt reached 70% of GDP, of which, roughly half 
was made up of public borrowing. 161  During the early to mid-1990s, “the 
overseas debt [was] privatised.”162 Following a massive sell off of state assets by 
the Fourth National Government, New Zealand’s gross external liabilities 
reached $113 billion in 1997, of which private inward equity investment made 
up around half.163 Since the 1997-8 East Asian crisis, however, “the hole in the 
New Zealand balance of payments” has been filled by an “extraordinary 
inflow” of funds into New Zealand banks from offshore.164 This inexorable rise 
in banks offshore borrowing prior to the impact of the GFC is presented in 
Figure 7.4. As can be seen, the component of New Zealand’s gross external 
liabilities made up of the offshore borrowing of banks totaled $137,513 million, 
or the equivalent of 60.6% of nominal GDP, in March 2008. 
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Table 7.7) Asset Structure of New Zealand Banking System,  
December 2008 ($billion) 
 
Australian Banks: Assets: 
ANZ National (1) $107.79 
Westpac (2) $64.71 
ASB (3) $59.35 
National Australia Bank (BNZ, 4) $56.38 
Total: $288.22 
Other Foreign Banks:  
HSBC (6) $6.17 
Deutschebank (7) $5.56 
Rabobank (8) $4.94 
Citibank NA (9) $3.35 
Total: $20.21 
New Zealand Banks:  
Kiwi Bank (5) $7.23 
TSB Bank (11) $3.12 
SBS (13) $2.43 
Total: $12.83 
Total Banking System Assets $321.25 
Australian Share 89.72% 
 Source: Management, 2009. 
In comparison, the component comprised of public debt was relatively 
small and remained more or less stable (in gross terms) during the decade prior 
to the onset of the GFC. As outlined in Chapter Five, during the period from 
1999 to 2008 the FLG ran a generally conservative fiscal stance. Substantial and 
ongoing fiscal surpluses were run and financial assets were simultaneously 
built up, primarily in the form of the so-called ‘Cullen Fund’. As a result of this 
conservative fiscal approach, net government debt tracked down significantly 
during the period from 1999 to 2008 (reaching and then moving below zero net 
debt in 2006), while government debt remained more or less stable in gross 
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terms.165 The comparative path of external general government debt prior the 
GFC is also set out in Figure 7.4. 
Figure 7.4) New Zealand Bank and General Government Offshore Debt, March 
2001 to March 2008 ($million) 
 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand. 
 
Mirroring developments elsewhere in the advanced capitalist world, the 
events surrounding the GFC significantly undermined the FNG’s financial 
position. A steep decline in international prices and demand for key export 
commodities (especially Dairy) 166 , combined with the effects of a domestic 
economy that had already entered a moderate downturn before the full impact 
of the GFC, as well as a significant package of tax cuts coming into effect in 
October 2008, meant that government revenues were substantially reduced 
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from late 2008 onwards.167 Simultaneously, government expenditure trended 
upwards, as the FNG introduced its modest discretionary fiscal stimulus and 
simultaneously exercised the country’s previously mentioned ‘automatic 
stabilisers’ to maintain existing welfare entitlements and, in the FNG’s words, 
to absorb “much of the shock of the recession on the Government’s balance 
sheet.”168 As a result, a large gap between the FNG’s revenue and expenditure 
began to emerge from early 2009 onwards. This revenue gap was necessarily 
funded from increased public borrowing (mainly from overseas investors).169 At 
the time of the announcement of Budget 2009, projections showed public debt 
reaching 48 percent of GDP by 2013 and 70 percent by 2023.170 The official 
projected trajectory of public debt provided in Budget 2009 is presented in 
Figure 7.5 below. In addition to this mounting international public debt, the 
previous FLG had also “recently taken on significant contingent liabilities to 
maintain confidence in the financial system.” 171  This was the government 
guarantee of the overseas wholesale funding of the largely Australian-owned 
domestic banking system, which, as we have seen, the FNG chose to maintain. 
Michael Cullen, Minister of Finance under the previous FLG, estimated that 
“the contingent liability for the New Zealand taxpayer” had the guarantee been 
‘called’ could have reached as high as $150 billion. However, looking closely at 
the overall structure of New Zealand bank’s funding, Bertram suggests 
contingent liability would more-likely have been somewhat smaller; between 
$20 billion and $70 billion.172 
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            Source: Treasury 2009, FSR, 34. 
 
The FNG’s rapidly deteriorating financial position acted to highlight for 
IPFMs a number of “systemic vulnerabilities” already present within the 
broader macroeconomy that generally sound government finances had 
previously acted to offset.173 In particular, vulnerabilities associated with the 
domestic banking system’s heavy reliance “on offshore funding became a 
looming issue.”174 As Bedford outlines, “the major Australian banks obtain a 
material amount of non-tradable debt funding directly from their Australian 
parents.” However, Australian Prudential Standard (APS) 222 Section 32 (12), 
enforced by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), places a 
quantitative restriction on the amount the parent banks are allowed to advance 
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to their New Zealand subsidiaries.175 Consequently, “the banks...also borrow 
externally by issuing debt securities in offshore credit markets” such as Wall 
Street and the City of London. By mid-2008, “in nominal terms, the banks [had] 
borrowed nearly $140 billion...from international investors.”176  
Immediately prior to the onset of the GFC, the maturity profile of this 
offshore borrowing was dominated by short-term financial instruments (such as 
90-day bills). Indeed, “40 percent of the bank’s offshore debt was typically due 
to mature within 90 days”, with a significant amount more due to mature 
within a year.177 In addition, a substantial proportion of this debt was also 
denominated in foreign currency. As Bedford observes, “around half of New 
Zealand’s international debt liabilities were denominated in foreign currency 
(mostly US dollars)” in June 2008. 178  Unsurprisingly, considering their 
dominance of the external liabilities ledger, the banks accounted “for a sizeable 
fraction” of these foreign-currency liabilities.179  
The dependence of the New Zealand banking system on short-term 
borrowing in international credit markets exposed the banks (and, subsequent 
to the introduction of the wholesale guarantee scheme, the FNG) to significant 
“rollover risk.”180 If for whatever reason offshore lenders became unwilling to 
provide new financing for maturing loans, New Zealand banks could have 
quickly faced “severe balance sheet distress” as funding and system-wide 
liquidity dried up. 181  This would not only severely impact on the banks 
apparently ubiquitous business operations, but could also potentially 
destabilise the wider macroeconomy (discussed in more detail below). 182 
Respectively, the bank’s predominantly foreign currency denominated offshore 
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debt exposed New Zealand to significant “exchange rate risk.”183 Over time, a 
steadily falling nominal FX rate could progressively raise the local currency 
value of a large portion of the country’s foreign liabilities, thereby increasing 
debt servicing costs and also the risk of default.184 
As a result, in early 2009 international credit rating agency Standard and 
Poor’s began to threaten to downgrade New Zealand’s sovereign credit rating. 
Having placed New Zealand on a negative ratings watch in January 2009, three 
Standard and Poor’s executives (Kyran Curry, David Beers, and Brendan Flynn) 
made a highly publicised visit to New Zealand in May during the week 
immediately prior to the announcement of the Budget. 185 On arrival it was 
stated that Standard and Poor’s were looking for the FNG “to articulate a path 
to a more fiscally conservative or a more stable fiscal position.” More 
specifically, Curry stated that it was expected “that over the cycle of the [Fifth 
National] Government [it] would be recording operating surpluses within…the 
next three to five years.”186 Without such moves, it was intimated that New 
Zealand’s AA+ sovereign credit rating would be downgraded. 
The immediate impact of such a rating downgrade would likely have 
been to increase the country’s interest rates and public debt servicing costs. 
There existed some “uncertainty about the [exact] quantitative impact” that a 
downgrade of New Zealand’s international credit rating would have had “on 
the size of New Zealand’s sovereign risk premium.” 187  However, Treasury 
Secretary John Whitehead observed that “based on Ireland’s [March 2009] 
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downgrade from AAA to AA, a downgrade for New Zealand would result in a 
1.5 percent rise in [domestic] interest rates”, as well as an increase of around 
“$600 million to government debt interest costs.”188  
But this was potentially only the ‘tip of the iceberg’. “A growing 
mountain of government debt” and a subsequent downgrade of the country’s 
sovereign credit rating could have also put “New Zealand at risk of a [serious] 
adverse reaction” from IPFMs that could have resulted in severe 
macroeconomic instability.189 As a number of commentators have observed, if 
for any reason foreign lenders were to continue to lose confidence in the 
underlying ‘creditworthiness’ of New Zealand borrowers – interpreting, for 
example, the initial downgrade of New Zealand’s official sovereign credit 
rating as a signal of incipient weakness in the country’s macroeconomy and 
related public policy settings - the country’s banks may have eventually found 
that they were unable “to refinance [their rapidly] maturing international debt 
at any price.”190 IPFMs may have begun to target New Zealand as a “weak link” 
in the global economy and subsequently raised “its borrowing costs to 
unsustainable levels.”191 Based on the recent experiences of fellow small open 
developed free-market economies Iceland (2006, 2008) and Ireland (2010), 
which likewise had large stocks of external liabilities residing on the balance 
sheets of their banks, (although of different character and quantities192), were 
such an eventuality to occur, there is a very real possibility that what would 
have followed would be the onset of a severe “economic disruption.”193 The 
nation’s sovereign credit rating would have plunged. A large-scale capital 
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outflow would have ensued, “triggering a...severe [downward] exchange rate 
adjustment.”194 The local currency value of any un-hedged foreign liabilities 
would consequently rise and, as the “sustainability” of the banks’ “foreign-
currency debts became a ‘public’ problem” under the government’s wholesale 
guarantee scheme, what began as a banking crisis would quickly morph into a 
classic sovereign debt crisis. 195  The local share market - the NZX - would 
collapse. Domestic interest rates would shoot up as the banks became 
increasingly reticent about lending out increasingly scarce funds and the RBNZ 
moved to stamp out any potential spike in inflation beyond its 1-3% target band. 
Productive investment would stall and many businesses would collapse 
following loan defaults, resulting in a spike in unemployment.196 
At some point, the IMF would be prompted to act in order to provide the 
country with “a crisis management programme.”197 Recent IMF country reports 
provide a fairly good indication of the likely shape of such a policy plan. In 
exchange for a sizeable debt relief package, the IMF would require: “transfers to 
middle-income households”, including Working for Families, social welfare, and 
student allowance entitlements, to be cut; the age of eligibility for national 
superannuation to be raised; “higher consumption taxes” (GST) coinciding with 
“a cut in capital taxes”; a significant generalised downsizing of the state, likely 
to include major cuts to the core public service, large-scale privatisations of 
remaining state-owned commercial assets, and increased private sector 
‘competition’ in the provision of remaining public services (such as prisons and 
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schools); and an even more ‘ambitious’ programme of so-called ‘supply-side’ 
regulatory reforms than the FNG has already pushed through parliament.198 
Simultaneously, what remained of the New Zealand economy would be 
systematically plundered by predatory foreign capital. The sharp fall in the FX 
rate would temporarily produce “a stock of devalued, and in many instances 
undervalued, assets” in New Zealand.199 These assets, comprising the country’s 
most productive and profitable resources and enterprises not already owned by 
foreign multinational corporations, would undoubtedly be bought up by 
predatory capital from North America, Europe, Japan, and to a lesser extent 
China and Russia, as part of a process of what eminent Marxist geographer 
David Harvey described as “accumulation by dispossession.”200 Indeed, as was 
the case with the East Asian crisis of 1997-8, alongside the currency and bond 
market speculators, the big winners of such a financial crisis in New Zealand 
would be foreign hedge funds and corporations.201 
As FNG Finance Minister Bill English explained in his speech 
announcing Budget 2009, the adoption of a neoliberal macroeconomic policy 
stance in the wake of the GFC would help to avert this looming ‘dark cloud on 
the horizon’. A milder programme of voluntary neoliberal structural 
adjustment, implemented pre-emptively, would avoid a much harsher 
neoliberal “adjustment...forced on us by lenders reluctant to pay our bills.”202 
The implementation of pre-emptive fiscal austerity measures would help 
to avert a national credit rating downgrade primarily by lowering the expected 
future track of government debt. As outlined in Budget 2010, the FNG’s various 
moves in Budget 2009 to curtail new and existing government expenditure, 
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defer the government’s annual contributions to the NZSF, and impose 
‘efficiencies’ in the core public service (via so-called ‘razor-gangs’), had a 
significant cumulative impact on the “explosive debt levels which the 
government faced in late 2008.”203 From a projected zenith of 36% of GDP in 
2018/19, net public debt was instead expected to peak at only 27% of GDP in 
2015/16.204 This impact of the FNG’s austerity measures introduced as part of 
Budget 2009 on the future path of net government debt is displayed in Figure 7.7 
(below). Lowering the government’s future debt path would mean that the 
government would retain sufficient financial capacity to step in, should the 
need arise, as a ‘lender of last resort’ to support any private banks in New 
Zealand that found themselves in serious funding difficulty.205 The state’s own 
balance sheet would effectively act as a fiscal bulwark against any further 
shocks to the New Zealand financial system, and offset the significant 
downward ‘dragging’ effect that the country’s comparatively weak private 
foreign debt position has on the nation’s overall creditworthiness. 
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Figure 7.7) Forecast Impact of FNG’s Austerity Measures on the Future Track of 
Net New Zealand Government Debt Contained within Budget 2009 
 
 
Source: Treasury 2009, “Fiscal Strategy Report”, 42. 
 
Respectively, the FNG’s neoliberal taxation reforms would help to 
maintain New Zealand’s creditworthiness in IPFMs by significantly bolstering 
the profitability of business (at the expense of workers). As discussed earlier, 
the tax reform programme contained within Budget 2010 entailed cuts to 
marginal personal and corporate tax rates which totaled around $15 billion over 
four years. Based on the data contained within the 2010 Budget document Key 
Facts for Taxpayers which, amongst other things, outlines the government’s gross 
revenue sourced from corporate taxation, the business share of this would be 
between $1.5 and $2 billion over three years.206 Business profitability would 
effectively be gaining a major boost via a substantial structural reduction in the 
overall tax burden shouldered by business. Fundamentally, bolstering the 
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profitability of business (especially in the ‘tradables’ sector) supports the 
underlying creditworthiness of the country by improving “the economy’s 
capacity to service its external debt”, thus reducing likelihood of a major default 
on international borrowing.207 
The FNG’s program of infrastructure investment would similarly aide in 
the maintenance of New Zealand’s international creditworthiness. As outlined 
in the previous section above, the infrastructure component of the FNG’s 
discretionary stimulus programme would total $7.5 billion over four years, 
concentrated in the areas of transport and telecommunications. This $7.5 billion 
effectively constitutes a massive public subsidy of private business investment. 
Substantial productivity (and, therefore, profit) advantages would accrue to 
business as a result of the spending programme without requiring any 
reciprocal private capital outlays (which would normally be a requirement). 
A number of observers have suggested that the level of threat faced by 
New Zealand in the wake of the GFC may have been exaggerated by the FNG 
in order to help justify its extension of the neoliberal policy agenda. Opposition 
MPs have been particularly vocal in this regard. However, the prevailing threat 
of a potential downgrade of New Zealand’s credit rating was real and the 
implications of such a development should not be underestimated.  
As outlined in Section One, the degree of disruption experienced by 
IPFMs during the GFC - especially between September 2008 and May 2009 - 
was unprecedented in recent history. IPFMs were characterised by considerable 
volatility and many international lending and credit markets virtually ceased to 
operate altogether. Included within the sphere of the “extreme disorder” were 
the “key bank funding markets.” 208  “The commercial paper market”, for 
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example, “which is a key source of funds for many [major New Zealand 
financial] institutions…, essentially became frozen over this period.”209 
As a result, New Zealand banks’ balance sheets were being “severely 
stretched” and becoming “strapped for cash” during the GFC.210 Indicative of 
the extent of New Zealand bank’s funding difficulties is the fact that RBNZ 
governor Alan Bollard and other top officials were required to undertake a so-
called “road trip” during the GFC, travelling “to several world financial 
markets [to] convince them of the desirability of lending to banks in New 
Zealand.”211 Further evidence is the scale of local bank’s uptake of the RBNZ’s 
MBS-backed liquidity scheme implemented in December 2008; as Bollard 
observes, “by the end of January 2009 [the RBNZ] had lent out $5 billion to the 
banks.”212 Thus, with the banking system facing a severe shortage of funds, 
New Zealand faced the distinct risk of a liquidity crisis developing. Indeed, 
Bollard characterised the country as being perched precariously “on a [financial] 
tight rope.”213 
It should be noted that it was in fact possible for New Zealand banks to 
secure some funding in the credit markets of Wall Street and the City of London 
during the height of the GFC, “albeit at a penalty price”, only in small amounts, 
for short term, and only if backed by a government guarantee.214 This was 
demonstrated by the ANZ in March 2009.215 However, generally speaking, New 
Zealand banks were extremely reticent about going offshore “to seek funding 
for fear that it would not be available.”216 Rejection by IPFMs would severely 
strain even a fundamentally sound bank’s reputation, leading to the possibility 
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of the withdrawal of existing funding or even a full-blown bank run. 217 
Moreover, as Bollard notes in his first-hand account of the GFC, it was clearly 
intimated to him by international investors that “if the government were to 
receive a credit rating downgrade, all bets would be off.” 218  Bank funding 
would completely dry up, and the Government would likely face a full blown 
liquidity crisis.  
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Conclusion 
In August 2007, the world entered into the worst financial crisis in post-
world war two history. A mounting wave of defaults on loans in the now 
infamous US ‘subprime’ mortgage market brought about a major ‘credit crunch’ 
in international inter-bank lending markets beginning in mid-2007. This ‘credit 
crunch’ brought about the collapse, or near collapse, of three of the five major 
Wall Street investment banks – Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill 
Lynch – in 2008 and ultimately seriously undermined the stability of the entire 
global financial system. From there, in late-2008, the world descended into what 
some have come to refer to as the ‘Great Recession’. 
 The FNG took power in the midst of this prolonged period of global 
financial and economic turmoil. In response, the FNG initially implemented a 
modest discretionary fiscal stimulus package, held a ‘jobs summit’, and 
maintained the existing wholesale and retail deposit guarantee schemes 
implemented by the previous FLG. This initial policy response was followed 
soon after by further ‘discretionary’ fiscal stimulus measures, as well as a 
substantial generalised fiscal expansion in Budget 2009. However, this 
macroeconomic policy response only constituted a temporary emergency 
measure designed to help ensure short-term economic stability. The FNG 
almost immediately reverted back to a medium-term fiscal strategy primarily 
characterised by neoliberal austerity measures which it closely adhered to 
throughout the remainder of its first term in power.  
 The FNG formulated and implemented this macroeconomic policy 
strategy in the wake of the GFC in a large part due to the threat posed by a 
significant decline in New Zealand’s perceived international ‘creditworthiness’. 
The FNG’s financial position rapidly deteriorated following the GFC. A large 
gap opened up between revenue and expenditure and this gap was necessarily 
funded by extensive offshore borrowing. The prospect of a significant increase 
in public debt served to highlight a number of vulnerabilities already existing 
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within the nation’s macroeconomy, particularly those linked to the domestic 
banking system’s heavy reliance on offshore short-term debt funding markets. 
New Zealand’s international creditworthiness was subsequently called into 
question, exposing New Zealand to the possibility of a negative reaction from 
IPFMs resulting in severe macroeconomic instability. Fundamentally, the 
various core aspects of the medium-term macroeconomic policy strategy 











Since the early 1970s, international financial relations have operated 
under a system of governance that has come to be known as the Dollar-Wall 
Street Regime (DWSR). The DWSR is underpinned by the twin, self-reinforcing 
pillars of a pure US dollar standard in international monetary relations and 
increasingly deep and geographically expansive international private financial 
markets (IPFMs) occupying a central position in international financial relations. 
The pure US dollar standard in international monetary relations, in particular, 
has provided the US with a large number of important economic and political 
privileges. These privileges include, most prominently, considerable balance of 
payments flexibility, seigniorage, significant private sector commercial 
advantages, and greatly enhanced influence and capacity in international 
relations. The centrality of IPFMs, meanwhile, has relegated states and 
international financial agencies to an entirely secondary position in relation to 
the management of international financial relations. Under the DWSR, the US 
has been invested with the capacity to exercise an unprecedented degree of 
power in the realm of international economic affairs. Simultaneously, 
developments in IPFMs – often heavily influenced by US macroeconomic 
decision-making - play a key role in determining the outcome of domestic-level 




The DWSR initially emerged due to the emergence of mounting systemic 
pressures on the existing BWS of international monetary relations and the onset 
of severe economic malaise in the early 1970s. During the long post-war boom, 
capitalism had become increasingly internationalised and unregulated financial 
markets had re-emerged. These major developments within the underlying 
structure of the global economy exerted unbearable pressure on the existing 
BWS arrangements from the perspective of the US. At the same time as the BWS 
was being effectively undermined, economic growth slowed considerably in the 
US and elsewhere as the rate of profit across the advanced capitalist world fell 
precipitously and a generalised crisis of over-accumulation set in. In response, 
the US asserted its power on the international stage by abandoning the official 
link between the USD and gold, and subsequently overseeing the cancellation 
of the BWS capital and exchange controls. 
Subsequently, economic growth was restored and the DWSR became 
firmly established in its hegemonic position governing international financial 
relations via the geographically uneven process of global neoliberalisation. 
Extensively sponsored by the US and also reflecting a major shift in the 
orientation of global capitalism towards finance that had occurred during the 
post-war boom, the historic rise and spread of neoliberalism across the globe 
privileged the interests of international private financial capital and facilitated a 
substantial deepening and geographic expansion of IPFMs. Primarily based 
around a combination of the ideas of classical liberalism and neoclassical 
economics, neoliberalism (as a class-based political project) served to free 
private financial capital from what they perceived to be onerous cross-border 
and domestic regulatory constraints that had previously curtailed (but not 
entirely prevented) its ability to exploit potentially profitable investment 
opportunities. In effect, the financial systems of the world were opened to 
increased penetration by internationally-mobile private financial capital. Thus, 
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via global neoliberalisation, states increasingly became firmly enmeshed into 
the DWSR. 
During the period from 1984 to 1990, New Zealand followed the broader 
global political trend and underwent a comprehensive process of neoliberal 
‘structural adjustment’. Throughout their two terms in power, the Fourth 
Labour Government implemented a wide-ranging radical neoliberal policy 
agenda. As part of this neoliberalisation process, New Zealand became 
integrated into the DWSR. The country’s financial markets and capital controls 
were comprehensively liberalised, the currency was floated, and the domestic 
financial system was extensively deregulated. Indeed, these necessary 
prerequisites of DWSR integration formed the absolute vanguard of the greater 
programme of neoliberal policy reform implemented by the Fourth Labour 
Government. As intimated by the analysis developed in Chapter 2, from this 
point forward, the formulation of public macroeconomic policy in New Zealand 
began to be heavily influenced by the vagaries of IPFMs. 
New Zealand’s historic shift to neoliberalism was initially propelled by a 
small, yet highly influential, group of political actors operating in Wellington. 
This ‘Wellington Policy Community’ (WPC) included key members of the 
Cabinet under the Fourth Labour Government (most notably, the Finance 
Ministry ‘troika’ comprised of Roger Douglas, Richard Prebble, and David 
Caygill), high-ranked bureaucrats in Treasury and the Reserve Bank (most 
notably Graham Scott and Rod Deane), and prominent business leaders. 
However, the fundamentally political project advanced by this group was 
heavily influenced by a broad range of developments, both within New 
Zealand’s domestic political economy and internationally. These developments 
included, most prominently: the worldwide onset of ‘stagflation’ during the 
mid-1970s; a major shift in the balance of power within New Zealand society in 
favour of business and, simultaneously, business becoming much more 
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industrially militant and politically active; and the shift in the prevailing 
international economic orthodoxy from Keynesianism to neoliberalism.  
During the period from 1990 to 1994, the Fourth National Government 
continued New Zealand’s historic shift to neoliberalism. In the realm of 
macroeconomic policy, this primarily involved the implementation of a radical 
neoliberal fiscal austerity strategy. The cornerstone of the Fourth National 
Government’s first term austerity strategy was a fundamental redesign of the 
New Zealand welfare state. This was implemented in two main stages; the 
Economic and Social Initiative (ESI) of December, 1990 and the 1991 ‘Mother of 
All Budgets’. After successfully imposing fiscal austerity via this key pair of 
policy packages, the Fourth National Government subsequently continued to 
closely adhere to a neoliberal approach to the formulation of fiscal policy. 
Between 1994 and 1999, the National administration steadfastly pursued a 
surplus-driven, low debt fiscal strategy. 
The second major phase of New Zealand’s neoliberalisation was driven 
forward by the Fourth National Government’s first Minister of Finance, Ruth 
Richardson. Surrounded by close allies in cabinet, Richardson received 
considerable support for the advancement of the neoliberal policy agenda from 
Treasury. She was also aided by the specific institutional structure of the state 
in New Zealand (or, more specifically, the dominance of Cabinet within the 
executive arm of government) and external pressures exerted on the Fourth 
National Government by IPFMs. Ultimately, however, to a significant extent, 
the Fourth National Government’s fiscal austerity agenda reflected the 
macroeconomic policy preferences of big business. 
A key factor contributing to the Fourth National Government’s ongoing 
adherence to a neoliberal fiscal austerity strategy during the period from 1994 
to 1999 was New Zealand’s integration into the DWSR. Centrally, the Fourth 
National Government faced significant implied pressure from IPFMs to closely 
adhere to a neoliberal fiscal strategy focused on running budget surpluses and 
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reducing public debt in order to partially mitigate the significant latent threat 
that adverse external capital flows posed to New Zealand’s ongoing 
macroeconomic stability. External constraints imposed by IPFMs were not the 
only or even the most decisive factor that determined the outcome of fiscal 
policy formulation during the period from 1994 to 1999. For example, both 
major business interests and Treasury are documented as having also exerted 
considerable influence over the Fourth National Government’s overall policy 
direction. IPFM-derived external constraints were nevertheless highly 
significant. Furthermore, integration into the DWSR continued to place major 
constraints on macroeconomic policy formulation in New Zealand subsequent 
to the electoral defeat of the Fourth National Government in 1999. 
In 1999, the centre-left Fifth Labour Government (FLG) was elected to 
power in New Zealand. Centrally, the FLG presented itself as pursuing an 
ostensibly pragmatic social democratic policy agenda. However, this so-called 
‘Third Way’ effectively only constituted a moderation of the prevailing 
neoliberal policy framework. Fundamentally, in the realm of macroeconomic 
policy, the FLG retained (and ultimately helped to entrench) all of the key 
features of the neoliberal macroeconomic policy nexus constructed by the 
previous Labour and National governments during the period from 1984 to 
1999. A ‘monetarist’ approach to monetary policy primarily aimed at 
maintaining low, stable levels of inflation, a freely-floating foreign exchange 
(FX) regime, and a conservative ‘surplus-driven, low debt’ approach to fiscal 
policy formulation all remained firmly in place and essentially unchanged 
under the FLG. 
While certainly not explaining everything in terms of an explanatory 
account of the FLG’s formulation of macroeconomic policy, New Zealand’s 
ongoing integration into the DWSR during the period from 1999 to 2008 
nevertheless placed significant constraints on the macroeconomic policy 
formulation of the FLG. The principle factor underpinning this was the 
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existence of what is known within the international economic orthodoxy as the 
‘impossible trinity’. The ‘impossible trinity’ necessitated that the FLG remain 
fundamentally committed to the existing independently floating FX regime. 
This was because its market-based adjustment serves to cushion the domestic 
economy from the impact of shocks to the nation’s current account. But a 
further crucial factor constraining the macroeconomic policy formulation of the 
FLG was the persistence of significant, unsubstantiated amplitude in IPFMs. 
Ultimately, each of the other core features of the neoliberal macroeconomic 
nexus – a ‘monetarist’ approach to macroeconomic management and a 
conservative approach to fiscal policy – were, at least in part, due to the 
potential to ‘dampen’ excessive financial volatility. 
Thus, it appears that New Zealand’s integration into the DWSR - via the 
historic process of neoliberalisation - has fundamentally acted to constrict 
successive New Zealand governments’ scope for autonomous action in to the 
realm of public monetary and financial management. The major political 
implication of financial market liberalisation in New Zealand has been a 
transformation of the underlying structural relationship between the state and 
internationally-mobile financial capital. The constant threat to ongoing 
economic viability posed by inherently volatile financial flows has effectively 
more closely intertwined the interests of the New Zealand state and IPFMs. 
This is not to suggest, however, that the power of the New Zealand state is in 
decline; while financial market discipline certainly serves to restrict its overall 
operational flexibility, the inherent volatility of the DWSR has simultaneously 
served to increase the necessity for the state to play its traditional functions. 
Moreover, this transformation of the conditions of state power is far from 
permanent. The apparent shift in the underlying structural relationship 
between internationally-mobile financial capital and the New Zealand state, 






This thesis constitutes an original contribution to the scholarly literature 
seeking to explain New Zealand’s historic shift to, and subsequent retention 
and entrenchment of neoliberalism. Rather than focusing on the role of specific 
societal, economic, and state-based factors within a relatively restricted national 
context, it primarily concentrated on the particular role played by IPFMs. 
Centrally, the thesis investigated the major political implications flowing from 
the rapid and wholesale liberalisation of New Zealand’s financial markets. This 
comprehensive, in-depth investigation integrated a unique application of 
Gowan’s DWSR analysis into a detailed historical study of New Zealand’s 
political economy during the period from 1984 to 2011. The resulting DWSR-
based analysis usefully supplements existing scholarly accounts of New 
Zealand’s political economy. Fundamentally, it goes beyond merely observing 
and, subsequently, describing the influence exerted by IPFMs over the state in 
New Zealand. Instead, it explains and critically evaluates in a coherent, 
theoretically-informed, and empirically-grounded way, exactly why and how 
the international financial system plays such an important role within New 
Zealand’s contemporary political economy. 
 
Agenda for Further Research 
In Chapter Two, it was shown that an important factor driving the global 
proliferation of neoliberalism was a process of increasingly significant 
international expansion of US-dominated private financial capital and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) during the 1960s and 1970s. Major financial institutions 
and multi-national corporations (MNCs) dramatically expanded their offshore 
activities during this period, fundamentally acting to create powerful pro-
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neoliberal constituencies within most of the states of the advanced capitalist 
world.1  
It is readily apparent that New Zealand was not left entirely undisturbed 
by these wider developments in the global political economy. As 
comprehensively documented by Cronin in his (2001) PhD thesis, The Politics of 
New Zealand Business Internationalisation 1972-1996, during the decade prior to 
the commencement of the neoliberal reforms, there was a steady upswing in 
inward business internationalisation (in terms of foreign ownership of assets) 
within the New Zealand economy.2 A major target of inward FDI during the 
period from 1972 to 1984 was industrial capital. Manufacturing resources, in 
particular, were of increasing interest to offshore investors. 3  However, the 
financial sector was also a major target of this increasing FDI in the New 
Zealand economy. As Cronin observes, while already dominated by foreign 
interests prior to 1972, the financial sector of the economy experienced further 
increases in foreign direct ownership “from 1972 to 1981 and a very rapid rise 
from 1981 onwards.”4 
At a high level of generality, it is possible to posit a brief preliminary 
analysis of the significance of these economic developments to our broader 
understanding of New Zealand’s historic shift to neoliberalism. As with other 
states of the advanced capitalist world, these developments directly affected the 
structure of New Zealand’s capitalist class.5 Those fractions of domestically-
operating capital closely associated with foreign and finance-oriented business 
interests became a much more powerful “social force” within the New Zealand 
political economy during the decade prior to 1984.6 Such intra-capital power 
                                                          
1
 See L. Panitch and S. Gindin 2015, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American 
Empire (London: Verso), 111-122. 
2
 Cronin, 171. 
3
 Ibid, 323.  
4
 Ibid, 183.  
5
 Panitch and Gindin 2003, 19. 
6
 Ibid. This contention is upheld by a number of authors. See B. Jesson 1992, “The New Elite”, The 
Republican, October-November; 1999, 39-40; Roper 2005b, 107; Kelsey 2015, 47. 
Conclusion 397 
 
shifts engendered a significant alteration of the political-economic pressures 
being exerted on the state in New Zealand. In particular, with significant 
elements within domestically-operating capital becoming progressively more 
internationalised, there was increasing pressure on the state to take 
“responsibility for creating the necessary internal conditions for sustained 
international accumulation.” 7  It is suggested that at the vanguard of this 
dynamic was steadily mounting pressure for extensive economic liberalisation 
and deregulation, core components of the radical programme of neoliberal 
reform subsequently implemented in New Zealand from 1984 to 1999. 
Closer examination of the issue of the increasing involvement of foreign 
private financial capital and expanding FDI within the economy prior to 1984 
would undoubtedly offer considerable utility. Centrally, a more detailed 
analysis would add a new degree of depth and sophistication to our 
understanding of the historical trajectory of neoliberalism in New Zealand. 
However, this thesis does not seek to examine the explanatory significance of 
this particular issue in great detail. Ultimately, these particular historical 
economic trends primarily relate to the initial implementation of neoliberalism 
in New Zealand. In contrast, as indicated at the outset of the thesis, the 
overarching focus of this study is on the important role played by IPFMs in the 
retention and entrenchment of the neoliberal macroeconomic policy regime in 
New Zealand. It would have therefore been outside of the ambit of this thesis to 
seek to undertake an extended empirical investigation of the explanatory 
significance of trends towards increasing internationalisation of productive 
investment and the financialisation of capitalism prior to 1984.8 
Consequently, further research is required that undertakes a 
comprehensive investigation and systematic analysis of the role played by 
                                                          
7
 Panitch and Gindin 2003, 20. 
8
 Nevertheless, an expanded preliminary analysis of the explanatory significance of processes of 
economic financialisation and business internationalisation during the period from 1972 to 1984 to New 
Zealand’s historic shift to neoliberalism is contained in Appendix A. 
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international finance and internationalising business interests in the historic 
shift to neoliberalism in New Zealand. This research could productively draw 
on the analyses developed by radical international political economists Leo 
Panitch and Sam Gindin in their seminal (2003) work Global Capitalism and 
American Empire and, more recently, in The Making of Global Capitalism.9 This 
research would effectively serve to integrate the valuable insights contained 
within the extensive critical literature relating to international political economy 
into existing explanatory accounts of New Zealand’s historic shift to 
neoliberalism. 
This thesis also highlights a number of other areas where further 
research would be valuable. In relation to the domestic political sphere, for 
example, it indicates that further research into the constraints imposed on the 
free formulation of industrial relations policy flowing from New Zealand’s 
continued integration into the DWSR is required. In this thesis I have primarily 
focused upon the implications of financial market liberalisation for the 
formulation of core macroeconomic policy. As a result, I have covered only in 
passing the role of IPFMs in helping to entrench a highly deregulated domestic 
labour market characterised by generally unfavourable employment conditions 
for workers (including extensive underemployment and casualisation, 
especially for younger workers), relatively poor job security, and weak union 
membership (by historical standards). The constraints imposed by IPFMs on 
New Zealand governments in the realm of monetary policy formulation have 
thus had powerful flow on effects carrying over into the realm of industrial 
relations policy formulation. In particular, the constraints on public monetary 
policy formulation have placed strong secondary pressures on governments to 
maintain a highly liberalised industrial relations regime. This is because, with 
the existing ‘monetarist’ approach to monetary policy effectively operating as 
                                                          
9
 L. Panitch and S. Gindin 2003, Global Capitalism and American Empire (London: Merlin); 2013, The 
Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire (London: Verso). 
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an anti-employment strategy (see Chapter Five), the overall efficacy of 
monetary policy is heavily reliant on a high degree of ‘flexibility’ in the 
domestic labour market.  
Consequently, further research is needed to trace the role played by 
IPFMs in the retention of the neoliberal industrial relations regime in New 
Zealand. This research could be conducted by undertaking a detailed empirical 
study focusing on the decision-making of the FLG in relation to the 
implementation of the 2000 ERA. Here, a popular centre-left government 
retained many of the core features of the neoliberal ECA as part of the ERA. 
This was despite a strong relationship with the NZCTU, suggesting other 
powerful pressures were also acting on the FLG. I contend that constraints 
deriving from New Zealand’s integration into the DWSR played an important 
role amongst the pressures arrayed against the left-leaning FLG, even if these 
constraints were not the most causally important factor. 
 
 
Implications for Public Policy Formulation 
This thesis also implies that if a liberal democratic political system that 
fosters true polyarchy is to prevail in New Zealand, substantive public policy 
initiatives are required. At a broad level, these policies would need to 
fundamentally curtail the power of financial capital within New Zealand’s 
political economy. More concretely, such a radical (and, ultimately, counter-
neoliberal) reform agenda would necessarily require the reintroduction of 
capital controls. The existence of robust capital controls would effectively blunt 
the ability of IPFMs to exert influence over the formulation of public policy. The 
largely unimpeded cross-border movement of capital into and out of New 
Zealand would be slowed drastically, thereby eliminating the key source of 
IPFM’s political-economic leverage - the enduring risk posed to the nation’s 
macroeconomic stability by a sudden episode of capital flight. The 
Conclusion 400 
 
reintroduction of robust capital controls could be supported by the 
implementation of an effective financial transactions tax. Comprising a micro-
levy targeting the vast multitude of individual financial transactions which take 
place in New Zealand’s financial markets each day, this tax would primarily 
function to dissuade IPFM participants from engaging in extensive (and 
potentially destabilising) speculative activity in New Zealand dollar-
denominated financial instruments.10 
However, the successful unilateral implementation of such policies 
would undoubtedly prove difficult. For example, significant practical barriers 
exist to the reintroduction of strong capital controls. As both Treasury and the 
RBNZ would hasten to point out, ultimately, the isolated reestablishment of 
controls over cross-border capital flows would almost certainly prove 
unworkable in practice. Even with a strongly sympathetic economic 
bureaucracy, financial innovation on the part of IPFMs would likely see the 
efficacy of any newly implemented capital controls rapidly compromised. 11 
Furthermore, while it is unlikely that the introduction of a financial transactions 
tax would prove to be entirely redundant, it is also doubtful that it would prove 
particularly effective in achieving its goal of significantly reducing speculative 
activity. A substantial portion of trading in New Zealand dollar-denominated 
financial instruments takes place far from Aotearoa. The important ‘eurokiwi’ 
market, for example, is primarily centred on the City of London.12 Consequently, 
much of the speculative financial asset trading targeted by a financial 
transactions tax lies outside the enforcement scope of local authorities and 
would therefore remain unaffected. 
                                                          
10
 Speculative investment is a prominent aspect of IPFM trading in New Zealand dollar-denominated 
assets. This is illustrated by BIS data which shows the New Zealand dollar is the tenth most traded 
currency in the world. See BIS 2013, 10. 
11
 Reddell 2009. 
12
 For a useful discussion of the key features of the eurokiwi market see K. Eckhold 1998, “Developments 
in the Eurokiwi bond market”, Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Vol. 61, no. 2, 100-111. 
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Given the considerable practical difficulties associated with unilateral 
implementation of both capital controls and a financial transactions tax, an 
alternative approach to strictly domestically-focused public policy initiatives 
might therefore be found in a cosmopolitan social democracy (CSD) agenda, 
such as that espoused by Held.13 Centrally, this would entail (amongst other 
things) reformed global governance institutions instead taking ultimate 
responsibility for the implementation of such policies designed to curtail the 
power of private international financial capital both within domestic political 
economies and globally.14 This thesis provides broad intellectual justification for 
such a policy approach. Most notably, reflecting on the seemingly inherent 
abilities of contemporary private financial capital to effectively “escape the 
control of the nation-state”, it intimates that, at the very least, the geographic 
boundaries of financial market regulation need to be fundamentally 
restructured along the lines espoused by proponents of a cosmopolitan social 
democracy. 15  Although there is widespread agreement across the left that 
reforms of this nature are desirable, its feasibility in the context of globalised, 
neoliberalised, and financialised capitalism is hotly contested. Nonetheless, this 
thesis is relevant to this debate by focusing attention on the powerful political 
effects of IPFMs. 
 
                                                          
13
 See D. Held 2004, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus 
(Cambridge: Polity); 2008, “At the Global Crossroads: The End of the Washington Consensus and the 
Rise of Global Social Democracy?”, in D. Held (ed.), The Global Politics of Globalization: ‘Empire’ vs 
‘Cosmopolis’ (London: Routledge), 95-113. 
14
 B. Roper 2011a, “Reformism on a Global Scale? A Critical Examination of David Held’s Advocacy of 
Cosmopolitan Social Democracy”, Capital and Class, Vol. 35, 254, 257. 
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